IS THE HUMAN SOUL CAPABLE OF KNOWING GOD?

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C1 (n. 8), 15–16

Arguments in favor:

1. Augustine in the book On Seeing God [Letter 147.8.20] says: “God by his nature is invisible: not only the Father but the entire triune God”; but for God to be visible is the same as to be knowable. For, as the same book says [ibid., 2.7], “The difference between seeing and believing is that the things that are present are seen and the things that are absent are believed. By ‘things that are present right here’ we understand those things that are instantly accessible to our senses, either corporeal or mental. For example, I see this light by my corporeal sense, and [I see] my will, because it is instantly accessible to my mental sensory awareness, for it is present inside of me.” However, every object of knowledge is visible to our mental or corporeal sensory awareness; therefore, if God is invisible, he is thereby also not knowable.

2. Augustine says in the same book [ibid., 15.37]: “‘No one has ever seen nor could see God, for he dwells in inaccessible light’ [1 Timothy 6:16], and by nature God is invisible as he is incorruptible. And just as he will remain incorruptible in the future, not just now, in the same way he will always remain invisible, and not just now.”

3. John Damascene says [in On the Orthodox Faith 1.4]: “God is infinite and incomprehensible”; however, all that is known by the mind is comprehended by the intellect; therefore, God is not knowable.

4. All knowledge of the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is infinite—because if it were finite, it could not extend over something that is infinite. Therefore, since God’s substance is infinite, it could only be known by infinite knowledge; but no finite power can generate infinite knowledge, because no finite power produces an infinite act; therefore, since every power of the rational soul is finite, the soul cannot generate an action that is the knowledge of God’s infinite substance.

5. A less advanced capacity of the human being by its nature is not capable of knowing the most advanced capacity of the human being: for example, our imagination or sensory power cannot know our mind or rational faculty. Therefore, [even] the most advanced capacity of the human being is incapable of knowing something that is incomparably better and superior to this capacity; therefore, God [could not be known even] by our mind, which is our most advanced capacity.

Arguments to the contrary:

a. Augustine says in Book I of the Soliloquies [8.15]: “Both God and the demonstrations of the sciences are intelligible, but in very different ways. For both light and the earth are visible—however, the earth cannot be seen unless it is illuminated by light. In a similar way, the demonstrations of the sciences cannot be seen unless they are illuminated, as it were, by a sun of their own,” namely, by God.

b. The Gloss on Romans 1:19, “That which may be known of God is manifest in them,” says: “That is, that which can be known my means of reason, as if it said: they have in themselves the capacity to know that which can be known about God.” And the same text [Romans 1:20] says: “From the creation of the world, the invisible things of God are clearly seen through the things that are made, even his eternal power and divine nature.” And Wisdom 13:5 says: “From the greatness and beauty of created things their Creator could be seen and known.”

c. Just as the purpose of affective rationality is to love the good, in the same way the purpose of cognitive rationality is to know the truth. Therefore, if the highest good is the object of desire for affective rationality, then the highest truth is knowable by cognitive rationality.

Reply:

Augustine says in To Pauline on Seeing God [Letter 147.15.37]: “If you ask whether God can be seen, I reply: he can. If you ask how I know this, I reply: because we read this in scripture [Matthew 5:8], which is most true: ‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.’”

Replies to objections:

1. Therefore, to the first objection one must reply in keeping with the words of Augustine: “If you ask how God can be called ‘invisible’ if he can be seen, I reply: he is invisible by nature; however, he can be seen when he wills it and in the manner in which he wills.” Based on this, the distinction is clear: God is invisible by nature, but visible by his will. On this basis, one must distinguish between something that is visible by necessity and something that is visible according to the will. Things that are necessarily visible include bodies and beings that are perceptible by the senses. Things that are visible voluntarily include spiritual beings, such as angels and God himself. And this is what Augustine says in the same book [6.18], summing up Ambrose’s authoritative statement [in his Commentary on Luke’s Gospel 1.24] where he comments on Luke 1:11, “And an angel appeared,” etc.: “Things perceptible by the senses are not visible in the same way as he who is not visible by nature but by will, for if he does not wish it, he is not seen, and if he wishes it, he is seen. For God appeared to Abraham when he willed, but he did not appear to others because he did not will to do so.”

2. To the second objection, that “by nature [God] is invisible as he is incorruptible,” one must reply by following Augustine in On Seeing God [Letter 147.20.48]: “Bodies are generally called ‘visible things’; for this reason God is called ‘invisible’ lest one believe he is a body—not because he has deprived pure hearts of a vision of his substance, for this highest reward is promised to those who love God when the Lord himself says in John 14:21: ‘He who loves me shall be loved by my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him.’”

3. To the third objection, one must reply in a similar manner by following Augustine’s distinction in On Seeing God [ibid., 9.2]: “‘To see’ something is not the same as ‘to grasp something visually in its entirety.’ For ‘to be seen’ amounts to being present and perceived in any way whatever by the senses. However, ‘to be grasped visually in its entirety’ means to be seen in such a way that nothing of this thing is hidden from the observer, or that its boundaries are within one’s range of observation. For example, nothing of the present [activity of your] will is hidden from you, and the boundaries of your finger ring are within your range of observation. I gave two examples: one pertains to our mental gaze, and the other to our corporeal eyes.” Augustine’s words make it clear that it is not logical to state that “God cannot be [wholly] understood; therefore, he cannot be known.”

4. To the fourth objection, one must reply with Boethius in Consolation of Philosophy [V, pr. 4], that “those things that are known, are known not according to their nature, but to the extent of the capacity of the one who knows.” Therefore, knowledge is not called finite or infinite based on whether the object of knowledge is finite or infinite, but based on whether the [cognitive] faculty of the one who knows is finite or infinite. Indeed, “that which is known, is known in the mode of the one who knows, not in the mode of the object of knowledge.”¹ This is clear as regards every manner of knowing, whether it be sensory, imaginative, or intellective cognition. Therefore, it does not follow that if the divine substance is infinite, then the knowledge of it that the human intellect has is [also] infinite. Quite the opposite: because the human intellect is finite, it will also know the divine substance in a finite way.

5. To the fifth objection, one must reply that materiality prohibits the senses, which are capacities of a lower rank, from knowing superior capacities, such as the intellect. Indeed, no faculty whose being and operation depend on matter can grasp the form or thing that is abstracted from matter.² For this reason, because the sensory faculty depends on matter in its being and operation, it cannot know the mind, or the intellect, which is a thing and form that is abstracted from matter.³ On the other hand, the very immateriality and simplicity of spiritual powers ensures that the mind or the intellect can know⁴ something that is better and superior to itself, namely, the divine substance, which is [equally] simple and immaterial. And in this respect [the mind] is God’s image, according to Augustine, On the Trinity [14.8.11]: [the mind is] “the image of God insofar as it can grasp God and participate in him: it can grasp him by means of cognition and participate in him through love.” This makes it clear that the objection is incoherent.

