Abstract
Authentication protocols based on an asymmetric keypair provide strong authentication as long as the private key remains secret, but may fail catastrophically if the private key is lost or stolen. Even when encrypted with a password, stolen key material is susceptible to offline brute-force attacks. In this paper we demonstrate a method for rate-limiting password guesses on stolen key material, without requiring special hardware or changes to servers. By slowing down offline attacks and enabling easy key revocation our algorithm reduces the risk of key compromise, even if a low-entropy password is used.
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Acknowledgements
We thank Alastair R. Beresford and the reviewers for their helpful feedback.
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Kleppmann, M., Irwin, C. (2016). Strengthening Public Key Authentication Against Key Theft (Short Paper). In: Stajano, F., Mjølsnes, S.F., Jenkinson, G., Thorsheim, P. (eds) Technology and Practice of Passwords. PASSWORDS 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9551. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29938-9_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29938-9_9
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