ON THE FITTINGNESS OF THE INCARNATION SHOULD NATURE NOT HAVE FALLEN DUE TO SIN: WOULD THERE BE ANY REASON FOR THE INCARNATION?

SH 3, In un., Tr1, Q2, T2 (n. 23), 41–42

It is shown that there would be:

a. Dionysius says [in On the Divine Names 4.1 and 7; The Celestial Hierarchy 4.1]: “The good is diffusive of its being (esse)”—for we say that in the divine the Father spreads his goodness to the Son through generation, and both spread [their goodness] to the Holy Spirit through procession, and this diffusion is within the Trinity, and this is the highest [form of] diffusion before creatures come into existence. Therefore, if the greatest good does not spread itself to creatures when they do come into existence, one can still think of a greater diffusion than the diffusion [that happens within the Trinity]. Therefore, if the diffusion of the greatest good is to be greatest, it is more fitting that it should spread itself to creatures [as well]. However, one cannot think of this diffusion [that extends to creatures] as the greatest unless [God] himself unites himself to a creature; therefore, it is fitting that God should unite himself to a creature, and most [fitting that he should unite himself] to a human creature, as has been shown; therefore, even if one were to assume that [human] creatures did not fall, still the greatest good should have been united with them.

b. Blessedness is only in God; a rational creature can be beatified in its entirety, but the rational creature that is the human being has two types of cognition, namely, sensory and intellective, and takes pleasure in both; therefore, if the human being can be beatified in its entirety, therefore, [it must happen] according to both the senses and the intellect; therefore, the human being must be beatified in God in respect to both faculties. However, if one takes God in himself and in his own nature, the senses cannot be beatified in him, but the intellect alone. Indeed, the senses are only delighted and beatified in something sensory or bodily; therefore, if the human being in its entirety is to be beatified in God, God must be in a body accessible to the senses; however, it is not fitting for God to assume just any corporeal nature, but only the human, as was said.

c. Three scenarios are logically possible: three persons in a single substance; the opposite of this, that is, three substances in a single person; and in between these two scenarios, three persons in three substances. Now, one of the opposite scenarios—three persons in one substance—does really obtain, namely, in the Trinity. So does the intermediate scenario—three persons in three substances—when three human beings or three angels are present (alternatively, if one takes one person of the Trinity, one angel, and one human being). Therefore, the third scenario should also obtain, namely, one person in three substances. But this can only happen through a union of the divine and human natures. Indeed, no other creature, except the human being, contains two substances, namely, spiritual and corporeal, or soul and body. Also, no creature can perfect the human being by uniting with it: indeed, no angel can accomplish this, because the human being is equal to an angel as far as his or her superior part is concerned. Therefore, in order to achieve perfection in the order of things, it is fitting that the divine nature be united to the human nature in a single person, so that just as there are three persons in one nature and three persons in three natures, so there would be three natures—namely, divine nature, body, and soul—in one person.

d. We find the unity of nature in three persons, namely, in God, and this is a sign of perfection in [that] nature. Also, we find the unity of person in multiple natures, namely, in the human being. But if existing in multiple persons is a sign of perfection in a nature, then being able to exist in multiple natures should be a sign of perfection in a person. Now, what is greater in perfection must always be attributed to God, as far as both nature and person are concerned. But then, just as the divine nature exists in multiple persons, so the divine person should be able to exist in multiple natures. However, this situation cannot obtain from all eternity, because no plurality of natures could exist from all eternity. Therefore, some divine person must have begun to exist in multiple natures in the course of time. But the only way this is possible is if a divine person is united to a creature. Therefore, it is fitting, in order to manifest the perfection of divine personhood, that the divine nature be united to a created nature through a divine person. However, as has been said, it is not fitting [that it be united] to any nature, but only to the human nature. Equally, as has also been said, [it is] not [fitting that] any person of the Trinity [be united to the human nature], but only the Son. It remains, then, that even in the absence of the fall of the human nature, a union [of two natures] in the person of the Son would still be fitting. An authoritative statement to the contrary:

1. “There was no point for us to be born except to be redeemed.” Therefore, the incarnation is useless unless redemption is to follow. However, if there were no fall, there would be no redemption. Therefore, if we hypothesize that [the human] nature did not fall, the incarnation would be absolutely fruitless. But then it would not befit God to become incarnate, because it does not befit God to do anything in vain.

Reply:

One must concede, without prejudice, that even in the absence of the fall of the human nature, still the incarnation would be fitting, according to what St. Bernard says commenting on Jonah 1:12, “For my sake this great tempest is upon you.” He expounds this statement about the Son of God, saying that Lucifer foresaw that the Son of God would assume a rational creature and be united to it, [that is, he] “saw and envied it.” It was this envy that precipitated the fall of the devil and moved him to tempt man, whose fortune he envied, in order to ensure that the human nature through sin would no longer be worthy of being assumed by and united to God. It is clear from this that Lucifer thought that the union of the human and divine natures would occur in the absence of the fall of the human nature, and even that he thought of the fall as an impediment to such a union, which is the reason he arranged for the fall to happen. Based on this, it remains that even in the absence of the fall, the incarnation would still be fitting. In addition, what Augustine says in The Soul and the Spirit [9] suggests the same thing: “God became man in order to beatify in himself the entire human being, so that whether one would enter internally through the intellect or exit externally through the senses, he or she could ‘find pastures’ in their Creator: internal pastures in the knowledge of the deity, and external pastures in the flesh of the Savior.” But this reason remains even in the absence of the fall of the human nature.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the objection, one must reply that that authoritative statement should be understood as presupposing the guilt of the fallen nature. Hence, the meaning is that if the Son of God were to be incarnated but did not redeem the guilt, it would be of no use to the human nature because it would neither be beatified nor redeemed. But the situation is different if one assumes the absence of the fall of the human nature, as was just discussed….

