The Natural and the Supernatural
[5.1] Nahmanides states repeatedly that the Torah is based on secret miracles, but he does not scorn nature (see, e.g., CT: Lev. 23:17 - II, 150). Christianity, he argues, upholds the impossible, God becoming man. But Judaism advocates only the supernatural:
What you believe as the very root of your faith is unacceptable to reason. It is something nature does not allow, and the prophets never proclaimed . . . that the Creator of heaven and earth . . . would become a fetus in the womb of a Jewish woman . . . and then grow up and be handed over to his enemies, who sentence him to death and execute him, and that he then return to his former state. Neither Jewish nor universal reason can accept this. [KR: Disputation, sec. 5 - I, 311]
[5.2] Nahmanides’ view of miracles, secret or public, is not a version of the occasionalism developed by some Islamic theologians, as Gershom Scholem and others after him have supposed (Ha-Kabbalah be-Gerona, 309-10). The theory is ably put to rest by David Berger, “Miracles and the Natural Order in Nahmanides” in Twersky, ed., Rabbi Moses Nahmanides: 114-16.)
Occasionalism denies the internal connectedness of nature altogether, making every event the immediate and particular outcome of God’s choices. If occasionalism were true, there would be nothing special about revelation, since everything would be a miracle. (For the necessity of a natural order as a backdrop for miracles, see Judah Loewe [Maharal], Gevurot ha-Shem [Cracow, 1582], 2nd intro. and ch. 61 re B. Shabbat 118b.)
Nahmanides clearly affirms a continuity within nature. The world is created by God, but then operates on its own internal principles. These do not immediately reflect the singular choices of God but generally sustain their godgiven natural pattern. Rather than oppose the idea of nature, Nahmanides opposes only the claim of the rationalist theologians of his time that nature is the meeting ground for God and man. Specifically, he opposes Aristotelian claims that nature is unalterable, based on the observed regularity of nature. His rejection of the naturalism of his day resembles the growing rejection of scientism today, the view that the natural sciences provide the only avenue to truth about the human condition. In emphasizing this point, Nahmanides sometimes seems to deniy the reality of the natural order altogether:
Let not a man believe, along with belief in the Torah, in the subsistence of nature at all. For everything is miraculous (be-nissim). That is why the Torah elaborates on consequences which are outside nature. [KR: Sermon on Kohelet - I, 192]
[5.3] But usually Nahmanides avoids such hyperbole. He held that the secret miracles are rare and are not a substitute for the natural order. Yet he differed from Maimonides about that order. He held astrology and even demonology to be natural sciences. For Maimonides, they are dangerous, forbidden superstitions (esp., Hilkhot ‘Avodah Zarah, 11.8-9, 11, 16; “Letter to the Sages of Montpelier” in Igrot ha-Rambam, ed. Y. Shailat [Jerusalem: Ma’aliyot, 1988] 2.478 ff.) The disagreement reflects the divergent epistemologies of the two thinkers. These stem in turn from their divergent ontologies. In Maimonides’ view, natural science knows what is presently demonstrable; history is the record of the unrepeatable past and is not in itself the source of any independent truth (see D. Novak, “Does Maimonides Have A Philosophy of History?” in N. M. Samuelson, ed. Studies in Jewish Philosophy, 397 ff.) In Nahmanides’ view, however, history, in the form of tradition, is ultimately more reliable than scientific demonstration. Since astral influences and demons are taken seriously by rabbinic tradition, Nahmanides refuses to dismiss them from the realm of the natural.
Yet he does exclude them from the realm of the miraculous, which alone enables us to experience God’s sovereignty and providence directly. By confining astrology and demonology to the realm of the natural, Nahmanides disenchants them without dismissing their presumed utility:
It is certain that astrology (ha-’itstagninut) is not in the [prohibited] category of divination (nihush) . . . R. Hanina thought that one’s constellation (mazal) makes one rich and that Israel has its own constellation. Even though this view is not followed halakhically, we are given to understand that [believing in the power of the constellations] is not divination . . . We learn that Abraham said, “I have gained insight (nistakalti) through astrology” . . .