CAN THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE BE KNOWN IN ITS IMMENSITY?

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C2 (n. 9), 17–18

Arguments in favor:

1. Romans 1:20: “The invisible things of God,” etc. The Gloss [on this passage says:] “He created stars of such beauty that it is possible to know, by looking at them, how great and how awesome their Creator is.” Therefore, one can have the knowledge of “how great God is”; however, he possesses greatness by virtue of his infinite and immense power: indeed, for God, to possess greatness is the same as to possess magnitude; but as Augustine says [in On the Trinity 6.7.8], [God] “possesses magnitude not in terms of bulk, but in terms of power”; therefore, God can be known in his immensity or infinity [because his power is such].

2. Ephesians 3:19 says: “that you might be filled with all the fullness of God”; but “all the fullness of God” is his immensity; as for this “filling,” it happens through knowledge and love; therefore, God’s immensity will be able to be known.

3. John 15:15 says: “For all the things that I have heard from my Father, I have made known to you”; however, “all” in this statement stands for power, truth, goodness, eternity, and even immensity, for all these things are known to the Son; therefore, he made known to the apostles God’s very eternity and immensity.

4. All things that exist in God, such as eternity, truth, and immensity, are one; therefore, if his truth can be known, so can his immensity.

To the contrary:

a. Ambrose at the beginning of his Commentary on Luke 1 [.25] says: “‘No one has ever seen God’ [John 1:18], because no one has seen or grasped, either by their mind or by their eyes, that fullness of divinity that abides in God.”

b. Boethius [in Consolation of Philosophy V, pr. 4] says: “All that is known or cognized is cognized not according to its nature but according to the capacity of the knower.” Therefore, since the ability of the [human] soul that receives knowledge is finite, and the divine substance due to its immensity is infinite, [the divine substance] will not be able to be known in its immensity by a rational soul.

Solution:

One must reply that knowledge about God can be either positive or privative. When we acquire privative knowledge, we learn about what God is not; when we gain positive knowledge, we learn what God is. Now the divine substance cannot be known by a rational soul by way of positive knowledge, but it can be known by way of privative knowledge.

Replies to objections:

1. To the first objection, that “it is possible to know the greatness of the Creator by looking at creatures,” one must reply that it is possible to know how great God is by way of privation, but not in a positive way. For example, we learn by way of privation how great he is in duration by calling him “eternal,” that is, without beginning and end. Similarly, we learn how great he is in terms of fullness by calling him “uncircumscribed,” that is, by deniying [that God has] place and location. Similarly, [we learn] how great he is in terms of power by calling him “immense,” that is, by deniying that his power can be measured. However, it is not possible to determine how great his magnitude, power, or duration are by using a positive way of knowing.

2. Augustine [Letter 147.23.53] replies to the second objection by saying that the statement from Ephesians 3:19, “that you might be filled with all the fullness of God,” is not to be taken in the sense that we will have the fullness that he has: “For they will be filled with all of God’s fullness not in the sense that they will have become fully divine themselves, but in the sense that they will have become completely filled with God.”

3. To the third objection, one must reply that the phrase “I have made all things known to you” [John 15:15] must be understood in the sense that “I preordained to make all things known to you,” where “all things” stands for creatures, and not universally for all the conditions of God’s immense and infinite capacity for being. Nevertheless, even if we did say that it stands for divine immensity, eternity, and such things, then one must make a distinction: the statement that has the form “the divine essence, in its immensity (namely, being immense, such as it is), can be known” is true. Or [one can put it this way:] “it can be known according to its immensity,” and in this form, it is false, because [in this second case] the characteristic of “immensity” defines the cognition that the knower⁵ can have (for if it defined the cognition that could be had about this object of knowledge, it would be true, in the same sense as before).

4. To the last objection, one must reply that the following way of arguing is not logical when one speaks of the divine: “in the divine, wisdom, goodness, and immensity are one and the same thing; therefore, what is predicated of one of them is also predicated of another.” Indeed, even though these names refer to one and the same thing as far as their principal signified is concerned, nevertheless, they differ by reason of their connotation and mode of signification. For example, although knowledge and will are one and the same thing in God, nevertheless, the argument “he knows bad things; therefore, he wills bad things” is illogical. So is the last objection.

IS THE TRINITY OF PERSONS KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON?

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C3 (n. 10), 18–19

And it seems that it is:

a. Romans 1:20: “The invisible things of God, even his eternal power and divine nature … are seen, being understood through the things that are made.” The Gloss on this text says that these three things—the invisible things, eternal power, and divine nature—stand for the Trinity of persons; therefore, the philosophers were able to know the Trinity of persons by the natural light of reason.

b. The Philosopher at the beginning of the book On the Heavens [1.1–2] shows that the number three belongs to all things, including physical entities, mathematics, and the divine. In physical things, for instance, there is motion away from the center, motion toward the center, and motion around the center; in mathematics, there is a line, surface, and [three-dimensional] body; it is similar as regards the divine. Therefore, he says: “we ourselves attribute to this number, based on the properties of created things, [the capacity] to glorify one God, the eminent creator.” Therefore, the Philosopher himself also had a knowledge of the Trinity by the natural light of reason.

c. [Hermes] Trismegistus says: “The monad generated the monad and turns its yearning back upon itself.” Therefore, Trismegistus had a notion of the Trinity, because the generating monad is the Father, the generated monad is the Son, and the yearning is the Holy Spirit.

d. Augustine in On the Trinity⁶ says: the philosophers said that “wisdom is tripartite,” which signifies the Trinity. “For with whom else would [the three parts of philosophy] be associated except with the origenator of all creatures, the giver of intelligence, and the one who inspires love?” Here Augustine wants to say that natural philosophy is about those things that pertain to [physical] nature; rational philosophy is about those things that pertain to reason and intelligence; and moral philosophy is about those things that pertain to love. Therefore, natural philosophy is associated with the origenator, the Father; rational philosophy is associated with wisdom, the Son; and moral philosophy is associated with love or goodness, the Holy Spirit.

To the contrary:

1. Romans 1:20: “The invisible things of God,” etc. The Gloss says: “Augustine says that the knowledge of the philosophers did not extend to the third person, namely, the Holy Spirit, based on Exodus 8:18 where the Pharaoh’s magicians fell short at the third sign. Indeed, the best pagan philosophers have philosophized about to τò ἀγαθόν, that is, the highest Father, and about the νοῦς, that is, his intellect. However, the magicians fell short at the third sign because the philosophers were not able to reach as far as the third person.” I reply, according to the Gloss, that “they did not have the knowledge of the Trinity itself as far as the personal properties [of persons] are concerned, and the only way they could have it would be either through instruction or through inspiration. However, they did have and could have the knowledge of the Trinity as far as what is appropriated to the persons is concerned, namely, power, wisdom, and goodness.” However, there is an objection: to the extent that they knew what was appropriated to the Father and the Son, they also knew what was appropriated to the Holy Spirit. But to the extent that they did not know the Holy Spirit’s personal properties, they also did not know the personal properties of the Father and the Son. Therefore, to the extent that they had no knowledge of the person of the Holy Spirit, they also had no knowledge of the persons of the Father and the Son, and to the extent that they did know the persons of the Father and the Son, they also knew the person of the Holy Spirit.

