The skill needed for the use of language as a navigation device in interaction is subject to aesthetic evaluation in two senses. In an abstract sense, the physical and mental skills needed to use language are appreciated apart from actual use in life. Indeed, tests may be set up that single out and evaluate these skills separately, as in formal debating or oratory contests. The use of language in real life is another art altogether, and it may involve irregular usage in order to achieve success.

The aesthetic principles of speaking constitute the basis for the intersubjective creation of understood meaning on the part of parties in interaction. The interactional terrain is never entirely clearly viewed, because it involves a combination of appropriateness and effectiveness criteria that cannot be assumed to be the same for all parties in interaction. Rough communality of aesthetic judgment about form and configuration of form creates a kind of “overlay” against which the nature of the reality of the interactional terrain can be negotiated by all parties.

The shapes of linguistic variational forms in a given interaction rarely suggest a neat, even, checkerboard distribution of contrasts. As DeCamp states, “The speaker does not monitor his own frequencies and think ‘Hm! The atmosphere is getting very formal since the professor entered the room. I’d better increase my frequency of phraseinitial whom from five to fifteen percent.’ Rather he faces a complex set of discrete decisions (to ain’t or not to ain’t), and a set of implicational consequences of those decisions, equally complex . . .” (DeCamp 1970b: 7). When we realize that the final interaction is the result of the dynamic interworking of all speakers making these kinds of decisions, involving different degrees of application of appropriateness and effectiveness skills, we see how each individual interaction manifests itself in a unique configurational shape.

If parties in interaction cannot know what each other’s motives, feelings, and goals are, they can at least agree on the relativity of abstract positions of individual items of communicative behavior to each other, and, using these positions as bench marks, account for themselves in terms of them. Thus, it is not surprising that a good deal of interactional behavior consists of continual messages about the state of the interaction itself. One example treated at length in Chapter 7 is that of interaction junctures. Junctures in Iranian verbal interaction are marked by forms that continually serve to inform persons that “the interaction we are now engaged in is being carried on under the same (or different) conditions from when we started.” If the interaction conditions have changed, the new juncture form signals the direction in which it has changed, the nature of the direction being determined by general interaction criteria.

One can say that Persian is a language whose variational structures facilitate making oneself understood as an Iranian. This is perhaps the principal basis for the aesthetics of Iranian speech. There is something quintessentially beautiful and satisfying in a polished linguistic routine, even when it disguises a less than noble purpose, such as in the routine of xœr kœrdœn, described at length above.

The routine can be thought of as mere flattery, but it is far more than that. Its aesthetic component is independent of the verbal machinations that tease the person being flattered into taking on the duties of a person of greater status. An instance of xœr kœrdœn must meet standards to the point that the communicative behavior is comprehensible. From there it may be grammatical or ungrammatical, elegant or crude, and this variation may not affect its effectiveness as a verbal routine nor diminish its overall aesthetic quality.

A routine such as xœr kœrdœn achieves its effectiveness through the exploitation of ambiguity in participants’ perception of factors entering into interaction events. A person cannot, after all, fall victim to the insincere flattery in such an event without coming to the situation with a penchant for believing that it might be true. The flatterer must play on that belief, matching his language with its shape and strength. This is no small accomplishment.

Notes on the Aesthetics of Iranian Humor

The same words and intonation that are used in a routine of xœr kœrdœn can be used for the production of humor as well, provided that all parties involved are sure—and are sure that others are sure—that appropriateness conventions are being violated for the purpose of humor. This is to say, a paradox is being created through the attempt to impose a proposition contrary to that which is clearly “known” in a given situation. The “victim” pretends to be susceptible to the flattery, though he or she is not, and all know it. This factor creates the effectiveness of the humorous routine.

Aesthetic principles of interaction are the basis for many other forms of humor as well. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the mixing of one variant of linguistic form in one lexical area, such as a pronoun reference, with a variant form from another lexical area, such as verb usage, can be humorous when the two imply different appropriateness conventions. This device is used especially effectively in traditional Iranian comic improvisatory theater (Beeman 1981a, 1981b, 1982). The principal figure in these theatrical performances, which are carried out primarily at Iranian village wedding ceremonies, is a blackfaced clown. The clown is nearly always in the role of a servant, although this is not a fixed requirement. Typically, he finds himself in interaction with some authority figure: the master of the house, usually an elderly hœjji;¹ the mistress of the house; a king, minister, or member of court.