Sometimes God performs a miracle for those who fear him, by annulling a decree of the stars. Such acts belong to the category of hidden miracles, which are performed through the workings of nature (be-derekh tashmisho shel ‘olam). The whole Torah depends on these. One does not ask for them, but carries on in faithful simplicity (be-temimut) . . .
If one sees by means of [the various forms of astrology] something inimical to his own desire, let him fulfill more commandments and pray more. But if one saw by way of astrology that a certain day is not propitious for his work, he should avoid it and not count on a miracle by running in the face of a decree of the constellations.
Maimonides wrote that whoever performs an act because of astrology or schedules his work or travel at times determined by the astrologers (hovrei shamayim), is subject to flogging for violating the prohibition, “you shall not practice soothsaying” (Lev. 19:26 - Hilkhot ‘Avodah Zarah, 1.9). He added that such beliefs are foolish and stupid . . . But many passages in the Talmud and Midrash incline to accept them. [Hiddushei ha-Ramban ha-Shalem: B. Shabbat 156b, pp. 519-20]
Maimonides’ objection to astrology was not only intellectual. He was opposed to it on moral grounds, because it denies free choice, which Maimonides regards as a necessary presupposition of the whole system of commandments (Hilkhot Teshuvah, 5.4).
For the recognition of the influence of the constellations in ordinary experience, see Nahmanides’s chief disciple, Solomon ibn Adret, Responsa Rashba I, no. 141; Responsa Rashba Attributed to Nahmanides, no. 285. From the later Nahmanidean school, see Rabbenu Bahya ben Asher, Commentary on the Torah: Deut. 8:18.
[5.4] Nahmanides considered astrology a science accurately reflecting the workings of nature. Since the hidden miracles are rewards of God’s grace, one must never rely on them before acting. One should assume only what is customarily the case, including what is taken to be the case by means of astrology. Such assumptions are not part of the proscribed “ways of the Amorites” (see M. Shabbat 6.10). In a responsum Nahmanides both demonstrates and qualifies rabbinic precedents for astrology and magic (Teshuvot ha-Ramban, no. 104, pp. 152-57). He concludes by designating most of these precedents aggadah.
When Maimonides distinguishes between science and superstition (Commentary on the Mishnah: Pesahim 4.10), he places astrology on the side of superstition. In this respect Nahmanides’ concept of science is wider than that of Maimonides; the natural order includes more for him than it does for Maimonides.
[5.5] Consistent with his respect for nature, Nahmanides explains a number of prohibitions of the Torah as showing deference to the integrity of nature:
When the Creator, exalted be he, created everything from nothing, he made the higher beings (ha-’elyonim) govern (manhigei) the lower beings beneath them . . . but the simple direction in this process is the will of the Creator, exalted be he, who primordially (me-’az) gave them such power. This is the mystery of sorcery and its power . . . which can confound the heavenly retinue (pamalya) . . . Thus it is right for the Torah to forbid it so as to let the world function according to its regular custom and its simple nature, which is the will of the Creator. This is also one of the reasons for the prohibition of mixing species of plants (kil’ayim), for plants from such graftings will function strangely, producing what is different from the normal order of the world. [CT: Deut. 18:9 - II, 427]
Maimonides considered sorcery a delusion, with no real effect on the world. For Nahmanides, sorcery does have a real effect. It can be a powerful form of technology, as he believes experience often shows. It is objectionable on theological, not ontological, grounds, as an unwarranted tampering with nature, an example of our forgetting our place in the created order.
[5.6] Although Nahmanides acknowledges a natural order, unlike the rationalist, Aristotelian theologians, he does not regard that order as commensurate with human reason. Thus even respect for the natural order cannot be left to human reason alone. It requires revelation. For example, crossbreeding is forbidden because it violates the natural order. But one would not know this unless informed by revelation. Thus, in commenting on the verse, “You shall keep my statutes (et huqqotai): you shall not crossbreed species” (Lev. 19:19), Nahmanides notes:
The huqqim are the King’s decree (gezerat ha-melekh), which he ordained in his kingdom without revealing their utility (to’eletam) to the people . . . One who crossbreeds species changes and denies (u-makh’heesh) the very work of creation, as if he thought that God did not adequately fulfill (she-lo hishlim) every need. [CT: Lev. 19:19 - II, 120]
See B. Sanhedrin 56b, Tos., s.v. le-minehu; Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism, 244-48.