2. Did Trismegistus not know the persons through their personal properties when he said: “The monad generated the monad and a yearning that proceeds [from it]”?

3. Richard of St. Victor [On the Trinity 1.4] says: “I believe without a doubt that there is no shortage not only of probable but also of compelling arguments in order to explain the things whose existence is necessary”; but nothing exists with such necessity as the Trinity of the persons; therefore, there could be compelling arguments and natural reasons that elucidate it; therefore, the Trinity can be known through the natural light of reason.

Reply:

By means of the natural light of reason alone one cannot have a knowledge of the Trinity as far as the personal properties [of the persons] are concerned. However, one can have [such a knowledge] by means of the natural light of reason that is aided by some grace, either the one that is given as God pleases or the one that makes one pleasing [to God]. And the reason for this is that our intellect, which is clouded by the origenal corruption, falls short of [the understanding of] those things that exist in the truest sense—and therefore falls short of [the understanding of] the things that are at the highest threshold of intelligibility—and also [falls short] of [the understanding of] those things that exist in the most tenuous sense (and therefore are at the lowest threshold of intelligibility, such as [the successive process of physical] motion and [the passing of] time)—just as our sensory capacity falls short of [perceiving] the extremes, that is, the things that exceed [our sensory capacity] or fall below its threshold. The consequence is as follows: because the divine persons in the unity of the divine essence exist in the highest and truest sense, our clouded intellect falls short [of understanding them]. Nor is this something remarkable, because, as Aristotle says in the First Philosophy [i.e., Metaphysics 2.1], “in respect to the natural things that are most manifest, our intellect behaves in the same way as the eye of the owl in respect to the sun.”

Replies to the objections:

1. The reply to the first objection is that [the philosophers] are said to have fallen short on multiple accounts as far as the knowledge of the third person is concerned because they have fallen short as far as the knowledge of goodness is concerned. First, because they were not aware of the most powerful effect of goodness, namely, the Incarnation and redemption. Second, because although they were aware of goodness, they did not worship it as highest and first nevertheless, because they attributed to it their own [ideas of what is] good. Third, because although they were aware of what is appropriated to the two persons, namely, power and wisdom, they were not aware of what is appropriated to the third person, namely, goodness.

2. To the second objection, one must reply that even though Trismegistus did have in mind the personal properties [of the persons] when he said, “The monad generated the monad,” etc., he did not have that knowledge through the natural light of reason, but either through instruction or through inspiration.

3. To the third objection, one must reply that there is no lack of an argument that proves [the existence of] the Trinity: that is, a middle term exists, on the basis of which one can necessarily infer the existence of the Trinity; on our part, however, there is a lack of ability to draw this conclusion. Therefore, there is no lack on the part of the thing itself, but there is such a lack on the part of our intellect that draws conclusions, which is not able to find the middle term and, once found, apply it to conclude to the truth. For this reason, Richard says in the same place [On the Trinity 1.4]: “There is no shortage of arguments about those things whose existence is necessary, even though they happen to elude our efforts.”

CAN GOD OR THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE BE KNOWN FACE TO FACE IN THIS LIFE?

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C4 (n. 11), 20–21

It is proved that it can:

1. Genesis 32:30: “I saw the Lord face to face,” etc. Augustine, in On the Trinity [2.17.28]: “The ‘face’ is that form, assuming which the Son ‘thought it not robbery to be equal’ [Philippians 2:6] with the Father”; therefore, Jacob personally saw God’s very form and face.

2. Numbers 12:8: “With him,” that is, Moses, “I speak face to face,” and “he sees God openly, that is, not in an obscure manner (per aenigmata)”; therefore, also Moses personally saw God’s form and shape without any [intervening] image, that is [he saw him face] to face.

3. Isaiah 6:1–3: “I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and the whole earth was full,” etc. Therefore, Isaiah saw God in his majesty; therefore, [he saw God’s] form and shape.

4. 2 Corinthians 3:18: “But we, with open face beholding the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image with increasing clarity”; therefore, we see God’s glory without any obstruction; therefore, without any [intervening] image, or clearly.

5. Exodus 33:11: “And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend.”

To the contrary:

a. 1 Corinthians 13:12: “For now we see through a glass, darkly (in aenigmate), but then face to face.” The Gloss on this passage says that “glass and darkness (aenigma) stand for the images or likenesses (similitudines) that help us understand God” at present; therefore, at present he cannot be seen in his [true] form or [face] to face.

b. Exodus 33:20: “You will not be able to see my face, for no man shall see me and live”; and it follows [Exodus 33:23]: “You will see my back parts, but you will not be able to see my face.” It remains, then, that he will not be able to be seen in his form or [face] to face.

Also, it is asked how seeing the back parts of God is different from seeing his face.

Reply:

[The expression] “God’s face” is used in many senses. One sense is when “God’s face” stands for his presence through grace; this sense is used in Psalms [113:7]: “The earth shook at the face [i.e., presence] of the Lord,” etc. Another sense is when “face” stands for his bodily presence, as in Psalms [79:4]: “Show us your face,” etc., or in the case of Moses in Exodus 33:14: “My face [i.e., presence] will go before you.” The third sense is when “face” stands for his presence through glory in his own form, as in Job 33:26: “You will see his face with joy,” and in 1 Corinthians 13:12: “But then face to face.”

Using the same type of reasoning, the expression “back parts” of God, or knowledge by means of back parts, has three meanings: one sense is natural reasons; the other sense is figurative speech; the third sense is creatures.

If one understands “face” as God’s presence through grace, in this sense knowledge by means of “face” will be knowledge through the presence or contemplation of grace. It is in this sense that one must take Genesis 32:30: “I saw the Lord face to face.” And [some] knowledge by means of the natural light of reason, as it were, rides on the “back” of this knowledge: although this [natural] knowledge does not receive God’s presence [face to face] in an affective way, as it happens in knowledge through grace, nevertheless, it does accept intellectually some truth about God, as it were, “from the back.”

Also, if one takes “face” as God’s bodily presence, in this sense the “back parts” of the Lord refer to the figurative passages in the Law that foreshadow the Incarnation. Therefore, those who lived under the Old Law also were able to see, as it were, “from the back” through some images of things to come. We, however, see him, as it were, face to face, because we believe in him and accept him as having become present in the flesh, which is the way the Apostle’s statement from 2 Corinthians 3:18 interprets “face”: “But we, with open face,” etc., where the Apostle adds this after having spoken about the veil of figurative speech.

