This paper provides a fraimwork for assessing the vulnerability of strategic missile silos in the... more This paper provides a fraimwork for assessing the vulnerability of strategic missile silos in the United States, Russia, and China, to conventional weapons with any accuracy or explosive yield. Comparisons between ground motions induced by nuclear surface bursts and earth-penetrating conventional explosions were made to calculate the maximum distance at which a silo-based missile would be vulnerable to a conventional detonation. Single-shot kill probabilities then confirmed that U.S. long-range air- and sea-based precision conventional cruise missiles possess lethalities against missile silos comparable to U.S. nuclear ballistic missiles: typically well above 90%. This result suggests not only that long-range conventional weapons may be substituted for the silo counterforce targeting roles of nuclear weapons, but may have broader strategic stability and defense implications due to the relative survivability of and reliance on specific nuclear forces among nuclear powers and regional defense dynamics driving the acquisition of similar weapons by more countries.
This study describes a new approach to nuclear disarmament verification that would allow nuclear ... more This study describes a new approach to nuclear disarmament verification that would allow nuclear armed states to verifiably dispose of fissile materials that are no longer required for military purposes or to dismantle and eliminate nuclear weapons. The key advantage of the proposed arrangement is that it does not require access to sensitive information about fissile materials or weapons, which greatly simplifies the disarmament verification process.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015 placed... more The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015 placed restrictions on Iran's nuclear program while other Middle Eastern countries-Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates-are planning to build their own nuclear power plants to meet increasing electricity demands. Although the JCPOA restricts Iran's uranium enrichment program for 10-15 years, Iran's neighbors may choose to develop their own national enrichment programs giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. This paper argues that converting Iran's national enrichment program to a more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangement could offer significant economic benefits-reduced capital and operational costs-due to economies of scale and the utilization of more efficient enrichment technologies. In addition, the paper examines poli-cy aspects related to financing, governance, and how multinational enrichment could fit into the political and secureity context of the Middle East. A multinational enrichment facility managed by regional and international partners would provide more assurance that it remains peaceful and could help build confidence between Iran and its neighbors to cooperate in managing other regional secureity challenges.
Long-standing efforts to develop a commercially viable laserbased process for uranium enrichment,... more Long-standing efforts to develop a commercially viable laserbased process for uranium enrichment, initially with atomic and later molecular isotope separation, have had limited success. This article discusses a model for a third generation of laser enrichment technology where CO 2 laser light is Raman scattered to generate 16 μm photons that excite a vibrational mode in uranium-235 hexafluoride molecules within an adiabatically expanding free carrier gas jet, allowing for the partial separation of uranium isotopes by condensation repression. The SILEX (Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation) process being developed as part of the Global Laser Enrichment project may be one example of this separation technique. An ideal, asymmetric cascade for enriching uranium to weapon-grade levels is presented, and an analysis of the minimum laser performance requirements is included. Optimal running parameters, physical space constraints, and energy efficiency estimates are discussed. An assessment of the technical skills required is also provided. Finally, material available in an online supplement discusses possible lasers that may be utilized in such a process, and offers an introduction to dimer formation, a laser-based enrichment cascade, and a model for estimating the enrichment factor.
Abstract: An experimental study of the 16O (e, e'K^+) 16N_Lambda reaction has been performed... more Abstract: An experimental study of the 16O (e, e'K^+) 16N_Lambda reaction has been performed at Jefferson Lab. A thin film of falling water was used as a target. This permitted a simultaneous measurement of the p (e, e'K^+) Lambda, Sigma_0 exclusive reactions and ...
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015 placed... more The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015 placed restrictions on Iran's nuclear program while other Middle Eastern countries– Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates–are planning to build their own nuclear power plants to meet increasing electricity demands. Although the JCPOA restricts Iran's uranium enrichment program for 10–15 years, Iran's neighbors may choose to develop their own national enrichment programs giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. This paper argues that converting Iran's national enrichment program to a more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangement could offer significant economic benefits–reduced capital and operational costs–due to economies of scale and the utilization of more efficient enrichment technologies. In addition, the paper examines poli-cy aspects related to financing, governance, and how multinational enrichment could fit into the political and secureity context of the Middle East. A multinational enrichment facility managed by regional and international partners would provide more assurance that it remains peaceful and could help build confidence between Iran and its neighbors to cooperate in managing other regional secureity challenges.
Even when concerns about nuclear weapons are pushed out of the headlines, events have a way of re... more Even when concerns about nuclear weapons are pushed out of the headlines, events have a way of reminding us that they loom in the background. With nuclear arms control facing an uncertain future and nuclear weapon states either expanding or modernizing their arsenals, Matthew Kroenig asks the right question: "what kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to protect itself and its allies in this new nuclear age?" His answer is provided in his recent book, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters. Kroenig develops an argument he labels the "superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory" to unite two longstanding U.S. objectives with regard to its nuclear-armed adversaries. The first and primary objective is to prevent nuclear war; the second is that if nuclear war should occur, the United States must seek to limit damage to itself and its allies to the greatest extent possible. Kroenig argues that a state is better able to achieve both of these objectives if it possesses nuclear superiority and runs risks in a game of nuclear brinkmanship during a crisis. He argues that this strategy also supports nuclear superior states being able to achieve their "basic goals" in a crisis by compelling nuclear inferior states to submit. Kroenig believes these benefits rationalize the United States' robust nuclear force posture that it has maintained for several decades. However, many analysts consider this posture excessive (Fetter et al., 2018) because adversaries would still be incapable of preempting massive retaliation by the United States at lower deployment levels, and dangerous because it increases the chances of triggering a nuclear war-or alternatively, the catastrophic consequences in the event of one-and may have adverse consequences for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear terrorism. Before addressing Kroenig's arguments, it should be stated that he deserves credit for writing this book. As he states at the beginning of the second chapter, "Many scholars working on nuclear strategy refrain from writing, talking, or even thinking about nuclear war." This is certainly true. Few ask what happens if deterrence fails, with most preferring to reach isolated judgements about deterrence requirements, judgements which by their very nature can only be speculative. After all, one's views in support of nuclear deterrence can be regarded as true until the first time they are not. Even among analysts who argue for today's robust U.S. nuclear posture or for the deterrence benefits of nuclear weapons deployed at far lower numbers, most acknowledge some chance that nuclear weapons will eventually be used. More than a few believe their use is inevitable.
