WHAT IS ETERNAL LAW?

SH 3, P2, In1, Q un., C3 (n. 226), 316–19

Multiple definitions exist.

I. Augustine, in the book On Free Choice of the Will [1.6.15], gives this definition of the eternal law: “The notion of eternal law can be explained briefly as follows, as that by which it is just for all things to be supremely well ordered.”

One could object to this definition that it is not just for all things to be as good as they can be, even by the goodness that they are meant to have by nature. Therefore, it is not just for all things to be supremely well ordered. This conclusion is clear because “goodness” and “order” are similar. For as evil and disorder fall under one category, so goodness and order fall under another, while what is best and supremely ordered falls under yet another. And it is clear that it is not just for all things to be as good as they can be, because if this were just, all things would be best, even by the goodness they are meant to have by nature, but this is not the case. Therefore, it is not just for all things to be supremely well ordered.

II. Augustine gives another definition of the eternal law in his book, On True Religion [30.56]: “there appears to be a law above our mind which is called truth. This truth is unchangeable, which is the law of all arts, and the law of the omnipotent craftsman.”

The objections against this definition are as follows:

1. The first objection concerns the statement that “it is the law of all arts.” Now, as Augustine says in City of God [8.19], one can also encounter magical and malicious arts. If therefore the eternal law is not a law of evil, then it is not a law of evil arts. For this reason, it is wrongly said that it is “the law of all arts”; one would need to say that it is [only] the law of good arts.

2. Similarly, an objection can be raised against this definition’s claim that the “law is that of an omnipotent craftsman,” because the liberty of God is such that “it is not subjected to any law or any judgment,” as Anselm says in his book, Why God Became Man [1.12].

III. The third definition of the eternal law is posited by Augustine in On the Free Choice of the Will [1.6.15]: “the eternal law is the highest principle, which must always be obeyed; through it the evil merit a miserable life, the good merit a good life, and through it the temporal [law] is rightly promulgated and rightly changed.”

Against this definition, it can be objected:

1. The first objection is against the part [of the definition] which states that, “[the eternal law] must always be obeyed,” because it is the same as the will of God, as the highest principle is the will of God. But Augustine says [Enchiridion 101] that “a good son by a good will, wills that his father live, whom God wills to be dead.” That the father might die is according to the eternal law or will of God. Therefore, the good son is able to will rightly but contrary to the eternal law. Thus, [that law] must not always be obeyed.

2. It can be objected as follows, against that part of the definition which states that “through it, the evil merit a miserable life and the good merit a good life”: because merit and demerit stem from our will, but the prize or punishment from the law. Thus, we are not deserving or undeserving through the law. Further, we ask whether these denotations of “eternal law” operate at equal [levels of abstraction] in regard to its substance, or if one is more general than another; and also how they relate to this [law].

Solution:

The notion of divine law can be considered in three ways, just as an eternal law can. For the eternal law can be considered with reference to good and evil or to the good only. As regards the good only, it can be considered either so far as it concerns goods generally or goods specifically, which are the goods of rational creatures only. In the first sense, it is fitting to say that “the eternal law is that by which it is just for all things to be supremely well ordered.” For in its arranging capacity, the eternal law concerns both good and evil, because God makes and arranges what is good, and although he does not do evil, he arranges it. Thus, to arrange is a common act of this law with respect to [both] good and evil, and this is the way we should understand it in relation to good and evil. As regards the law as it concerns the good in general, whether it concern goods of rational or irrational creatures, this definition is fitting: “the eternal law is the law of all crafts and the law of the omnipotent craftsman.” For insofar as the law is the art of an omnipotent artificer, it concerns the divine cause, which is the art and cause of all good things. As regards the law as it concerns the good that pertains to the rational creature only, this definition is fitting: “the eternal law is the highest reason, which must always be obeyed.” For the rational creature must be ordered through laws; thus, the temporal law is promulgated by humans to govern them. And so, as it befits this [eternal law] to produce temporal laws, as stated in the definition, it is clear that this [i.e., the production of temporal laws] concerns a rational creature. Similarly, the clause “that which must always be obeyed” pertains to it with respect to the rational creature, because the act of obedience pertains only to the rational creature.

Replies to the objections:

1. We reply to the objection to the first definition according to Augustine, who says in On Genesis [3.24.37], commenting on the passage “God saw all that he had made, and it was very good,” that while he said of singular things that they were good, he said of the whole that it was very good, because anything is good in itself, but is very good in terms of the whole. We must therefore draw a distinction between what we are able to understand about singular things, and in this way, it is said that all [singular] things are good; or in the context of the whole, which is twofold: either concerning the current order or the order in an unqualified sense, as it contains the whole succession of the order of present, past, and future things, because a thing which is present has also an order to a thing in the past and to another thing in the future. Now, if we speak of the order of the universe as understood in terms of the current order, we cannot say that all things are very good in the universe, because they could be better. But when we understand the whole succession of the present, past, and future order, then all things are very good in the universe, in such a way that they cannot be better. And therefore, just as it is good that all things may be as good as they can be, not separately but in the universal order, as already stated, so in the same way it must be said that, “it is just that all things should be supremely ordered,” and this is how we understand that definition. Or it can be said that all things in principle are supremely ordered in the universe, as Augustine says in On Genesis 8.[23], where he says, “the divine will subjected all things first of all to itself, then corporeal creatures to spiritual ones, then irrational to rational, earthly to heavenly.” However, we could say that in this train of thought there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, because in this statement, the phrase “all things” does not have an actual referent; therefore, it does not refer to actually existing things, but this statement could be made in relation to all eternity; however, when it is later said “it is not just for all things to be the best,” the phrase “all things” in that case does have an actual referent, for here it refers to actually and presently existing things.