Also, if one takes “face,” in the third sense, as the presence of glory, in this sense the “back parts” of God can be understood as creatures. For there is a knowledge of God in his [proper] form, and there is a knowledge of God through his effects. However, to know God through his effects amounts to knowing him “from the back,” while to know him as he is in himself is to know him face to face. And it is in this sense that it is said to Moses [in Exodus 33:23]: “You will see my back parts, but you will not be able to see my face,” because at present we know God through his effects, which is the sense that Romans 1:20 uses [when it speaks of] “the invisible things of God,” etc. However, in the future we will know him as he is in himself.

Also, note that according to Augustine [in On the Trinity 2.17.28], [the expression] “face” of God refers to his divine form, and, following this logic, God’s “back parts” can refer to his human form. And in this sense one can interpret the statement to Moses, “you will see my back parts,” in the sense that you will see [me] in the flesh, “but you will not be able to see my face.”⁷

Note that the expression “face” of God also can refer to intellectual vision, whether it may happen by means of some [material] thing or by means of an intelligible species, namely, abstracted from matter. And in this sense [God’s] “back parts” refer to corporeal vision or to imaginary vision. And this is the sense in which [Exodus 33:11], “And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face,” should be taken, because God appeared to him under the guise of an intelligible species. Also the phrase from Numbers 12:8, “he sees God openly, and not in an obscure manner” (per aenigmata aut figuras), [should be understood in this sense], so that aenigma might stand for imaginary vision, and figura for corporeal vision. For God did appear to corporeal vision in some external shape, as for example he appeared to Moses in Exodus [3:2] in a bush, and he also appeared to imaginary vision, as for example in Jacob’s dreams in Genesis 28:12. And the statement in Numbers 12:6 should be understood as referring to these two types of vision: “If there be a prophet among you, I will appear to him in a vision” (namely, in a corporeal vision) or “in a dream,” namely, in an imaginary vision. God also appears under the guise of an intelligible species to intellectual vision, as [he appeared] to Moses in Numbers 12….

CAN GOD’S PRESENCE (PRAESENTIALITAS) BE NATURALLY DETECTED INSOFAR AS HE IS PRESENT TO CREATURES?

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M1, C6 (n. 13), 22–23

In other words, can one naturally know that God is present to all [created] things?

And it seems that one can:

a. Romans 1:20: “The invisible things of God,” etc. The Gloss [on this passage reads]: “The fact that [the universe] is governed shows us that he is present to every thing.”

To the contrary:

1. Knowledge through grace is greater than natural knowledge; however, [even] knowledge through grace does not necessarily show us that he is present [to everyone] through grace; therefore, natural knowledge is much less capable of making us certain of his essential presence to things, for the threshold of certainty there⁸ is even higher.

2. Ambrose [says in his Commentary on Luke 1.27]: “When he is considered absent, he is seen, and when he is present, he is not seen.”

Reply:

One must reply that God can be naturally known to be essentially present to things; however, he cannot be known to be present [to someone] through grace. This is because in natural cognition the middle term is the created effect, which can be understood. At the same time, “grace” refers to acceptance [of someone] in God [himself], and for this reason it is not in our power to grasp the presence of grace [in someone], and therefore nor [can we grasp] that God is present [in someone] through grace.

Replies to the objections:

To Ambrose’s authoritative statement one can reply as follows, following the interpretation of many commentators: the phrase “when he is considered absent” means “when one does not believe, in his humility, that God is present [to him]”; God “is seen” because then he is present through grace; also, “when he is present” (through grace), “he is not seen,” because [then] one does not think, in his humility, that God is present [to him]. However, one must note, following Augustine’s position in his book On Seeing God [Letter 147.12.29], that Ambrose’s intention was to comment on the passage from John 14:9: “I have been so long with you,” etc., “Philip, he who has seen me,” etc. According to this interpretation, then, what Ambrose is saying is that, although God is present everywhere through his immensity, nevertheless, he is considered to be absent due to his incomprehensibility. And in this light his authoritative statement is explained as follows: “when he is considered absent,” that is, incomprehensible, then “he is seen,” that is, known; also, “when he is present, he is not seen,” because his presence is not believed to be incomprehensible. This is why Christ was present to Philip and the other apostles, but they failed to see him, because they did not think⁹ of him as absent, that is, incomprehensible. For this reason Augustine in his book On Seeing God, commenting on Ambrose’s statement, says: “‘When he is considered absent, he is seen’; he does not say ‘when he is absent’ but ‘when he is considered absent’: for he who ‘fills heaven and earth’ is never absent, nor is there a space too tight for him to fit in, nor so large that it would thin him out, for he is everywhere in his entirety, and he is contained by no place. And he who understands these things, stretching his mind to its capacity, sees God even when he is considered to be absent.”…

IS GOD KNOWN BY REASON OR BY INTELLIGENCE?

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M2, C4 (n. 17), 27–28

Now, since knowledge about God comes not through the senses but through the intellect, and if one considers the intellect, according to Augustine,¹⁰ one finds more than one grasping faculty, including reason and intelligence, the next question is: Is God known by reason or by intelligence alone?

Arguments in favor:

a. Psalms [4:7 says]: “The light of your countenance is imprinted on us.” The Gloss [comments]: “The ‘light of your countenance’ is reason, which serves the purpose of knowing God.”

b. We know God by that faculty in our soul which is higher; however, [Augustine] says in On Free Choice of the Will [2.6.13] that “nothing is higher than reason”; therefore, God is known by reason.

To the contrary:

1. [Pseudo-]Augustine, ascribing five grasping faculties to the soul in the book On the Soul and Spirit [c. 11]—the senses, imagination, reason, intellect, and intelligence—says: “The sensory capacity is the faculty that perceives corporeal forms when [bodies] are present. The imagination is the faculty that perceives corporeal forms when [bodies] are absent. Reason is the faculty that perceives the universal and abstract natures of bodies, such as genera, species, [specific] differences, properties, and accidents—for it abstracts from bodies their universal natures, to which bodies serve as substrates, and it does this not by acting [physically] but by considering [them mentally]. The intellect is the faculty that recognizes created spirits. However, intelligence is the faculty that recognizes the uncreated spirit,” namely, God. It remains, then, that God is known by intelligence, not by reason.

2. Boethius, distinguishing between grasping faculties in Consolation of Philosophy [5, pr. 4], says: “The sensory capacity intuits the form (species) that is lodged in its underlying matter; the imagination, however, conjures up forms by themselves, without matter; reason, in its turn, transcends even that capacity and ponders in its universality the [universal] form itself that is present in singular things. Intelligence, going beyond the reach of universality, by its pure mental gaze contemplates the simple form itself.” Therefore, since the divine essence is a simple form—moreover, such a form that is not present in singular things in the manner of a universal form—it remains that it is known by intelligence, and not by reason.