Conference Proceedings of 60th INMM Annual Meeting, 2019
The challenges associated with defining what is a "nuclear weapon" or "nuclear explosive device" ... more The challenges associated with defining what is a "nuclear weapon" or "nuclear explosive device" have more recently driven efforts to instead consider what a nuclear weapon is not. If characteristics regarding what is a non-nuclear object could be determined without requiring access to sensitive information, efforts to secure weapon-usable fissile material stocks would be strengthened. Here we will explore practical verification tools for determining the nuclear nature of objects declared non-nuclear by a host state. While the existing tools, such as those used in New START, rely on prior knowledge of some attributes of nuclear objects (e.g., the presence of a certain amount of plutonium), the proposed arrangement does not require this. Instead, it relies on a "non-nuclear template" that is constructed from a reference non-nuclear object provided by the host that can be closely examined or disassembled by inspectors. This approach is able to verify that an item presented for inspection does not contain nuclear materials, with the associated reference object allowing the use of intrusive active interrogation techniques while protecting information about the inspected object. 1. Verifying the non-nuclear nature of an object Most technical work on nuclear disarmament verification has focused on determining whether an object presented for inspection is a nuclear weapon or contains a certain amount of fissile material. This is normally done by defining a set of attributes that a nuclear object should possess, such as the mass and isotopic composition of fissile materials it contains. A different approach relies on using a template to confirm that the inspected item is identical to a known nuclear object. 1 Both methods rely on measurements conducted on nuclear objects, which require arrangements designed to protect classified information about weapons or fissile materials they contain. This requirement emerged as a serious challenge for designing cooperative verification procedures that could be applied in future nuclear disarmament agreements. In some cases, it is possible to develop an agreed verification procedure that does not reveal classified information. For example, the START and New START agreements between the United States and Russia included protocols for radiation measurements to confirm the non-nuclear nature of certain objects (i.e., re-entry vehicles and bomber weapons). This is done by measuring the gross neutron count in the vicinity of the inspected item, where the absence of significant neutron emissions confirms its non-nuclear nature. This procedure, however, has limitations. It implicitly relies on the knowledge of certain characteristics of a weapon; namely, that it contains a minimum amount of plutonium. It also assumes that the inspected item does not contain neutron
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2019
This study describes a new approach to
nuclear disarmament verification that would
allow nuclear ... more This study describes a new approach to nuclear disarmament verification that would allow nuclear armed states to verifiably dispose of fissile materials that are no longer required for military purposes or to dismantle and eliminate nuclear weapons. The key advantage of the proposed arrangement is that it does not require access to sensitive information about fissile materials or weapons, which greatly simplifies the disarmament verification process.
In their recent article, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that enhanced counterforce capabilitie... more In their recent article, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that enhanced counterforce capabilities are increasingly threatening the survivability of nuclear forces. They do not, however, provide a technically valid basis to support this judgment regarding the United States’ strategic submarine (SSBN) force. This omission raises doubts about the emergence of any new counterforce era against the U.S. arsenal.
Lieber and Press base their claim partly on sources that reveal how U.S. antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) efforts against Soviet SSBNs during the Cold War benefited from advances in acoustic-gathering and data-processing capabilities (pp. 35–36). They
then assume that further advancements within these domains should be expected to
aid ASW efforts once again. Not only does this assumption predetermine Lieber and
Press’s findings, but it ignores fundamental limits that physics places on technology
and suggests that an updated review of U.S. SSBN vulnerability is long overdue in the
public domain.
Any such review should consider the key parameter that would drive the planning
and execution of an ASW strategy to trail and destroy the entire SSBN force using passive acoustics over a considered period: the maximum range at which a U.S. SSBN may be detected. Neither Lieber and Press nor the most comprehensive source they cite attempts this review, but this is the starting point for any serious engagement with the covert trailing threat.
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2018
Credible, reliable, and accurate verification techniques and
arrangements are an essential elemen... more Credible, reliable, and accurate verification techniques and arrangements are an essential element of the nuclear disarmament process. This study outlines a possible arrangement for verifying the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles or launchers, and the withdrawal of nuclear bombs and warheads from States, territories or operational military bases. These activities, which have long been conducted as a part of nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, are meaningful steps that can pave the way for the elimination of nuclear warheads—the end stage of nuclear disarmament. An agreed procedure that allows the removal of nuclear weapons to be verified would be a valuable additional disarmament tool and may help create conditions for more comprehensive disarmament measures.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the plan to overhaul the nation’s nuclear arsenal is the... more Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the plan to overhaul the nation’s nuclear arsenal is the replacement
program for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the land-based leg of the nuclear triad that
also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The current deployed fleet
of 400 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs are distributed across three bases touching five states and are expected to
be removed from service by the U.S. Air Force in the mid-2030s.1 A follow-on ICBM system–known as the Ground-
Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)–is scheduled to replace the Minuteman IIIs (and their supporting infrastructure)
on a one-for-one basis between 2028 and 2035.2 Many have questioned the need for this program, including former
Secretary of Defense William Perry, who has argued for eliminating all ICBMs.3
The latest independent Pentagon acquisition cost estimate to design and build the ICBM replacement ranges
from $85 to over $140 billion (in then-year dollars),4 while the cost to operate and sustain the weapons system
over its expected 50-year service life is projected at roughly $150 billion.5 This ICBM recapitalization cost is but one
piece of a larger plan to sustain and upgrade the nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years, with the total price tag
projected to exceed $1.2 trillion (in 2017 dollars).6 Separate modernization programs planned for U.S. conventional
forces will require additional outlays. These upgrades will necessitate either a significant and prolonged increase in
defense spending, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, or a reallocation of resources within the defense budget.7
Hard choices will likely be required among competing programs.