II. 1. Regarding the first objection to the second definition, it must be said that as strictly speaking a law that is bad or that suggests something bad is no law at all, so strictly speaking an art that is bad is no art; for art, virtue, and law fall under the category of the good, while evil, vice, and artlessness fall under the category of evil. Thus, it must be said that the magical arts, insofar as there is truth in them, are from the eternal law; however, insofar as there is falsity and evil in them, they are not. Neither are they properly called arts, and thus the eternal law is not their law. For the deception of the demons is the beginning of all magical arts, and in this regard there is falsity, evil, and inordinateness in them, so that in this sense they are strictly speaking not arts.

2. To the second, it must be said according to Augustine in the Confessions [2.5.10], that “your law, Lord, is the law of laws, and your law is you, and you are the law itself.” Therefore, we should understand “the law of the omnipotent artificer” appositively (or in terms of identity) and not possessively. Hence, Augustine says [in On True Religion 30.56] that this [law] is the highest truth, and it is clear that the highest truth is God. However, the argument [in the objection] proceeds as if the statement had a possessive sense through non-identity.¹ The eternal law, then, is there [in the second definition] defined in relation to all goods generally, which are derived from the first eternal art, which is the first cause. But certain goods are from it immediately, as those which come from divine operation; certain mediately, such as those that come from human operation. Therefore, the law is said to be “of all the arts,” in the sense of being the rule of good operations of rational creatures. However, it is called the “law of the omnipotent artificer” insofar as it is the rule of those goods which are immediately from the creator.

III. 1. To the first objection to the third definition, it must be said that this definition befits the eternal law as it relates to rational creatures, for this law is the principle of order for rational creatures, as has been noted. But rational creatures have a threefold order: to God, to the self, and to the neighbor. Insofar as the eternal law is the principle of the order of the rational creature to God, to whom [this creature] is subject and obedient, it is described as “that with which one must comply.” Insofar as it is the principle of order of rational creatures to themselves, it is said to be “that through which the evil [merit] a miserable and the good, [a happy life],” and so on, because the human being merits or demerits punishment or glory of their own accord. Insofar as it is the principle of order of the human to the neighbor, it is described as “that through which the temporal [law] is rightly promulgated.” Therefore, in order to demonstrate that it is the universal principle of order in rational creatures, that definition consists of that many [i.e., this particular number of] elements. To the objection that it is not “that with which one must comply,” it must be said that the rectitude of our will is not always achieved through conformity to the divine will with respect to what is willed, but with respect to the one willing. For the movement of the will is related to the one willing and to what is willed; therefore, the conformity of my will to God should always pertain to the one willing, but not always to what is willed. Thus, I should conform myself to him in such a way that I may will what God wills me to will, not that I may always will what he wills. On this, the Gloss comments on [the words] of the Psalms [31:1], “praise adorns the righteous”: for it is fitting that whatever God wills you to will, you also will. It does not say that you must will whatever God wills. And so the good son, willing that the father should live, whom God wills to die, conforms his will to and complies with the divine, because he wills what God wills him to will, namely, that his father live. This is what Augustine says in the Enchiridion [101]: [God] wants “the son to will for his father to live” from natural piety “whom God wills to die” from his judgment.

2. To the second, it must be said that “merit” signifies in one way the act worthy of beatitude or of misery, or the good or evil act. In another sense, merit signifies the order of an act to the reward, whether it be beatitude or punishment. While an act itself is from free choice, the order of the act toward a reward is from the eternal law. According to the first sense, it is true that merit and demerit stem from our will. But this is not the case in the second sense, because to order a good or evil act to beatitude or punishment is not from free choice. Thus, Augustine implies that the eternal law orders the good act to beatitude and the evil to punishment, saying: the eternal law has affirmed the following by its unchangeable stability, that merit [should consist] in the will, and the reward in beatitude or misery. And so it is clear that the order to a reward is from it [the eternal law]….

IS THE NATURAL LAW UNIVERSALLY DERIVED FROM THE ETERNAL LAW?

SH 3, P2, In1, Q un., C7, Ar4 (n. 233), 328–29

1. The derivation of laws from the eternal law is through reason which understands the eternal law; but only the rational creature is allowed to see and to consult the eternal law, as Augustine says in his book, On True Religion [31.58]. Therefore, the natural law is derived from the eternal law only insofar as the former exists in rational creatures. Since therefore there is a natural law in rational and irrational creatures, as Isidore says, in Etymologies II, that the natural law is “the one nature taught to all animals,” it is not derived universally from the eternal law. The major proposition is made clear by Augustine in On Free Choice of the Will [1.6.15]: “nothing is just or legitimate except what humans have derived for themselves from the eternal law,” but this derivation is through understanding.

2. The second reason. There is no derivation from the law except according to the act and power of the law; but the act or power of the law, as has been said, and as it is held in the Canon [i.e., Gratian’s Decretum 1.3.4], is: to order, to prohibit, to permit, to counsel, to punish, and to assign reward. But all these acts only pertain to the rational creature, because neither precept nor prohibition, nor reward nor counsel, is made through the law except [as it pertains] to the rational creature. Therefore, the law is derived from the eternal law only insofar as the former exists in rational creatures.

