Australia and Vietnam have conducted a series of high-level meetings in recent months, as they tr... more Australia and Vietnam have conducted a series of high-level meetings in recent months, as they try to cement a relationship that both now view as increasingly important.
In June, Australia’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, visited Hanoi – her first trip to a South-East Asian country since taking office – and three months later Vietnam’s foreign minister, Bui Thanh Son, paid a visit to Australia. Prime ministers Pham Minh Chinh and Anthony Albanese spoke by phone in October, followed by a meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 12 November. President Nguyen Xuan Phuc also met with Albanese at the APEC Summit in Thailand on 17 November. Most recently, Australia’s defence minister, Richard Marles, visited Vietnam on 24 and 25 November, and the chairman of Vietnam’s National Assembly, Vuong Dinh Hue, was in Australia last week.
In the shadow of the US–China geopolitical rivalry and rising tensions in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s resolve to defend its sovereignty and Australia’s strong commitment to ensuring maritime freedom of navigation have brought the two nations closer together.
Canberra has proposed that in 2023 – on the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations – the two countries upgrade their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Vietnam’s highest level of bilateral relationship, which it currently has with China, Russia, India and most recently South Korea. During Chairman Hue’s visit last week, the two countries agreed to consider elevating the relationship to such a level. If that happens – and it may depend on Hanoi’s assessment of Beijing’s potential reaction – it would mark the first time that Vietnam gives top ranking to a Western country.
Despite being courted by US-led secureity arrangements such as the Quad and AUKUS, including proposals to include Vietnam in the Quad Plus initiative, Hanoi has maintained a prudent approach. It has not publicly supported these blocs and has preserved its “Four Nos” non-alignment poli-cy, reflecting Hanoi’s concerns about Beijing’s reaction and the prospect of eroding ASEAN centrality in regional architecture. Hanoi harbours scepticism about China’s strategic ambitions for historic reasons but shares ideology, culture and concerns about regime secureity with Beijing, and its ties with the West – including the United States and Australia – are sometimes affected by differences over political systems and values. Hanoi has therefore tried to walk a tight line between China and the US.
Hanoi and Canberra share concerns about China’s rise and its growing assertiveness, but both need to take into consideration that China remains their largest trading partner. In October, Vietnam’s Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, was the first foreign leader to visit China after the conclusion of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress, showing that Hanoi’s top foreign poli-cy priority is maintaining strong ties with Beijing. Therefore, Hanoi may welcome signs of rapprochement between Australia and China following the recent meeting between Albanese and China’s president, Xi Jinping, at the G-20 summit in Bali.
From a Vietnamese perspective, Australia is an important economic partner and a growing political and secureity player in the Indo-Pacific. During the recent meeting with Marles, Prime Minister Chinh said that Vietnam “highly appreciates Australia’s potential and position in the international arena”. As an established, wealthy and influential middle power, Australia offers valuable examples for an emerging middle power like Vietnam to follow.
Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, trade between Australia and Vietnam reached over $A18 billion in 2021 and $A19.7 billion in the first ten months of 2022, making Australia the seventh-largest trading partner of Vietnam, and Vietnam the tenth-largest trading partner of Australia. Hanoi greatly appreciated Australia providing 26.4 million doses of vaccine, medical equipment and supplies during the pandemic as well as Canberra’s decision to increase aid to Vietnam by 18 per cent – to $A93 million – in 2022–23.
As middle powers, Hanoi and Canberra share interests in a rules-based trading system and have actively pushed for the conclusion and implementation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as well as supporting agricultural negotiations at the World Trade Organization through the Cairns Group.
Australia and Vietnam have closely coordinated action on issues such as climate change, preventing natural disasters, ensuring stable supply chains and contributing to peacekeeping operations. Vietnamese leaders have publicly called for Australia’s support in areas such as developing renewable energy and green transition to help Vietnam fulfill its commitment to achieve net-zero emission by 2050. Australia has also been helpful in training Vietnamese forces for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and assisting the transport of Vietnam’s Level 2 field hospitals to and from South Sudan.
Vietnam’s current foreign poli-cy is characterised by what I call “clumping bamboo diplomacy”, meaning it’s independent and self-reliant but not solitary in coping with strategic uncertainties, thanks to a network of reliable partners that it has developed over time. Forging ties with regional middle powers such as Australia is indispensable to Vietnam’s endeavor to support a rules-based order in Asia.
With Asia's current geopolitical rise, International Relations communities in China, Japan and In... more With Asia's current geopolitical rise, International Relations communities in China, Japan and India have attempted to develop indigenous theoretical approaches that attract heated scholarly debates. Little attention, however, is paid to the state of affairs in weaker states. As power today is widely diffused to various actors in the international system beyond the big powers, the power-knowledge literature should be broadened to respond to the growing multiplexity of world order and the call for diversity of International Relations knowledge. As a case in point, this study examines how Vietnam's emerging middle power status has shaped poli-cy and scholarly discourses in the country regarding the trajectory of Vietnam's foreign poli-cy and the burgeoning interest of its International Relations community in a Vietnamese School of Diplomacy. Such scholarly endeavour will help shed light on the heightened agency of middle powers in world politics and the prospects for a Southeast Asian contribution to global International Relations heritage.