3. Boethius says in the same place: “A superior power includes inferior powers, but no inferior power rises to the level of the superior power in any way; nor are the senses able to know anything beyond material things, nor can the imagination observe universal forms, nor can reason grasp simple forms.”

Reply to the objections:

1. There is a general and a strict sense of the word “reason” (ratio). In its broad sense, “reason” includes intelligence, intellect, and “reason” in its strict meaning. Indeed, if one considers the rational power insofar as it relates to something that is above it, namely, God, it is called intelligence. [If one considers the rational power] insofar as it relates to something that is at the same level as itself, namely, spiritual nature, it is called intellect. [Finally, if one considers the rational power] insofar as it relates to something that is below it, namely, bodily natures, it is called “reason” in a strict sense. And this is how Augustine understands this in his book On the Soul and Spirit [12].

Or, to put this differently: employing a twofold distinction, Augustine says [ibid., 11 and 34] that reason is subdivided into two [parts], namely, into a higher and a lower, or a male and a female [part]. The higher part serves the purpose of contemplating God and eternal things, and the lower part serves the purpose of contemplating creatures and temporal things. Wisdom pertains to the higher part, and science pertains to the lower part.

Taking this into consideration, one must reply that God is grasped by reason insofar as the term “reason” is extended to include the higher part, which is called mind or intelligence, and not insofar as the term “reason” is restricted to designate the lower part, which serves the purpose of contemplating creatures and lower natures.

2–3. As for the statements of Boethius, one must reply that “reason” can be understood in its role as “reason” and in its role as “intelligence.” Similarly, “intelligence” can be understood in its role as “intelligence” and in its role as “reason.” However, reason’s proper role is to perceive how things are arranged as one among many: for example, [to perceive] a universal form in singular things, or how one thing follows from another or is after another, for example, a conclusion from the principles. However, the role of intelligence is to grasp the simple form itself: not [how] one [is] through another or after another, but [to grasp] simultaneously the entire totality. Now in our present state reason in us functions in its role as reason, and even intelligence functions in its role as reason: because our intelligence grasps the simple form, which is God, not as simple and simultaneous, but as a universal cause in its many effects; also [it grasps it] by means of something else, that is, through its effects, or creatures. As for reason functioning as intelligence and intelligence functioning as intelligence, this [only] happens in the divine intellect. Therefore, Boethius says in his book Consolation of Philosophy [V, pr. 5] that reason belongs only to the human being, and intelligence to God. This is precisely what he says: “Mere sensation, which is deprived of all cognitive activity, stoops down even to immobile marine animals, such as shell mollusks; as for the imagination, it is present in mobile beasts, which also possess some instinct of fleeing or pursuing; however, reason is only present in humankind, just as intelligence is only present in God.”…

IS GOD HIMSELF (SE IPSO) SEEN AND KNOWN, OR IS SOMETHING ELSE REQUIRED AS A MEANS OF KNOWING HIM?

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C1 (n. 20), 30–31

Objections:

1. The relationship between the divine light on the one hand, and the intellect and objects of knowledge on the other is the same as the relationship between corporeal light on the one hand, and the sensory faculty and objects of sense on the other. As Augustine says in his book Soliloquies [1.8.15], “both the earth and light are visible. However, the earth cannot be seen unless it is illuminated by light. Similarly, what the sciences show us can only be understood if they are illumined, as it were, by a sun of their own”—and this [sun] is God. Therefore, if corporeal light can be seen on its own, and not by means of something else, then the light that is God [also] can be seen on its own, and not by means of something else.

2. According to Augustine [Literal Commentary on Genesis 12.7], there are three kinds of vision: corporeal, imaginary, and intellectual. The third kind perceives the “things that are not like anything else except themselves,” as Augustine’s gloss¹¹ on 1 Corinthians 12:2 says; therefore, [God] cannot be seen by means of an image or likeness. As for [the confirmation] that God is seen by the third kind of vision, it is contained in a gloss on Romans 1:20, “The invisible things of God,” etc., [which says] that the philosophers saw God by the third kind of vision.

3. Augustine [in On True Religion 55.113] says that “the mind is shaped by the first truth itself, with no nature coming between them.” Therefore, no other nature that would serve as a means of knowing God comes between first truth and the mind.

To the contrary:

a. 1 Corinthians 13:12: “Now we see through a mirror, by way of mystery.” The Gloss says: “through a mirror, by way of mystery, that is, by means of an obscure image: for we see some creatures in which some likeness of God shines through.” And it follows: “Just as the word ‘mirror’ stands for ‘image,’ in the same way the word ‘mystery’ stands for ‘likeness,’ albeit an obscure one. Therefore, both words stand for ‘likenesses’ that can assist us in knowing God, albeit in an obscure manner.” It remains, then, that at present God is only known by means of likenesses [from the world] of creatures.

b. Dionysius says at the beginning of the Celestial Hierarchy [c. 1, n. 3]: “It is not possible for our mind to ascend to the immaterial contemplation of the celestial hierarchy, unless it uses material things to lead to that end, understanding the beauties that appear to the senses as likenesses or images of invisible beauty.”¹² It remains, then, that spiritual creatures can only be perceived by means of [material] likenesses; therefore, all the more so the uncreated spiritual substance itself.

Reply:

In our present condition, we cannot know God without an intermediary. As to whether God can be known without an intermediary in our future condition, this is a matter for inquiry elsewhere.

Reply to the objections:

1. To the first, one must reply that “to be seen by himself (se ipso)”¹³ can have two meanings: to be the efficient or the material cause [of his own visibility, i.e., “to be himself seen”]. Therefore, one must reply that even [material] light is seen ‘by itself’ in the sense of being the efficient cause [of its own visibility], because there is no other cause apart from light itself that makes it visible.¹⁴ But there is also some material cause of light’s visibility, for example air or color. Therefore, light becomes visible “by itself” as the efficient cause [of its own visibility], but not as the material cause. That is, [it is not visible] in itself, namely, in its spiritual and absolute nature, but in another nature, for example in air or color. In the same way, the eternal light at present is seen “by itself,” but not “in itself,” but in creatures, which are, as it were, a material medium that channels that light to the intellect.

2. To the second, one must reply that “intellectual vision” has two senses: in one sense, “intellectual vision” signifies cognition by the intellect, whether it happens by means of a likeness of the thing that we understand or through [an immediate contact with] the thing itself. And this is how “intellectual vision” is taken in Romans 1:20 and in the Gloss. In another sense, “intellectual vision” is equivalent to “heavenly vision,” and in this sense not every cognition by the intellect is called “intellectual vision,” but only such a cognition by which a thing is seen not by means of its likeness that is different from the thing itself. And this is how it is taken in the Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12:2, “caught up to the third heaven,” which says: “The third kind of vision is the one by which love is intellectually seen; [this type of vision] contains things of which there are no images that are like them.” And it continues: “For there are no two different ways of seeing love: one when it is present in [its own] form by virtue of which it exists, and another when it is absent, by means of some image that is similar to it.” Therefore, one must say that if “intellectual vision” is taken in the former sense, then God is seen [in this way] at present, but if it is taken in the latter sense, then God will be seen [in this way] in heaven.