ABOUT THREE OPINIONS (AND DOUBTS THAT ACCOMPANY THEM) ON THE ONE WHO IS CONSTITUTED AS A RESULT OF THE ASSUMPTION [OF HUMAN NATURE]

SH 3, In un., Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M4, C1 (n. 46), 68–70

I. The first of these opinions, first, says that as a result of the incarnation of the divine Word, some man was constituted out of a rational soul and human flesh, who subsisted prior to the union by a natural, not temporal priority. Second, it says that that man began to be God and that God began to be that man, so that God was made man, and conversely, that man was made God. Third, because there are two complete substances in Christ, each of which constitutes a “what” or quiddity (quid) in the unity of the person, it says that Christ is two, according to the statement [of Augustine in Against an Arian Sermon 8] “a giant of double substance.” Fourth, it says that the one who assumes is that which is assumed—that is, the Son of God is man, or the son of man—but neither plays the role of a substrate or supposit to one another. Fifth and last, it says that that man’s nature is not divine and human, but only human.

The second opinion says, first, that that man is not merely constituted out of these two, namely, out of a rational soul and human flesh, but out of three substances—namely, deity, soul, and flesh—in the unity of the person—however, this does not imply that the deity there is like a part. Second, it says that the person of the Word was simple before the incarnation, but as a result of the incarnation, it became composite by reason of the assumed nature. Third, it says that the divine person assumed a “what” or quiddity: namely, not “this” or “that” man, but the human nature (which is contrary to the first opinion)—and on these grounds it says that Christ is only one, not two. Fourth, it says that it is not that that man began to be God, but vice versa, because that human supposit had no existence prior to becoming God, neither by temporal nor by natural priority—which is [also] contrary to the first opinion.

The third opinion says that those two—namely, soul and flesh—are united to the person of the Word, or to the divine nature in the Word, in such a fashion that these two or three do not constitute any one substance or person; rather, the Word of God, as it were, is clothed in these two as in a garment of sorts. Hence, it says that Christ insofar as he is man is not a “what” or a quiddity, nor did the Word begin to be a “what” as a result of the incarnation, but [rather acquired] a certain state (qualiter ens, quodam modo se habens).¹ Consequently, it seems to say that that union was not of a substantial kind, but, as it were, like that of an accident with its subject, drawing on the texts from Philippians 2:8: “And being found in fashion (habitu) as a man.”

II. These are the three opinions by themselves. Next, we must see how they are different. There are three pronouncements [on the matter]. The first of them draws a distinction between these three opinions. Since there are two natures in Christ’s hypostasis, one must (1) view each nature as constituting a “what” or quiddity in one person, or (2, 3) one [nature] as constituting a “what” and the other as [functioning] in the way of a habit (habitus). This can happen in two ways: either (2) the human nature will function as a habit, and the divine nature will constitute a “what,” or, vice versa, (3) the human nature will constitute a “what” and the divine nature would function as a habit: just like it is said about the saints that they have God through an indwelling (inhabitantem) grace, so Jesus Christ, as the holiest of holies, [has God] in the highest way, through the grace of union. The second opinion is said to assume the first position; the third opinion is said to assume the second position; and the first opinion is said to assume the third position—perhaps, because it is mostly that opinion that refers to that man as deified.

However, there are objections against that:

1. Indeed, according to the first opinion, Christ is two according to his two natures: but this would not have been the case if the divine nature were there as a habit.

2. The first opinion should be reproached more than the third, because it is simply more in accord with the faith for God to be “found in fashion (habitu) as a man” than for a man to be “found in fashion as God,” because the former is stated in scriptures, while the latter is not. Therefore, those opinions do not seem to be distinguished for the aforesaid reasons.

For this reason, others say that the difference between these opinions is as follows: the first two assert that the Word assumed a “what,” but the third asserts that he did not assume a “what” but a “state” (quomodo se habens). Also, the first opinion states that he assumed a “what” in the sense of “man,” or, more precisely, some substance that is a body-soul compound. The other opinion, however, states that he assumed a “what” in the sense of human nature, not “man.” This is why the first opinion claims that Christ is two; the second claims that he is one; the third opinion claims that Christ is not a “what” insofar as he is human, because that union is more like the union between an accident and its subject. Therefore, the first opinion concedes that God began to be man and man began to be God; the second, however, denies that the man began to be God, but claims the converse; and the third claims that he did not begin to be a “what” but in a state (quodam modo se habens).

Others distinguish [between these three opinions] in a different way, claiming that they look at the three types of existence (esse) in Christ: moral existence, natural existence, and rational existence. Thus, the first opinion considers [Christ’s] natural existence and, because there are two natures in Christ, claims that Christ is two; further, because each nature is a complete substance (which is why [Christ] is called “a giant of double substance”), it claims that God began to be man and man began to be God. The next opinion, however, considers [Christ’s] moral existence. Indeed, the name “person” denotes dignity, and dignity pertains to moral existence: this is why moral properties pertain to persons. This opinion says: because the person [here] is one, Christ is one. Further, because [two] natures are united in a person [here], in such a way that God is man and vice versa, [this opinion] claims that Christ is one. And because [in this case] one does not deal with a union of two complete substances, that is, this is not a union of two persons but of two natures (by “human nature” I understand a body-soul compound)—that is, [here we deal with] “this man” consisting of the divine and human natures—therefore, [this opinion] does not concede that a man [here] began to be God, but the opposite, and it is not man who is deified here but God who is humanized. However, the third opinion considers [Christ’s] rational existence. For this reason it claims that Christ is a “what” insofar as he is God and in a state (aliquo modo se habens) insofar as he is a man. This is on account of the existence of the human nature, which comes after the hypostasis [here] is complete. Indeed, although two natures are united in this person, one of them comes after this person is [already] in existence, and that which comes after the hypostasis is [already] in existence, does not qualify as the “what” or quiddity of that hypostasis, but as its state (qualiter ens, quomodo se habens). For this reason this [last] opinion claims that Christ is not a “what” insofar as he is a man.

This is the difference between these opinions. The third was condemned by a Decretal of Pope Alexander [III], because it verges on error, as will be made abundantly clear later….

DOUBTS ABOUT THE THIRD OPINION

SH 3, In un., Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M4, C4 (n. 56), 80–82

As far as the third opinion is concerned, there is a doubt whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a quiddity: the third opinion denies this and the first two opinions concede it. The objections go as follows:

1. Christ is both God and man; however, being God amounts to being a “what” (quid), and so does being a man; but if Christ is a quiddity insofar as he is a man, then Christ is two “whats,” and therefore two [things]—which is incongruous.