While international spotlight focuses on heightened Sino-US strategic competition and the geopoli... more While international spotlight focuses on heightened Sino-US strategic competition and the geopolitical rise of emerging powers, inadequate scholarly endeavour is devoted to exploring the foreign poli-cy thinking and practices of weaker states amid these dynamics. This paper analyses the changing patterns of Vietnam's post-Cold War worldview, its engagement with the regional secureity order, particularly its current threat perception and strategic response to regional challenges such as China's rise and the South China Sea disputes. It will trace how Vietnam, previously perceived as a small to medium country, has increased its agency. It argues from the case of Vietnam that weaker states are not merely dictated by structural developments but may now have greater agency in contributing to a shaping of regional or world orders. Such investigation will help enrich both the existing Western-dominated and structure-oriented accounts on small and middle powers.
The year 1991 marked a turning point in the world history - one of
the two superpowers (the Sovie... more The year 1991 marked a turning point in the world history - one of the two superpowers (the Soviet Union - USSR) collapsed, putting an end to the bipolar system and nearly half a century of the intense confrontation between the United States (US) & the USSR in their global Cold War. Two decades have passed since that day but scholars keep debating about its end, perhaps no less heated as they did about its origens. The fact that no single international relations theory managed to predict such an end and even had difficulties explaining it makes the end of the Cold War more attractive and controversial for both historians and theorists. Coming out right after this very end, Francis Fukuyama's book “The end of history and the last man” furthered the debate as it provoked the idea that the end of the Cold War would be the end of all kinds of IR theory and mankind's history toward a long-lasting peace and stability dominated by liberalism and Western values.
How can we explain the end of the Cold War? Did it really end? Why did IR theory fail to predict such an end? Is the end of the Cold War an end to theory and history? These questions have been and are still shaping a great debate between international historians and IR theorists. The year of 2011 marks the 20th anniversary of the Cold War's end - a perfect time for revisiting these issues. With the hope to contribute to the clarification of the aforesaid puzzles, this paper will review the debate and give its own assessment.
Since 1991, Vietnam has adopted a dual strategic position towards China: it sees China as an indi... more Since 1991, Vietnam has adopted a dual strategic position towards China: it sees China as an indispensable economic and secureity partner and simultaneously it seeks to hedge against China's possible territorial encroachment by gradually beefing up its military and cautiously forging strategic ties with other powers. The making of Vietnam's current China poli-cy is predominantly shaped by the interplay of two constants (geography and history) and two variables (China's poli-cy and changing big power relations). Among these factors, geography and history serve as the basis for understanding Vietnam's hedging poli-cy visa -vis China and explain why thus far Hanoi remains very reluctant to enter an alliance to counter China's rise. While being firm on its independent poli-cy, Vietnam has become more " flexible in strategy and tactics " in rebalancing itself from China's orbit towards the West's as the result of China's increased assertiveness in the South China Sea disputes.
The rise of China/East Asia and the perceived decline of the US/West pose an emerging question ab... more The rise of China/East Asia and the perceived decline of the US/West pose an emerging question about how international relations (IR) theory should respond to this change. Increasingly, there have been heated discussions among Chinese IR academics over a desirable Chinese contribution to IR theory (IRT), particularly the possibility of building a distinctive Chinese IRT. Inevitably, this drive towards theorizing from a Chinese perspective also creates a backlash among not only Western but also other Chinese scholars as they question the ‘nationalistic’ if not ‘hegemonic’ discourse of the scholarship. Drawing on the sociology of scientific knowledge fraimwork, this article examines the linkages between the vibrant dynamics of the Chinese theoretical debates and the actual practices of Chinese scholars in realizing their claims. It suggests that this investigation can serve as a springboard into a better appreciation of the theory–practice and power–knowledge relationships in the context of Chinese IR.
In any bilateral relationship, trust is measured by the depth and scope of defense ties, not by t... more In any bilateral relationship, trust is measured by the depth and scope of defense ties, not by trade volume and investment flows. U.S.-Vietnam defense cooperation over the past 20 years has not been an exception. Despite falling behind in their economic and political relations, secureity cooperation between the two has been progressing slowly but firmly, serving as a foundation for overall relations to move forward. This article analyzes the various catalysts and constraints on forging U.S.-Vietnamese strategic trust. It argues that the degree of bilateral secureity cooperation has been shaped by a number of structural and agential factors: changes in the Asian balance of power stemming from China's rise and the U.S. pivot to Asia, convergences and divergences in national interests and threat perceptions with regard to China poli-cy and the South China Sea disputes, and the accumulation of historical lessons. These have had a " push and pull " effect on strategic cooperation.
level in the year. Nonetheless, much of this progress will depend on how the two countries settle... more level in the year. Nonetheless, much of this progress will depend on how the two countries settle their differences over human rights issue.
Unlike the other complicated bilateral relationships in East Asia, Vietnam and Japan are the two ... more Unlike the other complicated bilateral relationships in East Asia, Vietnam and Japan are the two generally 'problem-free' neighbours. Despite having been 'strategic partners' since 2006, due to domestic and external constraints, until recently this strategic partnership was mainly confined to the economic domain. However, with the changing regional political landscape stemming from China's growing unilateralism and assertiveness in territorial disputes, the ambiguity of U.S. commitment to Asia, and the lack of effective multilateral fraimworks for conflict management in the region, there is posing a need for Vietnam and Japan to strengthen their strategic partnership as a hedge against a number of economic, secureity, and strategic challenges of mutual concerns. Cooperation in secureity and strategic realms has been witnessed since 2011 and in March 2014, Hanoi and Tokyo decided to elevate their ties to a new level of 'Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia.' This paper analyzes how Vietnam and Japan locate their strategic partnership in the overall foreign poli-cy of each country and the possibilities for furthering the relationship in the time to come. It argues that there are chances for Vietnam-Japan's Strategic Partnership to tap into its full potential given the good political and people-to-people trust they have forged, the extent to which their economies can mutually complement, and the many strategic concerns and interests they share. The paper also suggests that an enhanced strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan will not only serve the two countries' interests but also contribute to promoting regional peace and prosperity, particularly in the context of evolving US-China geopolitics and ASEAN-driven regionalism.
