Greek Fiscal Crisis: Is A First World Debt Crisis in The Making?
Greek Fiscal Crisis: Is A First World Debt Crisis in The Making?
Greek Fiscal Crisis: Is A First World Debt Crisis in The Making?
In their recent book Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff (2009), This
Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press, report the findings of their recent studies based on 66 countries, across 5 continents and 8 centuries of economic history.
They find that sovereign debt and default crises have actually been more
common than we realize, that
during major episodes more than a third (33%) of countries are undergoing
default or in the process of a serious debt restructuring
they have exhibited a continuing serial pattern of recurrence throughout history they have involved
countries from both the developing as well as the developed world. every time there is a lull experts pronounce that this time is different and yet the cycle of defaults keeps on repeating itself
7) A significant share of domestic debt was of a long-term maturity 8) The governments gain to unexpected inflation often derives at least as much
from capital losses inflicted on holders of long-term government bonds
9) The median duration of default spells in the post WWII period is half (3
years) the length of what it was during the 1800-1945 period
Since its creation in 1867 Canada has never experienced a sovereign default
or debt restructuring although we came danerously close to ones in the 1930s and again in the 1990s
Our history of relative monetary and fiscal stability have ill prepared us to
understand what other countries have gone through or what we may go through in the future, but it is never too late to learn
External debt default: Here a country defaults on its payments to foreign debt holders. When a country runs into a sovereign debt crisis interest rates rise, capital flows stop and the country is thrown into a severe period of economic contraction and fall in living standards. When this happens, the country has a choice of debt repudiation which means it renegs on its debt to foreign debt holders entirely as Argentina did recently, as the Soviet Union did with Czarist bonds and Mexico in the 19th century or debt restructuring and debt rescheduling which means that it sits down with its foreign creditors and negotiates a settlement. Usually, the creditors are forced to take a loss on some portion of the debt, known as a haircut, interest rates are renegotiated towards more favourable terms and external lending resumes
The IMF was created in 1945 to assist countries when they run into this type of crisis by extending emergency lending at concessionary rates based on conditionality, that the government undertakes a specific set of reforms to balance its budget and return the country to financial solvency
Internal debt default: Here a country runs into an inability to service its debts
to its citizens but is not forced to default, because the government has the power to print money to service its debts. This results in a rise in unexpected inflation and results in economic stagnation -stagflation
The inflation unleashed by the printing of money reduces the real value of the
bonds held by debt holders who are its own citizens and thus the government lessens the burden of its debts. Inflation shifts the burden of debt from the state to its citizens and represents the ultimate form of taxation.
Devaluation and depreciation help a country boost its exports and reduce its
imports thereby stimulating domestic economic activity and moderating the contractionary effects on production and employment arising from the debt pressures.
World Commodity Price Cycles: When commodity prices fall many countries
exposed to the exportation of commodities succumb to external defaults
Large Movements of Capital Flows: When large amounts of capital flow into
a country they increase its indebtedness and when the cycle ends and interest rates rise, they are unable to repay, forcing them to default
Wars: Wars -both external and civil- have always disrupted the monetary and
fiscal stability of nations leading to sovereign debt defaults
and
due to a relatively recent and perhaps biggest financial innovation in the history of banking the introduction of bank safety net i.e. liquidity insurance, deposit insurance and capital insurance that can cause a sovereign debt default when the losses are transferred to the state:
In a recent study for the Bank of England, titled anking on the State B
Alessandri and Haldane (November, 2009) have tabulated the total support provided by the US, UK and Eurozone governments to the financial sector of the economy
It totals over $14 trillion or almost 25% of global GDP!!! This figure tallies the support given only to the financial sector and does not
include the fiscal stimulus packages introduced by these governments nor the sizeable cumulative fiscal deficits that have resulted from the global economic downturn.
The liabilities and losses from the banking crisis have been transferred to the
sovereign to a degree never seen before in economic history!
Alessandri & Haldane (2009) in their insightful paper state the following: Historically, the link between the state and the banking system has been umbilical. Through the ages sovereign default has been the single biggest cause of banking collapse For the past two centuries, the tables have progressively turned. The state has instead become the last-resort financier of the banks. As with the state, banks needs have typically been greatest at times of financial crisis. The Great Depression marked a regime-shift in state support to the banking system. The credit crisis of the past two years may well mark another Then, the biggest risk to the banks was from the sovereign. Today, perhaps the biggest risk comes from the banks. Causality has reversed.
T r illio n s o f U S $
UK
USA
EURO
T o ta l
0 .3 2 0 .3 0
3 .7 6 0 .2 0
0 .9 8 0 .0 0
5 .0 6 0 .5 0
G o v e rn m e n t - G u a ra n te e s - In s u r a n c e - C a p it a l 0 .6 4 0 .3 3 0 .1 2 2 .0 8 3 .7 4 0 .7 0 1 .6 8 0 .0 0 0 .3 1 4 .4 0 4 .0 7 1 .1 3
T o ta l ( % o f G D P )
74%
73%
18%
1 5 .1 6
Source: Alessandri & Haldane, Table 1, Banking on the State, Bank of England, November, 2009
Alessandri & Haldane state that there is an unwriten social contract between
the state and the banks: state support for the banks is one side of the contract, state regulation is the other.