2. Suppose that Christ is one “what” by virtue of a unity [he has as] created; it is also clear that he is essentially one “what” by virtue of a unity [he has as] uncreated; but these are essentially different unities; therefore, Christ will be essentially two [things]; therefore, Christ is not [something] one.

3. Substantial forms make [things] substantially different. Suppose that there are two substantial forms in Christ that are essentially different: this would be logical if Christ were a quiddity insofar as he is a man. But then these [two forms] would create a substantial difference within Christ. Therefore, if one were to posit “humanity” as a substantial form in Christ (which would happen if he were a quiddity insofar as he is a man), in addition to “divinity,” one would have to admit that there is a substantial difference within Christ; but then he is two [things].

4. Also, “one quiddity of nature in three persons makes three persons—namely, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—into something one”; therefore, “multiple quiddities of natures [in one person] would make one person into something multiple.” Therefore, if it is inappropriate to say that Christ is multiple [things] and not one, it remains that Christ, insofar as he is a man, is not a “what,” because he is a “what” insofar as he is God. Therefore, the opinion must be true that claims that when we state that “Christ is a man,” what is meant is not that Christ is a quiddity but that he is “in a state” (aliquo modo se habens).

5. Christ, insofar as he is God, by virtue of his divine nature and by virtue of being a divine person from all eternity, has complete being—nor does his humanity add anything to that person or that nature by coming in. Therefore, since that which follows the complete being of that person and nature has the status of something added, and is not quidditative in respect to that [person and nature], it remains that Christ, insofar as he is a man, is not a quiddity.

To the contrary:

a. The Decretal of Pope Alexander: “Since Christ is perfect God and a perfect man, how would anyone dare say that Christ, insofar as he is a man, is not a quiddity? However, in order to avoid such an abuse in the Church of God, let [this position] be condemned at a gathering of Masters.” On the basis of this Decretal, it is clear that the third opinion has been condemned.

Solution:

One must reply that when we hear the expression “Christ is a man,” we need to consider either the nature of the thing or the way of speaking. If, considering the nature of the thing, one were to say that Christ, insofar as he a man, is not a “what” or “something,” this person would err without a doubt and would hold that opinion that has been condemned. However, if, considering the way of speaking, one were to say that in the expression “Christ is a man” (or “was made man”) the term “man” is not predicated of Christ as a “what” (even though he is a “what” [insofar as he is a man]) but as “being in a state” (quomodo se habens), he would not seem to be completely in error, taking into consideration the statement of the Apostle from Philippians 2:8: “being found in fashion (habitu) as a man.” Augustine, discussing this statement in 83 Questions [73], distinguishes between four different ways of “having” something (habitus).² One of these ways is when “the nature of what is had is not changed, but it receives a different shape and form” when it begins to be had. “A garment serves as an example: when it is taken off and put down, it does not have the same shape as when it is worn; this type [of having something] suits the comparison” “being found in fashion as a man.” Accordingly, we would reply to the aforesaid question that Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a “what” and “something,” but [“man”] is not predicated [of him] as a “what.” However, in order to avoid perpetuating opinions that verge on error, one should state with no further distinctions that Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a “what” and “something.”

Reply to the objections:

1–4. First, if one considers the first opinion, that Christ is “two” in the neuter,³ but not in the masculine⁴ [it must be affirmed]: indeed, he is someone (unus), that is, one person, but not something one (unum), that is, not one nature. For this reason, it is not unfitting, in one sense, to grant the reasons that demonstrate that Christ is two.

5. As for the last argument, when it is objected that “humanity comes in after the complete being [of Christ has been in place], and therefore is not a ‘what,’” one must reply that it is not logical. Indeed, even if it does come in subsequently, nevertheless, it is assumed into the unity of the person. In the same way, if one assumes that the soul is created before the body and it is only subsequently that the body is united to it, it would not follow on this account that the body would not be a “what” of the [complete] human being, despite the fact that it postdates the complete rational being of the soul.

However, if one considers the second opinion, it is unfitting to admit that Christ is two, for he is strictly something one. Replies to the objections:

1. To the first objection: when it is said that “Christ is God and man,” “if the meaning is that the coordinating conjunction joins two supposits, then it is false; however, if the meaning is that the coordinating conjunction joins two natures, then it is true”—because there is only one supposit there but different natures. As for the objection that “he is a ‘what’ insofar as he is God, and he is another ‘what’ insofar as he is a man, therefore he is two,” it is not logical, because the “‘what’ insofar as he is a man” is not numbered together with the “what” that is God, because these “whats” do not belong to the same genus.

2. To the other objection, one must reply that it is permissible to follow the Doctors in this case: although “the binary number in Christ [consists of] essential [unities], nevertheless, one of the unities of this binary number, as it were, degenerates into an accident,” namely, that unity that represents the human nature. And “therefore that binary number does not number subjects or substrates, but natures, in the same way that the number of accidents does not number subjects, but their forms.”

3. And this makes clear the solution to the other [objection], because these substantial forms essentially make natures differ, but not the supposit, because “one of them,” as has been said, “as it were, degenerates into an accident,” for the reason that it comes in later.⁵

4–5. And this makes clear solutions to the other objections….

IS A PERSON ASSUMED?

SH 3, In un., Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D2, C4 (n. 35), 54–56

Arguments in favor:

1. First, following a statement by John Damascene, Book III, c. 7:⁶ “God the Word, when he became incarnate, did not assume that [type of] nature that is observed by mere contemplation⁷—for this would not be an incarnation but a pretense thereof—nor [the type] that is observed in a species … but [the type] that is in an individual … for he assumed the foundations of our materiality: not as already subsisting on their own and presenting an individual with a prior existence, but as subsisting in his own hypostasis” [i.e., the person of the Son]. Therefore, he assumed the [type of] “nature that is in an individual”; but the nature that exists in an individual is the person; therefore, he assumed a person—for “person” is an “individual substance of a rational nature,”⁸ which [definition] matches the [type of] “nature that is in an individual.”

2. Richard of St. Victor says in On the Trinity [4.15] that “the divine person is defined by origen, the angelic person by quality, and the human person in both ways.” However, in the assumed human nature there is a separate property of origen compared to [the one] in the Son of God, because [Jesus Christ] descends from his [human] mother according to the flesh and from the [divine] Father according to his divine nature. Also, there is another property of quality or form [in the human nature].⁹ Therefore, there would be two different personhoods.¹⁰

3. Anselm says in On the Incarnation of the Word [6] that the Son of God did not assume humanity in an unqualified sense, but this man, namely, Jesus. Therefore, since this man Jesus is an “individual substance of a rational nature,” [the Son of God] assumed a person.