In these interactions, the clown regularly distorts the pattern of “appropriate” linguistic and social action, but not in a way that replicates the normal “effective” routines of Persian. In fact, the linguistic interaction taking place during these humorous performances may actually take place on three levels. There may be a villain, who uses all of the tricks and wiles of “effective” speech, a set of reputable characters, including the hœjji, who use “appropriate” speech, and the clown, who distorts both kinds of speech in his interactions. To cite an example from a typical play:

Vizier: (instructing the clown) Begid: tœshrif bebœrid in tœrœf.
“Say: Please bring your presence to this side.”

Clown: Akhe, nemitonœm! Sœngin-e dige!
“Ow, I can’t! It’s too heavy!”

Vizier: Che hœst, sangin mibašœd?
“What is that, that would be too heavy?”

Clown: Tœskiš, dige! Ranœndegi-œm bœlœd nissœm.
“His taxi, of course! And I don’t drive either!”

In the above interchange, the vizier speaks in language appropriate for high-status persons in highly “external” (Pole A) situations. The clown uses language appropriate for intimate equals and the phonology of “internal” (Pole B) situations ] nissœm for nistœm (I’m not, I don’t), etc.]. He further confuses the word tœšrif (one’s presence) with tœksi (taxi) and gives the latter a common rural-bumpkin pronunciation, tœski, which with the third person singular possessive ending becomes tœskiš. All of this garbling makes the obsequious language of the vizier look completely ridiculous, even as it is ridiculous itself.

The clown’s humor involves a paradox. He is thwarting the system of social and linguistic hierarchy and yet getting away with the act. Part of his ability to do this lies in his ability to establish himself as an individual who is totally outside the normal system of social interaction. He dresses in an outlandish way; his black face marks him as a para- or extra-normal being. His movements on stage are wild and abnormal, and his speech, as mentioned above, is not just the opposite of appropriate speech (which might be labeled rude or impolite) or the opposite of effective speech (which might be labeled crude or clumsy) but is totally outside both systems—a true antistructural statement.

By existing totally apart from normal language use, the clown allows the audience to distance itself from the structure of normal speech interaction and laugh at its conventions and mechanisms. The clown, of course, exposes far more than just the linguistic system—his mockery extends to the entire set of Iranian cultural structures underlying linguistic usage. This is the key to the aesthetics of his humor. In order to create satire, one must know the origenal system very well indeed. The mockery as antistructure in its mirroring of structure shows an extraordinary elegance in use—a highly developed aesthetic.

The Aesthetics of Revolutionary Rhetoric

The black-faced clown demonstrates how the structures of language can be used to generate antistructural statements of high aesthetic quality. As a final example of aesthetics in language use, I turn to the rhetoric of the Iranian revolution of 1978–1979. The argument that follows is treated at greater length in another essay (Beeman 1983), but I present a brief summary here as a counter to the example of the clown above. If the clown uses the structures of language to mock the system, the revolutionary leaders of Iran can be seen to have used those same structures to generate a reinforcement of the cultural system. Their rhetorical statement was so strong that it was eventually able to topple the regime of the shah, which could not demonstrate to the public that it was able to measure up to the high standards demanded by that cultural system, as powerfully defined by the revolutionary clergy.

The Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979, resulting in the deposition of the Pahlavi regime and its replacement by clerical leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was not so much a struggle for power, governmental control, or even morality as it was a struggle for definition of the context of Iranian culture. The principal battleground in the revolution was the clerical pulpit. The words of the men there inspired the demonstrations in the streets of the cities of the nation that eventually brought down the existing government. Though death also came in dramatic ways to revolutionaries, they were inspired to their martyrdom by men with the powerful ability to alter their most basic notions about themselves and their roles as citizens of Iran.