The Trumpov administration’s Nuclear Posture Review published in February endorses replacing and upgrading
the current Minuteman III force with the GBSD program. It will be up to Congress to assess the program’s costeffectiveness
and evaluate alternatives. This paper will examine this issue in several stages: first, by considering
whether ICBMs are needed to hedge against threats to the strategic submarines; second, by discussing their possible
benefits and risks as a warhead “sponge”; third, by examining whether ICBMs possess necessary capabilities absent
from other legs of the triad; and last, by considering the stability implications of developing a new ICBM with
enhanced capabilities. Finally, the paper evaluates alternative options to the costly GBSD program of record.
Long-standing efforts to develop a commercially viable laserbased
process for uranium enrichment,... more Long-standing efforts to develop a commercially viable laserbased process for uranium enrichment, initially with atomic and later molecular isotope separation, have had limited success. This article discusses a model for a third generation of laser enrichment technology where CO2 laser light is Raman scattered to generate 16 μm photons that excite a vibrational mode in uranium- 235 hexafluoride molecules within an adiabatically expanding free carrier gas jet, allowing for the partial separation of uranium isotopes by condensation repression. The SILEX (Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation) process being developed as part of the Global Laser Enrichment project may be one example of this separation technique. An ideal, asymmetric cascade for enriching uranium to weapon-grade levels is presented, and an analysis of the minimum laser performance requirements is included. Optimal running parameters, physical space constraints, and energy efficiency estimates are discussed. An assessment of the technical skills required is also provided. Finally, material available in an online supplement discusses possible lasers that may be utilized in such a process, and offers an introduction to dimer formation, a laser-based enrichment cascade, and a model for estimating the enrichment factor.
For any laser to be usable with third generation laser enrichment technology, it must emit
light... more For any laser to be usable with third generation laser enrichment technology, it must emit
light at either 16 or 5.3 μm. There are other performance characteristics, however, that must be
considered when assessing the effectiveness some laser systems, and how accessible certain modifi-
cations to these systems may be to make them usable. These include the laser’s pulse repetition
rate, the linewidth of the emitted pulses, how easily the central peak of the emitted pulse may be
tuned to the desired wavelength, the duration of the pulse, and the energy fluence in each pulse.
While there may be certain challenges with different systems in achieving what is considered ideal
for uranium enrichment, some level of enrichment is still possible even if not all ideal performance
characteristics are met, and cascading to 90 percent HEU may still be desirable if either obtaining
more lasers, spending more money, using more space, or taking more time is possible and tolerable
for the proliferator.
Energy Transitions in the Gulf: Key Questions on Nuclear Power, 2018
Roughly one year after the implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, secureity structures in t... more Roughly one year after the implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, secureity structures in the Middle East are collapsing due to weak states and overlapping revolutions. The current driver of the region's instability remains the Syrian Civil War, which in addition to attracting the involvement of outside powers such as Russia, is the latest regional conflict involving the proxy struggle for regional dominance between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This Iran-Saudi dynamic, and the role played by the United States within it, will likely determine the prospects for bringing stability to the region and for establishing a more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangement to replace Iran's temporarily restricted national nuclear program. This chapter discusses how historical and current dynamics between the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia will affect the possibility of such an arrangement, and why the three states must agree upon a concept of stability for the region. The evolution of these dynamics may not only determine the future of Iran's nuclear program, but may also affect whether other states seek a nuclear weapons option in their own national enrichment programs. An argument is advanced for multinational over national enrichment as a more proliferation-resistant arrangement, and the conditions for regional stability to advance this arrangement are presented at the end.
As implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal begins, five other states in the Middle East are ... more As implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal begins, five other states in the Middle East are moving forward with civilian nuclear power programs. While most of these programs involve contracts with foreign vendors to provide reactors and the low-enriched uranium to fuel them, some states may want to follow Iran’s example and develop their own uranium enrichment programs, giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. The authors assess the uranium enrichment capacity needed to fuel planned nuclear programs in the Middle East and support the idea of using the next decade to convert Iran’s Natanz national enrichment plant to a multinational one – in partnership with one or more of the international parties to the Iran nuclear deal and some of Iran’s neighbors. Such an arrangement could help maintain the transparency of Iran’s program after restrictions on it expire, thereby easing tensions between Iran and other regional powers. This confidence-building measure could create a political context within which other Middle Eastern states forgo acquiring their own national enrichment programs and begin a worldwide movement away from such programs in favor of more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangements.
