PIA 3121

16 October 2024

Constructivism
SOURCE: https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-new-reality-in-the-ukraine-war/
 Constructivism
You can’t assume that all states are alike as “rational actors,” because in
fact they all vary significantly in their identity: their values, perceptions,
aspirations, and ways of looking at the world—which in turn shape the
states’ foreign policies.
 Constructivism
You can’t assume that all states are alike as “rational actors,” because in
fact they all vary significantly in their identity: their values, perceptions,
aspirations, and ways of looking at the world—which in turn shape the
states’ foreign policies.

Even if you want to believe that states are all rational, you’d have to decide
if they’re rational in the way that neorealists impute or rational in the way
that neoliberals impute. What’s the difference?
Neorealists say that all “normal” states are rational, and are
suspicious, self-regarding, amoral utility-maximizers determined to
increase their power relative to the power of other states, even at
the risk of inviting costly conflicts.
Neorealists say that all “normal” states are rational, and are
suspicious, self-regarding, amoral utility-maximizers determined to
increase their power relative to the power of other states, even at
the risk of inviting costly conflicts.

Neoliberals say that all “normal” states are rational, BUT they are
still predisposed to cooperate with other states in international
society and to smooth over conflicts. The goal of Neoliberal states
is to maximize absolute utility, compared to the utility accrued in the
past or that might be gained in the present and future from taking a
different course of action.
 Constructivism
You can’t assume that all states are alike as “rational actors,” because in
fact they all vary significantly in their identity: their values, perceptions,
aspirations, and ways of looking at the world—which in turn shape the
states’ foreign policies.

Even if you want to believe that states are all rational, you’d have to decide
if they’re rational in the way that neorealists impute or rational in the way
that neoliberals impute. What’s the difference?
 Constructivism
You can’t assume that all states are alike as “rational actors,” because in
fact they all vary significantly in their identity: their values, perceptions,
aspirations, and ways of looking at the world—which in turn shape the
states’ foreign policies.

Even if you want to believe that states are all rational, you’d have to decide
if they’re rational in the way that neorealists impute or rational in the way
that neoliberals impute. What’s the difference?

State interests aren’t self-evident. States aren’t “born” knowing what to go

after. They learn what to go after as a result of acquiring identities
through socialization—introjecting the norms of international or world
society and their own domestic cultures.
 Constructivism
You can’t assume that all states are alike as “rational actors,” because in
fact they all vary significantly in their identity: their values, perceptions,
aspirations, and ways of looking at the world—which in turn shape the
states’ foreign policies.

Even if you want to believe that states are all rational, you’d have to decide
if they’re rational in the way that neorealists impute or rational in the way
that neoliberals impute. What’s the difference?

State interests aren’t self-evident. States aren’t “born” knowing what to go

after. They learn what to go after as a result of acquiring identities
through socialization—introjecting the norms of international or world
society and their own domestic cultures.

Then, through their day-to-day policies and actions, states help construct
international AND world societies, which in turn interact with domestic
cultures to construct them in an endless, ongoing cycle: “structuration.”
STRUCTURATION
ANARCHY!
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 “Anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies
only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside
them."
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 “Anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies
only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside
them."

 An international anarchy, whether at the global or regional level, can have

any one of three kinds of structure: Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian.
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 “Anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies
only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside
them."

 An international anarchy, whether at the global or regional level, can have

any one of three kinds of structure: Hobbesian, Lockean, or Kantian.

 Each of these structures is fundamentally constituted by shared ideas

among the constituent state members, and these shared ideas in turn
“make up the subset of social structure known as ‘culture'." Although there
are other aspects to social structures, particularly material aspects, culture –
as shared ideas – is “the most fundamental fact about the structure of an
international system, giving meaning and power and content to interests."
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 Each of the three different kinds of structure centers on a dominant role that
state members play.
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 Each of the three different kinds of structure centers on a dominant role that
state members play.

 In Hobbesian cultures, the dominant role (or “subject position”) is “enemy."

