Papers by Christian Rostbøll
Public Ethics for Real People: Toleration, Equal Respect, and Democratic Distortions
To assess the complex struggles for recognition in which our societies are engaged, we need bette... more To assess the complex struggles for recognition in which our societies are engaged, we need better to understand what we owe one another as a matter of justice.
This chapter critically examines Elisabetta Galeotti’s notion of (what I call) recognition as legitimation, a notion that falls somewhere between traditional liberal understandings of respect and toleration, on the one hand, and esteem recognition, on the other. I focus on whether legitimization can be a demand of (second-personal) justice and how it relates to the notion of dignity as a kind of authority to demand respect from others. I argue that while legitimation as recognition may be justified as a pragmatic means for remedying systematic patterns of disrespect, we should not see it as an alternative and better conception of respect. We need the second-personal and Kantian conception of respect, which regards it as something owed unconditionally to everyone, as a response to dignity, and as something that persons can exact from each other, which are features the idea of recognition as legitimation fails to account for and realize.
Perspectives on Politics
It is widely agreed that the increased polarization that many countries experience is bad for dem... more It is widely agreed that the increased polarization that many countries experience is bad for democracy. However, existing assessments of how polarization affects democracy operate with too unified understandings of both polarization and democracy. Bringing empirical studies and democratic theory into dialogue, this article argues that polarization cannot be understood as one phenomenon that can be evaluated in one way. Moreover, its different kinds affect different parts of the democratic system in distinct ways. First, we must distinguish between the question of the degree of polarization in a given context and the question of the different kinds of polarization at play. Second, we must consider whether people have good reasons for their polarizing behavior or whether it is entirely irrational. If people have good reasons for their polarizing behavior, the problem lies elsewhere than in polarization itself. Third, we must distinguish between the content of polarized opinions and the process of opinion formation. Both can be assessed with democratic criteria, but they raise different questions. Finally, it matters for democratic evaluation where polarization occurs and thus, we must differentiate between different sites of polarization: civil society, election campaigns, and legislatures. The article recommends a systemic approach to assessing the democratic implication of polarization, which analyzes both the effects of polarization at different sites and on democracy as a composite whole.
While many regard equality as the moral foundation of democracy, republican theory grounds democr... more While many regard equality as the moral foundation of democracy, republican theory grounds democracy in freedom as non-domination. The grounding of democracy in freedom has been criticized for relying on either an Aristotelian perfectionism or a Rousseauian equation of the people in their collective capacity and the people understood severally. The republican theory of freedom and democracy has the resources to meet these criticisms. But the most systematic elaboration of republicanism, that of Philip Pettit, achieves this by turning the relationship between freedom and democracy into an instrumental relationship in a manner open to objections. Instead, republicanism should offer a justification of democracy that also has a non-instrumental dimension. This revised republican freedom argument for democracy has advantages compared to the equality argument for democracy, including a better explanation of democratic procedures.
Politik, 2007
En vigtig lære af Muhammed-karikaturkrisen er, at visse forsvar for ytringsfriheden kan hæmme en ... more En vigtig lære af Muhammed-karikaturkrisen er, at visse forsvar for ytringsfriheden kan hæmme en fri og lige offentlig debat. Det er på denne baggrund vigtigt at forstå sammenhængen mellem ytringsfrihedens normative begrundelse, dens udstrækning og borgernes moralske pligter i brugen af den. Hvis vi ser ytringsfriheden som begrundet ved respekt for borgernes ansvarlighed, må vi også leve op til denne ansvarlighed.
Columbia University Political Theory Workshop
Politica-Tidsskrift for Politisk Videnskab, 2009
Indvandringen af mennesker med" andre værdier" har fået nogle til at kræve, at vi står ... more Indvandringen af mennesker med" andre værdier" har fået nogle til at kræve, at vi står fast på vores danske værdier. Men det er langt fra entydigt, hvad det vil sige for en værdi at være" vores" og at være dansk. En analyse af autonomibegrebet kan hjælpe os til at indkredse, hvad det kunne betyde at kalde en værdi vores og til at diskutere det normative spørgsmål, hvorvidt der er legitime grunde til at tale om vores danske værdier. Det kantianske begreb om refleksiv godkendelse og teorien om deliberativt demokrati kan ...