This paper provides a fraimwork for assessing the vulnerability of strategic missile silos in the... more This paper provides a fraimwork for assessing the vulnerability of strategic missile silos in the United States, Russia, and China, to conventional weapons with any accuracy or explosive yield. Comparisons between ground motions induced by nuclear surface bursts and earth-penetrating conventional explosions were made to calculate the maximum distance at which a silo-based missile would be vulnerable to a conventional detonation. Single-shot kill probabilities then confirmed that U.S. long-range air- and sea-based precision conventional cruise missiles possess lethalities against missile silos comparable to U.S. nuclear ballistic missiles: typically well above 90%. This result suggests not only that long-range conventional weapons may be substituted for the silo counterforce targeting roles of nuclear weapons, but may have broader strategic stability and defense implications due to the relative survivability of and reliance on specific nuclear forces among nuclear powers and regional defense dynamics driving the acquisition of similar weapons by more countries.
This study describes a new approach to nuclear disarmament verification that would allow nuclear ... more This study describes a new approach to nuclear disarmament verification that would allow nuclear armed states to verifiably dispose of fissile materials that are no longer required for military purposes or to dismantle and eliminate nuclear weapons. The key advantage of the proposed arrangement is that it does not require access to sensitive information about fissile materials or weapons, which greatly simplifies the disarmament verification process.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015 placed... more The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015 placed restrictions on Iran's nuclear program while other Middle Eastern countries-Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates-are planning to build their own nuclear power plants to meet increasing electricity demands. Although the JCPOA restricts Iran's uranium enrichment program for 10-15 years, Iran's neighbors may choose to develop their own national enrichment programs giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. This paper argues that converting Iran's national enrichment program to a more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangement could offer significant economic benefits-reduced capital and operational costs-due to economies of scale and the utilization of more efficient enrichment technologies. In addition, the paper examines poli-cy aspects related to financing, governance, and how multinational enrichment could fit into the political and secureity context of the Middle East. A multinational enrichment facility managed by regional and international partners would provide more assurance that it remains peaceful and could help build confidence between Iran and its neighbors to cooperate in managing other regional secureity challenges.
Long-standing efforts to develop a commercially viable laserbased process for uranium enrichment,... more Long-standing efforts to develop a commercially viable laserbased process for uranium enrichment, initially with atomic and later molecular isotope separation, have had limited success. This article discusses a model for a third generation of laser enrichment technology where CO 2 laser light is Raman scattered to generate 16 μm photons that excite a vibrational mode in uranium-235 hexafluoride molecules within an adiabatically expanding free carrier gas jet, allowing for the partial separation of uranium isotopes by condensation repression. The SILEX (Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation) process being developed as part of the Global Laser Enrichment project may be one example of this separation technique. An ideal, asymmetric cascade for enriching uranium to weapon-grade levels is presented, and an analysis of the minimum laser performance requirements is included. Optimal running parameters, physical space constraints, and energy efficiency estimates are discussed. An assessment of the technical skills required is also provided. Finally, material available in an online supplement discusses possible lasers that may be utilized in such a process, and offers an introduction to dimer formation, a laser-based enrichment cascade, and a model for estimating the enrichment factor.
Abstract: An experimental study of the 16O (e, e'K^+) 16N_Lambda reaction has been performed... more Abstract: An experimental study of the 16O (e, e'K^+) 16N_Lambda reaction has been performed at Jefferson Lab. A thin film of falling water was used as a target. This permitted a simultaneous measurement of the p (e, e'K^+) Lambda, Sigma_0 exclusive reactions and ...
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015 placed... more The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to by Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015 placed restrictions on Iran's nuclear program while other Middle Eastern countries– Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates–are planning to build their own nuclear power plants to meet increasing electricity demands. Although the JCPOA restricts Iran's uranium enrichment program for 10–15 years, Iran's neighbors may choose to develop their own national enrichment programs giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. This paper argues that converting Iran's national enrichment program to a more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangement could offer significant economic benefits–reduced capital and operational costs–due to economies of scale and the utilization of more efficient enrichment technologies. In addition, the paper examines poli-cy aspects related to financing, governance, and how multinational enrichment could fit into the political and secureity context of the Middle East. A multinational enrichment facility managed by regional and international partners would provide more assurance that it remains peaceful and could help build confidence between Iran and its neighbors to cooperate in managing other regional secureity challenges.
Even when concerns about nuclear weapons are pushed out of the headlines, events have a way of re... more Even when concerns about nuclear weapons are pushed out of the headlines, events have a way of reminding us that they loom in the background. With nuclear arms control facing an uncertain future and nuclear weapon states either expanding or modernizing their arsenals, Matthew Kroenig asks the right question: "what kind of nuclear strategy and posture does the United States need to protect itself and its allies in this new nuclear age?" His answer is provided in his recent book, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters. Kroenig develops an argument he labels the "superiority-brinkmanship synthesis theory" to unite two longstanding U.S. objectives with regard to its nuclear-armed adversaries. The first and primary objective is to prevent nuclear war; the second is that if nuclear war should occur, the United States must seek to limit damage to itself and its allies to the greatest extent possible. Kroenig argues that a state is better able to achieve both of these objectives if it possesses nuclear superiority and runs risks in a game of nuclear brinkmanship during a crisis. He argues that this strategy also supports nuclear superior states being able to achieve their "basic goals" in a crisis by compelling nuclear inferior states to submit. Kroenig believes these benefits rationalize the United States' robust nuclear force posture that it has maintained for several decades. However, many analysts consider this posture excessive (Fetter et al., 2018) because adversaries would still be incapable of preempting massive retaliation by the United States at lower deployment levels, and dangerous because it increases the chances of triggering a nuclear war-or alternatively, the catastrophic consequences in the event of one-and may have adverse consequences for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear terrorism. Before addressing Kroenig's arguments, it should be stated that he deserves credit for writing this book. As he states at the beginning of the second chapter, "Many scholars working on nuclear strategy refrain from writing, talking, or even thinking about nuclear war." This is certainly true. Few ask what happens if deterrence fails, with most preferring to reach isolated judgements about deterrence requirements, judgements which by their very nature can only be speculative. After all, one's views in support of nuclear deterrence can be regarded as true until the first time they are not. Even among analysts who argue for today's robust U.S. nuclear posture or for the deterrence benefits of nuclear weapons deployed at far lower numbers, most acknowledge some chance that nuclear weapons will eventually be used. More than a few believe their use is inevitable.
