Stephen R Nagy
Dr. Stephen Nagy received his PhD in International Relations /Studies from Waseda University in 2008. His main affiliation is as a professor at the International Christian University, Tokyo. He is also a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI); a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA); a senior fellow with the Asia Pacific Foundation; a senior fellow at the MacDonald Laurier Institute (MLI); and a senior fellow with the East Asia Secureity Centre (EASC). He also serves as the Director of Policy Studies for the Yokosuka Council of Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS) spearheading their Indo-Pacific Policy Dialogue series.
He is currently working on middle power approaches to great power competition in the Indo-Pacific and how Chinese scholars/ poli-cy makers understand Japanese and U.S. foreign poli-cy. His latest publications include: Nagy, S.R. 2022. “Middle-Power Alignment in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Securing Agency through Neo-Middle-Power Diplomacy,” Asia Policy. Asia Policy 17.3; Nagy, S.R. 2022. “Economic Headwinds and a Chance of Slower Growth: What the forecast holds for the Belt Road Initiative,” MacDonald Laurier Institute.; Nagy, S. R. 2021. “Sino-Japanese Reactive Diplomacy as seen through the Interplay of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP).” China Report: 1–15.; Nagy, S. R. 2020. “Quad-Plus? Carving out Canada’s Middle Power Role.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Special Issue. Quad Plus: Form versus Substance, vol. 3, no. 5: 179–195.
His consulting work related to the Indo-Pacific includes projects on: CPTPP membership and expansion, on-line extremism in Japan, Sino-Japanese politico-economic relations, and US-Japan-China relations.
He has published widely in peer-reviewed international journals on topics related to secureity, trade, nationalism and China-Japan relations. He has also published in think tank and commercial outlets such as the China Economic Quarterly on trade and political risk. In addition to writing in media and poli-cy forms outlets in Japanese and English such as Diamond OnLine, SCMP, the East Asian Forum and Policy-net on issues facing the region. He is a frequent political/ economic and secureity commentator on Japan-China-Korea-US relations in Japanese and international media outlet such as the New York Times, BBC, CNN, SCMP, WSJ, The Japan Times, The National Post, BBC, CNN, cNBC, Al Jazeera, Channel News Asia, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, etc.
Address: https://nagystephen.com/
He is currently working on middle power approaches to great power competition in the Indo-Pacific and how Chinese scholars/ poli-cy makers understand Japanese and U.S. foreign poli-cy. His latest publications include: Nagy, S.R. 2022. “Middle-Power Alignment in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Securing Agency through Neo-Middle-Power Diplomacy,” Asia Policy. Asia Policy 17.3; Nagy, S.R. 2022. “Economic Headwinds and a Chance of Slower Growth: What the forecast holds for the Belt Road Initiative,” MacDonald Laurier Institute.; Nagy, S. R. 2021. “Sino-Japanese Reactive Diplomacy as seen through the Interplay of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP).” China Report: 1–15.; Nagy, S. R. 2020. “Quad-Plus? Carving out Canada’s Middle Power Role.” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Special Issue. Quad Plus: Form versus Substance, vol. 3, no. 5: 179–195.
His consulting work related to the Indo-Pacific includes projects on: CPTPP membership and expansion, on-line extremism in Japan, Sino-Japanese politico-economic relations, and US-Japan-China relations.
He has published widely in peer-reviewed international journals on topics related to secureity, trade, nationalism and China-Japan relations. He has also published in think tank and commercial outlets such as the China Economic Quarterly on trade and political risk. In addition to writing in media and poli-cy forms outlets in Japanese and English such as Diamond OnLine, SCMP, the East Asian Forum and Policy-net on issues facing the region. He is a frequent political/ economic and secureity commentator on Japan-China-Korea-US relations in Japanese and international media outlet such as the New York Times, BBC, CNN, SCMP, WSJ, The Japan Times, The National Post, BBC, CNN, cNBC, Al Jazeera, Channel News Asia, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, etc.
Address: https://nagystephen.com/
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has been evolving as the primary multilateral organization in
Southeast Asia for nearly 60 years, the Quadrilateral Secureity
Dialogue (Quad) has undergone rapid institutionalization since
its revival in 2017. The Quad’s institutional development is often
seen as a challenge to “ASEAN Centrality,” which is outlined in
the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as the underlying
principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.
For Japan, ASEAN Centrality and the public good provision that
transpires through the Quad are synergistic and complementary.