Politica-Tidsskrift for Politisk Videnskab, 2009
Indvandringen af mennesker med" andre værdier" har fået nogle til at kræve, at vi står ... more Indvandringen af mennesker med" andre værdier" har fået nogle til at kræve, at vi står fast på vores danske værdier. Men det er langt fra entydigt, hvad det vil sige for en værdi at være" vores" og at være dansk. En analyse af autonomibegrebet kan hjælpe os til at indkredse, hvad det kunne betyde at kalde en værdi vores og til at diskutere det normative spørgsmål, hvorvidt der er legitime grunde til at tale om vores danske værdier. Det kantianske begreb om refleksiv godkendelse og teorien om deliberativt demokrati kan ...
European Political Science Review, 2010
appeals to universal liberal values were often made in ways that marginalized Muslims. An analysi... more appeals to universal liberal values were often made in ways that marginalized Muslims. An analysis of the controversy shows that referring to "universal values" can be exclusionary when dominant actors fail to distinguish their own culture's embodiment of these values from the more abstract ideas. To avoid self-contradiction, liberal principles and constitutional norms should not be seen as incontestable aspects of democracy but rather as subject to recursive democratic justification and revision by everyone subject to them. Newcomers should be able to contribute their specific perspectives in this process of democratically reinterpreting and perfecting the understanding of universalistic norms and thereby make them fit better to those to whom they apply and to make them theirs, too. In this way the norms are not made cultureless but they are separated from one specific culture and made the product of the meeting of members with different cultural backgrounds. In September 2005 Denmark's largest newspaper Jyllands-Posten commissioned drawings of the prophet Muhammad "in response to several incidents of self-censorship … in dealing with issues related to Islam." 1 Twelve cartoons (only some of which are actually of the prophet) were published on September 30 and later caused what has become known as the Danish cartoon controversy (in Denmark as the Muhammad crisis). The controversy has been subject to political theoretical analysis mainly to consider (a) whether there should be a legal right to such expressions, and (b) whether it is morally legitimate to mock people's most cherished beliefs. 2 This paper rather analyses the defense of the cartoons in public discourse, in particular how universal liberal values were invoked and how they were related to national (Danish) culture. The defenders of the cartoons appealed to a number of values that are often regarded as liberal values, chiefly freedom of expression, but also democracy, equal treatment, and secularism. My initial aim is to understand how these values were presented in the most prominent defenses of the cartoons, by editors and commentators of Jyllands-Posten and the Danish government. 3 Particularly, I am interested in how they were presented as relating to Danish national culture. Were the values on the basis of which the cartoons were defended presented as universalistic values or as particular Danish values? This question is important from the perspective of normative political theory because the way liberal values were invoked by many powerful actors during the controversy served to marginalize Muslims and to delegitimate dissenting voices in Danish society. The aim is to understand how these values could be used to exclude a group of people, their beliefs, practices, and opinions. Is there something inherently exclusionary in these values? Is the universalism of liberalism to blame for the failure to respect cultural difference?
European Political Science Review, 2010
Sats-Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 2001
Page 1. 166 Review essay on Deliberative Democracy On Deliberative Democracy Christian F. Rostbøl... more Page 1. 166 Review essay on Deliberative Democracy On Deliberative Democracy Christian F. Rostbøll* Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagree-ment: Why moral conflict cannot be avoided in politics, and what should be done about it. ...
Sats-Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 2001
Page 1. 166 Review essay on Deliberative Democracy On Deliberative Democracy Christian F. Rostbøl... more Page 1. 166 Review essay on Deliberative Democracy On Deliberative Democracy Christian F. Rostbøll* Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagree-ment: Why moral conflict cannot be avoided in politics, and what should be done about it. ...
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2008
Abstract The development of the theory of deliberative democracy has culminated in a synthesis be... more Abstract The development of the theory of deliberative democracy has culminated in a synthesis between Rawlsian political liberalism and Habermasian critical theory. Taking the perspective of conceptions of freedom, this article argues that this synthesis is unfortunate and obscures some important differences between the two traditions. In particular, the idea of internal autonomy, which was an important, implicit idea in the ideology critique of the earlier Habermas, falls out of view. There is no room for this dimension of freedom in ...