4. According to another definition, “person” is a thing that is distinguished by a property that is a mark of dignity. Hence, Boethius says in On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ [2] that “this name suits substances of greater dignity.” But then, if when a man is assumed, his nature is exalted but his property or dignity is not diminished in any way, it remains that the person is assumed.

5. Three acts here concur simultaneously: to create, to assume, and to unite. It is clear that to create is prior than to assume; thus, the termination of [the act of] creation is the beginning of [the act of] assuming; but then, since [the act of] creation terminates at an actual being, an actual being will be assumed, and thereby a person, because in this case the “actual being” is a person.

To the contrary:

a. Augustine, in To Peter on Faith [17.60]: “God assumed the human nature, not a human person.” Therefore, he has not taken on a person.

b. Boethius, Against Nestorius:¹¹ if in Christ “a union of natures took place while two persons remained, no one thing could have come out of these two…. Therefore, according to Nestorius, Christ is no one thing, and thereby completely nothing, for something that is not one thereby has no existence whatsoever. However, we clearly and truly profess that Christ does exist; therefore, we imply that he is some one thing. But if it is so, there is no doubt that Christ must be one person.”

c. If a person is assumed, there must be two persons in Christ. Indeed, one cannot say that “a human person is assumed” if [what was assumed] was not a person prior to its assumption; in this case, Christ would contain different natures and diverse persons; therefore, he would be one neither in nature nor in person. But then [Christ] would be no different from other humans as far as the union of God and man in him is concerned—which is most absurd. It remains, therefore, that no person was assumed.

Solution:

One must concede the latter and reply to the objections by saying that three distinctive features are required for something to be a person: singularity, incommunicability, and dignity. The distinctive feature of singularity is present in every soul that is in a body, for it is separated from every other soul by some singular property. The distinctive feature of incommunicability is present in everything singular, such as this donkey, an animal; however, no soul existing in a body has this, because the soul and the body come together (communicent) to constitute one being. The distinctive feature of dignity, however, is that which distinguishes one human being¹² from another by means of individual rationality, which is the property that has the most dignity, because, as Boethius says, “this name ‘person’ suits substances of greater dignity.” Therefore, for something to be a person, these three distinctive features are required: singularity, incommunicability, and dignity (i.e., the property with most dignity). One must say, then, that the first distinctive feature, namely, singularity, is in Christ’s soul, as well as in his body; the first and second distinctive features are in the soul-body composite (it is this [pair of distinctive features] that is meant when I say “this man” pointing at a soul-body composite, i.e., something singular). However, the first, second, and third [distinctive features] are in the God-man Christ. And although [Christ] could have the first and second [distinctive features] by virtue of his human nature, nevertheless, he could have the third only by virtue of the divine person; therefore, [the trait of] being a person [is] not [present] in Christ by virtue of his human nature. Indeed, “person” is defined by the most excellent property with most dignity; however, the property with the most dignity in Christ does not come from his human nature but from the divine person; it remains, then, that no [human] person is assumed. Indeed, one must distinguish persons based on what is nobler in them. Therefore, since the noblest feature in an assumed man is to be the Son of God, it is this [i.e., being the Son of God] that gives him personal distinction: to be one and the same person with the Son of God.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the objection based on John Damascene’s statement about “assuming the [type of] nature that is in an individual,” it is true; however, it does not follow from this that he assumed a person, because the term “individual” denotes merely the distinctive feature of singularity or incommunicability, but not dignity, which defines “person.”

2. To the second objection, based on Richard, one must reply that although in the assumed man there is a separate property of origen compared to [the one] in the Son of God, nevertheless, it does not follow that there is another person, because “person” implies the degree of completion and finality that does not allow for a closer union, as well as the sort of distinction that is accomplished by means of a property of greater dignity, which do not suit Christ as man.

3. To the third objection, based on Anselm, one must reply that when he says, “he assumed this man,” this does not denote the person—because both the Son of God and the son of man share the same one person—but it denotes the individual, namely, this singular [compound] that is constituted out of body and soul. And when one objects that “this is an individual substance of a rational nature, and therefore a person,” one must reply that the sense here is the same as in the term “individual,” with the [aforesaid] triple distinction implied. Hence, one must reject [the conclusion that he assumes a person], because [this substance] is not individual [to the extent of the person], because it is still capable of a union with a substance of greater dignity.

4. To the fourth objection, the reply is already evident, because neither is a person assumed nor is there a diminution of dignity, but [it is simply that] personhood stems from a property of greater dignity.

5. To the fifth objection, one must say that sometimes something is created separately, and sometimes [it is created] in something else. If it has been created separately, not in something else, and it is an individual of rational nature, it will be a person. However, if it is created in something else, it will not be a person even though it may be an individual of rational nature, because it is not a substance that is distinct from everything else. And in this sense, not even the rational soul, which is created by means of its infusion into a body, is a person. In a similar way, this composite of body and soul that is assumed by means of creation and created by means of assumption, thereby cannot be called a person. And if Anselm’s statement from On the Incarnation of the Word is used as an objection, to the effect that “God is a person, the assumed man is a person, therefore there are two persons in Christ,” I reply [Anselm, ibid., 6] that “just as the Father is God and the Son is God, but this does not imply that there are multiple gods, but only one God, in the same way, in Christ, God is a person, and man is a person, but this does not imply that there are two persons, but only one. And the Son of God cannot be referred to without referring to the son of man, and vice versa, because the two are identical, and the Word and the assumed man share the same group of properties. At the same time, different persons cannot share the same group of properties or be predicated one of another.” …

IS CHRIST AN INDIVIDUAL INSOFAR AS HE IS A MAN?

SH 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, M4, C3, Ar3 (n. 52), 75–77

One speaks of two types of individuation: first and second. The first type is rooted in the hypostasis itself; one hypostasis of itself is distinguished from any other by virtue of its singular property; in this sense we say that Peter is different from Paul. The second type is based on the properties that subsequently come to be in this hypostasis. In this sense, individuation stands for a combination of properties, which are never the same in another [individual]. Thus, “individual” can mean one of these two things. The first meaning is that of “hypostasis,” which is the singular substance¹³ itself by reason of the singularity of substance: indeed, even if one took away all the properties that exist in Peter and Paul, still they would remain two distinct substances. The second meaning of “individual” is that of a combination of properties, which are never the same in another [individual].

