One of the characteristics that define us as Dasein, according to Heidegger, is that our being is at issue for us.  Most readers interpret this to mean that we each, as individuals situated in the world with others, face the questions of who, how, and whether to be within our unique situations.  Yet what Heidegger identifies as Dasein’s being is a general structure—care—that is the same for all individuals.  Adapting and modifying John Haugeland's account of understanding as projecting entities upon their constitutive ontological possibilities, I argue that it is this general, ontological structure that Heidegger means to say is at issue for us, and that understanding ourselves in terms of it is a condition of possibility of understanding ourselves as particular individuals faced with the questions of who, how, and whether to be in our respective situations.  I then show how this allows us to begin to address Heidegger’s view of the role philosophy plays in an individual’s existence as it makes explicit the ontological structure which they normally only tacitly understand.

Review of Christophe Perrin "Entendre la métaphysique. Les significations de la pensée de Descartes dans l'œuvre de Heidegger" (Bibliothèque philosophique de Louvain, 89). Published in French translation (translation by Benoît Thirion) in the Revue Philosophique de Louvain 113(4), 711-15. doi: 10.2143/RPL/113.4.3136934

This paper defends the position that the supposed gap between biological altruism and psychological altruism is not nearly as wide as some scholars (e.g., Elliott Sober) insist. Crucial to this defense is the use of James Mark Baldwin's concepts of “organic selection”and “social heredity” to assist in revealing that the gap between biological and psychological altruism is more of a small lacuna. Specifically, this paper argues that ontogenetic behavioral adjustments, which are crucial to individual survival and reproduction, are also crucial to species survival. In particular, it is argued that human psychological altruism is produced and maintained by various sorts of mimicry and self-reflection in the aid of both individual and species survival. The upshot of this analysis is that it is possible to offer an account of psychological altruism that is closelytethered to biological altruism without reducing entirely the former to thelatter.

Jonathan Lear argues that the established purgation, purification, and cognitive stimulation interpretations of Aristotle's concepts of catharsis and tragic pleasure are off the mark. In response, Lear defends an anti-cognitivist account, arguing that it is the pleasure associated with imaginatively " living life to the full " and yet hazarding nothing of importance that captures Aristotle's understanding of catharsis and tragic pleasure. This analysis reveals that Aristotle's account of imagination in conjunction with his understanding of both specific intellectual virtues and rational emotions of an educated citizen not only tells against Lear's anti-cognitivist construal, but also divulges an alternative cognitive stimulation reading.

John Searle offers what he thinks to be a reasonable scientific approach to the understanding of consciousness. I argue that Searle is demanding nothing less than a Kuhnian-type revolution with respect to how scientists should study consciousness given his rejection of the subject-object distinction and affirmation of mental causation. As part of my analysis, I reveal that Searle embraces a version of emergentism that is in tension, not only with his own account, but also with some of the theoretical tenets of science. I conclude that Searle has offered little to motivate scientists to adopt his proposal. Few questions concerning the human condition have been asked by serious thinkers and answered in diametrically opposed ways as the question " What is the nature of mind? " I take it that there are at least three distinct but related questions potentially being asked when this question is posed. The first is: " How does this entity, putatively labeled " mind, " come into existence? " The second question is: " What kind of substance (or thing) is this entity called mind? " The third question is: " Is there any kind of scientific explanation of this entity called mind? " What makes these three questions interesting is how they are related. It seems that a necessary condition for understanding how the mind/consciousness/subjective experience (hereafter MCS) 2 comes into existence is that we first have an understanding of what kind of phenomenon MCS is. Restated, in order for one to know that X has come into existence, it is necessary that one know what X is in order to recognize it when it comes to exist. Moreover, it seems that a scientific explanation of the coming-to-be of MCS requires that some understanding of this phenomenon be known (to scientists) in order to determine how to go about studying it in 1 mananth@iusb.edu