 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 Each of the three different kinds of structure centers on a dominant role that
state members play.

 In Hobbesian cultures, the dominant role (or “subject position”) is “enemy."

 In Lockean cultures it is “rival."

 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 Each of the three different kinds of structure centers on a dominant role that
state members play.

 In Hobbesian cultures, the dominant role (or “subject position”) is “enemy."

 In Lockean cultures it is “rival."

 In Kantian cultures it is “friend."

 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 Each of the three different kinds of structure centers on a dominant role that
state members play.

 In Hobbesian cultures, the dominant role (or “subject position”) is “enemy."

 In Lockean cultures it is “rival."

 In Kantian cultures it is “friend."

 Roles are attributes of the structures, not the agents or units. Roles are in
this sense “the objective, collectively constituted positions that give meaning
to” subjective self-understandings." Particular role-identities may come and
go “as individuals [states] take on or discard beliefs,” but roles as objective,
collectively constituted positions within the structure “persist as long as
someone fills them."
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 But what specifically are the central norms of a Hobbesian culture in
contradistinction to those of a Lockean or a Kantian culture?

 Wendt explains that in a Hobbesian culture enemies are constituted by

representations of the Other – that is, through securitization practices – as
“an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an
autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence
toward the Self…An enemy does not recognize the right of the Self to exist
as a free subject at all.”
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 In contrast to the Hobbesian culture, in a Lockean culture of anarchy,
member states freely agree to recognize and accept each other’s sovereign
autonomy as a right while refraining from trying to conquer or dominate
other states. To be sure, states might still use violence occasionally against
each other, or coercion, but since they are only rivals not enemies, they will
not try completely to destroy the other or eradicate the other’s
subjectivity/selfhood.
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 In contrast to the Hobbesian culture, in a Lockean culture of anarchy,
member states freely agree to recognize and accept each other’s sovereign
autonomy as a right while refraining from trying to conquer or dominate
other states. To be sure, states might still use violence occasionally against
each other, or coercion, but since they are only rivals not enemies, they will
not try completely to destroy the other or eradicate the other’s
subjectivity/selfhood.

 When all states party to an interstate society do so recognize each other’s

right to autonomous actorhood, “then we can speak of sovereignty not only
as a property of individual states, but as an institution shared by many
states.”
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 In contrast to the Hobbesian culture, in a Lockean culture of anarchy,
member states freely agree to recognize and accept each other’s sovereign
autonomy as a right while refraining from trying to conquer or dominate
other states. To be sure, states might still use violence occasionally against
each other, or coercion, but since they are only rivals not enemies, they will
not try completely to destroy the other or eradicate the other’s
subjectivity/selfhood.

 When all states party to an interstate society do so recognize each other’s

right to autonomous actorhood, “then we can speak of sovereignty not only
as a property of individual states, but as an institution shared by many
states.”

 Wendt finds that on the global level, most of the world most of the time has
been characterized by a Lockean culture of anarchy since the conclusion of
WWII.
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 Finally there is the Kantian culture, which Wendt perceived as of the late
1990s to have taken root among the US, Canada, most of Europe, Australia,
New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and others, a security community in
which member states view each other not even as rivals on the most
important questions but instead as friends.

 “Friendship is a role structure in which states expect each other to observe

two simple rules: (1) disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war
(the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of
any one of them is threatened by a third part (the rule of mutual aid)."
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 Wendt finds there to be four master variables that can cause transition from
a Lockean culture to a Kantian culture: interdependence, common fate,
homogeneity, and self-restraint. The first three (interdependence, common
fate, and homogeneity) are active or efficient causes of collective identity.
The last (self-restraint) is an enabling or permissive cause.
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 Wendt finds there to be four master variables that can cause transition from
a Lockean culture to a Kantian culture: interdependence, common fate,
homogeneity, and self-restraint. The first three (interdependence, common
fate, and homogeneity) are active or efficient causes of collective identity.
The last (self-restraint) is an enabling or permissive cause.