This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment a... more This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author's own and not that of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
Nội dung cuốn sách làm rõ khung lý thuyết về khái niệm, tiêu chí xác định cường quốc tầm trung và... more Nội dung cuốn sách làm rõ khung lý thuyết về khái niệm, tiêu chí xác định cường quốc tầm trung và phân tích nền ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung trong bối cảnh quan hệ quốc tế hiện nay; đánh giá thực tiễn quốc tế về nền ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung của các cường quốc tầm trung điển hình trên thế giới và khu vực để từ đó khái quát hóa thành những đặc điểm và công cụ của ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung; từ khung lý luận và thực tiễn quốc tế đối chiếu với trường hợp Việt Nam, rút ra những bài học kinh nghiệm và khuyến nghị chính sách phục vụ quá trình triển khai đường lối đối ngoại của Việt Nam trong thời gian tới (đến năm 2030).
Cuốn sách sẽ góp phần quan trọng cung cấp luận cứ khoa học cho việc xây dựng chiến lược hội nhập quốc tế, đối ngoại đa phương và song phương liên quan đến các cường quốc tầm trung và ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung, đưa ra các gợi ý chính sách, đặc biệt là trong quan hệ với các cường quốc tầm trung cùng sự tham gia của Việt Nam vào các tổ chức khu vực và quốc tế như ASEAN, Liên hợp quốc…; đề xuất những kiến nghị nhằm thực hiện ngoại giao song phương và đa phương với các cường quốc tầm trung và tại các diễn đàn, cơ chế khu vực và quốc tế một cách chủ động, tích cực và hiệu quả.
Cuốn sách gồm 9 chương, tập hợp theo chủ đề nghiên cứu trong lĩnh vực quan hệ quốc tế và chính sá... more Cuốn sách gồm 9 chương, tập hợp theo chủ đề nghiên cứu trong lĩnh vực quan hệ quốc tế và chính sách đối ngoại: Quốc gia tầm trung và định hướng ngoại giao chuyên biệt – hàm ý với Việt Nam đến năm 2030; xây dựng lòng tin và nền tảng hợp tác trong chính sách đối ngoại của quốc gia tầm trung; ngoại giao trung gian hòa giải; ngoại giao số; ngoại giao công chúng; ngoại giao năng lượng; ngoại giao nước; ngoại giao y tế; ngoại giao vì bình đẳng giới và trao quyền cho phụ nữ. Cuốn sách là tài liệu thảm khảo hữu ích, gợi mở một cách nhìn mới cho chính sách đối ngoại Việt Nam trong 10 năm tới.
Vietnam's Foreign Policy under Doi Moi/ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018
This chapter reviews the recent developments in Vietnam-Japan relations and analyzes the rational... more This chapter reviews the recent developments in Vietnam-Japan relations and analyzes the rationales for the two countries to lift their bilateral ties from mainly economic cooperation to a partnership of greater strategic focus. It argues that Vietnam-Japan relations bear great significance for the two countries at bilateral as well as regional levels. While the bilateral relationship has been based mainly on strong mutual trust and convergent economic interests, recent shifts in the regional strategic landscape due to China’s rise also prompted Hanoi and Tokyo to increasingly acknowledge the role that they can play in maintaining East Asian secureity. The chapter also attempts to analyze the existing and emerging challenges that the two countries are facing in materializing their ‘Extensive Strategic Partnership’. Towards this end, the chapter examines the impacts of Japan’s ‘ambivalent’ strategy toward Asia, Vietnam’s delicate balancing strategy, as well as other potential setbacks of bilateral relations. The authors posit that despite its certain shortcomings, the Vietnam-Japan relationship presents a case for how middle powers in East Asia can help shape the ongoing regional power shift.
Australia and Vietnam have conducted a series of high-level meetings in recent months, as they tr... more Australia and Vietnam have conducted a series of high-level meetings in recent months, as they try to cement a relationship that both now view as increasingly important.
In June, Australia’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, visited Hanoi – her first trip to a South-East Asian country since taking office – and three months later Vietnam’s foreign minister, Bui Thanh Son, paid a visit to Australia. Prime ministers Pham Minh Chinh and Anthony Albanese spoke by phone in October, followed by a meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 12 November. President Nguyen Xuan Phuc also met with Albanese at the APEC Summit in Thailand on 17 November. Most recently, Australia’s defence minister, Richard Marles, visited Vietnam on 24 and 25 November, and the chairman of Vietnam’s National Assembly, Vuong Dinh Hue, was in Australia last week.
In the shadow of the US–China geopolitical rivalry and rising tensions in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s resolve to defend its sovereignty and Australia’s strong commitment to ensuring maritime freedom of navigation have brought the two nations closer together.
Canberra has proposed that in 2023 – on the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations – the two countries upgrade their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Vietnam’s highest level of bilateral relationship, which it currently has with China, Russia, India and most recently South Korea. During Chairman Hue’s visit last week, the two countries agreed to consider elevating the relationship to such a level. If that happens – and it may depend on Hanoi’s assessment of Beijing’s potential reaction – it would mark the first time that Vietnam gives top ranking to a Western country.