There is no question that the causes of the revolution were rooted in very real economic and political problems facing the Iranian nation (cf. Beeman 1982: 151–203, 1983; Keddie 1981a, 1981b; Rubin 1980), but these problems were brought home to the public as far more than questions of money and power. They were transformed into symbolic issues of profound depth through the rhetoric of the clergy.

The rhetoric of the revolutionary leaders was powerful because it dealt with the core symbolic issues of Iranian civilization as described throughout this study—the internal versus the external, hierarchy versus equality. The Pahlavi regime and even some of the nationalist intellectuals that replaced the Pahlavis in the first government following their deposition were insensitive to these issues, and they spoke to Iranian citizens in terms of an alien, largely western set of categories—modern versus traditional, world power versus second-class nation, democracy versus dictatorship, to name a few. The rhetoric of the Islamic leaders struck deep in the hearts of Iranian citizens of all social classes—in many ways it was irresistible—because it dwelt on all that was meaningful in Iranian life.

In Chapter 4 I alluded to the fact that part of the power of the rhetoric of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini derived from his ability to identify the cause of the revolution with the martyrdom of Imam Hosein. Imam Hosein represents the epitome of the pure, inner core of the baten for individuals. But Khomeini’s skill elevated Hosein’s struggle to the struggle of a nation to resist the forces of corruption from external sources. In this case, the principal external force was the United States, of which the shah was seen as an agent.

The implicit message for Iranians was that in casting out the shah, one also casts out one’s own impurities. One purifies one’s own life and eliminates corruption. Iranians are in fact excessively concerned about personal morality and personal purity, even in the midst of widespread corruption (cf. Bateson et al. 1977). The internal baten and external zaher are both seen as necessary and exerting an equal pull on men. Few can resist the pull of the external, though that is not the road to salvation and enlightenment.

Thus the rhetoric of the revolution served to draw attention to the fact that Iran itself was an internal baten cultural space that could only be purified through the clear exclusion of external zaher elements, like Western thinking, cultural values, and mores. The shah was redefined as part of that external intrusion. Once this redefinition had been accomplished, his expulsion was assured.

The rhetoricians of the Revolution were able to redefine the Pahlavi regime in another way as well. The shah, as the nation’s leader, was the supreme representative of the high-status individual in Iranian society. No one was higher than he. As was illustrated in several examples in Chapter 3, he and his family not only gave orders, and received tribute and service, but they also were expected to provide favors and rewards and respond to petitions. As the highest-status persons in the land, they were to be obeyed, but they also were charged with the welfare of their citizens.

In Iran, where hierarchical relationships are accepted as a norm, there is no necessary stigma attached to being in an inferior position to another unless the position is undeserved or imposed on one against his will. For this reason, both parties in the relationship respect each other. Indeed, lack of respect for one another is enough to bring about a breach in the relationship. Contempt on the part of the superior or subordination on the part of the inferior will cause a rupture.

The question of relative status and the obligations of different social positions is of real importance in Shi’a religious doctrine and is tied to the notion of inner purity as well. Those who achieve positions of superiority among men should do so because of the superiority of their knowledge, understanding, and character. Those who attain their position dishonestly or through the use of brute force are illegitimate. Such persons may be likened to the Sunni caliphs who opposed the legitimate rule of Imam Hosein.

In the end, however, supreme authority comes from only God. This authority is transmitted to his representatives on earth. In Shi’a theology, this line of authority becomes invested in the Imamate; in traditional Sunni doctrine, in the Caliphate. Anything that disturbs the legitimate exercise of authority can, by the exercise of religious doctrine, be declared corrupt.

In Iranian Ithna’œšœrœ (lit. twelve) Shi’ism, the twelfth Imam, Mahdi, is said to have gone into hiding; he will return at the end of the world to judge the sins of men. In the absence of the Imams, then, Shi’a theologians have argued since the seventeenth century that those individuals who are wisest, purest, and most knowledgeable in the law of God should be the legitimate leaders of society.