 All four may be present in a given case, and the more that are present the
more likely collective identity formation will occur. But all that is necessary
for it to occur is one efficient cause combined with self-restraint.” Self-
restraint has the effect of “enabling states to solve the fundamental problem
of collective identity formation overcoming the fear of being engulfed by the
Other."
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 1. INTERDEPENDENCE. “In order to cause collective identity,
interdependence must be objective rather than subjective…The problem is
changing objective into subjective interdependence."
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 1. INTERDEPENDENCE. “In order to cause collective identity,
interdependence must be objective rather than subjective…The problem is
changing objective into subjective interdependence."

 “When people choose to ‘defect’ in a social dilemma they are

simultaneously choosing to reproduce the egoistic identities that constitute
the dilemma. And conversely for prosocial behavior: by choosing to
cooperate in a social dilemma Ego implicitly takes a collective identity,
acting ‘as if’ he cares for Alter, even if this is initially for selfish reasons, and
signals to Alter, ‘I expect you to do the same in return’ (altercasting). If Alter
reciprocates then Ego’s tentative new identity will be reinforced, leading to
further cooperation and, over time, an internalization of collective identity on
both sides."
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 2. COMMON FATE. “Actors face a common fate when their
individual survival, fitness, or welfare depends on what happens to the
group as a whole. As with interdependence, this can only cause collective
identity if it is an objective condition, since subjective awareness of being ‘in
the same boat’ is [already] constitutive of collective identity, not a cause." If
both sides already think that subjectively, they already have the collective
identity.
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 2. COMMON FATE. “Actors face a common fate when their
individual survival, fitness, or welfare depends on what happens to the
group as a whole. As with interdependence, this can only cause collective
identity if it is an objective condition, since subjective awareness of being ‘in
the same boat’ is [already] constitutive of collective identity, not a cause." If
both sides already think that subjectively, they already have the collective
identity.

 The emergence of perceptions of common fate may depend on

‘entrepreneurs’ and/or ‘epistemic communities’ who take the lead in
reframing how actors understand themselves. Such leadership is not
always present.”
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 2. COMMON FATE. “Actors face a common fate when their
individual survival, fitness, or welfare depends on what happens to the
group as a whole. As with interdependence, this can only cause collective
identity if it is an objective condition, since subjective awareness of being ‘in
the same boat’ is [already] constitutive of collective identity, not a cause." If
both sides already think that subjectively, they already have the collective
identity.

 The emergence of perceptions of common fate may depend on

‘entrepreneurs’ and/or ‘epistemic communities’ who take the lead in
reframing how actors understand themselves. Such leadership is not
always present.”

 But common fate is not a sufficient condition for collective identity

formation because as with interdependence, actors may fear exploitation by
others in the collective…Believing that those with whom one might
cooperate will exhibit self-restraint is therefore an important condition."
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 3. HOMOGENEITY. “The concept of collective identity presupposes
that members categorize themselves as being alike along the dimensions
that define the group, and as such the perception of homogeneity helps
constitute collective identity. The causal relationship, therefore, must be
between ‘objective’ homogeneity and its subjective categorization...The
hypothesis would be that increases in objective homogeneity cause actors
to recategorize others as being like themselves."
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 3. HOMOGENEITY. “The concept of collective identity presupposes
that members categorize themselves as being alike along the dimensions
that define the group, and as such the perception of homogeneity helps
constitute collective identity. The causal relationship, therefore, must be
between ‘objective’ homogeneity and its subjective categorization...The
hypothesis would be that increases in objective homogeneity cause actors
to recategorize others as being like themselves."