Some might say to this that these are the proper acts of the law, not that laws are derived according to them; moreover, there is an act common to [all laws], namely, to constrain, according to which the [laws] are derived, and this befits the eternal law with respect to both rational and irrational creatures, because it constrains insofar as it sets limits on the power of rational and irrational creatures indiscriminately, and so [the law] is derived according to the principle of constraint. Thus, Augustine says in On Genesis [9.17.32]: “the most normal course of every nature has certain natural laws, which impose certain limits on the acts of the vital spirit, which is created, which even an evil will is not able to surpass.” Similarly, of the elements, he says: “and the corporeal elements of this world have a definite power and certain qualities, which [determine what] each one is able or not able [to do].” From this, it is clear that constraint applies to all creatures. But against this, it is objected that irrational creatures are limited by necessity and rational creatures are not, since they have free choice; therefore, the term “constraint” is equivocal in these and not [applied] according to a common meaning. From which the same consequence as before follows.

On the other hand:

a. Every good is universally from the eternal goodness; therefore, every natural law, because it is good, is in every case from the eternal law.

Solution:

Every natural law is derived from the eternal law, on the basis of how near to or remote from God the natures are, in which this law is. For the natural law is threefold. First, it concerns the order of rational creatures, which is described in Romans 2:14: “those who do not have the law, naturally do those things that pertain to the law.” And this is even said in the Gloss on this passage: “the law of nature, by which anyone understands and is conscious of what is good and what is evil.” Likewise, there is a natural law concerning the order of irrational, sensible creatures, of which Isidore speaks: the natural law “is that which nature has taught to all animals,” such as males [being] with females. Likewise, there is a natural law concerning the order of all other creatures, namely, irrational and insensible, of which Augustine speaks in the Soliloquies [1.1.4]: “God, whose laws determine the rotation of the axis [of the world] and the course of the stars.” According to these differences, the natural law is universally from the eternal law. Nevertheless, the first [type of law] is nearer than the second and the third, and the second nearer than the third, insofar as rational creatures remain closer to God than sensible ones and sensible ones [closer] than insensible and irrational ones.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the first, it must be said that the notion of the eternal law is twofold, according to Augustine. First, there is an eternal law, by which “it is just that all things are supremely well ordered.” Then there is an eternal law, which is the “highest reason, to which all must comply, by which the evil lead a miserable life and the good lead a good life.” From this it is clear that the eternal law signifies the divine art and wisdom, insofar as it ordains creatures and the movement of creatures, and that order according to the law in all creatures is from it [the divine wisdom] and the law equally. But the order is twofold: for a certain creature, namely, the rational one, is the lord of its own acts, but others are not, namely, irrational creatures. Therefore, the eternal law orders by a necessary order the acts of irrational creatures; the acts of rational creatures, however, are not ordered by a necessary order but remain in them a free choice. To the objection that the derivation [of the natural law] from the eternal law is according to understanding, it must be said that this is said with respect to the temporal law and not the natural law. Thus, Augustine speaks of the temporal law when he says, “nothing just or legitimate,” etc. The reason for this is that the natural law is in us without our cooperation, but is imparted and impressed by God: for he impresses the power of natural order in both rational and irrational creatures. But in the temporal law, we cooperate so that we contribute to this law’s observance by ourselves. This cooperation is through rational understanding, however, and therefore [such understanding] is implied when thinking about that law.

2. To the second, it must be said that just as heating describes the essential (per se) and principal act of fire, and the hardening [of clay] the consequent and not the principal act, so constraint describes a consequent effect of the law. But the principal act that applies to all and according to which [other laws] are derived is to order, because the eternal law is that by which “it is just for all things to be supremely well ordered,” and this act persists in precepts, prohibitions, and in other acts of the law, and latterly concerns irrational creatures and their acts, because the order runs through all acts. Thus, Augustine says in On Genesis 8.[23]: “the divine will first of all subjects all things to itself, then corporeal creatures to spiritual ones, then irrational to rational, terrestrial to celestial,” and so order runs through all things. It can even be said that, if we extend the meaning of “precept” in the same way that we extend the meaning of “obedience,” that derivation [of laws from the eternal law] can follow the logic of a precept. For we extend the term obedience to both rational and irrational creatures when we say that all things obey God, and this is a natural subjection. Thus Psalm 148:5 says: “he commanded and [all things] were created; he established a precept, which shall not pass.” And the Gloss: “The precept, that is the law and the circumstance.” And similarly, Anselm in Why God Became Man [1.4]: “Any creature, when it naturally serves the order prescribed (praeceptum) for it, is said to obey God, and most of all the rational creature, to which it is given to understand what one should do.” And so, extending [the meaning of] a precept, it can be said that this derivation proceeds according to the logic of a precept….

IS THE NATURAL LAW A COGNITIVE OR MOTIVE HABIT?

SH 3, P2, In2, Q2, C2 (n. 244), 343–44

1. Romans 3:20: “the cognition of sin comes through the law.” Therefore, the effect of the law as such is cognition, even though this [passage] refers to the written law. Therefore, as the “law” part is common to the natural and the written law, the natural law is also a cognitive habit, because it shares in common with the written law its effect, which is cognition.

2. Gloss on Romans 2:14: “the natural law is that by which anyone understands,” etc. Therefore, its effect is to understand, and it is a cognitive habit.

3. Romans 2:15: “the requirements of the law are written,” and the Gloss: “that is, it is firmly infixed in reason.” But a habit infixed in reason is cognitive.

On the other hand:

1. No cognitive habit binds the will to do or not to do anything, because cognition is not binding. But the law is called that which binds² one to do or not to do something. Therefore, it is an operative or motive habit and not a cognitive one.

