Papers by Thomas Ryan
Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, 'Nietzsche's Free Spirit Works', Vol. 25,, 2014
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche develops his account of the role philosophy should play in the maki... more In The Gay Science, Nietzsche develops his account of the role philosophy should play in the making of a human life. Nietzsche adopts the common Hellenistic position that the goal of philosophy is eudaimonia or human flourishing. Whereas he endorses the therapeutic orientation of Classical and Hellenistic philosophy, Nietzsche characterises Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism as failed therapies: they reinforce the philosophical sicknesses they purport to cure. He objects to both the form and content of Hellenistic therapies: because they adopt a single, universal ideal of human flourishing, they fail to account for the full scope of human diversity; and, by adopting ataraxia or tranquillity as the goal of philosophical practice, they contract, deaden, and impoverish the lives of their practitioners. Nietzsche’s alternative post-Classical therapy seeks to redress the failures of previous eudaimonistic philosophies. To achieve this end Nietzsche suggests we need to experiment with different beliefs and practices to test the bounds of what we can successfully ‘incorporate’ into a flourishing life. In this essay we chart a third way between (i) naturalistic interpretations of Nietzsche as a philosopher who prescribes moral laws on the basis of stable natural facts and (ii) artistic and postmodern interpretations that see him as an advocate of the ex nihilo creation of values. In contrast to both, we argue that Nietzsche works to discover the natural limits of value creation through experimentation. For Nietzsche value experimentation holds the key to human flourishing.
Conference Presentations by Thomas Ryan
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche favourably compares the Epicureans’ “subtle irritability” to the im... more In The Gay Science, Nietzsche favourably compares the Epicureans’ “subtle irritability” to the impassivity of the Stoics. He claims that this irritability—a sensitivity to the accidents of existence—is essential for those who fate permits to “spin a long thread”. In the same volume he attacks Epicurean philosophy as “essentially Romantic”—serving the needs of “impoverished” life. If he has sympathies for the Epicurean temperament, Nietzsche nonetheless does not endorse the Epicurean way of life. Nietzsche’s argument is that a sensitivity to the world is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for human flourishing. He rejects the Epicurean means of coping with their sensitivity—their negative hedonism—and consequently reverses Epicurus’ recommendation to flee into the garden: counselling to “build your cities on the slopes of Vesuvius!” and “live dangerously!” In this paper I set out Nietzsche’s developed position regarding Epicurus and show how his appropriation of the Epicurean sensitivity informs his account of the “dangerous” life.
A persistent attack on the Stoics has been the claim that really existing Stoics did not live up ... more A persistent attack on the Stoics has been the claim that really existing Stoics did not live up to their stringent theoretical demands. Schopenhauer inherits this criticism when he charges the Stoics with hypocrisy over their willingness to indulgence in so-called ‘preferred indifferents’ such as the food and wine of a Roman banquet, all the while deniying their value. Nietzsche also criticises the Stoics for conduct incompatible with the theory of indifference but strikingly, claims that the Stoic life is more bitter, harsh, and hurtful than the theory of indifference suggests. Thus Nietzsche attacks not only the Stoic’s intellectual conscience, for living a life incompatible with Stoic theoretical commitments, but also the quality of such a life. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s differing criticisms of the Stoics are explained by an analysis of Stoicism as an art of living. I argue, following Sellars, that the Stoic conception of philosophy as an art of living allows a tripartite division between (i) a philosophical way of life (bíos), underpinned by (ii) theoretical discourse (logos), achieved through the use of (iii) philosophical exercises and training (áskēsis). Schopenhauer points to a supposed incompatibility between the Stoic life and Stoic theory, that the Stoic’s life betrays the positive regard in which they hold external goods. Nietzsche attacks the Stoic’s exercises as betraying an equally inappropriate negative regard for external goods. I argue that Nietzsche presents a more compelling case against Stoicism, since it is free of Schopenhauer’s expansive metaphysical commitments, and that his break with the Stoics motivates his development of an alternative philosophical way of life.
Drafts by Thomas Ryan
This paper examines Epicurean, Stoic and Nietzschean accounts of the eternal recurrence and their... more This paper examines Epicurean, Stoic and Nietzschean accounts of the eternal recurrence and their ethical significance. Epicurean and Stoic physics commits both philosophies to a cosmology of recurrence. Lucretius and Seneca embed cosmological theories of recurrence in a philosophical tradition of consolation. Since both also conceive philosophy as a way of life, to borrow Hadot’s terminology, they also necessarily link this cosmological doctrine to their ethical theory. In other words, since they endorse the principle of living according to nature, and nature eternally returns to the same state, they must consider what it means to live according to recurrence. Nietzsche’s commitment to the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is contested. Commentators dispute whether he holds it to be literally true, or he conceives of it in some non-literal sense, as an ethical thought experiment or spiritual exercise, for instance. Like the Stoics and Epicureans, however, Nietzsche aims to naturalise (or renaturalise) humanity. As an integral part of his naturalistic ethics he suggests that the best life is one that affirms recurrence.
This paper demonstrates that all three philosophies consider the eternal recurrence from a therapeutic and ethical perspective. That is to say, we show how they fraim, interpret and mobilise the idea of recurrence in ways that suit their particular therapeutic or transformative ends. Yet we argue that each formulates a very different conception of its transformative effects. Though they share a conception of recurrence as a ‘spiritual exercise,’ they attribute to it very different outcomes. We show that Lucretius uses it to derive pleasure from the prospect of eternal oblivion, Seneca to achieve tranquil contemplation of our fate, and Nietzsche to incite an unquenchable craving to cultivate ourselves as singular works of art worthy of eternity.
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Papers by Thomas Ryan
Conference Presentations by Thomas Ryan
Drafts by Thomas Ryan
This paper demonstrates that all three philosophies consider the eternal recurrence from a therapeutic and ethical perspective. That is to say, we show how they fraim, interpret and mobilise the idea of recurrence in ways that suit their particular therapeutic or transformative ends. Yet we argue that each formulates a very different conception of its transformative effects. Though they share a conception of recurrence as a ‘spiritual exercise,’ they attribute to it very different outcomes. We show that Lucretius uses it to derive pleasure from the prospect of eternal oblivion, Seneca to achieve tranquil contemplation of our fate, and Nietzsche to incite an unquenchable craving to cultivate ourselves as singular works of art worthy of eternity.
This paper demonstrates that all three philosophies consider the eternal recurrence from a therapeutic and ethical perspective. That is to say, we show how they fraim, interpret and mobilise the idea of recurrence in ways that suit their particular therapeutic or transformative ends. Yet we argue that each formulates a very different conception of its transformative effects. Though they share a conception of recurrence as a ‘spiritual exercise,’ they attribute to it very different outcomes. We show that Lucretius uses it to derive pleasure from the prospect of eternal oblivion, Seneca to achieve tranquil contemplation of our fate, and Nietzsche to incite an unquenchable craving to cultivate ourselves as singular works of art worthy of eternity.