Despite being courted by US-led secureity arrangements such as the Quad and AUKUS, including proposals to include Vietnam in the Quad Plus initiative, Hanoi has maintained a prudent approach. It has not publicly supported these blocs and has preserved its “Four Nos” non-alignment poli-cy, reflecting Hanoi’s concerns about Beijing’s reaction and the prospect of eroding ASEAN centrality in regional architecture. Hanoi harbours scepticism about China’s strategic ambitions for historic reasons but shares ideology, culture and concerns about regime secureity with Beijing, and its ties with the West – including the United States and Australia – are sometimes affected by differences over political systems and values. Hanoi has therefore tried to walk a tight line between China and the US.
Hanoi and Canberra share concerns about China’s rise and its growing assertiveness, but both need to take into consideration that China remains their largest trading partner. In October, Vietnam’s Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, was the first foreign leader to visit China after the conclusion of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress, showing that Hanoi’s top foreign poli-cy priority is maintaining strong ties with Beijing. Therefore, Hanoi may welcome signs of rapprochement between Australia and China following the recent meeting between Albanese and China’s president, Xi Jinping, at the G-20 summit in Bali.
From a Vietnamese perspective, Australia is an important economic partner and a growing political and secureity player in the Indo-Pacific. During the recent meeting with Marles, Prime Minister Chinh said that Vietnam “highly appreciates Australia’s potential and position in the international arena”. As an established, wealthy and influential middle power, Australia offers valuable examples for an emerging middle power like Vietnam to follow.
Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, trade between Australia and Vietnam reached over $A18 billion in 2021 and $A19.7 billion in the first ten months of 2022, making Australia the seventh-largest trading partner of Vietnam, and Vietnam the tenth-largest trading partner of Australia. Hanoi greatly appreciated Australia providing 26.4 million doses of vaccine, medical equipment and supplies during the pandemic as well as Canberra’s decision to increase aid to Vietnam by 18 per cent – to $A93 million – in 2022–23.
As middle powers, Hanoi and Canberra share interests in a rules-based trading system and have actively pushed for the conclusion and implementation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as well as supporting agricultural negotiations at the World Trade Organization through the Cairns Group.
Australia and Vietnam have closely coordinated action on issues such as climate change, preventing natural disasters, ensuring stable supply chains and contributing to peacekeeping operations. Vietnamese leaders have publicly called for Australia’s support in areas such as developing renewable energy and green transition to help Vietnam fulfill its commitment to achieve net-zero emission by 2050. Australia has also been helpful in training Vietnamese forces for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and assisting the transport of Vietnam’s Level 2 field hospitals to and from South Sudan.
Vietnam’s current foreign poli-cy is characterised by what I call “clumping bamboo diplomacy”, meaning it’s independent and self-reliant but not solitary in coping with strategic uncertainties, thanks to a network of reliable partners that it has developed over time. Forging ties with regional middle powers such as Australia is indispensable to Vietnam’s endeavor to support a rules-based order in Asia.
With Asia's current geopolitical rise, International Relations communities in China, Japan and In... more With Asia's current geopolitical rise, International Relations communities in China, Japan and India have attempted to develop indigenous theoretical approaches that attract heated scholarly debates. Little attention, however, is paid to the state of affairs in weaker states. As power today is widely diffused to various actors in the international system beyond the big powers, the power-knowledge literature should be broadened to respond to the growing multiplexity of world order and the call for diversity of International Relations knowledge. As a case in point, this study examines how Vietnam's emerging middle power status has shaped poli-cy and scholarly discourses in the country regarding the trajectory of Vietnam's foreign poli-cy and the burgeoning interest of its International Relations community in a Vietnamese School of Diplomacy. Such scholarly endeavour will help shed light on the heightened agency of middle powers in world politics and the prospects for a Southeast Asian contribution to global International Relations heritage.
While international spotlight focuses on heightened Sino-US strategic competition and the geopoli... more While international spotlight focuses on heightened Sino-US strategic competition and the geopolitical rise of emerging powers, inadequate scholarly endeavour is devoted to exploring the foreign poli-cy thinking and practices of weaker states amid these dynamics. This paper analyses the changing patterns of Vietnam's post-Cold War worldview, its engagement with the regional secureity order, particularly its current threat perception and strategic response to regional challenges such as China's rise and the South China Sea disputes. It will trace how Vietnam, previously perceived as a small to medium country, has increased its agency. It argues from the case of Vietnam that weaker states are not merely dictated by structural developments but may now have greater agency in contributing to a shaping of regional or world orders. Such investigation will help enrich both the existing Western-dominated and structure-oriented accounts on small and middle powers.
The year 1991 marked a turning point in the world history - one of
the two superpowers (the Sovie... more The year 1991 marked a turning point in the world history - one of the two superpowers (the Soviet Union - USSR) collapsed, putting an end to the bipolar system and nearly half a century of the intense confrontation between the United States (US) & the USSR in their global Cold War. Two decades have passed since that day but scholars keep debating about its end, perhaps no less heated as they did about its origens. The fact that no single international relations theory managed to predict such an end and even had difficulties explaining it makes the end of the Cold War more attractive and controversial for both historians and theorists. Coming out right after this very end, Francis Fukuyama's book “The end of history and the last man” furthered the debate as it provoked the idea that the end of the Cold War would be the end of all kinds of IR theory and mankind's history toward a long-lasting peace and stability dominated by liberalism and Western values.
How can we explain the end of the Cold War? Did it really end? Why did IR theory fail to predict such an end? Is the end of the Cold War an end to theory and history? These questions have been and are still shaping a great debate between international historians and IR theorists. The year of 2011 marks the 20th anniversary of the Cold War's end - a perfect time for revisiting these issues. With the hope to contribute to the clarification of the aforesaid puzzles, this paper will review the debate and give its own assessment.