While the state expanded its support for the banks it has not expanded its
regulation of the banks
When banks know that the state will run to their support in times of crisis they
can afford to take bigger risks. Without more regulation they are driven to increase their returns by taking bigger risks. When they win they keep the profits, when they lose, it is the state that pays
We all know who is behind the state: you the taxpayer and the recipient of
public services. Something has gone terribly wrong with this picture
World Economic Growth, 2001-2009 and Projections for 2010 & 2011
The global economic downturn that followed the global financial crisis impacted the world s developed economies far more than it did the developing economies
10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Advanced Economies
Emerging Economies
World Average
10
12
14
16
18
225
200 175 150 125
Japan
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Belgium
France Portugal
USA
Canada Israel Germany Austria Spain
100 75 50 25
UK Ireland Netherl
Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis World, IMF, February 4, 2010
100
80
60
40
20
Advanced G-20
Emerging G-20
Source: IMF
Fiscal Consolidation Required to Achieve Debt Target Between 2010 and 2020
IMF study has calculated that many advanced industrial countries will have to undertake a high degree of fiscal consolidation over the next 10 years to achive debt targets 16 14
Percent (%) of GDP
12
10 8 6 4 2 0
GRC IRE JAP USA UK SPA POR FRA BEL AUS ITA GER CAN
Degree of Fiscal Consolidation Source: IMF, Strategies for Fiscal Consolidation in the Post-Crisis World, February 4, 2010
Debt-GDP Ratio =
Government (or public) debt grows when the government has a budget deficit
and it stops growing when it balances its budget
faster than the government debt. For this to happen, the economy must experience economic growth in output (real GDP), rise in prices (inflation) or both.
Low interest rates also help in that they contain the interest cost of servicing
In the long-run demographic factors also play a role, in that a country with
stagnant or declining population experiences much slower growth in its nominal GDP and makes it harder to bring down the debt burden
What are the Prospects for Economic Growth and Debt Reduction?
Growth prospects are poor, entitlements are large and the European countries have placed themselves into a deflationary straightjacket
In light of the large debt loads advanced economies will have to undertake a
series of fiscal consolidation measures to reduce government spending and increase taxes which will lower the growth rate of these economies for a number of years to come
Most of these countries have high and rising age dependency ratios and low or
falling population growth rates which put additional pressures on the state and reduce the growth potential of the economies
All of these countries have expensive social and entitlement programs which
add to the burden of the state and reduce room for manuevre
The Eurozone countries are especially vulnerable because they are tied into a
monetary framework that places priority on monetary control and low inflation
A country of 11.2 million and GDP of US$ 360 billion, representing 2.8% of
Eurozone and 27th biggest economy in the world Has one of the highest debt-GDP ratios in the world: 113% of GDP Has one of the highest budget deficits in the world: 12.9% of GDP Has a large current account deficit: 11.0% of GDP Has a high degree of net foreign debt: 70% of GDP Has not had a credible financial reporting of its fiscal position Is viewed as the first domino in a potential first world sovereign debt crisis Greeces total outstanding public debt amounts to 290 billion euro If Greece were to default on its debt payments it would amount to the biggest sovereign default in history, bigger than that of Russia and Argentina combined If Greece were to default, it would raise fears that the crisis will spread to other Eurozone members and this could cause the collapse of the euro currency
Since it joined the Eurozone, it has ceeded control of monetary policy to the
ECB and can no longer print money
Wages have risen faster than in Germany and has not adapted its economy
rapidly enough to global competition, especially from Asia
Two of its largest industries, maritime shipping and tourism were hit strongly
from the global economic downturn
The Eurozone has not injected the same degree of monetary liquidity as did
the UK and the USA while the ECB has maintained a more contractionary monetary stance than the other two central banks
The euro has appreciated by about 65% since 2001 against the US Dollar and
by 47% against the Chinese Yuan
10
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1-yr GGB
10-yr GGB
USD/EUR Exchange Rate Since Greeces Entry Into the Eurozone: 2001-2010
Between January 2001 and January 2010 Euro has appeciated by 65% against the US Dollar, undermining the competitiveness of Greek exports
1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 USD/EUR Exchange Rate
1.2
1.1 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 2001 2001200120022002200320032004200420052005200620062007200720082008200920092010 2010-12 USD/EUR Exchange Rate
0.9
0.8
0.7
Greece/Euro
UK/Euro
100
10
1 1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Series 1
Trillions of US Dollars
Billions of oz of Gold
100
10000
1000
10
100
10
30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 0 2 4 6 8 10
US GDP in Gold
US Federal Gross, Net and Foreign Debt as Percent of GDP , 19392009 and Projections to 2011
US Federal debt levels have risen dramatically since the global financial crisis. Gross debt will reach 100% of GDP in 2011 and foreign debt 35%
140 120 100 Percent of GDP
80
60
40
20 0 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 Net Debt 79 84 89 94 99 04 09 11
Gross Debt
Foreign Debt
60 50 40 30
20
10 0 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 94 99 04 09 Series 1
50 300 40
200
30
20 100 10
0
1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009