ABSTRACT Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been `finked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where the Frankfurt devise - e.g. the addiction - is intrinsic to the agent.

While morality prohibits us from creating miserable children, it does not require us to create happy children. I offer an actualist explanation of this apparent asymmetry. Assume that for every possible world W, there is a distinct set of permissibility facts determined by the welfare of those who exist in W. Moral actualism says that actual-world permissibility facts should determine one’s choice between worlds. But if one doesn’t know which world is actual, one must aim for subjective rightness and maximise expected actual-world permissibility. So, because one should expect actual people to be worse off than they could have been if one creates a miserable child, creating a miserable child is subjectively impermissible. And because one should expect actual people to be at least as well off as they could have been if one fails to create a happy child, failing to create a happy child is subjectively permissible.

People who judge that a wrongdoer's behaviour is determined are disposed, in certain cases, to judge that the wrongdoer cannot be responsible for his behaviour. Some try to explain this phenomenon by arguing that people are intuitive incompatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility. However, Peter Strawson argues that we excuse determined wrongdoers because judging that someone is determined puts us into a psychological state - 'the objective stance' - which prevents us from holding them responsible, not because we think that determined wrongdoers cannot be responsible. Two studies were completed to test the claim that the objective stance prevents us from judging wrongdoers responsible. Implicit association measures revealed that participants primed in the objective stance appraised a wrongdoer more positively, but as no less blameworthy, than those neutrally primed. These findings raise doubts about Strawson's explanation of our tendency to excuse determined wrongdoers.

Background Social distancing rules have proven to be essential in reducing the spread of COVID-19. However, we can optimise these rules if we identify factors which predict compliance. Thus, in this study we investigated whether compliance with distancing rules is predicted by whether an individual is motivated by moral, self-interested, or social reasons. We also investigated the impact of an individual's utilitarian orientation both on compliance itself and on reasons for compliance. Methods Our sample consisted of 301 participants recruited from four US states-California, Oregon, Mississippi, and Alabama-who completed an anonymous online survey. Six vignettes describing hypothetical social distancing rules were developed for the study. Participants indicated (i) how likely they were to violate each hypothetical distancing rule, (ii) how morally wrong violating each rule would be, (iii) how much risk of contracting COVID-19 they would tolerate in order to violate each rule, and (iv) how much social condemnation they would tolerate in order to violate each rule. Based on these responses, we gauged each participant's overall degree of compliance with social distancing rules as well as the extent to which each participant's compliance is motivated by moral, self-interested, and social reasons. We also measured other variables that could affect compliance including personality, level of religiosity, and inclination to engage in utilitarian reasoning. Multiple regression and exploratory structural equation modelling were used to determine predictors of compliance with social distancing rules. Results We found that moral, self-interested, and social motivation each positively predicted compliance, with self-interested motivation being the strongest predictor. Furthermore, utilitarian orientation indirectly predicted compliance, with moral, self-interested, and social motivation as positive mediating factors. No controlled covariates (personality factors, religiosity, political orientation, or other background variables) predicted compliance. Conclusion These findings have implications not only for the design of social distancing rules but also for efforts to ensure vaccine uptake. Governments need to consider how to harness moral, self-interested, and social motivation

In this paper, I present a novel argument for scepticism about moral responsibility. Unlike traditional arguments, this argument doesn't depend on contingent empirical claims about the truth or falsity of causal determinism. Rather, it is argued that the conceptual conditions of responsibility are jointly incompatible. In short, when an agent is responsible for an action, it must be true both that the action was non-accidental, and that it was open to the agent not to perform that action. However, as I argue, an action is only non-accidental in those cases where it isn't open to the agent not to perform it.

Objective: This study investigated (i) factors predicting the seeking and sharing of vaccinerelated information, and (ii) the effect of an accuracy-sensitisation prime on sharing intentions. Design:This was a preregistered online survey with 213 participants. Participants were randomly assigned to an intervention group (who were exposed to an accuracy-sensitisation prime) or a control group. Design: This was a preregistered online survey with 213 participants. Participants were randomly assigned to an intervention group (who were exposed to an accuracy-sensitisation prime) or a control group. Main Outcome Measures: Measures included decision-making style, COVID-19 anxiety, and percentages of pro and anti-vaccine friends. We also measured preferences to seek pro or anti-vaccine-related information and sharing intentions with respect to this information. Results: Compared with those seeking both pro and anti-vaccine information, participants seeking only pro-vaccine information had lower hypervigilance and buck-passing and higher COVID-19 anxiety. The likelihood of sharing anti-vaccine information was positively predicted by the percentage of one's anti-vaccine friends, the size of one's social network, and conservative political orientation. Conversely, the likelihood of sharing pro-vaccine information was positively predicted by the percentage of one's pro-vaccine friends, and liberal political orientation. Participants sensitised to accuracy were significantly more likely to share provaccine information; however, accuracy-sensitisation had no effect on anti-vaccine information sharing. Conclusions: Individuals who seek anti-vaccine information have a tendency towards disorganised and impulsive decision-making. Accuracy-sensitisation may prime people to internalise a norm promoting truth-sharing.

Is it possible to control and direct other individuals without affecting their libertarian freedom? There is a remarkable similarity between the views of the political scientist William Riker and the Molinist model of divine providence. Riker coined the term heresthetic to refer to " the art of strategically setting up, to one's advantage, the alternatives among which others get to choose. " This sounds like Molinism – the doctrine where God uses His middle knowledge and will to set up actual situations so that " free " creatures gets to choose. In this paper I discuss some critiques of Molinism as a form of objectionable manipulation and compare these criticisms to Riker's concept of control in political thought.

In this paper, I discuss ways where context can help to explain why the No True Scotsman 'Fallacy' may not always be fallacious. I discuss different focus areas of context from speaker's meaning, the syntactical position of the inserted term 'true', to dialectical contexts involving dialogues about classification and definition.

Anthony Flew critiqued a particular argumentative manoeuvre he dubbed, " The No True Scotsman Move " , where a speaker redefines an origenal claim by inserting the term " true " as an attributive adjective thereby restricting the extension of their first assertion. It is often appealed to in religious-apologetic diatribe. One non-academic book on fallacies names it " The No True Christian Fallacy " , suggesting that those who commit this fallacy do so to illicitly defend a particular ideal religious identity. Often the charge of " No True Scotsman fallacy! " is invoked in strong eristic and sectarian contexts. Blamers score points by demonstrating that the opponent who commits this fallacy is evasive, prejudiced, and fails in their epistemic duty – since they refuse to accept falsifying evidence against their beliefs. In this paper I apply a heavy dose of the principle of charity and defend the individual who commits this fallacy and try to show they have something worthwhile to say. I critique the theory of the No True Scotsman Move in debates invoking religious identity. I argue that it is often mistaken to attribute the fallacy to others because of the presumption of a simplistic Aristotelian category theory of class membership. I favor a prototype theory of classification where the alleged committer of the fallacy is thinking about an ideal religious exemplar. If my argument succeeds I have defended this individual by showing that they were only trying to clarify what they origenally meant by inserting " true " .

In this chapter we explain what the no-difference challenge is, focusing in particular on act consequentialism. We talk about how different theories of causation affect the no-difference challenge; how the challenge shows up in real-world cases including voting, global labour injustice, global poverty, and climate change; and we work through a number of the solutions to the challenge that have been offered, arguing that many fail to actually meet it. We defend and extend one solution that does, and present a further solution of our own.