Solution:

As free choice is “the faculty of will and reason,” it is clear that free choice entails three things, namely, the faculty, reason, and the will. Therefore, there are three acts of the natural law which correspond to these three aspects of free choice. The first involves binding, which it has with respect to “faculty,” because the faculty in itself is freely flexible, and therefore in relation to it, the natural law binds. The second act of the natural law is to show, which correlates to “reason,” and this according to the interpretation by which the law (lex) derives its name because it involves reading (legere), as Isidore says in Etymologies [5.3.2], “the term ‘law’ (lex) is derived from ‘reading’ (legendum).” The third of its acts is to instigate or motivate one to do good and to shun evil, which matches “will,” as Isidore says in Etymologies [5.4.1], “the natural law is common to all, for the reason that we universally have it by natural instinct, not by any constitution.”

Therefore, the natural law is defined with respect to a faculty as that which binds and restrains; with respect to reason as what illumines reason; with respect to the will as what instigates to the good. And so it participates in the nature of both habits, namely, cognitive and motive, and the [aforesaid] arguments are based on its diverse acts….

CAN THE NATURAL LAW BE ERASED?

SH 3, P2, In2, Q3, C1 (n. 246), 346–47

1. The first objection: the Gloss on Romans 2:14, “For when the gentiles,” etc., says, “As was stated, it is not that grace is negated through the word ‘nature,’ but rather nature is repaired through grace. When this grace has renewed the interior person, it writes [on the heart] the law of justice, which has been deleted by guilt.” And here “nature” stands for “natural law.” Therefore, it is deleted through guilt and is erasable.

2. Second, Malachi 2:15: “Guard your spirit and do not despise the wife of your youth.” The Gloss: “a wife, that is the natural law written on the heart, by which even unbelievers are compelled to say: may God judge, may God see, and I permit him to judge all things between you and me. This wife is something that resides in our spirit, because she is always coupled to our spirit, and if she recedes from us, we immediately offend God.” The [natural law] therefore recedes and therefore is erasable from the soul.

3. Third, that which is able to [act on] something greater is also able to affect something lesser. If therefore guilt can erase the law of grace, which is greater than the law of nature, then it can also erase the law of nature, which is therefore erasable.

On the other hand:

Augustine in Confessions 2.[4]: “Your law, Lord, and the law written on the hearts of human beings, which iniquity cannot erase, punishes theft. For what thief suffers another thief with equanimity?” From this it is clear that [the natural law] is not erasable, because if it were erasable, this would be on account of a certain iniquity.

Solution:

Something can be erased in two ways, either as regards its essence or as regards its effect, as is clear in the eclipse of the sun: for the light of the sun is not lacking in this case as regards its essence but only as regards the effect it has on us, which is to illumine, although it always shines in itself. In the same way, the natural law, which is as the sun in the soul, as regards its essence, is never erased from [the soul], but always shines in it in itself. Nevertheless, it is sometimes erased in its effect, namely, because it does not always illumine the soul itself, as when the soul turns away from God and is darkened through sin. Thus, the shadow of sin, interposed between the soul and God, prevents the effect of the law. Thus, the Gloss on Romans 2:14 says, “For when the gentiles,” etc.: “the image of God is not so rubbed away in the soul [on account] of the temporal effects of the fall, that none of its features remain there [in the soul]. What was impressed there through the image of God when it was created is not entirely destroyed.” Thus, the natural law always remains written in the soul. For that law itself is impressed through the image, and on this account, even if the ability to read that law is destroyed by earthly effects, nevertheless, the essence [of the law] is not [destroyed]. And this is how one can interpret the reason given in the Gloss on Malachi 2:15, which says that the natural law “is always joined with our spirit”; therefore, it cannot be erased from it. And this is understood insofar as it pertains to the essence of the natural law.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the first objection, which shows that [the natural law] is erasable without qualification, it must be said that there is a writing of the law in terms of essence and in terms of manifestation. When therefore it is said that “the natural law of justice is inscribed” [in us], this is not the case as regards essence, but as regards manifestation, so that what was darkened through sin might be enlightened.

2. To the second objection, it must be said that the natural law may recede as regards operation or effect, but nevertheless not according to essence, as a lord is said to have receded when he does not have rulership in his home.

3. To the third objection, it must be said that it does not follow that if grace which is greater [than nature] can be erased, then what is lesser can be erased also. For it does not follow that “grace erases mortal sin, which is greater; therefore, it also erases venial sin, which is lesser.” Similarly, it does not follow that “guilt erases the law of grace, which is greater; therefore, it also [deletes] the natural law, which is lesser.” For guilt is naturally opposed to the law of grace and not to the law of nature, and therefore it deletes this and not that [one], except as regards effect. And likewise, although the law of grace is more powerful than the law of nature, nevertheless, it is not as durable in the subject, because that law [of nature] is naturally inserted in the soul and is therefore not erasable from it through sin as is the other one [i.e., law of grace]….

DOES THE NATURAL LAW ORDAIN US TO GOD?

SH 3, P2, In2, Q4, M2, C1 (n. 250), 353

a. Ecclesiasticus 17:9: “he teaches them discipline” and the Gloss: “he has given discipline and the natural law to human beings, that they may be subjected to their creator and may honor him with good works.” Therefore, the natural law entails that humans be subjected to the creator and that they should be ordained to him through obedience.

b. Cicero in the Rhetoric [2.54] says that the natural law “is not that which opinion generates but which a certain innate power instills, such as religion, piety, etc.” And he says that “religion offers ceremony and worship of a certain superior nature, which is called divine.” Therefore, religion consists in the worship of the divine nature. If therefore religion is a part of the natural law, the natural law ordains us to God and to his worship.