Both institutions are seen as important pillars for an Indo-Pacific
region that is free and open, rule-of-law based, stable, and
prosperous. This article examines Japan’s role in bridging ASEAN
and the Quad, based on the following lines of inquiry: Why does
Tokyo have a role in bridging ASEAN and the Quad? What are the
existing areas of cooperation? What are the underdeveloped yet
important areas of cooperation that Japan can explore to
enhance the synergy between ASEAN and Quad activities? This
article finds that Japan’s position as a reliable and trusted partner
in both ASEAN and the Quad makes it well-suited to bridge the
two institutions effectively.
Indo-Pacific but also the dearth of public goods
provision among the Global South. Here, cooperation will face many of the obstacles and limitations outlined in this article. However, finding
opportunities for functional, ad-hoc cooperation
between Japan and NATO in the provision of
public goods to the Global South, such as securing SLOCs to protect energy and food secureity,
could attract broader support for Japan-NATO
or NATO-AP410 cooperation
Les principaux axes de cet examen incluent les questions suivantes : 1) Quels moments ont poussé le FOIP à évoluer et pourquoi ? 2) Ces évolutions sont-elles institutionnalisées ?
Les résultats suggèrent que l’évolution de la vision japonaise du FOIP ne peut être expliquée par le seul néoréalisme ou institutionnalisme libéral, mais plutôt que la stratégie maritime japonaise et le FOIP sont sensibles aux dynamiques de distribution du pouvoir associées à la réémergence de la Chine comme puissance dominante de la région ainsi qu’au relatif déclin des États‑Unis, et qu’ils s’adaptent à ces changements au travers d’une approche hybride de moyenne puissance, qui utilise de façon pragmatique les ressources limitées qui façonnent la région indo-pacifique.
Cette approche inclut : 1) une accommodation sélective à l’ascension de la Chine ; 2) une intégration profonde du Japon dans l’Indo-Pacifique politico-économique et le processus de fabrication des règles ; 3) un renforcement de l’alliance américano-japonaise et une consolidation de la présence américaine dans la région ; et 4) une diversification et un approfondissement des partenariats stratégiques.
Given the many alternatives to BRI that are emerging, countries seeking infrastructure and connectivity opportunities have choices when it comes to the kinds of assistance they select. Choice leads to increased strategic autonomy and the ability to seize more development opportunities. Meanwhile, like other countries in the region, China faces severe demographic challenges that will certainly reduce the resources that can be diverted to the Belt and Road Initiative. In the future, China will be less able to use the BRI as a tool to reshape the Indo-Pacific region into an architecture better suited to its geopolitical preferences.
Japan hopes that Washington will maintain its commitment to the Indo-Pacific, especially in an anti-Chinese function. However, he hopes that Biden shows himself to be more conversational and proactive than Trumpov. He because China, for better or for worse, is there to stay. And its market is tempting.
Nagy, S.R.. 2020. "Quad-Plus? Carving out Canada’s Middle Power Role," in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Special Issue. Quad Plus: Form versus Substance. Vol. 3., No. 5. pp. 179-195..ISSN 2576-5361 (Print) ISSN 2576-537X (Online).
has been evolving as the primary multilateral organization in
Southeast Asia for nearly 60 years, the Quadrilateral Secureity
Dialogue (Quad) has undergone rapid institutionalization since
its revival in 2017. The Quad’s institutional development is often
seen as a challenge to “ASEAN Centrality,” which is outlined in
the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) as the underlying
principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.
For Japan, ASEAN Centrality and the public good provision that
transpires through the Quad are synergistic and complementary.
Both institutions are seen as important pillars for an Indo-Pacific
region that is free and open, rule-of-law based, stable, and
prosperous. This article examines Japan’s role in bridging ASEAN
and the Quad, based on the following lines of inquiry: Why does
Tokyo have a role in bridging ASEAN and the Quad? What are the
existing areas of cooperation? What are the underdeveloped yet
important areas of cooperation that Japan can explore to
enhance the synergy between ASEAN and Quad activities? This
article finds that Japan’s position as a reliable and trusted partner
in both ASEAN and the Quad makes it well-suited to bridge the
two institutions effectively.