It is demonstrated that Jesus Christ,¹⁴ insofar as he is a man, is an individual in both senses:

a. Indeed, it is clear that he is an individual in the first sense. For insofar as he is a man, he is an individual in substance,¹⁵ which of itself is separate from other humans. Also in the second sense, because insofar as he is Jesus or a man, he possesses a combination of properties, which cannot be found in anyone else. Therefore, he is an individual in both senses of “individuation.”

b. Just as it is clear that Socrates is distinguished from other [humans] by means of his singular substance, in the same way Christ, insofar as he is a man, is [distinguished] from other humans. And just as Socrates is distinguished from others by means of his qualitative characteristics and size, in the same way Jesus Christ, insofar as he is a man, is [distinguished] from other humans. However, this is what makes Socrates an individual. Therefore, it remains that Jesus also should be considered an individual.

To the contrary:

1. John Damascene says [in On the Orthodox Faith 3.3]: “No common species must be posited or assumed in the Lord Jesus Christ.” Therefore, Christ is not an individual belonging to the species “man,” nor to any other; therefore, he is not an individual insofar as he is a man.

2. If Christ, insofar as he is a man, is an individual, then he is a certain “who” (quis) insofar as he is a man, as well as, similarly, a certain “who” insofar as he is God, because he is a person [that way]; therefore, he is two “whos”; but the position that God and man do not constitute one Christ contradicts the Creed [“Quicumque”].

Solution:

In order to clarify the question, one must note that there is a difference between hypostasis, person, individual, and supposit (i.e., a substrate or underlying nature). A hypostasis is some incommunicable existence or substance [that consists] of any distinguishing [factors] whatsoever. This is according to Richard of St. Victor [On the Trinity 4.3], who sometimes uses “hypostasis” in the sense of “person.” A person, however, both in name and in essence, is a rational incommunicable substance that is distinguished by its property of dignity. It is clear from this that every person is a hypostasis, but not vice versa. Indeed, the hypostases of rational natures, which imply dignity, are their persons. However, the hypostases of other natures do not constitute persons, except grammatically speaking—and even this is in relation to acts of rational natures, namely, acts of speaking: the first person is the one who speaks, the second is the one to whom speech is directed, and the third is the one about which speech is. Now, “individual” has two meanings, as was said previously: in one sense, it is an individual substance, which is of itself different from any other; in another sense, it is [something] that possesses a combination of properties that is not matched [by a combination of properties] in anything else. Further, an underlying nature, or a supposit, signifies a compound of form and matter, for example, a soul united with a body, as far as composite things go. In simple things, however, it is the thing (res) itself that is referred to as the underlying nature. However, in the proper sense, “essence” is “that which gives a thing existence”; “nature” is that, by which [a thing] functions, acts, or undergoes [something]; “what is” (quid est) is the underlying nature [or supposit]. For example, if one refers to “God and deity,” “God” refers to that which exists (quod est), and “deity” refers to that, by which it exists (quo est). “Who is” (qui est), then, refers to the supposit, which is a “thing of nature,” such as one of the persons in God or one of the humans among human beings. These observations suggest that “hypostasis” is common to “person” and “individual.” Hence, Christ, insofar as he is the Son of God, is a “hypostasis” in the sense of a “person.” However, insofar as he is a man, he is a “hypostasis” in the sense of an “individual.” It remains, then, that he has been a person from all eternity, but not an individual.

Replies to the objections:

1. A reply to the statement by John Damascene is clear from what has been said. It must be understood in the following sense: “No common species must be posited in Christ,” that is, it is not appropriate to predicate of Christ a common species, which would contain both divine and human natures and, as it were, conflate both, namely, divinity and humanity. However, one can admit [predicating of Christ] a common species insofar as his human nature is concerned, [that is, the one he shares in common] with other humans.

2. To the second and last argument, one must reply that “individual” or individual substance constitutes the middle between “person” and “underlying nature” (or supposit); however, a middle must harmonize with its extremes; therefore, individual substance must have something in common with the extremes. Therefore, since there are multiple underlying natures in Christ, but only one person, one must say of the “human individual” [in him] that it is both something different from that, according to which he is God, and not different. [They say] the latter [i.e., that it is not different] when they refer to the person, and [they say] the former [i.e., that it is different, when they refer] to his underlying nature. And this is the way to make sense of a number of authoritative statements.

To the objection that “he is a certain ‘who’ [insofar as he is a man] and another ‘who’ [insofar as he is God], therefore, he is two ‘whos,’” one must reply that this is not logical. Indeed, “two” refers to “numerically one and numerically one,” but this mode of speaking is valid [only] of things whose positions are distinct. However, no such situation obtains as regards the individual substance of the son of man and the person of the Son of God, which are united without any distance between them, in such a way that the son of man is the Son of God and vice versa….

IS CHRIST ONE OR TWO [THINGS]?

SH 3, In un., Tr1, Q4, Ti1, D3, M4, C3, Ar1 (n. 50), 73–74

That he is [two]:

1. First, there is an authoritative statement of Augustine in Enchiridion [35], which is quoted in Book III of [Lombard’s] Sentences [6.2]: “Both substances, divine and human, are one single Son of God the Father, but [he is] one thing on account of the Word, and another on account of his humanity.” Therefore, Christ is one thing and another thing; therefore, he is two.

2. Isidore in On the Trinity [i.e., Sent. 1.14.5]: “[One] ‘mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus’ [1 Timothy 2:5]; although he is one thing on the Father’s side, and another on the Virgin’s, he is nevertheless not [one and] another one.”¹⁶ Therefore, Christ is one thing and another thing; therefore, he is multiple things (in the neuter).¹⁷

3. Anselm in On the Incarnation of the Word [6]: “God and man in Christ are not two different ones (alius), although God is one thing (aliud) and man is another.” Therefore, [he is two].

4. Those things are different whose definitions or substantial natures (rationes) are different; but the natures of God and man are different; therefore, because Christ is both God and man, he is different things.