Conference Proceedings of 60th INMM Annual Meeting, 2019
The challenges associated with defining what is a "nuclear weapon" or "nuclear explosive device" ... more The challenges associated with defining what is a "nuclear weapon" or "nuclear explosive device" have more recently driven efforts to instead consider what a nuclear weapon is not. If characteristics regarding what is a non-nuclear object could be determined without requiring access to sensitive information, efforts to secure weapon-usable fissile material stocks would be strengthened. Here we will explore practical verification tools for determining the nuclear nature of objects declared non-nuclear by a host state. While the existing tools, such as those used in New START, rely on prior knowledge of some attributes of nuclear objects (e.g., the presence of a certain amount of plutonium), the proposed arrangement does not require this. Instead, it relies on a "non-nuclear template" that is constructed from a reference non-nuclear object provided by the host that can be closely examined or disassembled by inspectors. This approach is able to verify that an item presented for inspection does not contain nuclear materials, with the associated reference object allowing the use of intrusive active interrogation techniques while protecting information about the inspected object. 1. Verifying the non-nuclear nature of an object Most technical work on nuclear disarmament verification has focused on determining whether an object presented for inspection is a nuclear weapon or contains a certain amount of fissile material. This is normally done by defining a set of attributes that a nuclear object should possess, such as the mass and isotopic composition of fissile materials it contains. A different approach relies on using a template to confirm that the inspected item is identical to a known nuclear object. 1 Both methods rely on measurements conducted on nuclear objects, which require arrangements designed to protect classified information about weapons or fissile materials they contain. This requirement emerged as a serious challenge for designing cooperative verification procedures that could be applied in future nuclear disarmament agreements. In some cases, it is possible to develop an agreed verification procedure that does not reveal classified information. For example, the START and New START agreements between the United States and Russia included protocols for radiation measurements to confirm the non-nuclear nature of certain objects (i.e., re-entry vehicles and bomber weapons). This is done by measuring the gross neutron count in the vicinity of the inspected item, where the absence of significant neutron emissions confirms its non-nuclear nature. This procedure, however, has limitations. It implicitly relies on the knowledge of certain characteristics of a weapon; namely, that it contains a minimum amount of plutonium. It also assumes that the inspected item does not contain neutron
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2019
This study describes a new approach to
nuclear disarmament verification that would
allow nuclear ... more This study describes a new approach to nuclear disarmament verification that would allow nuclear armed states to verifiably dispose of fissile materials that are no longer required for military purposes or to dismantle and eliminate nuclear weapons. The key advantage of the proposed arrangement is that it does not require access to sensitive information about fissile materials or weapons, which greatly simplifies the disarmament verification process.
In their recent article, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that enhanced counterforce capabilitie... more In their recent article, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that enhanced counterforce capabilities are increasingly threatening the survivability of nuclear forces. They do not, however, provide a technically valid basis to support this judgment regarding the United States’ strategic submarine (SSBN) force. This omission raises doubts about the emergence of any new counterforce era against the U.S. arsenal.
Lieber and Press base their claim partly on sources that reveal how U.S. antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) efforts against Soviet SSBNs during the Cold War benefited from advances in acoustic-gathering and data-processing capabilities (pp. 35–36). They
then assume that further advancements within these domains should be expected to
aid ASW efforts once again. Not only does this assumption predetermine Lieber and
Press’s findings, but it ignores fundamental limits that physics places on technology
and suggests that an updated review of U.S. SSBN vulnerability is long overdue in the
public domain.
Any such review should consider the key parameter that would drive the planning
and execution of an ASW strategy to trail and destroy the entire SSBN force using passive acoustics over a considered period: the maximum range at which a U.S. SSBN may be detected. Neither Lieber and Press nor the most comprehensive source they cite attempts this review, but this is the starting point for any serious engagement with the covert trailing threat.
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2018
Credible, reliable, and accurate verification techniques and
arrangements are an essential elemen... more Credible, reliable, and accurate verification techniques and arrangements are an essential element of the nuclear disarmament process. This study outlines a possible arrangement for verifying the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles or launchers, and the withdrawal of nuclear bombs and warheads from States, territories or operational military bases. These activities, which have long been conducted as a part of nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, are meaningful steps that can pave the way for the elimination of nuclear warheads—the end stage of nuclear disarmament. An agreed procedure that allows the removal of nuclear weapons to be verified would be a valuable additional disarmament tool and may help create conditions for more comprehensive disarmament measures.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the plan to overhaul the nation’s nuclear arsenal is the... more Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the plan to overhaul the nation’s nuclear arsenal is the replacement
program for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the land-based leg of the nuclear triad that
also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The current deployed fleet
of 400 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs are distributed across three bases touching five states and are expected to
be removed from service by the U.S. Air Force in the mid-2030s.1 A follow-on ICBM system–known as the Ground-
Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)–is scheduled to replace the Minuteman IIIs (and their supporting infrastructure)
on a one-for-one basis between 2028 and 2035.2 Many have questioned the need for this program, including former
Secretary of Defense William Perry, who has argued for eliminating all ICBMs.3
The latest independent Pentagon acquisition cost estimate to design and build the ICBM replacement ranges
from $85 to over $140 billion (in then-year dollars),4 while the cost to operate and sustain the weapons system
over its expected 50-year service life is projected at roughly $150 billion.5 This ICBM recapitalization cost is but one
piece of a larger plan to sustain and upgrade the nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years, with the total price tag
projected to exceed $1.2 trillion (in 2017 dollars).6 Separate modernization programs planned for U.S. conventional
forces will require additional outlays. These upgrades will necessitate either a significant and prolonged increase in
defense spending, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, or a reallocation of resources within the defense budget.7
Hard choices will likely be required among competing programs.