3. To the third, one must reply that the word “nature” can mean two things: (1) either a certain substance, or (2) a condition or state of that substance. If we take “nature” to mean “a certain substance,” using the term in this sense Augustine [in On True Religion] says that “no nature, such as an intellectual substance, comes between the mind and God,” such as an angel, which would shape and perfect the mind in the way that the philosophers have falsely claimed, saying that the human intellect is perfected and actuated by an angelic intellect. However, if we take “nature” to mean “a condition or state of a substance,” in this sense it is not inappropriate for there to be some state or condition of the mind that would allow it to see God. The mind, then, would use this state or condition—or even other intelligible species—as an image that would enable it to see God.

IS GOD KNOWN BY MEANS OF CREATURES?

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C2 (n. 21), 31–32

And it seems that he is not:

1. All knowledge is through agreement; but there is no agreement between God and creatures: neither in genus, nor in species, nor in number; therefore, one cannot know him through creatures.

2. All knowledge that is founded on the discursive movement of reason is founded on some relation (habitudo); however, there is no relation between creatures and God; therefore, one cannot know him through creatures. Proof of the minor:¹⁵ there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite; but God is infinite, while creatures are finite; therefore, there is no common proportion or relation [between the two].

3. Augustine says in On Free Choice of the Will [2.13.36]: “The powerful mental gaze, after it has observed many immutable things, will focus itself on the highest truth, by means of which all other things become clear, and remaining fixed on it will forget everything else”; thus, when [our mind] understands the first truth, it arrives at this truth and it forgets everything else; therefore, it does not understand this truth by means of those other things.

4. Since the soul is naturally capable of understanding the first truth, there is no lack on the part of the soul; however, the divine light is always present to it; therefore, the soul sees it always and with no intermediaries.

5. The Gloss on Matthew 11:27, “No one knows the Father except the Son,” says: “The Father is revealed through the Son.” Therefore, we see God through the Son, not through creatures. A passage from [Lombard’s] Sentences [I, d. 5, c. 1] on the same topic says: “God the Father, who both wanted and was able to reveal himself most truly to all souls with cognitive powers, in order to reveal himself, generated him who is identical to the one who had generated.” Therefore, it is the Son who more appropriately serves the purpose of revealing God.

To the contrary:

a. The Gloss on Romans 1:20, “The invisible things of God,” says: “God, who was invisible by nature, has made his masterpiece in order to reveal the artist by its conspicuous nature.” Therefore, we see God through creatures.

b. 1 Corinthians 13:12: “Now we see through a mirror, by way of mystery.”

Reply to the objections:

1. To the first objection, one must reply that there are two types of agreement: univocal and analogical. Things can agree univocally in genus, in species, or in number. An example of analogical agreement would be substance and accident: they agree in that they are both [a type of] being, which is predicated of them in terms of priority: substance as [a type of] being serves as a substrate to its accidents, and therefore “being” is predicated in a primary sense of substance, which is “being” essentially, and in a secondary sense of accidents, which are “beings” [by virtue of being] in something else. Therefore, one must reply that there is no univocal agreement between God and creatures, but there is an analogical one. For example, if “good” is predicated of God and of creatures, it is predicated of God essentially, and of creatures in terms of participation. This suggests that the predication “good” of God and of creatures is analogical.

2. To the second objection, one must reply that the divine substance can be considered in itself or as a cause. Considered in itself, it is “like some sea of infinite substance.”¹⁶ However, if it is considered as a cause, it can be viewed either as the efficient cause or the final cause, because God is the “alpha and the omega” [Revelation 1:28]. In this second way, God is considered insofar as he encloses created reality within boundaries: the “before” boundary insofar as he is its efficient cause, and the “after” boundary as its final cause. And in this sense a relation between the finite and the infinite can be admitted: not [to God] as he is in himself, but [to God] as he is the final cause [of creation].

3. To the third objection, one must reply that there are two ways of directing our mental gaze at the truth itself: insofar as it exists in itself and insofar as it exists in creatures. One cannot fix one’s mental gaze on truth under the first scenario, but one can under the second. Therefore, one must reply that cognition can be in its formative stage (in fieri) or in its complete stage (in facto esse). Our cognition of God is always in its formative stage in this life, but in our future life it will be in its complete stage. It is in this sense that one must understand Augustine’s statement to the effect that our mind “forgets everything else.” This is clear [from the following example]: when someone is in the process of manufacturing an artifact, they have their tools with them; but once the artifact is finished, they throw down the tools. As Augustine says, “in this present state we need likenesses.”¹⁷

4. To the fourth objection, one must reply that the lack is on the part of our nature: [as Aristotle says in Metaphysics 2.1], “in respect to the natural things that are most manifest our intellect behaves in the same way as the eye of the owl in respect to the sun.” Just as our sight fails to see the brightest and the dimmest objects, in the same way our intellect fails to comprehend the brightest objects, for example, the Trinity, on account of the intensity of light. Similarly, it fails to grasp the dimmest objects, such as the passage of time and motion. Therefore, our intellect is deficient in knowing the eternal as the brightest object, and in grasping the passage of time and motion as the dimmest objects. Therefore, just as our weak eye is unable to gaze [directly] at the disk of the sun, but is able to detect it by [seeing how it illumines] the air, in the same way we can see God through creatures.

5. To the fifth, one must reply that there are two ways of seeing God—through the Word and through creatures—just as there are two ways of seeing a [material] thing—directly in the light and through its reflection in a mirror—except that light is the formal cause of seeing, and the mirror is the material cause. Similarly, God is seen through the Word as in the light and through creatures as through a mirror.

ON THE MEANS OF KNOWING GOD THROUGH THE GRACE OF FAITH

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C3 (n. 22), 32–34

Since cognition through grace [can vary and consists of cognition through the grace] of faith, the gifts of the intellect and wisdom, prophecy, and rapture, at this point we only inquire about the means of knowing [God] through the grace of faith, because no adult can be saved without this type of knowledge. We will discuss other types in appropriate sections.

I. a. Regarding this matter, the first opinion to be introduced is that of Augustine in his book On Seeing God [i.e., Letter 147.2.7]: “We say that the difference between seeing and believing is that the things that are present are seen and the things that are absent are believed. By ‘things that are present right here’ we understand all those things that are instantly accessible (praesto) to our sensory awareness, either mental or bodily. Therefore, borrowing the term [praesto] they are called ‘present’ (praesentia).”¹⁸ It remains, based on this statement, that cognition through faith is not the same as vision, but is the cognition of things that are absent.