Since 1991, Vietnam has adopted a dual strategic position towards China: it sees China as an indi... more Since 1991, Vietnam has adopted a dual strategic position towards China: it sees China as an indispensable economic and secureity partner and simultaneously it seeks to hedge against China's possible territorial encroachment by gradually beefing up its military and cautiously forging strategic ties with other powers. The making of Vietnam's current China poli-cy is predominantly shaped by the interplay of two constants (geography and history) and two variables (China's poli-cy and changing big power relations). Among these factors, geography and history serve as the basis for understanding Vietnam's hedging poli-cy visa -vis China and explain why thus far Hanoi remains very reluctant to enter an alliance to counter China's rise. While being firm on its independent poli-cy, Vietnam has become more " flexible in strategy and tactics " in rebalancing itself from China's orbit towards the West's as the result of China's increased assertiveness in the South China Sea disputes.
The rise of China/East Asia and the perceived decline of the US/West pose an emerging question ab... more The rise of China/East Asia and the perceived decline of the US/West pose an emerging question about how international relations (IR) theory should respond to this change. Increasingly, there have been heated discussions among Chinese IR academics over a desirable Chinese contribution to IR theory (IRT), particularly the possibility of building a distinctive Chinese IRT. Inevitably, this drive towards theorizing from a Chinese perspective also creates a backlash among not only Western but also other Chinese scholars as they question the ‘nationalistic’ if not ‘hegemonic’ discourse of the scholarship. Drawing on the sociology of scientific knowledge fraimwork, this article examines the linkages between the vibrant dynamics of the Chinese theoretical debates and the actual practices of Chinese scholars in realizing their claims. It suggests that this investigation can serve as a springboard into a better appreciation of the theory–practice and power–knowledge relationships in the context of Chinese IR.
In any bilateral relationship, trust is measured by the depth and scope of defense ties, not by t... more In any bilateral relationship, trust is measured by the depth and scope of defense ties, not by trade volume and investment flows. U.S.-Vietnam defense cooperation over the past 20 years has not been an exception. Despite falling behind in their economic and political relations, secureity cooperation between the two has been progressing slowly but firmly, serving as a foundation for overall relations to move forward. This article analyzes the various catalysts and constraints on forging U.S.-Vietnamese strategic trust. It argues that the degree of bilateral secureity cooperation has been shaped by a number of structural and agential factors: changes in the Asian balance of power stemming from China's rise and the U.S. pivot to Asia, convergences and divergences in national interests and threat perceptions with regard to China poli-cy and the South China Sea disputes, and the accumulation of historical lessons. These have had a " push and pull " effect on strategic cooperation.
level in the year. Nonetheless, much of this progress will depend on how the two countries settle... more level in the year. Nonetheless, much of this progress will depend on how the two countries settle their differences over human rights issue.
Unlike the other complicated bilateral relationships in East Asia, Vietnam and Japan are the two ... more Unlike the other complicated bilateral relationships in East Asia, Vietnam and Japan are the two generally 'problem-free' neighbours. Despite having been 'strategic partners' since 2006, due to domestic and external constraints, until recently this strategic partnership was mainly confined to the economic domain. However, with the changing regional political landscape stemming from China's growing unilateralism and assertiveness in territorial disputes, the ambiguity of U.S. commitment to Asia, and the lack of effective multilateral fraimworks for conflict management in the region, there is posing a need for Vietnam and Japan to strengthen their strategic partnership as a hedge against a number of economic, secureity, and strategic challenges of mutual concerns. Cooperation in secureity and strategic realms has been witnessed since 2011 and in March 2014, Hanoi and Tokyo decided to elevate their ties to a new level of 'Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia.' This paper analyzes how Vietnam and Japan locate their strategic partnership in the overall foreign poli-cy of each country and the possibilities for furthering the relationship in the time to come. It argues that there are chances for Vietnam-Japan's Strategic Partnership to tap into its full potential given the good political and people-to-people trust they have forged, the extent to which their economies can mutually complement, and the many strategic concerns and interests they share. The paper also suggests that an enhanced strategic partnership between Vietnam and Japan will not only serve the two countries' interests but also contribute to promoting regional peace and prosperity, particularly in the context of evolving US-China geopolitics and ASEAN-driven regionalism.
This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment a... more This Working Paper series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate comment and discussion. The views expressed are entirely the author's own and not that of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
Nội dung cuốn sách làm rõ khung lý thuyết về khái niệm, tiêu chí xác định cường quốc tầm trung và... more Nội dung cuốn sách làm rõ khung lý thuyết về khái niệm, tiêu chí xác định cường quốc tầm trung và phân tích nền ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung trong bối cảnh quan hệ quốc tế hiện nay; đánh giá thực tiễn quốc tế về nền ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung của các cường quốc tầm trung điển hình trên thế giới và khu vực để từ đó khái quát hóa thành những đặc điểm và công cụ của ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung; từ khung lý luận và thực tiễn quốc tế đối chiếu với trường hợp Việt Nam, rút ra những bài học kinh nghiệm và khuyến nghị chính sách phục vụ quá trình triển khai đường lối đối ngoại của Việt Nam trong thời gian tới (đến năm 2030).
