Modifiers of Human Acts

HUMAN ACT
Human Act
• A human act comes from the will directly or

indirectly. When the act itself is the choice of the
will, it comes directly from the will and is said to
be willed in se or in itself. When the act comes
indirectly from the will, inasmuch as the will
chooses rather what causes or occasions the act
than the act itself, it is said to be willed in its cause
or in causa.
Human Act
• Thus a man who wills to become intoxicated, wills

it directly or in se; a man who does not wish to
become intoxicated, but who seeks entertainment
where, as experience tells him, he is almost sure to
become intoxicated, wills the intoxication
indirectly or in causa
Human Act
• This distinction of direct and indirect willing (or

direct and indirect voluntariness) raises a notable
issue, and we have here two of the most
important principles (that is, fundamental guiding
truths) in all ethics.
Indirect Voluntariness
• (1) The Principle of Indirect Voluntariness: A person is responsible

for the evil effect of a cause directly willed when three conditions are
met:
• when he can readily foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way;
• when he is free to refrain from doing what causes the evil effect; and
• when he is bound to refrain from doing what causes the evil effect.
Indirect Voluntariness
• But is the agent (that is, the doer of an act) not

always bound to avoid what causes an evil effect?
Is not the fact that the effect is evil a sufficient
reason for rendering the act which leads to it
unlawful? Not always, for sometimes the act has
two effects, one good and one evil. In this case, the
following principles apply:
(2) The Principle of Twofold
Effect:
• A person may lawfully perform an act which has two effects,

one good and one evil, when the following conditions are met:
• when the act which has two effects is not in itself an evil act;
• when the evil effect does not come before the good effect so as
to be a means to it;
(2) The Principle of Twofold
Effect:
• when there exists a reason, proportionately

weighty, which calls for the good effect;
• when the agent B (that is, the doer or performer of

the act) intends the good effect exclusively, and
merely permits the evil effect as a regrettable side-
issue.
• Sound human reason vindicates the value and
trustworthiness of these two leading ethical
principles.
• The basic law of morals, -- called THE NATURAL
LAW, -- is summed up in this plain mandate of
reason:
• We must do good;
we must avoid evil.
• And, developing the second point, -- that is, the
avoidance of evil, -- we have this basic rational principle:
• We must never do what is evil,

even though good may be looked
for and intended as a result of it.
• Human acts are modified, that is,
affected, and made less perfectly
human, by anything that hampers or
hinders any of the three essentials of
human action: knowledge, freedom,
voluntariness.
Chief of the modifiers of
human acts
• 1) Ignorance.
Ignorance that may be
overcome by due diligence is called
vincible ignorance or culpable
ignorance; ignorance that cannot be
expelled by due diligence is called
invincible ignorance or inculpable
ignorance.
human acts
• The reasoned ethical principle on this
point is: Invincible ignorance destroys
voluntariness and relieves the agent of
responsibility; vincible ignorance
lessens but does not remove
voluntariness and responsibility.
human acts
• (2) Concupiscence. By concupiscence
we mean any of the human impulses or
tendencies technically called the
passions.
• These are: love, hatred, grief, desire,
aversion, hope, despair, courage, fear,
anger.
2. Concupiscence
• When concupiscence sweeps upon a person

without his intending it, it is called antecedent
concupiscence; when a person wills it (as in the
case of a man who nurses his injuries, or stirs
himself to revenge, or who allows a suddenly
envisioned obscene image to remain in his mind or
before his eyes) it is called consequent
concupiscence.
2. Concupiscence
• The ethical principle here is:
• A. Antecedent concupiscence lessens

voluntariness and responsibility but
does not take them away;
• B. consequent concupiscence does not
lessen voluntariness and responsibility.
2. Concupiscence
• Of all the types of concupiscence which influence

human acts, fear has a peculiar significance, and
we have a special reasoned principle for it:
• An act done from a motive of fear is simply
voluntary; the agent is responsible for it, even
though he would not do it were he not under the
sway of fear.
2. Concupiscence
• Of course, if the fear is so great that it renders the agent

insane at the moment of his act, he is incapable of a
human act and is not responsible.
• Civil law make provisions for the nullifying of contracts
made under the stress of fear (that is, of threat, or duress),
for the common good requires that people be protected
from the malice of unscrupulous persons who would not
hesitate to enforce harmful bargains by fearsome means.
3. Violence
• (3) Violence. Co-action or violence is external

force applied by a free cause (that is, by human
beings) to compel a person to do something
contrary to his will. The ethical principle with
respect to violence is: An act owing to violence to
which due resistance is made, is not voluntary, and
the agent is not responsible for it.
4. Habit
• (4) Habit. Habit is a readiness, born of repeated

acts, for doing a certain thing. The ethical principle
is: Habit does not take away voluntariness; acts
done from habit are voluntary, at least in cause, as
long as the habit is permitted to continue.

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HUMAN ACT

• A human act comes from the will directly or

• Thus a man who wills to become intoxicated, wills

• This distinction of direct and indirect willing (or

• (1) The Principle of Indirect Voluntariness: A person is responsible

• But is the agent (that is, the doer of an act) not

• A person may lawfully perform an act which has two effects,

• when there exists a reason, proportionately

• when the agent B (that is, the doer or performer of

• We must never do what is evil,

• When concupiscence sweeps upon a person

• A. Antecedent concupiscence lessens

• Of all the types of concupiscence which influence

• Of course, if the fear is so great that it renders the agent

• (3) Violence. Co-action or violence is external

• (4) Habit. Habit is a readiness, born of repeated

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