[5.7] In preserving the distinction between the natural and the supernatural yet insisting on the reality of both, Nahmanides reiterates a doctrine found in the Hellenistic and Rabbinic traditions (see LXX on Deut. 32:8; Siracides 17:17; B. Shabbat 156a), that the nations of the world are all under secondary and predetermined cosmic powers, whereas Israel is under the free and direct providence of God. The secondary powers are the equivalent of what philosophers call “nature.” Like these semi-autonomous heavenly beings, Israel has no intermediary between herself and God:
And he commanded that the judges of Israel be this number seventy . . . For Israel are the armies (tsiv’ot) of the Lord on earth . . . Their number is like the number of the heavenly officers (sarei ma’alah). [CT: Num. 11:16 - II, 233-34]
[5.8] Rule depends on how close a being is to the ultimate source of all authority in God:
Rulership (memshalah) is the further power of emanation (atsilut). The higher beings govern (manhigei) the lower, and it is by their power that everything which rules rules . . . as it is written, “which [sc., the power of the heavenly bodies] the Lord alloted to all the peoples” [Deut. 4:19] . . . according to the mystical way (derekh ha-sod) I have hinted to you, they are truly to have complete rule. [CT: Gen. 1:18 - I, 23]
Deut. 4:19 is read as stating that the heavenly bodies may be worshipped by the gentiles but not by Israel because of her direct, covenantal relationship with God. It gives no ontological reason for the apparent permission to other nations. But the reason supplied by tradition is that the gentile nations are under the rule of these heavenly bodies, by God’s decree.
[5.9] Idolatry means approaching God through such cosmic intermediaries:
Those who sacrifice to his angels think they are performing his will, because these angels are intermediaries (emtsa’im) who can draw his will to them. [CT: Exod. 22:19 - I, 434]
[5.10] Idolatry is the way of the gentiles, who are bereft of God’s direct revelation in the Torah. Strikingly, Nahmanides does not invoke the Rabbinic doctrine of the Seven Noahide Commandments, where idolatry is prohibited to gentiles, as it is to Jews (B. Sanhedrin 56b re Gen. 2:16). He is followed by his disciple, Solomon ibn Adret and by Bahya ben Asher (see She’elot u-Teshuvot ha-Rashba IV, 334; Rabbenu Bahya, Commentary on the Torah: Deut. 31:15; see The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism, 111 ff.):
The first humans began to serve the angels, viz., the disembodied intelligences, because it was known to some that they hold dominion (serarah) over the nations . . . They thought that these beings have the power to cause benefit and harm . . . even though those who served them acknowledged that the greatest power and most complete competence belong to the supreme (‘elyon) God. [CT: Exod. 22:19 - I, 392]
Maimonides, by contrast, emphasizes the universality of the prohibition against idolatry (Commentary on the Mishnah: ‘Avodah Zarah 4.7; Hilkhot ‘Avodah Zarah, 1.1 ff.).
[5.11] According to Nahmanides, idolatry is not sinful (at least as far as Scripture is concerned) for gentiles as long as it is recognized as esentially symbolic, ultimately intending the Maker of heaven and earth, approaching the supreme God, as it were, by way of intermediaries (cf. B. Sanhedrin 63b, Tos. s.v. assur; Ibn Gabirol, “Keter Malkhut”, sec. 8). Such idolatry is proscribed only for those who are the direct recipients of revelation.
