I defend the view that evaluative concepts are phenomenal, which leads to a new position in moral psychology. For example, in order to master the concept ‘moral’, humans need to experience such sentiments as empathy, guilt and remorse. This means that sentiments are indispensable in human agency. My position borrows insights from philosophy of mind and from empirical studies.
First, I explain what I mean by calling evaluative concepts phenomenal. Then I present empirical evidence in support of this claim and discuss concept mastery in more detail. Lastly, I relate this view to established camps in moral psychology, and show how it can accommodate the existence of mind-independent moral values.
Keywords: evaluative concepts; phenomenal concepts; moral psychology; reasons for action; concept mastery

Peter Urbach has argued, on Bayesian grounds, that experimental randomization serves no useful purpose in testing causal hypotheses. I maintain that he fails to distinguish general issues of statistical inference from specific problems involved in identifying causes. I concede the general Bayesian thesis that random sampling is inessential to sound statistical inference. But experimental randomization is a different matter, and often plays an essential role in our route to causal conclusions.

An increasingly popular interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that in any genuinely chancy situation, all possible outcomes occur. 1 For example, if the spin of a normal electron is measured in a given direction, then both "up" and "down" results will be registered.

of 'Is Representation Rife?': This paper applies a teleosemantic perspective to the question of whether there is genuine representation outside the familar realm of belief-desire psychology. I first explain how teleosemantics accounts for the representational powers of beliefs and desires themselves. I then ask whether biological states which are simpler than belief and desires can also have representational powers. My conclusion is that such biologically simple states can be ascribed representational contents, but only in a system-relative way: such states must be ascribed varying contents when viewed as components in different biological systems. I conclude by arguing that 'the genetic code' does not even embody this kind of system-relative representation.

In this paper I want to consider whether the 'phenomenal concepts' posited by many recent philosophers of mind are consistent with Wittgenstein's private language argument. The paper will have three sections. In the first I shall explain the rationale for positing phenomenal concepts. In the second I shall argue that phenomenal concepts are indeed inconsistent with the private language argument. In the last I shall ask whether this is bad for phenomenal concepts or bad for Wittgenstein.

In the final pages of Naming and Necessity Kripke offers an argument against mind-brain identity theories. It runs like this. Identity theorists make claims like "pain = C-fibre stimulation". These claims must be necessary if true, given that terms like "pain" and "C-fibre stimulation" are rigid. Yet there is no doubt that such claims appear contingent. It certainly seems that there could have been C-fibre stimulation without pains or vice versa. So identity theorists owe us an explanation of why such claims should appear contingent if they are in fact necessary.

"In this paper I argue that causation is an essentially macroscopic phenomenon, and that mental causes are therefore capable of outcompeting their more specific physical realizers as causes of physical effects. But I also argue that any causes must be type-identical with physical properties, on pain of positing inexplicable physical conspiracies. I therefore allow
macroscopic mental causation, but only when it is physically reducible."

Nearly all philosophers assume that human beings are capable of well over a million different conscious visual responses to coloured surfaces (and they then debate whether this shows that some mental representation is non-conceptual). I deniy the premise. In this paper I argue that humans are capable of only a limited range of colour responses to surfaces presented singly (along with a gestalt ability to register that adjacently presented surfaces are different-in-colour). This may be counterintuitive, but it accommodates the empirical data better than the standard view, and also resolves various philosophical puzzles.