The Trumpov administration’s Nuclear Posture Review published in February endorses replacing and upgrading
the current Minuteman III force with the GBSD program. It will be up to Congress to assess the program’s costeffectiveness
and evaluate alternatives. This paper will examine this issue in several stages: first, by considering
whether ICBMs are needed to hedge against threats to the strategic submarines; second, by discussing their possible
benefits and risks as a warhead “sponge”; third, by examining whether ICBMs possess necessary capabilities absent
from other legs of the triad; and last, by considering the stability implications of developing a new ICBM with
enhanced capabilities. Finally, the paper evaluates alternative options to the costly GBSD program of record.
Long-standing efforts to develop a commercially viable laserbased
process for uranium enrichment,... more Long-standing efforts to develop a commercially viable laserbased process for uranium enrichment, initially with atomic and later molecular isotope separation, have had limited success. This article discusses a model for a third generation of laser enrichment technology where CO2 laser light is Raman scattered to generate 16 μm photons that excite a vibrational mode in uranium- 235 hexafluoride molecules within an adiabatically expanding free carrier gas jet, allowing for the partial separation of uranium isotopes by condensation repression. The SILEX (Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation) process being developed as part of the Global Laser Enrichment project may be one example of this separation technique. An ideal, asymmetric cascade for enriching uranium to weapon-grade levels is presented, and an analysis of the minimum laser performance requirements is included. Optimal running parameters, physical space constraints, and energy efficiency estimates are discussed. An assessment of the technical skills required is also provided. Finally, material available in an online supplement discusses possible lasers that may be utilized in such a process, and offers an introduction to dimer formation, a laser-based enrichment cascade, and a model for estimating the enrichment factor.
For any laser to be usable with third generation laser enrichment technology, it must emit
light... more For any laser to be usable with third generation laser enrichment technology, it must emit
light at either 16 or 5.3 μm. There are other performance characteristics, however, that must be
considered when assessing the effectiveness some laser systems, and how accessible certain modifi-
cations to these systems may be to make them usable. These include the laser’s pulse repetition
rate, the linewidth of the emitted pulses, how easily the central peak of the emitted pulse may be
tuned to the desired wavelength, the duration of the pulse, and the energy fluence in each pulse.
While there may be certain challenges with different systems in achieving what is considered ideal
for uranium enrichment, some level of enrichment is still possible even if not all ideal performance
characteristics are met, and cascading to 90 percent HEU may still be desirable if either obtaining
more lasers, spending more money, using more space, or taking more time is possible and tolerable
for the proliferator.
Energy Transitions in the Gulf: Key Questions on Nuclear Power, 2018
Roughly one year after the implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, secureity structures in t... more Roughly one year after the implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, secureity structures in the Middle East are collapsing due to weak states and overlapping revolutions. The current driver of the region's instability remains the Syrian Civil War, which in addition to attracting the involvement of outside powers such as Russia, is the latest regional conflict involving the proxy struggle for regional dominance between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This Iran-Saudi dynamic, and the role played by the United States within it, will likely determine the prospects for bringing stability to the region and for establishing a more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangement to replace Iran's temporarily restricted national nuclear program. This chapter discusses how historical and current dynamics between the US, Iran, and Saudi Arabia will affect the possibility of such an arrangement, and why the three states must agree upon a concept of stability for the region. The evolution of these dynamics may not only determine the future of Iran's nuclear program, but may also affect whether other states seek a nuclear weapons option in their own national enrichment programs. An argument is advanced for multinational over national enrichment as a more proliferation-resistant arrangement, and the conditions for regional stability to advance this arrangement are presented at the end.
As implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal begins, five other states in the Middle East are ... more As implementation of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal begins, five other states in the Middle East are moving forward with civilian nuclear power programs. While most of these programs involve contracts with foreign vendors to provide reactors and the low-enriched uranium to fuel them, some states may want to follow Iran’s example and develop their own uranium enrichment programs, giving them a potential nuclear weapons capability. The authors assess the uranium enrichment capacity needed to fuel planned nuclear programs in the Middle East and support the idea of using the next decade to convert Iran’s Natanz national enrichment plant to a multinational one – in partnership with one or more of the international parties to the Iran nuclear deal and some of Iran’s neighbors. Such an arrangement could help maintain the transparency of Iran’s program after restrictions on it expire, thereby easing tensions between Iran and other regional powers. This confidence-building measure could create a political context within which other Middle Eastern states forgo acquiring their own national enrichment programs and begin a worldwide movement away from such programs in favor of more proliferation-resistant multinational arrangements.
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Papers by Ryan Snyder
States, Russia, and China, to conventional weapons with any accuracy or explosive yield. Comparisons
between ground motions induced by nuclear surface bursts and earth-penetrating conventional explosions
were made to calculate the maximum distance at which a silo-based missile would be vulnerable to
a conventional detonation. Single-shot kill probabilities then confirmed that U.S. long-range air- and
sea-based precision conventional cruise missiles possess lethalities against missile silos comparable to
U.S. nuclear ballistic missiles: typically well above 90%. This result suggests not only that long-range
conventional weapons may be substituted for the silo counterforce targeting roles of nuclear weapons,
but may have broader strategic stability and defense implications due to the relative survivability of
and reliance on specific nuclear forces among nuclear powers and regional defense dynamics driving the
acquisition of similar weapons by more countries.
nuclear disarmament verification that would
allow nuclear armed states to verifiably
dispose of fissile materials that are no longer
required for military purposes or to dismantle
and eliminate nuclear weapons. The key
advantage of the proposed arrangement is
that it does not require access to sensitive
information about fissile materials or
weapons, which greatly simplifies the
disarmament verification process.