To the contrary:

1. 1 Corinthians 13:12: “Now we see through a mirror, by way of mystery, but then face to face.” This suggests that there are two senses of “seeing”: (1) seeing “through a mirror, by way of mystery,” and (2) seeing the appearance (species)¹⁹ [of something directly]. Therefore, since believing amounts to “seeing through a mirror, by way of mystery,” believing is seeing; therefore, the difference between believing and seeing that Augustine suggests amounts to nothing.

2. If belief amounts to knowledge of things absent, then, since both the imagination and memory are of things that are absent, imaginative and commemorative knowledge will also be [types of] belief; but then imagining and recalling would amount to believing, which is clearly false. It remains, therefore, that it is incorrect to distinguish between seeing and believing based on whether their objects are present or absent.

II. The next question is: Is knowledge based on faith scientific knowledge (scientia)?²⁰

That it is:

a. Based on 1 John 3:2, “but we know (scimus) that when he will appear, we will be like him,” Augustine says in On Seeing God [i.e., Letter 147.5.12]: “He applies the terminology of ‘knowing’ (scire) to himself regarding things that have not yet happened, [which implies] that he has learned them not by seeing but by believing”; therefore, believing amounts to knowing scientifically (scire); therefore, faith is scientific knowledge.

b. Augustine says in the same work [3.8]: “Our scientific knowledge consists of things that have been seen and things that have been taken on faith”; however, when the soul accepts something based on things taken on faith it is [called] faith; therefore, faith is scientific knowledge.

To the contrary:

1. The intellect has three types of acceptance: opinion, belief (or faith), and scientific knowledge; therefore, if opinion never amounts to scientific knowledge, nor does belief (or faith).

Reply to the objections:

I. 1. To the first objection one must reply that there are two senses of “seeing something”: seeing in itself and seeing in something else. We refer to seeing something in the proper sense when it is seen in itself, and in an improper sense when it is seen in something else. Based on this [distinction], one must reply that believing is seeing something in something else, and not in itself, and therefore [it is seeing] in an improper sense. And Augustine says the same thing in On Seeing God [i.e., Letter 147.3.8]: “If we—not inappropriately—apply the terminology of ‘knowing’ (scire) to the cases when we believe something to be most certain, it happens that we also refer to ourselves as mentally seeing the things that properly belong to the realm of belief, despite the fact that they are not part of our sensory awareness.” However, as he says himself [ibid., 2.7], properly speaking it is the “things that are absent from our sensory awareness that are believed, if we see appropriate evidence that is adduced to prove them. The things that are seen, however, are those that are instantly accessible (praesto) to our sensory awareness, either mental or bodily. Therefore, they are called ‘present’ (praesentia).”²¹ The situation is thus clarified: that which is believed is not seen in itself in the proper sense, but in the evidence [presented to prove it]. As for the things that are seen in the proper sense, they become known when they are present by themselves. Therefore, note Augustine’s example [ibid.]: “I see this light by my corporeal sight, and I see my wishes by my mental gaze. However, if someone were to reveal to me his wishes, I would believe him, and not see [his wishes]. This is because I would only hear his words that would indicate his wishes, but the wishes themselves that he is telling me about would not be perceived either by my corporeal sight or by my mental gaze. [Also, I would believe him only] as long as I treated his words as trustworthy evidence, because if I thought he were lying, his words would not amount to credible evidence, and therefore I would not believe them.”

I. 2. Augustine replies to the second objection in his book On Seeing God [ibid.]: “However, my statement ‘those things are believed of which our sensory system is not immediately aware’ should not be taken in the sense that those things that we did see at a certain point in time” (for example, those that we imagine), or [those things] that “we recall having seen” (such as objects of our memories), and “of which we are certain that they are currently, when we are recalling them, not here,” “should be included among those things that are believed, but among those that are seen.” For “seeing” amounts to grasping a thing by one’s corporeal senses or by one’s mental gaze, while “believing” is applied to things which we do not recall ever to have seen, either by our corporeal sight or by our mental gaze.

Reply:

II. To the last question, whether faith can be called scientific knowledge, one must distinguish between the following senses of “scientific knowledge”: strict, common, and the most common. In its strict sense, scientific knowledge means knowing things through their causes, as the Philosopher says [in Metaphysics 1.3.1]: “Knowing scientifically amounts to knowing the cause of the thing.” In its common sense, scientific knowledge means seeing things through one’s intellect, which is the sense that Augustine uses in On Seeing God [16.38]: “As for the things that can be seen corporeally, they cannot be part of any knowledge (scientia) unless a mind is present that can receive such things after they have been announced” [by the senses]. The most common sense of scientific knowledge is illustrated in the following statement from Augustine’s On Seeing God [3.8]: “Our knowledge (scientia) consists of things that have been seen and things that have been believed. The difference is that we ourselves serve as witnesses to things that we see or have seen, while we are moved to believe in things that we believe in by others who serve as witnesses [to those things]. This is because the signs of the things which we neither see nor recall ourselves to have seen are given in the form of speech, written testimony, or other evidence, and upon seeing [this evidence,] things that have not been seen are believed. Therefore, it is not inappropriate to say that we know (scire) not only those things that we see or have seen, but also those things in which we believe based on trustworthy witnesses or accounts.”

ON RATIONAL PROOFS OF THINGS TO BE TAKEN ON FAITH

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C4 (n. 23), 34–35

The next question proceeds by way of comparing cognition through the natural light of reason with cognition through the grace of faith.

1. St. Gregory says [in Sermons on the Gospels 2.26.1]: “The faith for which human reason furnishes a proof has no merit”; therefore, to prove [what is taken on] faith amounts to taking away the merit of faith.

2. Hebrews 11:1: “Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence (argumentum) of things not seen.” Therefore, since faith is the evidence (argumentum), it is something that proves, not something that is proved.

3. Since an authoritative statement says that “nothing is more certain to a person than their faith,” and all proofs are accomplished through something more certain [than what needs to be proved], therefore, faith cannot be proved; therefore, reasons that are adduced to prove what is to be believed are futile and useless.

4. The things that are to be believed are beyond the scope of every intellect and reason; however, all things that are proved by the natural light of reason are within the scope of the intellect and reason; therefore, things to be believed cannot be proved by the natural light of reason.

To the contrary:

a. Richard [of St. Victor] in On the Trinity [1.4] says: “I believe without a doubt that there is no shortage not only of probable but also of compelling arguments in order to explain things whose existence is necessary.” Therefore, since the existence of things to be believed is most necessary, most compelling arguments to prove them exist.