5. Something of Christ is the same as what the Father is (for he is God), and something of him is not the same (for he is a man); therefore, he is two, and not something that is one.

To the contrary:

a. Bernard, in To Pope Eugene, distinguishes between different degrees of unity. Among them, according to him, is the highest degree of unity, by which the three persons are one by the unity of substance. Second, he says, there is that [type of] unity, by which, conversely, three substances are [united] in one person. Therefore, the unity of three natures in Christ is greater than the unity of two natures in the human being. But then, since the human being is not considered to be multiple on account of its two natures, but is seen as something one, neither should Christ be considered to be multiple but should be seen as something one.

b. Boethius says in On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ [4]: “Every thing that exists, insofar as it exists, is something one.” But we profess that Christ truly exists; therefore, we acknowledge that he is something one.

Solution:

One must reply that there is a difference¹⁸ between saying “this is that” and saying “this is of that.” Also, it is appropriate to refer to the difference between “nature” and a “thing of a nature”¹⁹ in all things apart from the First, that is, God. One must say, then, that although there are multiple natures in Christ, they are not predicated of Christ in the subject [case, i.e., in the nominative], that is, we do not say that “Christ himself is [multiple] natures.” Now [we do not predicate in the nominative] insofar as his human nature is concerned, because as far as his divine nature is concerned, “nature” and a “thing of a nature” are not different, because [in the divine] the person is the essence, and there is no difference between saying “this is that” and “this is of that,” because [in the divine] the person is the divine essence and the person is of the divine essence. However, as far as his human nature is concerned, there is a difference. Indeed, it is false to say, “Christ is the human nature,” but it is true to say that “Christ is of the human nature” or “one who has the human nature.” Therefore, since the human nature is not predicated of the person, namely, of Christ, essentially, but only obliquely,²⁰ Christ is not said to be multiple things on account of the plurality of natures [in him], because things that are predicated of something in oblique [cases]²¹ do not increase it in number. Therefore, it does not follow from the aforesaid arguments that Christ is multiple things, but that he is of multiple things—just as it does not follow that a human being is multiple things just because he is a body-soul compound, and the soul is some one thing, and the body is some one thing.

Replies to the objections:

1–3. To the authoritative statements that are used in objections one must reply that they should be understood in the sense of oblique [predication]. Therefore, when it is said that Christ is “one thing and another thing,” this must be understood [to mean] “of one and another²² nature,” namely, divine and human. Therefore, the proper sense is that it is the predication of the type “this is of that” that is used here, not of the type “this is that.”

4. As for the fourth argument, that is, the objection that “those things are different whose definitions are different,” one must reply that this is true where something is predicated of something else in the subject case and formally, not obliquely; however, the consequence does not hold of predication in indirect cases. Hence, the following does not follow: “the definitions of the corporeal and the incorporeal natures are different; however, the human being has both the corporeal and the incorporeal natures; therefore, the human being is different things.”

5. The reply to the fifth argument is already clear. Indeed, when we say, “Christ the man is something that is not the Father,” the term “something” stands for “man,” not for the divine essence. However, when we say, “[he] is something that is the Father,” [the term “something”] stands for the divine essence. Therefore, it does not follow: “therefore, he is something that is the Father and something that is not the Father,” but rather there is a fallacy of the figure of speech here that concludes from multiple “standings for” to a single one, because in the conclusion the term “something” should stand for only one thing; therefore, the conclusion must hold either only for the divine essence or only for “man.” …

DOES THE UNION TAKE PLACE IN THE PERSON?

SH 3, In un., Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C1 (n. 57), 82–84

The objections are as follows:

1. When something is united or combined [with something else], this does not constitute personal unity: indeed, a per-son is something per se,²³ and therefore its unity is not one of combination; however, the unity of the Son of God when he is united to the flesh is not a unity of the per se kind, but one of combination; therefore, it is not a personal unity. The major premise is clarified by the Master in Sentences [3.10.1], where he raises the question “whether Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a person.” He says there that “the soul is not a per-son,” even though it is a “rational substance, because it is not per se, but is combined” with the flesh. Therefore, the union of the Son of God with the flesh is not a union [that happens] in the person.

2. Nothing can be both a middle and an extreme in the same sense; but the divine person and the human nature are the extremes of this union; therefore, this union does not happen in the person, because that in which²⁴ the union of the extremes happens is the middle.

3. Nothing is terminated at itself; therefore, if the [extremes that are] united are terminated at that in which this union happens, it is clear that none of the [extremes that are] united is identical with that in which this union happens; therefore, if in this union the person—namely, the Son of God himself—is one of the [extremes that are] united, this union does not happen in the person.

To the contrary:

a. If this union does not take place in the person, then it happens in a nature: either created or uncreated. If it takes place in the uncreated, that is, divine, nature, then the divine and human natures become one through this union—which is impossible. Similarly, if it takes place in the created nature, the same incongruity will follow, because then, diverse natures will become one. Therefore, this union does not take place in a nature; but it can only be in a nature or in the person; therefore, it takes place in the person.

b. There are two ways in which a union can happen: sometimes it happens in such a way that one [of the united elements] is in a dominant position over the other, and sometimes not. When a union happens in the first way, then the dominant element compels the other to unite with it; and when it happens in the second way, then neither of them compels the other to unite with it, but a third thing comes of the two. Now in this union, the divine nature is the dominant one; therefore, it compels the human nature to unite with it; but it cannot compel it to a unity of nature, where one nature becomes identical with the other; therefore, it compels it to a unity in the person; therefore, this unity takes place in the person, and not in a nature, either created or uncreated.

Solution:

One must reply that, essentially, “one” is used in two senses, unqualified and qualified. There are also two ways of predicating “one” in an unqualified sense: one through unity and one through union. What is one through unity is that in which there is no plurality and which neither exists in many nor [consists] of many; for example, God [is one in this sense]. At the same time, one through union is that which exists in many or [consists] out of many.