On the other hand:

1. Hugh of St. Victor [On the Sacraments 1.12.4]: “There are only two precepts in the natural law, namely, that you not do to others what you would not want done to yourself” (Tobias 4:16), and “whatever you will to be done to you, etc.” (Matthew 7:12). But through this precept, the rational creature is only ordained to the neighbor and not to God. Therefore, either Hugh’s distinction is insufficient or the law does not ordain us to God.

2. The Gloss on Romans 2:14, “For when the gentiles,” says: “the natural law [holds that] one should not inflict injury on anyone, and should not shortchange another, but abstain from fraud and perjury and such things, and, to put this briefly, should not wish to do to another what you would not wish to be done to yourself, which concords with evangelical doctrine,” as in Matthew 7:12. From this it is clear that the precepts of the natural law are reduced to this: “whatever you will that others do to you,” etc. If therefore that law ordains us to the neighbor and not to God, it is clear that the natural law does not have a precept ordaining us to God.

Solution:

As the Gloss on Romans 2:14 says, insofar as human beings are in the image and likeness of God, “they have a law by which they understand and are conscious in themselves of what is good and what is evil.” For insofar as humans are in the image, they have a cognition of the first truth, which is God, because, as Augustine says [in De spiritu et anima 10], the image is located in the power of understanding. However, insofar as human beings are in the likeness of God, they have the power and obligation to love the highest good, because the likeness consists in the power of loving, according to Augustine, and because of this, the law does prescribe that humans be ordained both to God and to the neighbor.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the first argument to the contrary, it must be said that these mandates³ do presuppose the order of the human being to God. For just as in the mandate to love the neighbor we understand the love of the self (which is clear when it is said, “do not steal,” etc., which is reduced to the mandate, “don’t do to others, etc.,” and the latter to this one: do to others what you would want done to yourself, that is, do to others the good that you would want your neighbor to do to you, and what is presupposed here is the love of the self) so one must reduce the mandate of the natural law to the love of one’s self…. Indeed, the mandate “do what you would want done to yourself” is reduced to the love of one’s self, as was shown, and so the mandate to love the self is the foundation of the mandates of the natural law. But the love of self, insofar as a person loves themselves ordinately and for a good end, implies the love of God and the love of neighbor. For if I love myself and my own existence, I naturally love the origen of my own being and of its conservation. This [origen], however, is God and so the love of God is naturally founded in [one’s love for oneself]. Likewise, any thing whatsoever naturally loves something similar to it in species, because nature desires its own likeness, which implies the love of the neighbor. For loving myself means loving naturally my own species and what is similar to me in species. Nevertheless, in another mode, love of self is said to be the foundation of the city of the devil, namely, insofar as it is not ordained to the right end, but this is not the type [of love] that we are speaking of here. Thus, the precept of nature, insofar as it is “of nature,” is founded on the love of the self. From this it is clear by what mode it ordains the self to God and to the neighbor, because in the love of self is understood the love of God and neighbor. And from this it follows: do to others what you would wish to have done to yourself. However, the law of grace elevates nature, because it posits the love of God as the foundation of everything, and thus the reply is clear….

DOES THE NATURAL LAW INSTRUCT US TO LOVE GOD ABOVE ALL THINGS?

SH 3, P2, In2, Q4, M2, C3 (n. 252), 357–58

1. The Gloss on Ecclesiasticus 17:9, “he teaches them discipline,” says: “natural and written law suggest that we must love God with our whole heart, soul, and power, and we must guard his mandate to love God and neighbor.” Therefore, in the natural law we are able to read that God must be loved above all things, because this is what it means to love him with the whole heart.

2. Through nature, anyone loves his or her own being above all else; but loving one’s own being, one naturally loves the origen of one’s being [which is supernatural]. But the love, by which one loves the origen of one’s being, is equal to that by which one loves oneself or even something greater. If therefore the ultimate principle of the being of human creatures is God, therefore, one naturally loves him above all things, because there is no difference between this love and that of the self.

3. To love is to will the good of another. But from the natural law, I love God. Therefore, from the natural law I will him the good that is appropriate for him. Therefore, since his own good is the highest, I naturally will him the highest good. But loving myself, I do not will myself the highest good because my proper good is the highest. Therefore, I naturally will a greater good for God than for myself; therefore, the natural law prescribes to me to love God above me and above all else.

On the other hand:

a. It is impossible that the knowing agent should naturally understand something greater than itself. But love does not extend itself above understanding, because the good is not loved unless known. Therefore, it is impossible that someone naturally love another more than the self. Therefore, through the natural law, no rational creature can love God above the self and all things. The major premise is clear, because certain things are understood through their likenesses in the soul, others, however, through themselves as being in the soul, such as things that are directly present in the soul; in the latter way, the soul understands itself and its justice and its affections, because the soul is present to itself, and similarly so are those [affections]. If therefore this [latter] cognition is greater than that which is through likenesses, as nothing is more present to the soul than itself, it is impossible that the soul can know something else better than itself; neither even can it know God [in this way] because he is not as present to the soul as it is present to itself, because the soul understands him through likenesses and “through a mirror, darkly” [1 Corinthians 13:12].

b. In order for the intellect to know God as he is, it is necessary that it [the intellect] strip itself of its form, because as long as it uses itself [i.e., its natural form as intellect], by this very act it sees God through a likeness, and so not as he is. Therefore, it is necessary for the intellect to go beyond itself or above itself in order to understand God as he is. Similarly, in order for our affection to love God more than itself, it must go beyond itself; if therefore naturally the soul is not able to go beyond itself or to choose anything above itself, then it is not naturally capable of loving God above itself, and so it is not naturally capable of loving him charitably.