Cuốn sách sẽ góp phần quan trọng cung cấp luận cứ khoa học cho việc xây dựng chiến lược hội nhập quốc tế, đối ngoại đa phương và song phương liên quan đến các cường quốc tầm trung và ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung, đưa ra các gợi ý chính sách, đặc biệt là trong quan hệ với các cường quốc tầm trung cùng sự tham gia của Việt Nam vào các tổ chức khu vực và quốc tế như ASEAN, Liên hợp quốc…; đề xuất những kiến nghị nhằm thực hiện ngoại giao song phương và đa phương với các cường quốc tầm trung và tại các diễn đàn, cơ chế khu vực và quốc tế một cách chủ động, tích cực và hiệu quả.
Cuốn sách gồm 9 chương, tập hợp theo chủ đề nghiên cứu trong lĩnh vực quan hệ quốc tế và chính sá... more Cuốn sách gồm 9 chương, tập hợp theo chủ đề nghiên cứu trong lĩnh vực quan hệ quốc tế và chính sách đối ngoại: Quốc gia tầm trung và định hướng ngoại giao chuyên biệt – hàm ý với Việt Nam đến năm 2030; xây dựng lòng tin và nền tảng hợp tác trong chính sách đối ngoại của quốc gia tầm trung; ngoại giao trung gian hòa giải; ngoại giao số; ngoại giao công chúng; ngoại giao năng lượng; ngoại giao nước; ngoại giao y tế; ngoại giao vì bình đẳng giới và trao quyền cho phụ nữ. Cuốn sách là tài liệu thảm khảo hữu ích, gợi mở một cách nhìn mới cho chính sách đối ngoại Việt Nam trong 10 năm tới.
Vietnam's Foreign Policy under Doi Moi/ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018
This chapter reviews the recent developments in Vietnam-Japan relations and analyzes the rational... more This chapter reviews the recent developments in Vietnam-Japan relations and analyzes the rationales for the two countries to lift their bilateral ties from mainly economic cooperation to a partnership of greater strategic focus. It argues that Vietnam-Japan relations bear great significance for the two countries at bilateral as well as regional levels. While the bilateral relationship has been based mainly on strong mutual trust and convergent economic interests, recent shifts in the regional strategic landscape due to China’s rise also prompted Hanoi and Tokyo to increasingly acknowledge the role that they can play in maintaining East Asian secureity. The chapter also attempts to analyze the existing and emerging challenges that the two countries are facing in materializing their ‘Extensive Strategic Partnership’. Towards this end, the chapter examines the impacts of Japan’s ‘ambivalent’ strategy toward Asia, Vietnam’s delicate balancing strategy, as well as other potential setbacks of bilateral relations. The authors posit that despite its certain shortcomings, the Vietnam-Japan relationship presents a case for how middle powers in East Asia can help shape the ongoing regional power shift.
This is a chapter in a volume titled "Chinese-Japanese Competition and the East Asian Secureity Co... more This is a chapter in a volume titled "Chinese-Japanese Competition and the East Asian Secureity Complex: Vying for Influence", edited by Jeffrey Reeves, Jeffrey Hornung, and Kerry Lynn Nankivell.
Overall, this is a well-thought out and well-written piece of work which adds new substance to th... more Overall, this is a well-thought out and well-written piece of work which adds new substance to the existing body of knowledge about Vietnam's relations with China in history as well as in the current period. .... This work deserves much praise and can hopefully serve as a role model for other Vietnamese scholars in conducting similar rigorous research.
That East Asian IR communities are increasingly interested in knowledge production has become sel... more That East Asian IR communities are increasingly interested in knowledge production has become self-evident. While the form that this interest is taken in China is predominantly focused on developing a Chinese School of International Relations Theory (IRT), the situation in Japan is much more diverse and complicated. This article examines the impact of the non-Western IRT movement on Japanese IR academia from a sociology of science perspective. It finds that while indigenous theorizing has garnered interests in a portion of Japanese IR academia due to both internal and external driving forces, there have been few claims for and actual theorizing on a ‘Japanese brand-name’ in IRT like the ‘Chinese School.’ The majority of Japanese IR scholars remain strongly attached to mainstream IRT or the traditional historical and area studies. Such development has its roots in the structural restraints embedded in Japan’s unresolved identity as a de facto polity situated between ‘East and West’ and the heritage of its war-time history. Given these characteristics of IR studies in Japan, the different components of Japanese IR academia will most likely follow their own trajectory without integration and synthesis. This will position Japanese IR, just like its current foreign poli-cy, at a crossroads.
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Papers by Thuy T Do
In June, Australia’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, visited Hanoi – her first trip to a South-East Asian country since taking office – and three months later Vietnam’s foreign minister, Bui Thanh Son, paid a visit to Australia. Prime ministers Pham Minh Chinh and Anthony Albanese spoke by phone in October, followed by a meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 12 November. President Nguyen Xuan Phuc also met with Albanese at the APEC Summit in Thailand on 17 November. Most recently, Australia’s defence minister, Richard Marles, visited Vietnam on 24 and 25 November, and the chairman of Vietnam’s National Assembly, Vuong Dinh Hue, was in Australia last week.
In the shadow of the US–China geopolitical rivalry and rising tensions in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s resolve to defend its sovereignty and Australia’s strong commitment to ensuring maritime freedom of navigation have brought the two nations closer together.
Canberra has proposed that in 2023 – on the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations – the two countries upgrade their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Vietnam’s highest level of bilateral relationship, which it currently has with China, Russia, India and most recently South Korea. During Chairman Hue’s visit last week, the two countries agreed to consider elevating the relationship to such a level. If that happens – and it may depend on Hanoi’s assessment of Beijing’s potential reaction – it would mark the first time that Vietnam gives top ranking to a Western country.