What is one in a qualified sense is one by way of placing one next to another…. There are three ways of predicating “one” in this sense. In some cases, one is united to another through placing them side by side in such a way that neither acquires a name or a property from the other. In other cases, one is placed next to another in such a way that it acquires from the other a certain property, but not a name. In yet other cases, [one is placed next to another] in such a way that it acquires from the other a name, but not a property. For example, one stone is placed next to another, making a pile, that is, creating something one out of them through aggregation—and yet, one stone acquires neither a name nor a property from another stone. In the second sense of “placing next to each other,” an apple or an aromatic herb is united to a hand—for an apple placed into a hand gives it its scent, so that the hand acquires some property from it, but not its name. In the third sense of “placing next to each other,” a garment is united with the person who is dressed in it; in this case this person does receive a name from the garment and is called “dressed” but acquires no property from this garment.

As for [the type of] one in an unqualified sense that is one through union, it is also predicated in several ways. One way is when two things are united while the natures of both remain intact, with no change. Another way is when the natures of both do not remain intact. There are two scenarios here as well: either both natures are changed or just one of them is. One of the natures is changed, for example, when one [of the things united] dominates the other and compels the other into unity with it or its nature. An example of this is when a large quantity of wine is united with a little bit of water. An example of both natures changing is when water is united with honey, forming a third thing. Also, there are two ways of achieving a union where both natures remain intact: either their union results in something third, or it does not, but one becomes the other. An example of the first is the union of soul and body, which results in a human being, which is composed of both components: indeed, neither the nature of the soul nor of the body is changed here. An example of the second type of union is when a branch of a pear tree is united to an apple—or some other—tree, on to which it is grafted: indeed, in this case both natures—namely, pear and apple—remain intact, and apples never become pears, nor vice versa—and yet no third entity results from this union—such as a tree that is neither a pear tree nor an apple tree—but one emerges out of the other, namely, a pear tree out of an apple tree, because as a result of the grafting, the dominant [entity] compels the other to unite with itself, so that it grows out of it, but is not it.

The type of union, then, where the other [member] is changed, takes place in the member that compels the other to [unite with] its nature. The type of union where both members are changed takes place in a third thing, namely, in a third nature, and this third emerges or comes into existence from the other two. However, the union where one comes out of the other, as in the example of grafting, takes place in one hypostasis, in such a way that there is one hypostasis of two natures there. Hence, when one grafts a pear branch on to an apple tree stump and they are united through this grafting, the [grafting] results in one hypostasis—that is, one tree—comprising both pear and apple, which have two completely different natures. In this case we have something that is one in hypostasis, not one in nature.

Taking this into consideration, we must reply, to the extent of our abilities (for we are not worthy to unloose the latchet of his shoes, that is, to explain this sacred union), that the union of humanity and deity is of the sort where one comes out of the other, and not of the sort where one becomes the other or where the two become a third thing. In this respect we read in James 1:21: “receive with meekness the engrafted word,” that is, the Son of God united with the human nature. Thus, since the divine person is the dominant element in this union, it compels the human nature to unite with its hypostasis. For this reason humanity is not a part of the divine person, but is of it (de illa), because both [natures] share only one hypostasis, while at the same time each nature maintains its integrity. It is for this reason that James says: “receive the engrafted word.” It is clear, then, that this union takes place in one divine hypostasis or person.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the first argument to the contrary, one must reply that one meaning of “per se” excludes “being with” something else (in this sense “per se” is equivalent to “not being with something else”), and another meaning excludes “dependence on” something else (in this sense “per se” is equivalent to “not being dependent on something else”). Therefore, when one states that a “person” is a “per se being,” this is true in the sense that it does not depend on anything else. However, this does not preclude it from being with something else. Therefore, a person is a “per se being” in the sense of not depending on anything else. However, it can be with something else. In the same way, a substance is called a per se being despite the fact that it might be conjoined to something else, because it does not depend on that [thing with which it is conjoined]. In this sense an apple [stump] united to a pear [branch, as in grafting,] is a per se being, because one does not depend on the other. Similarly, the Son of God is a per se being in this union, because his hypostasis or person does not depend on the human nature.

However, one might object: no unity of the “united” type is a personal unity. One must reply to this that something can be united to something else in such a way that the former is compelled into this unity with the latter and participates in it, or in such a way that the former gives its own unity to the latter and compels it into a unity with itself. For example, this is the way that an apple [branch] dominates when it is grafted on to a pear [stump] by compelling the pear [stump] into a unity with its own hypostasis. On the other hand, the pear [stump] is united to [the apple branch] in such a way that it participates in this unity and is drawn toward it. Therefore, the unity of that which is united by way of being drawn into a unity with something else is not a personal unity. However, the unity of that which is united by way of drawing something else [into a unity with itself] is [personal]. This is the way the Son of God is united to the human nature, because he draws it into a unity with his hypostasis, and not vice versa; therefore, his unity is personal.

2. To the second objection, that “nothing can be both a middle and an extreme in the same sense,” one must reply that when one says, “this tree [trunk] is united with this graft,” we can consider “this tree” insofar as it is an instantiation²⁵ of nature or insofar as it is an individual, because, as will become clear later, both considerations are acceptable. Now, insofar as it is an instantiation of nature, it does function as an extreme of this union. However, insofar as it is an individual, in this sense it is an intermediary²⁶ of this union. Indeed, in this sense it is that in which this union takes place, because this thing, namely, a tree, is united with the graft in its individuality or hypostasis. Similarly, if the Son of God is understood as an instantiation of nature, in this sense he is an extreme of this union. However, insofar as he is a person, in this sense he is an intermediary of this union, because the Word is united with the human nature in the person. Thus, [the Son of God] is both an intermediary and an extreme in different [senses].

3. To the third objection, that “nothing is terminated at itself,” one must reply that this is true [if the thing in question is taken] in the same sense. But consider the following example: a circle both begins a line and is terminated at it; therefore, one and the same thing can terminate at itself, as long as it is taken in different senses. Similarly, one must reply, insofar as the person that is the Son of God is taken as an instantiation of nature, it functions as an extreme of this union. However, insofar as it is taken as a person, in this sense it is an intermediary and terminates this union—and thus is terminated at itself, as long as it is taken in different senses.

But then there is a further question: that person who you say is the intermediary of this union is united. But in what is it united, then, as a union takes place in something? Similarly, there will be a question about that in which you will say it is united, as to where that is united, and thus there will be an infinite regress. One must reply here that one extreme is united with another extreme in a different fashion compared to how an intermediary is united with its extremes. Indeed, extremes are not united with each other [directly], but by means of an intermediary, while an intermediary is itself [directly] united with its extremes. And for this reason it is improper to question where the union of an intermediary is, because it is united by itself, not through some other intermediary. One can give a similar reply about the person….