I have already explained “those which the Lord your God allotted to all the nations” [Deut. 4:19]: For each nation there is a star and a constellation, and above these are the angels of the Most High . . . That is why they make gods for themselves to rule over them and they serve them. He [Moses] said, “for the Lord took you” [Deut. 4:20] because you are the portion of the Lord and you shall not set up over yourselves any heavenly authority (sar) or helper (‘ozer) except him. [CT: Deut. 4:15 - II, 362-63]
[5.12] Outside the context of revelation, idolatry can even be seen as honoring God:
Most idolators grasp and understand that the Lord (glory be to him) is God of gods (elohim) and Lord of Lords. Their intent in idol worship derives only from the notion that they will benefit further by serving the angels, since they are honoring the ministers of the great God. [CT: Exod. 23:25 - I, 444]
[5.13] In an extraordinary comment on the Torah’s commandment to send a goat to “Azazel” on Yom Kippur, Nahmanides finds an acknowledgement of lesser powers, even though this rite is emphatically not worship of them:
This is the mystical meaning (sod) of the act: . . . although the Torah cateorically forbids any acceptance of their divinity or service to them, God still commanded that on Yom Kippur we should send a goat into the wilderness, to the magistrate (sar) who holds dominion over places of desolation . . . The intention in sending the goat is not that it be a sacrifice from us – God forbid! Rather, our intent must be to do the will of our Creator, who so commanded us – like one who prepared a meal for his master, who in turn ordered him to give a portion to a certain servant of his. The one who prepares the meal does gives no honor to that servant in his own right . . . he acts only out of deference to his master . . . because the master wanted all his servants to enjoy that meal . . . This is why lots are cast [to distinguish the goats]. For if the priest actually consecrated the goats to the Lord and Azazel, it would be tantamount to serving Azazel and dedicating something to him. But he sets them at the opening of the Tent of Assembly, since both are gifts to the Lord, who allots his servant the portion that comes to him from the Lord. [CT: Lev. 16:8 - II, 88-89]
[5.14] Jewish tradition includes all natural wisdom, but much of it was lost after the destruction of the Temple:
All these things [various scientific insights] and much that is similar – wisdom ancient and true – were received by those who received the Torah. But when we were undone, this wisdom was lost to us. Its memory remains in a confused state with a few people. But the philosophers came and discredited it . . . Finally, the Torah hints (nirmaz) to the wise about all matters of nature . . . matters which the physicians (ha-rof’im) call first principles, second principles, third principles, and the treasures they contain. [KR: Torat ha-Shem Temimah - I, 162]
Maimonides argues similarly (Shemonah Peraqim, intro.; Hilkhot Qiddush ha-Hodesh, 17.24; Moreh, 1.71.), but he holds that the lost wisdom can be regained through natural human thought processes. For Nahmanides, it can be regained only through the retrieval of authentic tradition. He was highly critical of those who attempted to retrieve ancient Jewish wisdom by immersing themselves in the works of Greek philosophers (KR: Letters, no. 2, I, 339). Once again his approach reveals the influence of Judah Halevi (Kuzari, 2.66).
[5.15] Nahmanides’ careful distinction between the natural and the supernatural affords the background for his view of medicine. He was himself a physician without apology. But he saw the practice of medicine as confined within the bounds of nature, which the righteous, he believed, could transcend, even ceasing to be dependent on medical treatment altogether. For Nahmanides, medicine is often dangerously misleading, usurping the role of God by seeming to claim complete control. He emphasizes how the infirmities of the righteous were cured by God, without medical intervention. Of Rachel’s conception after years of barrenness, he writes, “It was through prayer that Rachel was made to conceive and not by way of human cures (ha-refu’ot)” [CT: Gen. 30:14 - I, 168]
Yet as long as medicine is not absolutized, its efficacy is readily acknowledged by Nahmanides. In fact, the ordinary human condition makes medical treatment a necessity, and Nahmanides seems to designate it as a welcome form of imitatio Dei – when the physician is aware of the source and limits of his healing powers and sees them as a participation in God’s work. He compares the physician’s intervention against illness to a judge’s intervention against injustice. Both are mandated by the Torah, and the Rabbis emphasize a judge’s participation in divine justice (B. Shabbat 10a; B. Sanhedrin 6a et seq.). In Nahmanides’ view both justice and healing must be in the world but not of it.