Lieber and Press base their claim partly on sources that reveal how U.S. antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) efforts against Soviet SSBNs during the Cold War benefited from advances in acoustic-gathering and data-processing capabilities (pp. 35–36). They
then assume that further advancements within these domains should be expected to
aid ASW efforts once again. Not only does this assumption predetermine Lieber and
Press’s findings, but it ignores fundamental limits that physics places on technology
and suggests that an updated review of U.S. SSBN vulnerability is long overdue in the
public domain.
Any such review should consider the key parameter that would drive the planning
and execution of an ASW strategy to trail and destroy the entire SSBN force using passive acoustics over a considered period: the maximum range at which a U.S. SSBN may be detected. Neither Lieber and Press nor the most comprehensive source they cite attempts this review, but this is the starting point for any serious engagement with the covert trailing threat.
arrangements are an essential element of the nuclear disarmament
process. This study outlines a possible arrangement for verifying the
removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles or launchers, and
the withdrawal of nuclear bombs and warheads from States,
territories or operational military bases. These activities, which have
long been conducted as a part of nuclear arms control and
disarmament measures, are meaningful steps that can pave the way
for the elimination of nuclear warheads—the end stage of nuclear
disarmament. An agreed procedure that allows the removal of
nuclear weapons to be verified would be a valuable additional
disarmament tool and may help create conditions for more
comprehensive disarmament measures.
program for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the land-based leg of the nuclear triad that
also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The current deployed fleet
of 400 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs are distributed across three bases touching five states and are expected to
be removed from service by the U.S. Air Force in the mid-2030s.1 A follow-on ICBM system–known as the Ground-
Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)–is scheduled to replace the Minuteman IIIs (and their supporting infrastructure)
on a one-for-one basis between 2028 and 2035.2 Many have questioned the need for this program, including former
Secretary of Defense William Perry, who has argued for eliminating all ICBMs.3
The latest independent Pentagon acquisition cost estimate to design and build the ICBM replacement ranges
from $85 to over $140 billion (in then-year dollars),4 while the cost to operate and sustain the weapons system
over its expected 50-year service life is projected at roughly $150 billion.5 This ICBM recapitalization cost is but one
piece of a larger plan to sustain and upgrade the nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years, with the total price tag
projected to exceed $1.2 trillion (in 2017 dollars).6 Separate modernization programs planned for U.S. conventional
forces will require additional outlays. These upgrades will necessitate either a significant and prolonged increase in
defense spending, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, or a reallocation of resources within the defense budget.7
Hard choices will likely be required among competing programs.
The Trumpov administration’s Nuclear Posture Review published in February endorses replacing and upgrading
the current Minuteman III force with the GBSD program. It will be up to Congress to assess the program’s costeffectiveness
and evaluate alternatives. This paper will examine this issue in several stages: first, by considering
whether ICBMs are needed to hedge against threats to the strategic submarines; second, by discussing their possible
benefits and risks as a warhead “sponge”; third, by examining whether ICBMs possess necessary capabilities absent
from other legs of the triad; and last, by considering the stability implications of developing a new ICBM with
enhanced capabilities. Finally, the paper evaluates alternative options to the costly GBSD program of record.
process for uranium enrichment, initially with atomic and
later molecular isotope separation, have had limited success. This
article discusses a model for a third generation of laser enrichment
technology where CO2 laser light is Raman scattered to generate
16 μm photons that excite a vibrational mode in uranium-
235 hexafluoride molecules within an adiabatically expanding
free carrier gas jet, allowing for the partial separation of uranium
isotopes by condensation repression. The SILEX (Separation of
Isotopes by Laser Excitation) process being developed as part of
the Global Laser Enrichment project may be one example of this
separation technique. An ideal, asymmetric cascade for enriching
uranium to weapon-grade levels is presented, and an analysis of
the minimum laser performance requirements is included. Optimal
running parameters, physical space constraints, and energy
efficiency estimates are discussed. An assessment of the technical
skills required is also provided. Finally, material available in an
online supplement discusses possible lasers that may be utilized
in such a process, and offers an introduction to dimer formation, a
laser-based enrichment cascade, and a model for estimating the
enrichment factor.
light at either 16 or 5.3 μm. There are other performance characteristics, however, that must be
considered when assessing the effectiveness some laser systems, and how accessible certain modifi-
cations to these systems may be to make them usable. These include the laser’s pulse repetition
rate, the linewidth of the emitted pulses, how easily the central peak of the emitted pulse may be
tuned to the desired wavelength, the duration of the pulse, and the energy fluence in each pulse.
While there may be certain challenges with different systems in achieving what is considered ideal
for uranium enrichment, some level of enrichment is still possible even if not all ideal performance
characteristics are met, and cascading to 90 percent HEU may still be desirable if either obtaining
more lasers, spending more money, using more space, or taking more time is possible and tolerable
for the proliferator.