DOES THIS UNION PRODUCE ANY CHANGE IN WHAT IS SO UNITED?

SH 3, In un., Tr1, Q4, Ti2, C7, Ar1 (n. 63), 92–93

The objections are as follows:

1–2. To be changed means to be in a different state now compared to previously; however, that which is now something different compared to before is in a different state now compared to before; therefore, that which is now something different compared to before has changed. However, the Word through its union with the flesh is something different compared to what it was before; therefore, this union produces a change in the divine nature. Indeed, to be changed means exactly to be in a different state now compared to previously; but to be something now that one was not before is a greater [difference] than to be in a different state now compared to before; therefore, if the latter [difference] amounts to a change, so does the former; however, the Word in this union is something (aliquid) that it was not before, because now it is a man and it was not that previously; therefore, it has changed.

3. That which transitions from nonexistence to existence undergoes change; therefore, that which transitions from some [form of] nonexistence to existence [of this sort] undergoes change; however, the Son of God as a result of the incarnation transitions from not-being-man to being man; therefore, he is changed as a result of this union.

To the contrary:

a. All change implies imperfection; however, the eternal Word is in no way imperfect; therefore, it cannot undergo, nor has it undergone change. Bernard [in On Consideration 5.6.17] says in this regard: “God is always one and the same, one with himself, remaining in the same state.” Psalms [101:28]: “but you are the same, and your years shall have no end.”

Solution:

One must note that there are several ways things are united. In one way, both elements of the union are changed, for example, when water is mixed with wine. In another way, only one of the elements is changed: for example, when the sunlight is united with the air, the light in this union does not change nor receive any disposition that it did not have previously. Even though right now it is “illumining” something and previously it was not, this does not create a new disposition in the light, but in the recipient, because now it is “illumined,” but previously it was not. Taking this into consideration, one must reply that the union between the Word and flesh produces no change in the Word, but the change is only in the humanity that now receives the light of divinity and previously it did not, and this causes no change in the eternal light.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the first objection, one must reply that “something is in a different state now compared to previously” either on account of a change in this thing itself or on account of a change in something else, which is now related differently to the first thing compared to before. For example, we call the sun “illumining” based on how it acts on the air [now], despite the fact that it did not do so previously—and yet the sun is not changed in itself, but it is only the air that is related to it differently now compared to before, while the sun itself remains the same as it was before. Therefore, I say that the Word is not in a different state now compared to [the state it was in] before, but something—namely, humanity—is related differently to the Word now compared to before.

2. The reply to the second objection is similar.

3. To the third objection, one must reply that as a result of this union, the Son of God does not transition from some form of nonbeing to some form of being, but something that is related to it, namely, the human nature, transitions from not-being-divine to being divine through a union with the Word in one person [that leads] to one personal existence….

IS CHRIST GOD INSOFAR AS HE IS A MAN?

SH 3, Tr1, Q4, T1, D3, M4, C3, Ar2 (n. 51), 74–75

Objections:

1. Everything that is predicated of something insofar as it is itself, either acts as its per se accident, or is its definition, or part of its definition, or its effect; however, God does not relate to Christ insofar as (secundum quod) he is a man in any of these ways; therefore, Christ is not God insofar as he is a man.

2. Christ, insofar as he is a man, is a rational mortal animal; however, if these traits are repugnant to divine existence, then Christ insofar as he is man will not be God or the Son of God.

3. The next question is whether Christ is God or the Son of God insofar as he is this man. Since human existence according to its definition is repugnant to divine existence, so is the existence of this man; therefore, if he is not God insofar as he is a man, nor is he God insofar as he is this man. Furthermore, God does not relate to this man as his definition, or part of his definition, or as his per se accident or effect; therefore, he is not God insofar as he is this man.

To the contrary:

a. Christ has the power to remit sins insofar as he is a man, as in Matthew 9:6: “But that you may know that the Son of man has power on earth to forgive sins, then says he to the sick of the palsy,” etc. However, only God has the power to remit sins; therefore, Christ is God insofar as he is a man.

Solution:

One must reply that the expression “insofar as” (secundum)²⁷ has multiple meanings. For sometimes it points to a cause, sometimes to a natural condition, and sometimes to the unity of person. In addition, sometimes it points to the efficient cause, as in: “Christ was resurrected insofar as he is God”; sometimes to the material cause, as in: “Christ redeemed us insofar as he is a man”; sometimes to the formal cause, as in: “Christ is something insofar as he is God.” As for pointing to a natural condition, this happens when one says: “the Son of God remits sins insofar as he is God,” that is, “Christ remits sins insofar as he is one having the divine nature.” And sometimes it points to the unity of person, as in: “Christ created the stars insofar as he is a man,” that is, “Christ created the stars insofar as he is that one or that person, who is a man.” A similar example would be when one says: “[Christ] has the capacity to remit sins insofar as he is a man.”

Replies to the objections:

1. In this way, a reply to the first objection is clear. Indeed, if the expression “insofar as” (secundum) denotes a cause or natural condition, the statement “Christ is God or the Son of God insofar as he is a man” is false. However, if it denotes the unity of person, it is true. Indeed, if it indicates a natural condition, the meaning is: “Christ is God by reason of his human nature,” and this is false. However, insofar as [this expression] denotes the unity of person, the meaning is: “Christ is God insofar as he is one who is a man,” and this is true.

2. To the second objection, one must reply that it is natures or essences that receive definitions, not persons or individuals. Hence, natures that are diverse according to their definitions [can] belong to one and the same individual: indeed, the definitions of “white” and “man” are different, but an individual can be both white and man. Similarly, although the definitions of God and man are different, one and the same person can be both God and man.

3. To the third objection, one must reply that one must analyze the expression “Christ is God insofar as he is this man.” Indeed, the pronoun “this” can point to an individual man, and in this case, if the expression “insofar as” denotes a cause, the statement is false. But if it denotes personal union, it is true, as is clear from what has been said. Or it can point to the person of the Son of God, with the term “man” being used appositively with it, and in that case the following statement is true in an unqualified sense: “Christ is God insofar as he is the Son of God, who is a man.”