Solution:

To love God above all things and above oneself and for the sake of himself is, as it were, instigated and insinuated in the natural law, though not in the sense of making us [love] or leading us [to this love]. For the natural law, insofar as it is a law, shows and suggests to the soul that it should love God in this way. Insofar as it is natural, however, its relation to the soul involves instigating it to this love. And therefore the Gloss on Ecclesiasticus 17:9 says: “this natural law suggests that we should love God with the whole heart.” Thus, it says that [the natural law] insinuates and instigates to this love but does not lead to it, which is why the law of grace is necessary, which leads to this [love]. It is also true that, in addition to that, after sin the law of Moses is necessary.

Replies to the objections:

1. To the first objection, it must be said that the Gloss does not say that the law makes us love, but only that it suggests that we do so. Thus, it is described according to insinuation and not according to leading to it.

2. To the second objection, that “everyone naturally loves their own being and their own origen,” it must be said that the love of one’s origen is twofold, because there is a love of one’s origen insofar as it is an origen and love for the origen in an absolute sense, not insofar as it is one’s origen: for example, I can love God as he is in himself or as my origen. The natural law, therefore, does not prescribe that we love the origen in itself and absolutely above all things but that we love it insofar as it is our origen; this is clearly there [in the law]. But in that case the love of self and of one’s origen are the same, because the soul does not love its origen, insofar as it is its origen, except because it associates it with its own being, which is what it loves, and not the converse. And in this sense the soul cannot naturally love God more than itself because nature does not extend beyond itself.

3. To the third objection, it must be said that this argument does not stand, namely, “I wish the highest good for God but not for myself; therefore, I love God more than myself.” However, from this it follows: “therefore, I will a greater good for him than for myself.” Indeed, there is the “willing” and the “good” there. Therefore, this adverb “more” can modify either that “willing” or that which I call “good.” If it is taken to go with the “good,” that argument would not follow. But if it goes with the “willing,” then it does follow, because loving comes from the will and not from the good that is willed. By nature, however, I will more strongly for myself my own good, which is lesser, than for God his own good, which is greater, as soldiers desire for themselves their own small patch of land more than they desire for the king to obtain his great kingdom….

IS THE LAW OF MOSES NECESSARY FOR SALVATION?

SH3, P2, In3, Tr1, Q1, C2 (n. 260), 369–70

1. Hugh of St. Victor, in On the Sacraments [1.6.7], says that in the natural law there are three things, namely, the precept, which concerns what is necessary; prohibition, which concerns what is harmful; and concession, which concerns matters of indifference. But no sin so blinds humans as to prevent them from knowing through a natural judgment of the natural law what is to be done and what to be avoided. As Augustine says in the Questions on the Old and New Testament [4]: “Who is ignorant of what is appropriate for good life or that one ought not inflict on another something that they do not want to happen to themselves?” Therefore, without the law of Moses, humans are able to know what is necessary for their salvation. Thus, the law is not necessary for their salvation.

2. In us there is an adjudicative power concerning those things which are necessary for salvation, namely, synderesis. Similarly, in us there is a power that is desirous of salvation. Therefore, without the law humans are able to see or know and desire what is necessary for their salvation and the law is not necessary for it.

3. Augustine [On Grace and Free Will 3]: “Ignorance excuses no one to the extent of saving them from burning in perpetual fire.” And this is understood to pertain to the ignorance of those things which are necessary for salvation; but ignorance of the law of Moses does serve as an excuse that saves one from an eternal fire, as is clear as regards the blessed Job and other saints, who did not know the law in the time of the law and were not of the Jews. Therefore, the law of Moses was not necessary for salvation.

On the other hand:

a. The knowledge of things that should be believed and the performance of things that should be done is necessary for salvation. But the law of Moses, in a figurative⁴ way, does give knowledge of things to be believed and does pertain to salvation; as far as moral precepts are concerned, however, it pertains to the performance of things that should be done and even to the knowledge of these things. Therefore, it is necessary for salvation.

Solution:

The law of Moses includes the natural law through the explanation of morals, and it includes the law of grace in a figurative way in the ceremonial precepts. Therefore, it should be called necessary for salvation as regards moral things that pertain to the natural law, useful for salvation to those people who were not of the Jews as regards ceremonials and symbols before the promulgation [of the law], but necessary [for salvation] after its promulgation for those who belonged to the Jews, to whom the law was given. And from this the reply to the objections is clear….

IS THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL THE SAME AS THE NATURAL LAW?

SH 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q4 (n. 546), 843–45

1. Romans 2:14: “If the gentiles not having the law naturally do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, because they show that the work of the law is written in their hearts.” From this it is accepted that the natural law is written into the heart and conscience of humans. Thus, the Gloss on this passage says that the natural law is that “by which anyone understands and is conscious in themselves of what is good and what is evil.” If therefore the law of the gospel is the law which is inscribed in the human heart, by which we understand and are conscious of what is good, and what is evil (whence Jeremiah 31:33: “I will give my law in their visceral parts, and I will write it in their hearts,” which statement is understood to be about the law of the gospel), the law of the gospel is the same as the law of nature.

2. Whatever the law of nature dictates, the law of the gospel dictates, but not the converse. Therefore, the natural law is integral to the law of the gospel.