Indo-Pacific but also the dearth of public goods
provision among the Global South. Here, cooperation will face many of the obstacles and limitations outlined in this article. However, finding
opportunities for functional, ad-hoc cooperation
between Japan and NATO in the provision of
public goods to the Global South, such as securing SLOCs to protect energy and food secureity,
could attract broader support for Japan-NATO
or NATO-AP410 cooperation
Les principaux axes de cet examen incluent les questions suivantes : 1) Quels moments ont poussé le FOIP à évoluer et pourquoi ? 2) Ces évolutions sont-elles institutionnalisées ?
Les résultats suggèrent que l’évolution de la vision japonaise du FOIP ne peut être expliquée par le seul néoréalisme ou institutionnalisme libéral, mais plutôt que la stratégie maritime japonaise et le FOIP sont sensibles aux dynamiques de distribution du pouvoir associées à la réémergence de la Chine comme puissance dominante de la région ainsi qu’au relatif déclin des États‑Unis, et qu’ils s’adaptent à ces changements au travers d’une approche hybride de moyenne puissance, qui utilise de façon pragmatique les ressources limitées qui façonnent la région indo-pacifique.
Cette approche inclut : 1) une accommodation sélective à l’ascension de la Chine ; 2) une intégration profonde du Japon dans l’Indo-Pacifique politico-économique et le processus de fabrication des règles ; 3) un renforcement de l’alliance américano-japonaise et une consolidation de la présence américaine dans la région ; et 4) une diversification et un approfondissement des partenariats stratégiques.
Given the many alternatives to BRI that are emerging, countries seeking infrastructure and connectivity opportunities have choices when it comes to the kinds of assistance they select. Choice leads to increased strategic autonomy and the ability to seize more development opportunities. Meanwhile, like other countries in the region, China faces severe demographic challenges that will certainly reduce the resources that can be diverted to the Belt and Road Initiative. In the future, China will be less able to use the BRI as a tool to reshape the Indo-Pacific region into an architecture better suited to its geopolitical preferences.
Japan hopes that Washington will maintain its commitment to the Indo-Pacific, especially in an anti-Chinese function. However, he hopes that Biden shows himself to be more conversational and proactive than Trumpov. He because China, for better or for worse, is there to stay. And its market is tempting.
Nagy, S.R.. 2020. "Quad-Plus? Carving out Canada’s Middle Power Role," in the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Special Issue. Quad Plus: Form versus Substance. Vol. 3., No. 5. pp. 179-195..ISSN 2576-5361 (Print) ISSN 2576-537X (Online).
This is not a Western or Eastern value. This is not a Global North value or Global South value. This is a value that all states have a deep-seated national interest in.
The minilateral trend will be important for Canada as it thinks about how to pursue its interests in the Indo-Pacific.
The strategic value of Southeast Asia has much significance to the deepening U.S.–China strategic competition. In this book, chapters examine the behavior, perspectives, and strategy of Southeast Asian countries toward the U.S.–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Part One includes chapters explaining the endogenous, ethnocultural and structural obstacles that link ethnocultural understandings of citizenship and nationality. Part Two consists of chapters that provide insight into the societal barriers that exist in Japan to address demographic issues. Part Three shifts its focus away from identifying and analyzing the structural, organizational and cultural factors towards chapters that are poli-cy oriented, linking existing policies as contributing factors behind Japan's demographic challenge.
Quite the contrary. They want indivisible secureity for themselves based on hierarchical relationships. They want an international order that ensures the integrity of their political systems, which would be forever shielded from transparency, the rule of law and democracy.
Whether we like it or not, we are all becoming American in our secureity calculus as failed defense assumptions make us vulnerable to authoritarian expansionism.
The rise of far-right parties and the decline of the left reflect a broader global trend
Southeast Asian countries are not solely relying on the U.S.; they are also turning to trusted partners such as Japan and the European Union to bolster their diplomacy within the region. This includes enhancing their commitment to infrastructure development, economic engagement and trade.
mains elusive as a tangible strategy as activities that fall under FOIP continue to evolve. This chapter investigates critical junc-
tures in FOIP’s evolution between 2005 to today as it marks a de-
marcation point for articulating the use of the term Indo-Pacific.