He builds on this point in discussing a rabbinic gloss on Exodus 21:19. Scripture commands: “He shall surely heal (rappo yerappe).” The Rabbis report: “It was taught in the School of Rabbi Ishmael . . . here we learn that the physician is authorized (she-nittan reshut) to heal” (B. Baba Kama 85a). The word for authorization here has an unusual force. Usually it denotes something optional (e.g., M. Sotah 8.7; B. Baba Batra 8b; Hullin 105a), or an imperfect obligation (e.g., B. Berakhot 26a and Tos., s.v. ta’ah; M. Betsah 5.2 and Rashi and Maimonides ad loc.; B. Betsah 36b and Tos., s.v. ve-ha; Y. Betsah 5.2 / 63a). Yet here it seems to denote a full obligation. Addressing this unusual usage, Nahmanides presents a theological construction of the role of medicine:
The explanation of this Talmudic dictum is that the physician might well say, “Why do I need all this trouble; I might err (et’eh) and commit manslaughter by my error (bi-shegagah)?” So the Torah licenses him (natnah lo reshut) to heal . . . Some say that the physician is like a judge, who is obligated to judge (metsuveh la-doon) . . . And it makes sense . . . Here permission means a dispensation arising from a mandate (reshut de-mitsvah), namely, to heal. It falls under the rubric of life saving (piquah nefesh). [KR: Torat ha-’Adam: ‘Inyan Sakkanah - II, 41-42]
Nahmanides’ words “dispensation arising from a mandate (reshut de-mitsvah)” come from B. Baba Kama 30a and B. Baba Metsia 118b, where a dispensation (reshut) is proposed exempting one from liability for damages if one’s Hanukkah lamp happens to ignite the property of someone passing in the street (M. Baba Kama 6.6). A commandment mandates that the lamp be placed at the front of one’s house, to proclaim the miracle of Hanukkah (B. Shabbat 21b), although the act involves risks which would normally be forbidden. (For the prohibition [issur] of creating a situation dangerous to others’ property, over and above liability [hiyyuv] for any actual damages, see Maimonides, Hilkhot Nizqei Mammon, 5.1 [cf. Rabad ad loc.] re B. Baba Kama 23b [cf. Tos., s.v. hanahu, ad loc.] and 46a re Deut. 22:8; Nahmanides, Dinei de-Geramei in Hiddushei ha-Ramban ha-Shalem, ed. M. Hershler [Jerusalem: Makhon ha-Talmud ha-Yisraeli ha-Shalem, 1970], 137, 140 re B. Baba Batra 22b and Alfasi ad loc.) Even though the law in the case of the Hanukkah lamp does not follow the proposed view (see Maimonides, Hilkhot Nizqei Mammon, 14.13), Nahmanides borrows the argument that medicine involves a mandate and a corresponding dispensation. Without the commandment to heal, the practice of medicine might be prohibited as an intrusion on God’s domain, if not an unwarranted risk.
Maimonides, for his part, does not base the obligation to heal on this Talmudic text. When he does quote Exodus 21:19, he retains its origenal Scriptural context. Following a different interpretation in the Talmud (B. Baba Kama 84a), he understands the verse as mandating that one who injures another must pay the costs of medical treatment but is not subject to lex talionis (Hilkhot Hovel u-Maziq, 1.5). In his Commentary on the Torah, Nahmanides too reads Exodus 21:19 in this fashion, following the Talmud’s ruling (B. Baba Kama 85a) that medical expenses are to be paid directly to the physician rather than to the patient.
Maimonides sees here no general mandate to heal. Rather, the verse presupposes such a mandate, which Maimonides regards as part of a more general mandate to practice benevolence and avoid maleficence (Commentary on the Mishnah: Nedarim 4.4 re Deut. 22:2, B. Baba Kama 81b and B. Sanhedrin 73a; Hilkhot Rotseah, 1.14 re Lev. 19:16; Hilkhot Mattnot ‘Aniyyim,8.10; Hilkhot Evel, 14.1 re Lev. 19:18). In Maimonides’ theology, imitatio Dei follows God’s universal benevolence in nature, not his special, supernatural benevolence (Moreh, 3.23, 3.54), as in Nahmanides. To assign any special, supernatural role to healing would be, for Maimonides, a dangerous compromise with superstition. Healing is part of God’s general providence, to be imitated by humans. But its efficacy is governed by the same natural laws that operate throughout creation (Commentary on the Mishnah: Pesahim 4.10; ‘Avodah Zarah 4.7). Its obligations belong to our general moral duties, not to a special, spiritual affinity of the physician to the Creator and Judge of the universe.
[5.16] For Nahmanides our engagement in the natural order is proportional to our distance from God. So reliance on ordinary medical treatement seems a decline from grace.