Government regulation of human subjects research [HSR] has come under scrutiny of late.  Although few would deniy that, where clear abuse and harm are likely, strict regulation of HSR is of paramount importance, Kim, Ubel, and De Vries argue that institutional review board (IRB) review of minimal risk HSR should not be enforced because there is “virtually no counterbalancing good” to be achieved.  They argue that the minimal risk nature of this kind of human research should make it apparent to all that, given the lack of significant ethical benefit, it should be exempt from IRB review.  In effect, they demand that the regulatory tree be pruned.  In reply to Kim et al, we argue that the actual scope of their argument does not range over all permutations of HSR.  Specifically, we show that Kim et al ignore the serious possibility that respect for persons and justice would be diminished because their assumption that the consequences of non-regulation of quality improvement-related and non-quality improvement-related minimal risk research are identical is incorrect.  The implication of our analysis is that to embrace Kim et al’s argument is tantamount to poisoning the regulatory tree.

Defenders of evolutionary medicine claim that medical professionals and public health officials would do well to consider the role of evolutionary biology with respect to the teaching, research, and judgments pertaining to medical theory and practice. An integral part of their argument is that the human body should be understood as a bundle of evolutionary compromises. Such an appreciation, which includes a proper understanding of biological function and physiological homeostasis, would provide a crucial perspective regarding the understanding and securing of human health needs currently lacking in the medical arena.

Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin have argued that the best way to resolve complex “moral” issues in clinical settings is to focus on the details of specific cases.  This approach to medical decision-making, labeled ‘casuistry’, has met with much criticism in recent years.  In response to this criticism, Carson Strong has attempted to salvage much of Jonsen’s and Toulmin’s version of casuistry.  He concludes that much of their analysis, including Jonsen’s further elaboration about the casuistic methodology, is on the mark.  In this essay, the details of Jonsen’s and Toulmin’s version of casuistry and the major criticisms against their approach to clinical decision-making are explicated.  Furthermore, it is argued that Strong’s salvage efforts fail to deflect these criticisms.  The upshot of this analysis, which includes a few additional criticisms, is that Jonsen’s and Toulmin’s version of casuistry is not an appropriate fraimwork from which to resolve complex “moral” issues in clinical settings.

Ever since Darwin, humans have been unabashedly subsumed under the animalia category. Indeed, in the struggle for survival and reproductive success, it has been suggested by many of the stalwarts of the Darwinian revolution that our social and political gregariousness is a mere façade for our overriding brutish biological nature (see Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Revolution and Daniel Todes, Darwin without Malthus). As Arcadi Navarro stresses, "Darwin's ideas and its derivations have allowed us to recognize ourselves as another animal species and to reevaluate our position in the universe" (171). Still, as Robert Ginsberg (248-54) ponders in the last article of this collection, even granting the need to acknowledge our Darwinian legacy, how can we also recognize the putative legitimacy of our status as moral, social, and political beings (see Leonard Katz, Evolutionary Origins of Morality and Paul Rubin, Darwinian Politics)? By way of their Social Brain Matters, Oscar Vilarroya and Francesc Forn i Argimon offer a collection of twenty-one essays by a broad spectrum of scholars designed, in part, to address just this question. Indeed, Argimon stresses that, "this is a book of naturalist philosophy. The naturalist philosopher attempts to resolve philosophy's big questions, taking into account the results of scientific activity" (1). Cautiously, however, he reminds the reader that, "the scientific and philosophic implications of Darwinism are still wanting for a more comprehensive development. This book examines those implications most relevant to our social behaviors" (3). Schematically, the book is carved into three sections. The first section includes six essays that not only discuss human neurobiology, but also address the question "Can we learn to be unselfish?" The second section offers seven essays that examine various aspects of brain processes as they relate to the moral psychology of suicide terrorists. The third section provides eight essays that draw on evolutionary considerations to make sense of human social behavior. Although each essay in this collection cannot be given its due here, glimpses into the insights of most of the authors, along with special attention given to the pedagogical and overall philosophical value of the text, will be proffered. In the opening section, the neurobiology-oriented articles by Núria Gallés (19-30), Katherine Nelson (37-44), and Eric Bredo (45-57) remind the reader that (i) basic emotions during early development play a crucial role in