CH 11

Chapter 11 – Cryptographic
Hash Functions
Each of the messages, like each one he had ever
read of Stern's commands, began with a number
and ended with a number or row of numbers. No
efforts on the part of Mungo or any of his experts
had been able to break Stern's code, nor was
there any clue as to what the preliminary number
and those ultimate numbers signified.
—Talking to Strange Men, Ruth Rendell
Hash Functions
 condenses arbitrary message to fixed size
h = H(M)
 usually assume hash function is public
 hash used to detect changes to message
 want a cryptographic hash function

computationally infeasible to find data mapping
to specific hash (one-way property)

computationally infeasible to find two data to
same hash (collision-free property)
Cryptographic Hash Function
Hash
Functions
& Message
Authent-
ication
Hash Functions & Digital
Signatures
Other Hash Function Uses
 to create a one-way password file

store hash of password not actual password
 for intrusion detection and virus detection

keep & check hash of files on system
 pseudorandom function (PRF) or
pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)
Two Simple Insecure Hash
Functions
 consider two simple insecure hash functions
 bit-by-bit exclusive-OR (XOR) of every block
 Ci = bi1 xor bi2 xor . . . xor bim

a longitudinal redundancy check

reasonably effective as data integrity check
 one-bit circular shift on hash value

for each successive n-bit block
• rotate current hash value to left by1bit and XOR block

good for data integrity but useless for security
Hash Function Requirements
Attacks on Hash Functions
 have brute-force attacks and cryptanalysis
 a preimage or second preimage attack

find y s.t. H(y) equals a given hash value
 collision resistance

find two messages x & y with same hash so
H(x) = H(y)
 hence value 2m/2 determines strength of
hash code against brute-force attacks

128-bits inadequate, 160-bits suspect
Birthday Attacks
 might think a 64-bit hash is secure
 but by Birthday Paradox is not
 birthday attack works thus:

given user prepared to sign a valid message x
m/

opponent generates 2 2 variations x’ of x, all with
essentially the same meaning, and saves them
m/

opponent generates 2 2 variations y’ of a desired
fraudulent message y

two sets of messages are compared to find pair with
same hash (probability > 0.5 by birthday paradox)

have user sign the valid message, then substitute the
forgery which will have a valid signature
 conclusion is that need to use larger MAC/hash
Hash Function Cryptanalysis
 cryptanalytic attacks exploit some property
of alg so faster than exhaustive search
 hash functions use iterative structure

process message in blocks (incl length)
 attacks focus on collisions in function f
Block Ciphers as Hash
Functions
 can use block ciphers as hash functions
 using H0=0 and zero-pad of final block
 compute: Hi = EMi [Hi-1]

and use final block as the hash value

similar to CBC but without a key
 resulting hash is too small (64-bit)

both due to direct birthday attack

and to “meet-in-the-middle” attack
 other variants also susceptible to attack
Secure Hash Algorithm
 SHA originally designed by NIST & NSA in 1993
 was revised in 1995 as SHA-1
 US standard for use with DSA signature scheme

standard is FIPS 180-1 1995, also Internet RFC3174

nb. the algorithm is SHA, the standard is SHS
 based on design of MD4 with key differences
 produces 160-bit hash values
 recent 2005 results on security of SHA-1 have
raised concerns on its use in future applications
Revised Secure Hash
Standard
 NIST issued revision FIPS 180-2 in 2002
 adds 3 additional versions of SHA

SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
 designed for compatibility with increased
security provided by the AES cipher
 structure & detail is similar to SHA-1
 hence analysis should be similar
 but security levels are rather higher
SHA Versions
SHA-512 Overview
SHA-512 Compression
Function
 heart of the algorithm
 processing message in 1024-bit blocks
 consists of 80 rounds

updating a 512-bit buffer

using a 64-bit value Wt derived from the
current message block

and a round constant based on cube root of
first 80 prime numbers
SHA-512 Round Function
SHA-512 Round Function
SHA-3
 SHA-1 not yet "broken”

but similar to broken MD5 & SHA-0

so considered insecure
 SHA-2 (esp. SHA-512) seems secure

shares same structure and mathematical
operations as predecessors so have concern
 NIST announced in 2007 a competition for
the SHA-3 next gen NIST hash function

goal to have in place by 2012 but not fixed
SHA-3 Requirements
 replace SHA-2 with SHA-3 in any use

so use same hash sizes
 preserve the online nature of SHA-2

so must process small blocks (512 / 1024 bits)
 evaluation criteria

security close to theoretical max for hash sizes

cost in time & memory

characteristics: such as flexibility & simplicity
Summary
 have considered:

hash functions
• uses, requirements, security

hash functions based on block ciphers

SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3

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Chapter 11 – Cryptographic

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