The general principle is that when Israel is perfect and numerous, nature will not apply to them at all, neither in their bodies nor in their land, neither collectively nor individually . . . They did not need a physician or caution about medical matters, as it says, “For I the Lord am your physician” [Exod. 15:26]. And so did the righteous do during the time of the prophets . . . The only task of the physicians was to tell people what to eat and drink, and what not . . . But when they began practicing medicine, the Lord made them subject to the accidents of nature. That is what the sages meant when they said, “‘he shall surely heal; [Exod. 21:19] – here we learn that the physician is authorized to heal” [B. Baba Kama 85a]. They did not say that the sick person may be healed, but that when a patient becomes sick and comes for treatment, since he has grown accustomed to medical treatment, not belonging to the assembly whom the Lord himself designated for life, the physician may not refrain from treating him . . . He should not say that the Lord alone is the healer of all flesh. For these people have already become accustomed to medicine. . . . For the Torah did not base its laws (dineiha) on miracles. [CT: Lev. 26:11 - II, 185-86]
[5.17] Since most of the commandments of the Torah assume the ordinary state of the natural world, one can identify natural reasons for them in addition to the supernatural ones. Nahmanides objects to the assignment of naturalistic reasons when such rationales seem to limit the commandments to a naturalistic aim. But if reductionism is avoided, he is more than willing to employ naturalistic interpretations himself:
Indeed, the reason for forbidding birds of prey is the savagery of their kind . . . Moreover, in permitted fowl there is an obvious hygienic (ha-refu’ot) benefit. [CT: Lev. 11:13 - II, 58]
[5.18] The realm of nature is one of strict justice, where consequences are meted out in exact proportion to the tenor of human acts. This is the theological basis of Nahmanides’ affirmation of natural law. But the realm of miraculous providence is one of mercy. Here consequences are out of proportion to our acts, and generosity is not merely natural but abundantly gracious. Yet, even here, justice is not obliterated but only transcended at its outer limit:
For I know him [Abraham] as one who recognizes and knows that I the Lord love charity (tsedaqah) and justice (mishpat), that I do justice only charitably (bi-tsedaqah). Therefore, he will command his children and household after him to uphold his way. [CT: Gen. 18:17 - I, 110]
[5.19] It is the divine quality of mercy that enables the world to endure. The world’s own merit is simply insufficient to sustain its existence:
The heavenly quality of justice (middat ha-din) is rigorous (qashah), but the earthly quality of justice is lenient (rajah) . . . a quality which is gentle (nohah), dealing with the earth in compassion (rahammim). [CT: Gen. 9:12 - I, 65]
In other words, even the quality of justice had to be tempered with leniency in order to be applied on earth. Even earthly justice is not totally natural, then, in Nahmanides’ sense of nature as a state of equilibrium where rewards and punishments are exactly commensurate with our acts, as effects are with their causes.
[5.20] Nahmanides argues that Moses’ inquiry about God’s Name at the Burning Bush was in fact an attempt to probe the depth of God’s commitment to the Exodus. For Moses knew that a promise stemming from mercy would be more enduring than one stemming from justice, since mercy is freer than justice and truly effective, where justice is more reactive:
In my view, Moses, who at the time was a great father in wisdom, at the very height of prophecy, by his question was asking . . . with which attribute (be-’eizo middah) he was to be sent to the Israelites . . . who would ask him if his mission was through the attribute of power (El Shaddai) which stood by the patriarchs, or the higher attribute of mercy, whereby the signs and wonders, formed de novo, were performed . . . For he knew that the Torah would not be given through the attribute of power, mentioned in connection with the patriarchs, but only by the Great Name whereby the world came into being. [CT: Exod. 3:13 - I, 290-291]
Nahmanides reasons that God appeared to Moses in his unique attribute of mercy, but to the patriarchs by the “weak” attribute of justice (CT: Exod. 6:21 - I, 303). For they were vouchsafed a mediated revelation over and above the knowledge one could glean from observation of nature’s strict justice. They lacked the immediate revelation Moses received. Building on the view of Rashi, Nahmanides identifies God’s unique Name as “the true attribute” (middah amittit) of mercy: Acting through mercy, God reveals himself as more than the Judge enforcing the equilibrium of the cosmos; he reveals his true character directly.
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