 “Inventing or problematizing new sources of group differentiation

shores up the boundary between the group Self and the Other. This need
for difference does not have to lead to aggression or disrespect toward
other groups (to ‘Othering’), and need not block the formation of a collective
identity on other issues. But it does weaken the relationship between
homogenization and prosocial behavior.
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 4. SELF-RESTRAINT. “Interdependence, common fate, and
homogeneity are efficient causes of collective identity formation and thus
structural change. As they increase actors have more incentive to engage
in prosocial behavior, which erodes egoistic boundaries of the Self and
expands them to include the Other. This process can only proceed,
however, if actors can overcome their fear of being engulfed, physically or
psychically, by those with whom they would identify.
 Cultures of Anarchy (Alexander Wendt, 1999) :
 4. SELF-RESTRAINT. “Interdependence, common fate, and
homogeneity are efficient causes of collective identity formation and thus
structural change. As they increase actors have more incentive to engage
in prosocial behavior, which erodes egoistic boundaries of the Self and
expands them to include the Other. This process can only proceed,
however, if actors can overcome their fear of being engulfed, physically or
psychically, by those with whom they would identify.

 In order to get past this threat, which is the source of egoism and
‘Realism,’ actors must trust that their needs will be respected, that their
individuality will not be wholly submerged by or sacrificed to the group.
Creating this trust is the fundamental problem of collective identity
formation, and is particularly difficult in anarchy, where being engulfed can
be fatal."
 Constructivism and Military Security

Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein:

 Constructivism and Military Security

Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein: The security environments in

which states find themselves embedded are NOT just material (e.g.,
balance of military power), but also—importantly, and even DECISIVELY
—cultural or institutional.
 JWK’s “Three Layers” to the
International Cultural Environment (ICE)
 JWK’s “Three Layers” to the
International Cultural Environment (ICE)

1. The layer of formal institutions or security

REGIMES.
 JWK’s “Three Layers” to the
International Cultural Environment (ICE)

1. The layer of formal institutions or security

REGIMES.

2. A world political culture layer.

 JWK’s “Three Layers” to the
International Cultural Environment (ICE)

1. The layer of formal institutions or security

REGIMES.

2. A world political culture layer.

3. A layer consisting of enduring patterns of amity

and enmity, particularly within regions.
 JWK’s “Three Layers” to the
International Cultural Environment (ICE)

1. The layer of formal institutions or security

REGIMES.

2. A world political culture layer.

3. A layer consisting of enduring patterns of amity

and enmity, particularly within regions.

FOR EXAMPLE:
Which country is – to the
U.S. – the nice country?
 JWK’s Key Novel Argument

Elements of the international cultural environment don’t

just affect the incentives facing states to behave in
certain kinds of ways.
 JWK’s Key Novel Argument

Elements of the international cultural environment don’t

just affect the incentives facing states to behave in
certain kinds of ways.

The ICE also affects the basic character of the states:

their identities.
 BREAKTHROUGH:
From the Neo-Neo Debate
to the Neo-Neo Synthesis

“We reject the prevailing assumption, shared by

Neorealists and Neoliberals alike, that the defining actor
properties are intrinsic to states, that they are all power-
seeking and (material) interest-maximizing rational
actors.”
The ICE’s Three Effects on
State Identities
 The ICE’s Three Effects on
State Identities

1. Elements of it can affect some states’ very

prospects for survival.
 The ICE’s Three Effects on
State Identities

1. Elements of it can affect some states’ very

prospects for survival.

2. Changing ICE elements may change “the

modal character of statehood” over time.
 The ICE’s Three Effects on
State Identities

1. Elements of it can affect some states’ very

prospects for survival.

2. Changing ICE elements may change “the

modal character of statehood” over time.

3. ICE elements may cause variation in the

character of statehood within a given international
society: so states may be similar in structure and
function, but be compelled by norms to play different
roles.
 6 Primary Norms of Imperialism

1. The world is divided into civilized and uncivilized

realms.
 6 Primary Norms of Imperialism

2. To rule over foreigners was acceptable.

 6 Primary Norms of Imperialism

3. Accumulating a domain was a legitimate state

pursuit.
US imperialism in the Pacific and in “its own backyard”
 6 Primary Norms of Imperialism

4. Power should be balanced.

 6 Primary Norms of Imperialism

5. Mercantilist economic policies were legitimate.

 6 Primary Norms of Imperialism

6. States should not interfere in other states’

colonial administration.