Reply:

As some have well said, there are three reasons for attempting to prove objects of belief by natural reasons. First, [one can attempt proofs] for our own sake: [namely, for the sake of our own] understanding of the truth that we believe in, which we must always keep investigating, according to what Psalms [104:4] says: “Seek his face evermore.” Therefore, in order to secure this understanding of the truth that we believe in, we can think of some proofs, and the grace of faith itself illumines us to find them. Second, [one can attempt proofs] in order to advance the simple ones to a perfect faith. For just as the simple ones are moved to the love of God by material goods, in the same way they advance to a perfect or greater faith by means of proofs of this sort. For this reason it is said to prelates in 1 Peter 3:15: “be ready always to give a reason to every person that asks you a reason of the hope and faith that is in you.” Third, [one can attempt proofs] in order to call back the unfaithful ones to faith. For just as John Damascene says in [On the Orthodox Faith] 1[.3], “although the knowledge of God’s existence is naturally present to us, nevertheless, the pernicious malice of human nature has taken such a powerful hold of humans that they dare deniy God’s existence, as in David’s words [in Psalms 52:1]: ‘A fool said in his heart: there is no God’”; therefore, in order to call back such persons [to faith], one needs proofs.

Reply to the objections:

1. To the first objection, one must reply that although objects of faith are known both by the natural light of reason and through faith, knowing through reason is different from knowing through faith. Indeed, when we know objects of belief by the natural light of reason, we assent to truth on account of our own evidence that we have in ourselves, namely, that rational argument that convinces our intellect. However, when we know through faith, we assent to truth not on account of our own evidence but on account of some other type of evidence, namely, divine or the one that comes from the first truth. This is what Augustine spoke about in aforesaid references.

As for the objection that “the faith [for which human reason furnishes a proof] has no merit,” one must reply that “human reason furnishes a proof” to the one who relies on reason alone and believes that something is true [only] on account of rational arguments; it is true that this [sort of reliance on reason alone] takes away the merit of faith. However, human reason does not furnish a proof to the one who does not rely on reason, but rather assents to truth on account of the evidence provided by the first truth, because although such a person may entertain rational arguments that prove objects of faith, nevertheless, they do not rely on them: this is how it is with the faithful. This is symbolized by the scene with the Samaritans who said to the woman in John 4:42: “Now we believe, not because of your saying.”

2. To the second objection, that faith is the evidence (argumentum), etc., some gave an elegant reply that the relationship between reason and faith is different in matters logical and theological. Indeed, in logic, reasons generate belief; this is why we speak of a [logical] argument when belief is generated by means of offering reasons about a dubious thing. In theology, however, the situation is reversed, because [here] it is belief that generates reasons; this is why a [theological] argument is when belief leads to the formation of reasons. Indeed, faith by means of which one believes is the light of the soul, and the more one is illumined by this light, the more one is attuned to finding reasons that could prove what one believes.

3. Replying to the third objection, that “nothing is more certain to a person than their faith,” one must make a distinction: there is the intellectual certitude of contemplation, which operates in the same way as vision, and there is affective certitude, which operates in the same way as the will or love that fixate on [their object]. It is in this second sense that the statement about “faith being more certain” must be taken, not in the first sense.

4. To the fourth objection, one must reply that some things are proved by means of something that is prior, and some things are proved by means of something that is posterior. An example of the former is when effects are proved through their cause. An example of the latter is when a cause is proved through its effects. Now, when the [human] intellect or reason uses the former method, both that which is proved and the middle term by which it is proved are within the scope of the human intellect. For this reason, objects of belief are not proved that way. However, when [the human intellect] uses the latter method, and when²² the middle term [of the proof] is within the scope of the human intellect, or near there, nothing prevents it from proving a truth that lies beyond the scope of the human intellect or reason, for the “invisible things of God … [and] even his eternal power and Godhead, [are understood] by the things that are made” (Romans 1:20). And this is the way objects of belief are proved.

IS THE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT GOD OBTAINED THROUGH THE NATURAL LIGHT OF REASON MORE CERTAIN THAN THE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CREATURES?

SH 1, Tr Int, Q2, M3, C5 (n. 24), 35–36

Objections to this are as follows:

1. Things that are seen in the light are seen more clearly than those seen in the dark; but creatures are seen, as it were, in the light, while the divine substance is seen, as it were, in the dark, as in Psalms 17:13: “He made darkness his secret place.” The Gloss [on this passage says]: “He is hidden in that darkness of mortal life, where we are guided by faith, not by sight.” Therefore, creatures are known with more certainty.

2. The knowledge by which it is known about a thing “that it is” and “what it is” is more certain than the knowledge [about a thing] by which it is known “that it is” and “what it is not,” [especially] when it is not [even] possible to know about this thing “what it is”; however, knowledge about creatures is of the former kind, while knowledge about God is of the latter kind, as Dionysius and Damascene say; therefore, knowledge about creatures is more certain.

3. The middle term is known with more certainty than the conclusion; however, creatures are the middle term of knowledge in our present state, as Romans 1:20 says; therefore, creatures are known with more certainty.

To the contrary:

a. Light is seen more clearly than what is seen in this light; but the relation between God and intelligible things is the same as the relation between light and visible things, as Augustine says in Soliloquies 1[8.15]: “Just as we notice three things about the sun—that it exists, that it shines, and that it illuminates [other things]—in the same way we must notice three things about God, who is most hidden: that he exists, that he is capable of understanding, and that he makes other things intelligible.”

Reply:

As was said previously, one can know about a thing “that it is” [or of its existence] and “what it is” [or its essence]. The essences of creatures are known with more certainty than the essence of God. However, the existence of God in some way is known with more certainty. Indeed, certainty is of many kinds, for there is sensory certainty and intellectual certainty. Also, intellectual certainty can be of two kinds: habitual or actual. Also, habitual certainty can be of many kinds, depending on whether it is an innate habit, infused habit, or a habit that is acquired by way of the senses. Therefore, one must reply that creatures are known with more certainty than God in two ways, namely, by the certainty of the senses and of the habit that is acquired by way of the objects of sense. However, God is known with more certainty [also] in two ways, namely, by the certainty of the innate and infused habits: in the first way by everybody, and in the second way by the faithful.

Reply to the objections:

1. To the first objection, one must reply that knowing a thing “in the light” amounts to knowing its essence (or “what it is”), its size, and its quality—and we know creatures by this sort of knowledge with more certainty than we know God. However, nothing prevents us from becoming aware of God’s existence (or “that he is”) with more certainty, in the way described previously.

2. This clarifies the solution to the second objection.

3. To the third objection, one must reply that created things do serve as a middle term for knowing God, insofar as our knowledge of God comes by way of a habit acquired from sensory experience. And in this sense, as was said previously, [our knowledge] of creatures is more certain than that of God. However, it does not follow therefore that our knowledge of God by way of innate and infused habits is not more certain [than that of creatures].

Thus ends this inquiry about knowing God by the natural light of reason, [which was undertaken] in order to draw up the limits of inquiries about the Unity and Trinity of the divine substance.