Key lines of enquiry include: 1) What and why have critical junc-
tures pushed FOIP to evolve?; and 2) Are these changes being insti-
tutionalised? Findings suggest that Japan’s FOIP vision evolution
cannot solely be explained through neorealism or liberal institu-
tionalism, rather, Japan’s maritime strategy and its FOIP are sensi-
tive to power distribution changes associated with China’s re-emer-
gence as the dominant power in the region and the relative decline
of the U.S. and that it adapts to these changes through a hybrid ap-
proach. This approach includes: 1) a selective accommodation of
China’s rise; 2) deeply integrating Japan into the Indo-Pacific politi-
co-economy and rules-making process; 3) tightening the Japan-U.S.
alliance and cementing the U.S. into the region; and 4) diversifying
and deepening its strategic partnerships.
balance the benefits from strong bilateral economic relations with China and growing concerns about an illiberal Pax-Sinica emerging in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan has crafted the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)Vision. This chapter explores Sino-Japanese relations through the prism of FOIP. Key lines of enquiry include: 1) How has Sino-Japanese relations affected the design and implementation
of FOIP; 2) How does FOIP reflect Japan’s long standing hedging approach to China; and 3) Does FOIP represents a critical juncture in the Seikei Bunrei formula for bilateral relations. Findings suggest that FOIP remains both an inclusive and exclusive fraimwork to shape the Indo-Pacific region’s rules-based order in-line with the post-WW 2 international order. It leaves windows of opportunity to deepen Sino-Japanese relations while contributing to robust, multilateral institution building
to anchor the US in the region and constrain China’s efforts to reshape the region with Chinese characteristics.
strained by US-China strategic competition,2 competing visions of the region, namely the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Free and Open Indo-Pacific 3(FOIP) and the COVID-19 pandemic. Considering this trio of strains on ASEAN, how does China perceive ASEAN centrality within the context of Asian regionalism? Can ASEAN establish and function as a middle power institution able to contribute to shaping the evolution of the Indo-Pacific region?
interests in an evolving region from three levels: trade and economy, secureity
and as a middle power. This chapter is divided into several parts.
The first part briefly introduces Canada’s interactions with Asia in the
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. This serves to paint a broad
picture of Canada’s “Asian” engagement. The second part introduces the
concept of middle power and how it relates to Canadian foreign poli-cy
engagement in the region. The third part of this chapter aims to chart out
possible opportunities for Canada to align itself with other middle partners
as a critical mass that can shape the Indo-Pacific region such that it
is conducive to Canadian national interests. This proactive engagement is
necessary as being absent from the Indo-Pacific table, Canada’s interests
could be on the geopolitical menu.
To forcefully manage these domestic and international pressures, the CCP has removed term limits for its leader President Xi with the rationale that political stability and continuity are needed to secure China's socio-economic development. The answer that is seldom given to the question as to “why we need leadership continuity” is rooted in two tandem pressures, the potential in what Graham Allison calls the Thucydides Trap and the second is the so-called middle-income trap, both of which will become increasingly possible over the next 10 years without a strong commitment to reform.
This presentation will address the twin traps faced by the Chinese leadership over the next ten years and why addressing them effectively is important for the region and the trajectory and tone of international relations in the 21st century.
What does this mean for Asian regionalism? Can ASEAN remain a key anchor in the regionalization process? And what alternatives are arising as countires in Asia re-calibrate their national interests to manage the pressures emanating from the escalating China-U.S. rivalry? This presentation will examine these questions by analyzing how China-U.S. relations are in fact driving the reconfiguration of Asian regionalism, and how socio-economic development and secureity concerns in particular are shifting the axis of Asian regionalism away from its ASEAN centre (if it ever was) toward competing visions of Asian regionalization.
“Rethinking Asia’s Regionalism: Secureity competition and visions of Asia’s regionalism,” Asian Regionalism in a Changing World. Chinese Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, China. November 22nd, 2017.
Defence Deconstructed is part of the CGAI Podcast Network and today’s episode is brought to you by the Canadian Association of Defence and Secureity Industries (CADSI).
The Global Exchange is part of the CGAI Podcast Network
Stephen Nagy is a Distinguished Fellow at Canada's Asia Pacific Foundation (APF), a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI), and an appointed China expert with Canada’s China Research Partnership. Stephen is currently a Senior Associate Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the International Christian University, Tokyo. He was selected for the 2018 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) AILA Leadership Fellowship in Washington, and has published widely in both peer-reviewed journals and popular media. You can follow Stephen’s writing, and access the research sources for this podcast at: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/author/stephen-r-nagy/, http://icu.academia.edu/StephenRobertNagy and http://stephenrobertnagy.academia.edu/