3. The law of the gospel is the universal law, which is always applicable for all. However, every law which is always and for all is the natural law, because what is natural, is always and for all, and is not acquired or received later. Therefore, it remains that the law of the gospel is the same as the natural law.

4. Also, that which is such by nature, is also such of itself, to a greater degree. Therefore, if the gospel by nature is the law to the greatest degree, it would also be the law of itself; therefore the gospel will be the same as the natural law. Gratian says in the beginning of the Decretum [1.1]: “the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the gospel,” siding with Isidore in Etymologies [5.2.1]: “all laws are either divine or human; divine [laws] are known naturally, and human [laws] from customs.” Also, if one were to say, with Gratian [Decretum 5.6.3], that “the natural law is contained in the law and in the gospel, nevertheless, not everything that is found in the law and in the gospel can be proved to cohere in the natural law. For there are certain morals and certain mystical aspects in the law. Moral mandates pertain to the natural law and therefore demonstrably are not susceptible to any change. However, the mystical on the surface is proved alien to the natural law, [although] insofar as its moral import is concerned, one could find a link to it [i.e., natural law].”

On the other hand:

a. In the gospel and even in the law there are moral principles, which are according to the suppositions of faith, such as the worship of the assumed humanity of Christ and so forth; but those things which are according to the supposition of faith transcend the dictates of reason and nature. Therefore, the moral principles of the gospel or the law generally are not contained in the natural law.

b. Nature and grace are not the same but differ essentially. Nor are the order of nature and of grace [the same]. Therefore, neither are the rule or the law that is according to the order of nature [the same as] the law that is according to the order of grace. But then neither will the law of the gospel, which is the law of grace, be the same as the natural law, which is according to the order of nature.

c. Natural powers are not the same as the powers given by grace. Therefore, neither will the natural law be the same as the law of grace.

d. It is one thing to be obliged to do something by reason of the exigencies of nature and another by reason of the exigencies of grace. For example, from the exigencies of nature there is an obligation to love the benefactor and the friend, not, however, the evildoer or those who harm you. From the exigencies of grace, however, there is an obligation to love those who harm you and do you evil. Luke 6:32: “if you love those who love you, what grace is that to you? Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you.” If therefore differences between laws amount to differences between what ought to be done, because the law is nothing other than a description of what ought to be done or the evil to be avoided, the law of the gospel will be other than the law of nature.

Reply:

As nature is ordered to grace, so the law of nature is ordered to the law of the gospel, but the natural law is not the same as the law of the gospel. Nevertheless, the natural law is not abolished through the gospel but perfected. For example, the natural law says that God must be loved, because he is our benefactor and creator. The law of the gospel says that he is to be loved, because he is good and the redeemer. Likewise, the natural law says that we must love our neighbors because they are human and conform to us in species and because we are made by the same creator. The law of grace, however, dictates that the neighbor must be loved because they are a child of God or can be and because they are made in the image of God and we are redeemed by the same one. Therefore, the obligation to love God and neighbor in the natural law and the law of the gospel stem from different causes, although the former is ordained to and perfected through the latter. From this it is clear that the natural law is not the same as the law of the gospel; nevertheless, the natural law is ordained to the [law of the gospel] as to its perfection. And thus Isidore says that the divine law is evident naturally, and for this reason it is true that “the natural law is contained in the law and the gospel.”

Replies to the objections:

1. To the first objection, that the law of the gospel is written in the heart like the natural law, it must be said that this is true, but in different ways. For there is an inscription of what should be done according to the dictate of what is written in the conscience and which is the same in all from creation, and there is an inscription according to a dictate impressed on conscience which is from faith or justification in those who believe. The first inscription is from nature and the second is from the law of the gospel. The first is inserted by nature and the second is given or superadded by grace. And therefore it is figuratively said in Jeremiah 31:33: “I will give my law” and in Romans 1:16, “the gospel is the power of God for the salvation of all who believe,” because as the natural law is the same for all humans, so the law of the gospel is the same for all believers.

2. To the second objection, it must be said that the natural law is not a part of the law of the gospel, but it is nevertheless its foundation, as nature is the subject of grace. Therefore, whatever the natural law dictates, the law of the gospel also dictates, but by a higher reason. For example, according to the law of nature matrimony is prescribed for the generation of the human race and the multiplication of the species. According to the prescription of grace, however, it is so that human children can be regenerated as children of God and offspring can be multiplied for the worship of God.

3. To the third objection, I respond that the law of the gospel is universal and “always and for all” in one way and the natural law is so in another way. For the law of the gospel is universal and applies to all in a causal sense; according to its effect, however, it is universal for believers, for although grace is offered to all according to the way of causality, nevertheless, according to effect it is only shown to those who are disposed and receive it. However, the natural law is universal and applies to all according to cause and effect: for all persons are naturally imprinted with it and it follows human nature inseparably. The law of the gospel, however, is universal and “always for all” in itself or as regards the grace of the one giving, not nevertheless as regards the effect in the one receiving, while the natural law is “always and for all” according to its effect in the recipient.

4. To the last objection, I respond that that rule of the philosopher, “what is such by nature,” etc., applies to the comparison of a natural habit to an acquired habit, not to the comparison of a [natural to a] gratuitous habit; rather, what is gratuitous is greater than what is natural, that is, more noble and worthy, although not as long-lasting. Nevertheless, both the natural law and the law of the gospel are called eternal and perpetual, but in different ways: for the former is perpetual as regards all and in effect, and the latter is perpetual of itself and as regards believers.

IS THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL THE SAME AS THE LAW OF MOSES?