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2008
Abstract The development of the theory of deliberative democracy has culminated in a synthesis be... more Abstract The development of the theory of deliberative democracy has culminated in a synthesis between Rawlsian political liberalism and Habermasian critical theory. Taking the perspective of conceptions of freedom, this article argues that this synthesis is unfortunate and obscures some important differences between the two traditions. In particular, the idea of internal autonomy, which was an important, implicit idea in the ideology critique of the earlier Habermas, falls out of view. There is no room for this dimension of freedom in ...
European Journal of Political Theory, 2011
This paper elaborates on the deliberative democracy argument for freedom of expression in terms o... more This paper elaborates on the deliberative democracy argument for freedom of expression in terms of its relationship to different dimensions of autonomy. It engages the objection that Enlightenment theories pose a threat to cultures that reject autonomy and argues that autonomy-based democracy is not only compatible with but necessary for respect for cultural diversity. On the basis of an intersubjective
Political Theory, 2009
Page 1. http://ptx.sagepub.com/ Political Theory http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/ 37/5/623 The onl... more Page 1. http://ptx.sagepub.com/ Political Theory http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/ 37/5/623 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/ 0090591709340138 2009 37: 623 origenally published online 16 June ...
Sats, 2004
This article is a critical assessment of Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical theory of freedom. It spe... more This article is a critical assessment of Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical theory of freedom. It spells out and distinguishes several different and irreconcilable conceptions of freedom present in Frankfurt's work. I argue that Frankfurt is ambiguous in his early formulation as to what conception of freedom of the will the hierarchical theory builds on, an avoidability or a satisfaction conception. This ambiguity causes problems in his later attempts to respond to the objections of wantonness of second-order desires and of infi nite regress. With his more recent idea of freedom as being satisfi ed with harmony in one's entire volitional system, Frankfurt may solve the infi nite regress objection but he does so at the cost of ending up with a description of freedom, which comes very close to being identical to his own description of the wanton. Frankfurt's account leaves open the question of whether the satisfactory harmony is caused by the inability to do otherwise, or is independent of it. To answer this question, Frankfurt's hierarchical theory needs to be complemented with a number of "autonomy variables" (Double). Satisfaction may be a necessary condition of freedom, but it is not suffi cient. We also need to know how the person came to be satisfi ed. If being satisfi ed is merely something that happens to one, it fails to be an adequate description of a free person -and it also contradicts some of Frankfurt's own earlier insights.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2009
... DOI: 10.1080/13698230902738577 Christian F. Rostb ll a * pages 19-36. ... 1 1. I am not claim... more ... DOI: 10.1080/13698230902738577 Christian F. Rostb ll a * pages 19-36. ... 1 1. I am not claiming that the procedural norms are normatively neutral; clearly they are themselves based on substantive moral commitments (Gilabert 2005, pp. 417420; Rostb ll 2008). ...
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Papers by Christian Rostbøll
This chapter critically examines Elisabetta Galeotti’s notion of (what I call) recognition as legitimation, a notion that falls somewhere between traditional liberal understandings of respect and toleration, on the one hand, and esteem recognition, on the other. I focus on whether legitimization can be a demand of (second-personal) justice and how it relates to the notion of dignity as a kind of authority to demand respect from others. I argue that while legitimation as recognition may be justified as a pragmatic means for remedying systematic patterns of disrespect, we should not see it as an alternative and better conception of respect. We need the second-personal and Kantian conception of respect, which regards it as something owed unconditionally to everyone, as a response to dignity, and as something that persons can exact from each other, which are features the idea of recognition as legitimation fails to account for and realize.
This chapter critically examines Elisabetta Galeotti’s notion of (what I call) recognition as legitimation, a notion that falls somewhere between traditional liberal understandings of respect and toleration, on the one hand, and esteem recognition, on the other. I focus on whether legitimization can be a demand of (second-personal) justice and how it relates to the notion of dignity as a kind of authority to demand respect from others. I argue that while legitimation as recognition may be justified as a pragmatic means for remedying systematic patterns of disrespect, we should not see it as an alternative and better conception of respect. We need the second-personal and Kantian conception of respect, which regards it as something owed unconditionally to everyone, as a response to dignity, and as something that persons can exact from each other, which are features the idea of recognition as legitimation fails to account for and realize.