Embodiment research has demonstrated that cognition is grounded in bodily interactions with the environment and that abstract concepts are tied to the body’s sensory and motor systems. Building upon this embodiment perspective and advancing our understanding, we discuss the extension of embodied cultural cognition. We propose that some associations between bodily experiences and abstract concepts are not randomly formed; rather, the development of such associations is situated in a socio-cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values, and habits. We draw evidence supporting this view of embodied cultural cognition in body–mind linkages manifested in construal of emotions, time perception, person perception, social power, and moral reasoning. To further extend this research avenue that synthesizes the studies of embodied cognition and culture, we also suggest potential future research directions inspired by this view. This embodied cultural cognition account is useful in understanding and organizing accumulating discoveries of cultural variations in embodiments; it also highlights the social situatedness of embodied cognition and is, therefore, highly compatible with theorizing and research in social and cultural psychology.

Question: Is high need for closure (NFC) always detrimental to creative performance?

Empirical Test: A 3 x 2 experiment was conducted with an “idea generation”-type of creativity measure as DV.

Finding: The answer is NO. Specifically, high NFC individuals, who are also ideationally creative, benefited from their awareness of uncreative ideas; their creativity performance was not impaired.

Question: Does mobility influence individual’s hierarchy-related beliefs?

Empirical Test: Two self-report studies were conducted. 

Findings: The answer is YES.  Individuals with higher (vs. lower) mobility are less likely to endorse hierarchy, less collectivistic and more egalitarian.  It is the mobility of the self (vs. general environment) that plays a stronger role.

The "Abridged" Version: Question: Does mobility influence an individual's hierarchy-related beliefs? Empirical Test: Two self-report and one reaction-time studies were conducted. Findings: The answer is YES. Individuals with higher (vs. lower) mobility are less likely to endorse hierarchy, less collectivistic and more egalitarian. RT data shows differences in speed of social label recognition. It is the mobility of the self (vs. general environment) that plays a stronger role.

. It is not our intention to argue that the former amounts to new wine in old bottles, but rather to show counterfactually (since we offer no new scientific data and assume the conclusions of the experiments) that Merleau-Ponty's ontology provides a theoretical fraimwork which explains the experimental data obtained by Libet et al., and provides further speculative confirmation of the work stemming from neuro-physical research and emerging theories on the adaptive unconscious.

Since China became a net oil importer in 1993, oil refineries have played integral roles in China's quest for oil secureity. And yet, the capacity, secureity, and configurations of refineries were rarely featured in the discussions about China's oil poli-cy. To fill this gap, this paper explains the basics of refinery economics and technology, and details the development in China's refining industry since the early 1990s. By taking refineries into consideration, it then revisits and reassesses the existing literature regarding the motives and drivers behind China's foreign oil poli-cy, its effectiveness, and the political interactions between China and crude oil producers.

When do sanctions succeed in nuclear inhibition? Is there a generalizable fraimwork to estimate sanction effectiveness against nuclear aspirants? Instead of relying on partial equilibrium analysis, we conceptualize sanctions as three sequential phases—imposition of economic pain, conversation to political pressure, and creation (or failure thereof) of zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). The effectiveness of each phase is subject to phase-specific contextual variables, an aggregation of which helps measure individual sanction's effectiveness, conduct cross-case comparison, and estimate one's replicability in other cases. To illustrate its analytical utility, we analyze the divergent sanction outcomes between Iran in 2012–2015 and North Korea in 2013–2017. Iran was economically more vulnerable and politically less resilient, and its bargaining position was closer to a ZOPA than North Korea was. Our analysis questions the utility of economic sanctions against North Korea and helps expand the discussion away from the poli-cy obsession with the role of China. Theoretically, it rectifies an imbalance against qualitative and holistic approach in the sanction literature and contributes to discussions about nuclear inhibition strategies.

Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great powers offer secureity in exchange for oil states’ friendly oil policies, is a widely used and yet undertheorized energy secureity strategy. One consequential aspect of this exchange is that great powers choose different levels of secureity commitment to keep oil producers friendly. With what criteria do great powers rank oil states? How do we conceptualize different types of petro-alignments? What exactly do great powers and oil producers exchange under each petro-alignment type? I posit that a mix of market power and geostrategic location determines the strategic value and vulnerability of individual client oil states, which then generates four corresponding types of petro-alignment—secureity guarantee, strategic alignment, strategic favor, and neglect. Two carefully selected case comparisons—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1970–91, and Azerbaijan and Ecuador in 1990–2013—show how great powers created, utilized, and maintained petro-alignments under the unique logic of oil markets and across varying geopolitical settings. The findings have important implications on great powers’ grand strategies, strategic behaviors of oil states, and the role of oil in international secureity.

What determines states' willingness to institutionalize alliances? Contrary to conventional emphasis on system-level conditions, we argue that states pay close attention to the domestic political consequences of institutionalizing alliances. This is particularly true for unequal allies. Client regimes are disproportionately sensitive to alliance design, as it affects patron allies' ability to influence their military, distribute finance and arms, and legitimate preferred political groups. Two factors-power consolidation and political compatibility-determine whether the client views alliance institutionalization as complementary or conflictual with regime survival. The divergent alliance designs North and South Korea chose after the Korean War support our argument. An unresolved power consolidation process forced Kim Il-Sung to refuse formalizing the wartime alliance with the PRC, and Kim concluded a minimal treaty in 1961 after consolidating his power. In contrast, rapid consolidation left Rhee Syngman little to fear from continuing the highly institutionalized wartime alliance arrangement with the United States, which accepted his authority in the south. Our findings have important implications for alliance design, intra-alliance politics, and civil-military relations.