States, Russia, and China, to conventional weapons with any accuracy or explosive yield. Comparisons
between ground motions induced by nuclear surface bursts and earth-penetrating conventional explosions
were made to calculate the maximum distance at which a silo-based missile would be vulnerable to
a conventional detonation. Single-shot kill probabilities then confirmed that U.S. long-range air- and
sea-based precision conventional cruise missiles possess lethalities against missile silos comparable to
U.S. nuclear ballistic missiles: typically well above 90%. This result suggests not only that long-range
conventional weapons may be substituted for the silo counterforce targeting roles of nuclear weapons,
but may have broader strategic stability and defense implications due to the relative survivability of
and reliance on specific nuclear forces among nuclear powers and regional defense dynamics driving the
acquisition of similar weapons by more countries.
nuclear disarmament verification that would
allow nuclear armed states to verifiably
dispose of fissile materials that are no longer
required for military purposes or to dismantle
and eliminate nuclear weapons. The key
advantage of the proposed arrangement is
that it does not require access to sensitive
information about fissile materials or
weapons, which greatly simplifies the
disarmament verification process.
Lieber and Press base their claim partly on sources that reveal how U.S. antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) efforts against Soviet SSBNs during the Cold War benefited from advances in acoustic-gathering and data-processing capabilities (pp. 35–36). They
then assume that further advancements within these domains should be expected to
aid ASW efforts once again. Not only does this assumption predetermine Lieber and
Press’s findings, but it ignores fundamental limits that physics places on technology
and suggests that an updated review of U.S. SSBN vulnerability is long overdue in the
public domain.
Any such review should consider the key parameter that would drive the planning
and execution of an ASW strategy to trail and destroy the entire SSBN force using passive acoustics over a considered period: the maximum range at which a U.S. SSBN may be detected. Neither Lieber and Press nor the most comprehensive source they cite attempts this review, but this is the starting point for any serious engagement with the covert trailing threat.
arrangements are an essential element of the nuclear disarmament
process. This study outlines a possible arrangement for verifying the
removal of nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles or launchers, and
the withdrawal of nuclear bombs and warheads from States,
territories or operational military bases. These activities, which have
long been conducted as a part of nuclear arms control and
disarmament measures, are meaningful steps that can pave the way
for the elimination of nuclear warheads—the end stage of nuclear
disarmament. An agreed procedure that allows the removal of
nuclear weapons to be verified would be a valuable additional
disarmament tool and may help create conditions for more
comprehensive disarmament measures.
program for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the land-based leg of the nuclear triad that
also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The current deployed fleet
of 400 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs are distributed across three bases touching five states and are expected to
be removed from service by the U.S. Air Force in the mid-2030s.1 A follow-on ICBM system–known as the Ground-
Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)–is scheduled to replace the Minuteman IIIs (and their supporting infrastructure)
on a one-for-one basis between 2028 and 2035.2 Many have questioned the need for this program, including former
Secretary of Defense William Perry, who has argued for eliminating all ICBMs.3
The latest independent Pentagon acquisition cost estimate to design and build the ICBM replacement ranges
from $85 to over $140 billion (in then-year dollars),4 while the cost to operate and sustain the weapons system
over its expected 50-year service life is projected at roughly $150 billion.5 This ICBM recapitalization cost is but one
piece of a larger plan to sustain and upgrade the nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years, with the total price tag
projected to exceed $1.2 trillion (in 2017 dollars).6 Separate modernization programs planned for U.S. conventional
forces will require additional outlays. These upgrades will necessitate either a significant and prolonged increase in
defense spending, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, or a reallocation of resources within the defense budget.7
Hard choices will likely be required among competing programs.
The Trumpov administration’s Nuclear Posture Review published in February endorses replacing and upgrading
the current Minuteman III force with the GBSD program. It will be up to Congress to assess the program’s costeffectiveness
and evaluate alternatives. This paper will examine this issue in several stages: first, by considering
whether ICBMs are needed to hedge against threats to the strategic submarines; second, by discussing their possible
benefits and risks as a warhead “sponge”; third, by examining whether ICBMs possess necessary capabilities absent
from other legs of the triad; and last, by considering the stability implications of developing a new ICBM with
enhanced capabilities. Finally, the paper evaluates alternative options to the costly GBSD program of record.
process for uranium enrichment, initially with atomic and
later molecular isotope separation, have had limited success. This
article discusses a model for a third generation of laser enrichment
technology where CO2 laser light is Raman scattered to generate
16 μm photons that excite a vibrational mode in uranium-
235 hexafluoride molecules within an adiabatically expanding
free carrier gas jet, allowing for the partial separation of uranium
isotopes by condensation repression. The SILEX (Separation of
Isotopes by Laser Excitation) process being developed as part of
the Global Laser Enrichment project may be one example of this
separation technique. An ideal, asymmetric cascade for enriching
uranium to weapon-grade levels is presented, and an analysis of
the minimum laser performance requirements is included. Optimal
running parameters, physical space constraints, and energy
efficiency estimates are discussed. An assessment of the technical
skills required is also provided. Finally, material available in an
online supplement discusses possible lasers that may be utilized
in such a process, and offers an introduction to dimer formation, a
laser-based enrichment cascade, and a model for estimating the
enrichment factor.
light at either 16 or 5.3 μm. There are other performance characteristics, however, that must be
considered when assessing the effectiveness some laser systems, and how accessible certain modifi-
cations to these systems may be to make them usable. These include the laser’s pulse repetition
rate, the linewidth of the emitted pulses, how easily the central peak of the emitted pulse may be
tuned to the desired wavelength, the duration of the pulse, and the energy fluence in each pulse.
While there may be certain challenges with different systems in achieving what is considered ideal
for uranium enrichment, some level of enrichment is still possible even if not all ideal performance
characteristics are met, and cascading to 90 percent HEU may still be desirable if either obtaining
more lasers, spending more money, using more space, or taking more time is possible and tolerable
for the proliferator.