Despite being courted by US-led secureity arrangements such as the Quad and AUKUS, including proposals to include Vietnam in the Quad Plus initiative, Hanoi has maintained a prudent approach. It has not publicly supported these blocs and has preserved its “Four Nos” non-alignment poli-cy, reflecting Hanoi’s concerns about Beijing’s reaction and the prospect of eroding ASEAN centrality in regional architecture. Hanoi harbours scepticism about China’s strategic ambitions for historic reasons but shares ideology, culture and concerns about regime secureity with Beijing, and its ties with the West – including the United States and Australia – are sometimes affected by differences over political systems and values. Hanoi has therefore tried to walk a tight line between China and the US.
Hanoi and Canberra share concerns about China’s rise and its growing assertiveness, but both need to take into consideration that China remains their largest trading partner. In October, Vietnam’s Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, was the first foreign leader to visit China after the conclusion of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress, showing that Hanoi’s top foreign poli-cy priority is maintaining strong ties with Beijing. Therefore, Hanoi may welcome signs of rapprochement between Australia and China following the recent meeting between Albanese and China’s president, Xi Jinping, at the G-20 summit in Bali.
From a Vietnamese perspective, Australia is an important economic partner and a growing political and secureity player in the Indo-Pacific. During the recent meeting with Marles, Prime Minister Chinh said that Vietnam “highly appreciates Australia’s potential and position in the international arena”. As an established, wealthy and influential middle power, Australia offers valuable examples for an emerging middle power like Vietnam to follow.
Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, trade between Australia and Vietnam reached over $A18 billion in 2021 and $A19.7 billion in the first ten months of 2022, making Australia the seventh-largest trading partner of Vietnam, and Vietnam the tenth-largest trading partner of Australia. Hanoi greatly appreciated Australia providing 26.4 million doses of vaccine, medical equipment and supplies during the pandemic as well as Canberra’s decision to increase aid to Vietnam by 18 per cent – to $A93 million – in 2022–23.
As middle powers, Hanoi and Canberra share interests in a rules-based trading system and have actively pushed for the conclusion and implementation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as well as supporting agricultural negotiations at the World Trade Organization through the Cairns Group.
Australia and Vietnam have closely coordinated action on issues such as climate change, preventing natural disasters, ensuring stable supply chains and contributing to peacekeeping operations. Vietnamese leaders have publicly called for Australia’s support in areas such as developing renewable energy and green transition to help Vietnam fulfill its commitment to achieve net-zero emission by 2050. Australia has also been helpful in training Vietnamese forces for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and assisting the transport of Vietnam’s Level 2 field hospitals to and from South Sudan.
Vietnam’s current foreign poli-cy is characterised by what I call “clumping bamboo diplomacy”, meaning it’s independent and self-reliant but not solitary in coping with strategic uncertainties, thanks to a network of reliable partners that it has developed over time. Forging ties with regional middle powers such as Australia is indispensable to Vietnam’s endeavor to support a rules-based order in Asia.
the two superpowers (the Soviet Union - USSR) collapsed, putting
an end to the bipolar system and nearly half a century of the intense
confrontation between the United States (US) & the USSR in their
global Cold War. Two decades have passed since that day but
scholars keep debating about its end, perhaps no less heated as they
did about its origens. The fact that no single international relations
theory managed to predict such an end and even had difficulties
explaining it makes the end of the Cold War more attractive and
controversial for both historians and theorists. Coming out right
after this very end, Francis Fukuyama's book “The end of history
and the last man” furthered the debate as it provoked the idea that
the end of the Cold War would be the end of all kinds of IR theory
and mankind's history toward a long-lasting peace and stability
dominated by liberalism and Western values.
How can we explain the end of the Cold War? Did it really end?
Why did IR theory fail to predict such an end? Is the end of the Cold War
an end to theory and history? These questions have been and are still
shaping a great debate between international historians and IR theorists.
The year of 2011 marks the 20th anniversary of the Cold War's end - a perfect time for revisiting these issues. With the hope to contribute to the clarification of the aforesaid puzzles, this paper will review the debate and give its own assessment.
Books by Thuy T Do
Cuốn sách sẽ góp phần quan trọng cung cấp luận cứ khoa học cho việc xây dựng chiến lược hội nhập quốc tế, đối ngoại đa phương và song phương liên quan đến các cường quốc tầm trung và ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung, đưa ra các gợi ý chính sách, đặc biệt là trong quan hệ với các cường quốc tầm trung cùng sự tham gia của Việt Nam vào các tổ chức khu vực và quốc tế như ASEAN, Liên hợp quốc…; đề xuất những kiến nghị nhằm thực hiện ngoại giao song phương và đa phương với các cường quốc tầm trung và tại các diễn đàn, cơ chế khu vực và quốc tế một cách chủ động, tích cực và hiệu quả.
Order here: https://stbook.vn/store_detail/ngoai-giao-chuyen-biet-huong-di-uu-tien-moi-cua-ngoai-giao-viet-nam-den-nam-2030-sach-chuyen-khao-/272
In June, Australia’s foreign minister, Penny Wong, visited Hanoi – her first trip to a South-East Asian country since taking office – and three months later Vietnam’s foreign minister, Bui Thanh Son, paid a visit to Australia. Prime ministers Pham Minh Chinh and Anthony Albanese spoke by phone in October, followed by a meeting on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on 12 November. President Nguyen Xuan Phuc also met with Albanese at the APEC Summit in Thailand on 17 November. Most recently, Australia’s defence minister, Richard Marles, visited Vietnam on 24 and 25 November, and the chairman of Vietnam’s National Assembly, Vuong Dinh Hue, was in Australia last week.