SH 3, P2, In4, Tr1, Q5 (n. 547), 845–46

1. The faith of the New and Old Testaments is one, and it is not essentially different; therefore, the law of the New and Old Testaments will be one and the same. For if there is unity on the part of the cognition of truth through faith, then there should be unity on the part of the order to the good through the law.

2. Matthew 5:17: “I did not come to destroy the law but to fulfill it”; as the Gloss says: “the gospel is the recapitulation of the old law.” If therefore the recapitulation of the law does not make the law different, then the law of the gospel and the law of Moses are not different.

3. The gospel is the fulfillment of the law; therefore, the full law is the law of Moses plus the gospel. Therefore, there is not a difference between the law of the gospel and the law of Moses.

4. The same law in its initial stage and in its complete stage are not two different laws; but this is how the law is related to the gospel, Matthew 5:20: “Unless your righteousness abounds,” etc. The Gloss: “The precepts that are given at the initial stage (i.e., in the Law) are more abundant than those that are added at the final stage (i.e., in the gospel).”

On the other hand:

a. The letter of the law and the spirit of the law are not the same; but the law of Moses is the letter of the law and the law of the gospel or Christ is the spirit, according to Romans 7:6.

b. The law that concerns actions and the law that concerns faith are not the same; but the law of Moses concerns actions and the law of the gospel concerns faith, according to Romans 3:27.

c. The law of signs and shadows is not the same as the law of truth and demonstration; but the law of Moses is the law of shadows and signs, according to Hebrews 10:1: “the law is the shadow of future things, not their image.” However, the law of the gospel is the law of truth and demonstration. Therefore, the law of Moses and the law of the gospel are not the same.

d. The laws that have diverse ends are therefore diverse; but the end of the law is the fear of God (Ecclesiastes 12:13), while the end of the gospel is the love of God (1 Timothy 1:5). Thus, Augustine says [in Against Adimantus 17:2], “In brief, the difference between the law and gospel is between fear and love.”

e. Temporal and eternal laws are not the same; but the law of Moses is temporal, as Galatians 3:19 says, “What therefore is the Law? It was posited on account of our transgressions, to restrain them, until the seed [Christ] comes.” However, the gospel is the eternal law, Revelation 14:6: “I saw the angel holding the eternal gospel,” and Matthew 24:35, “heaven and earth will pass away, but my word will not pass away.”

Reply:

One must reply that the law of Moses and the law of the gospel are one law in terms of their universal import but different in terms of their proper meanings. Thus, Augustine says in Against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets [1.17.34], “the ones who rightly worship God, find one God in both testaments, and they love the goodness of one and the same God in both testaments, and fear his severity in both.” However, there are multiple ways of defining “universal” or “common”: in relation to an efficient cause, in relation to an end, and in relation to sense. The universal legislator of the law and the gospel is the one God, James 4:12: “there is one legislator and judge.” There is one end, namely, Christ. Thus, Augustine writes in Against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets 2 [7.26], “Who is the end of the law? To this, not I but the apostle himself responds: ‘The end of the law,’ he says, ‘is Christ for the justice of all who believe’ (Romans 10:4), [and it is] the perfecting end, not the one that kills. He is surely called that ‘end,’ at which are aimed all actions that derive from any obligation. Now the difference between an obligation and an end is that an obligation consists in those things which we ought to do, and an end is that for the sake of which we do them.” [Finally,] there is one sense, because [there is] one universal truth. Thus, Gregory says in [Homilies 1.6.4] commenting on Ezekiel 1:16, where it is said that there were “wheels within wheels,” “what the law proclaims, the gospel displays,” and likewise, the same author, “divine statements, even if they are made at separate points in time, are united by sense.”

Similarly, “proper” can be understood in multiple ways: in relation to an efficient [cause] and a final [cause] and a sense. In relation to the efficient cause, the law and the gospel differ, because the law is given through a mere human being, but the gospel through Christ. John 1:17, “The law was given through Moses.” In relation to the end they also differ: for the end of the law is to deflect evil through fear, but the end of the gospel is principally to do good through love. Thus, Augustine in Against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets [2.7.25], “The New Testament differs from the Old, because in the latter, humans were constrained by fear, and in the former, they are given the latitude of charity.” In relation to the sense, however, they differ because in one, truth is presented figuratively, and in the other, the truth is presented clearly, as far as symbolism is concerned. Thus, Augustine says, in The Harmony of the Evangelists [1.1]: “What the law and prophets have announced, is presented as delivered and completed in the gospel.” Likewise, in the law there is inchoate truth, and here there is perfect truth, as far as morals are concerned. Thus Matthew 5:20, “unless your righteousness surpasses,” etc., and Augustine says in this respect: “The precepts that are given at the initial stage are more ample than those that are added at the stage of completion.”

Therefore, it must be said that the law of Moses and of the gospel are one law in terms of their universal import but different in their proper implications, and this is because one was given to carnal people, and another to spiritual ones, one to children and the other to those who are perfected. Thus, as Augustine says in On True Religion [17.34], the wise doctor gives one mandate to the sick person through his ministers and another through himself. In this way, God gave one law through Moses and another through himself in the gospel. As Augustine says in To Marcellinus [Ep. 138.2]: “The teacher usually prescribes something different to an adolescent than to a child by changing the requirement but not changing the doctrine, [however, the doctrine] remained the same, although [the way of instruction] changed.” In the same way, the Creator intentionally prescribed different ways of teaching one and the same truth in the law and in the gospel, in the former case [teaching] the children and in the latter adults. And this distinction allows one to address the objections.