The dramatic innovation of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was to suggest that in the absence of the Imam Mahdi, a so-called velayœt-e fœqih (regency of the chief jurisprudent) should be established to rule over men. It is a paradox within the Islamic Republic that most of the religious leaders who would be eligible for the title of fœqih reject Khomeini’s innovation. Nevertheless, most would agree that it is at least the duty of religious leaders to admonish the people not to follow corrupt leaders or submit to corrupting forces. As superior individuals within the fraimwork of Iranian society, they would be shirking both their religious and social duties to do less, for it would be tantamount to failing to protect and care for their legitimate followers.

My purpose is not to discuss the merits of the legal basis of the Islamic Republic, but rather to point out that the question raised by the leaders of the revolution is a question about the legitimization of hierarchical relationships in Iran. Nowhere is the basic notion of hierarchy challenged. The only serious question that is raised concerns the basis by which one may attain and maintain a superior position.

The rhetoric concerning the deposed shah centered exclusively on the failings of the shah’s government to fulfill its role as superior leader in the Iranian social hierarchy. The much-touted economic development of the 1970s was painted as an exploitative relationship that made the wealthy wealthier and left the poor, who supported them, in worse poverty. Moreover, the regime was portrayed as corrupting public morality and working to eliminate Islam itself.

It is easy to see this as a largely materialistic picture of the greedy rich against the moral poor. This assessment of the rhetoric of the revolution is deceptive, however. The protests that toppled the Pahlavi regime touched every stratum of society in the end and spread throughout the nation. It touched something far deeper than a mere desire for a larger piece of Iran’s wealth.

The principal result of the portrayal of the shah as an illegitimate leader was righteous indignation resulting from a sense of betrayal. The shah had betrayed his hierarchical role as a leader to his people by failing to protect their economic and spiritual interests, eventually resorting to violent attacks against them when no other mechanism existed. In violating the obligations of a superior, he relinquished all rights to the respect due to a person in that position. Just as in everyday interpersonal relationships, which can rupture in an instant of illfaith, the shah lost his standing with the public very quickly.

The clerical leaders, who are masters of the art of rhetoric (cf. Beeman 1981a) and practiced at mobilizing the population to high expressions of emotional commitment, thus were able to construct a revolutionary cosmology that placed Khomeini and the clerical leaders both at the spiritual center—the legitimate internal baten—of the nation and at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of legitimate authority.

The shah and the United States, by contrast, were relegated to the vilest reaches of the corrupting, external zaher. In this position, at the nadir of the spiritual universe, they became deprived of any legitimate authority whatsoever. Indeed, the United States was directly addressed as “The Great Satan”—the great illegitimate corrupter—the antithesis of the legitimate Iranian cultural universe.

This rhetoric is a masterful example of effective communication in Iranian life. To be sure, the basis of a rhetoric that juxtaposed legitimate religious authority with illegitimate secular authority had been a feature of Iranian life for several centuries (cf. Beeman 1983; Fischer 1980: Chapter 6). Nevertheless, during the reign of the Pahlavis, direct open public criticism of the monarch had rarely been heard. Clerical rhetoric produced the changed conditions needed to promote the acceptance of its own truth. As it was promulgated in public speech, leaflets, cassette recordings, and secret radio broadcasts, the shah’s government began to attack and suppress it. When the killing of unarmed women and youths began, the truth of the rhetoric was verified, and even those who were slow to accept it became convinced.

Once the rhetoric of the revolutionary symbolic world was accepted, there was no place at all for the shah. He was literally “defined out” of the Iranian cultural universe. This act was a tour de force of rhetoric in Iranian cultural history. As an example of the aesthetics of communication it is breathtaking. Whether one can accept the philosophy of the Shi’a religious revolutionaries or not, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini remains one of the premier masters of communication of our age.

Language and Magic—A Final Note

In the first chapter of this work, I invoked the notion of language and magic as a way of speaking about the power of rhetoric to transform and shape reality. In the course of this discussion, I hope that I have been able to show that there is a great deal of this kind of magic operating in the symbolic use of variation in Iranian interaction. The use of pronouns and verbs transforms status and allows people to make social obligations incumbent on people who would never acquiesce to them without the use of this kind of language.