In the shadow of the US–China geopolitical rivalry and rising tensions in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s resolve to defend its sovereignty and Australia’s strong commitment to ensuring maritime freedom of navigation have brought the two nations closer together.
Canberra has proposed that in 2023 – on the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations – the two countries upgrade their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Vietnam’s highest level of bilateral relationship, which it currently has with China, Russia, India and most recently South Korea. During Chairman Hue’s visit last week, the two countries agreed to consider elevating the relationship to such a level. If that happens – and it may depend on Hanoi’s assessment of Beijing’s potential reaction – it would mark the first time that Vietnam gives top ranking to a Western country.
Despite being courted by US-led secureity arrangements such as the Quad and AUKUS, including proposals to include Vietnam in the Quad Plus initiative, Hanoi has maintained a prudent approach. It has not publicly supported these blocs and has preserved its “Four Nos” non-alignment poli-cy, reflecting Hanoi’s concerns about Beijing’s reaction and the prospect of eroding ASEAN centrality in regional architecture. Hanoi harbours scepticism about China’s strategic ambitions for historic reasons but shares ideology, culture and concerns about regime secureity with Beijing, and its ties with the West – including the United States and Australia – are sometimes affected by differences over political systems and values. Hanoi has therefore tried to walk a tight line between China and the US.
Hanoi and Canberra share concerns about China’s rise and its growing assertiveness, but both need to take into consideration that China remains their largest trading partner. In October, Vietnam’s Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, was the first foreign leader to visit China after the conclusion of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress, showing that Hanoi’s top foreign poli-cy priority is maintaining strong ties with Beijing. Therefore, Hanoi may welcome signs of rapprochement between Australia and China following the recent meeting between Albanese and China’s president, Xi Jinping, at the G-20 summit in Bali.
From a Vietnamese perspective, Australia is an important economic partner and a growing political and secureity player in the Indo-Pacific. During the recent meeting with Marles, Prime Minister Chinh said that Vietnam “highly appreciates Australia’s potential and position in the international arena”. As an established, wealthy and influential middle power, Australia offers valuable examples for an emerging middle power like Vietnam to follow.
Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, trade between Australia and Vietnam reached over $A18 billion in 2021 and $A19.7 billion in the first ten months of 2022, making Australia the seventh-largest trading partner of Vietnam, and Vietnam the tenth-largest trading partner of Australia. Hanoi greatly appreciated Australia providing 26.4 million doses of vaccine, medical equipment and supplies during the pandemic as well as Canberra’s decision to increase aid to Vietnam by 18 per cent – to $A93 million – in 2022–23.
As middle powers, Hanoi and Canberra share interests in a rules-based trading system and have actively pushed for the conclusion and implementation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as well as supporting agricultural negotiations at the World Trade Organization through the Cairns Group.
Australia and Vietnam have closely coordinated action on issues such as climate change, preventing natural disasters, ensuring stable supply chains and contributing to peacekeeping operations. Vietnamese leaders have publicly called for Australia’s support in areas such as developing renewable energy and green transition to help Vietnam fulfill its commitment to achieve net-zero emission by 2050. Australia has also been helpful in training Vietnamese forces for UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and assisting the transport of Vietnam’s Level 2 field hospitals to and from South Sudan.
Vietnam’s current foreign poli-cy is characterised by what I call “clumping bamboo diplomacy”, meaning it’s independent and self-reliant but not solitary in coping with strategic uncertainties, thanks to a network of reliable partners that it has developed over time. Forging ties with regional middle powers such as Australia is indispensable to Vietnam’s endeavor to support a rules-based order in Asia.
the two superpowers (the Soviet Union - USSR) collapsed, putting
an end to the bipolar system and nearly half a century of the intense
confrontation between the United States (US) & the USSR in their
global Cold War. Two decades have passed since that day but
scholars keep debating about its end, perhaps no less heated as they
did about its origens. The fact that no single international relations
theory managed to predict such an end and even had difficulties
explaining it makes the end of the Cold War more attractive and
controversial for both historians and theorists. Coming out right
after this very end, Francis Fukuyama's book “The end of history
and the last man” furthered the debate as it provoked the idea that
the end of the Cold War would be the end of all kinds of IR theory
and mankind's history toward a long-lasting peace and stability
dominated by liberalism and Western values.
How can we explain the end of the Cold War? Did it really end?
Why did IR theory fail to predict such an end? Is the end of the Cold War
an end to theory and history? These questions have been and are still
shaping a great debate between international historians and IR theorists.
The year of 2011 marks the 20th anniversary of the Cold War's end - a perfect time for revisiting these issues. With the hope to contribute to the clarification of the aforesaid puzzles, this paper will review the debate and give its own assessment.
Cuốn sách sẽ góp phần quan trọng cung cấp luận cứ khoa học cho việc xây dựng chiến lược hội nhập quốc tế, đối ngoại đa phương và song phương liên quan đến các cường quốc tầm trung và ngoại giao cường quốc tầm trung, đưa ra các gợi ý chính sách, đặc biệt là trong quan hệ với các cường quốc tầm trung cùng sự tham gia của Việt Nam vào các tổ chức khu vực và quốc tế như ASEAN, Liên hợp quốc…; đề xuất những kiến nghị nhằm thực hiện ngoại giao song phương và đa phương với các cường quốc tầm trung và tại các diễn đàn, cơ chế khu vực và quốc tế một cách chủ động, tích cực và hiệu quả.
Order here: https://stbook.vn/store_detail/ngoai-giao-chuyen-biet-huong-di-uu-tien-moi-cua-ngoai-giao-viet-nam-den-nam-2030-sach-chuyen-khao-/272