One of the challenges to the philosophical consideration of ecclesiology is that as a domain of theology, it is underdeveloped. One can, however, attend directly to the biblical source material and discover opportunities to bring philosophical tools to bear. Romans 12:5 makes two claims that have ecclesiological implications: the “many” constitute “one body” and, the constituent “many” are interrelated. These claims retain entailments that provide substance for the philosophical consideration of ecclesiological topics. After an exegetical clarification of the text, this essay offers brief assessments of possible explanatory mechanisms before applying a mereological construct to this passage as the most robust mechanism to describe just how it can be the case that the many can be one and especially how the many remain interrelated.

Analytic theology is a thriving research program at the intersection of theology and analytic philosophy. Prior to Oliver Crisp and Michael Rea's launch of "analytic theology" in 2009, the discipline functioned under the moniker "philosophical theology. " Considerable ink has been spilled on what is analytic theology in the past decade, and most recently by William Wood (2021). Some theologians (e.g., Abraham 2009) have argued that it is systematic theology while others (e.g., Coakley 2013) have been content to remain in a family resemblance class rooted in philosophical theology. At the same time, analytic theology has welcomed Christian philosophers (e.g., Beall 2021) who have migrated into Christian doctrine via philosophy of religion. These philosophers are not systematic theologians, but, rather, philosophical theologians. This essay analyzes the relation between analytic theology, philosophical theology, and philosophy by examining their starting points and how they perceive and access truth, and then proposes a spectrum to graph their overlapping zones of research. I conclude that philosophical theology stands at the heart of the disciplines and thus remains an appropriate term for analytic theologians and Christian philosophers working somewhere in the vicinity of Jerusalem.

On hylomorphism and a concrete view of Christ’s human nature a human person might be defined ontologically by a real definition. Per their definitions, both views depend on a thick particular ‘human person’. This dependence between the person and its definition is what I have termed the principle of ontological priority (POP). I analyze how POP affects the views given two theological puzzles, respectively: 1) the disembodied intermediate state, and 2) a single person in Christ following Chalcedon. I find that the entailment of the thick particular is unfavorable for both views. Consequently, their real definitions need to be redefined.

Faithful persons tend to relate to their religious beliefs as truth claims, particularly inasmuch as their beliefs have soteriological implications for those of different religions. For Christians the particular claims which matter most in this regard are those made by Jesus of Nazareth and his claims are primarily relational in nature. I propose a model in which we understand divine grace from Jesus as being mediated through relational knowledge of him on a compassionately exclusivist basis, including post-mortem. Supporting this model, I draw from Eleonore Stump's hypothesis in her 2018 Atonement that the crucifixion of Jesus opens the divine psyche to all human psyches sufficiently for salvific mutual indwelling to occur, and from Gavin D'Costa's conception of the descensus Christi ad inferos as the mechanism for grace's accessibility post-mortem presented in his 2009 Christianity and World Religions. This model seeks to address ongoing, justified pastoral concern for the soteriological status of non-Christians while still treating Christianity as objectively true.

Theological anthropology has tended to view human flourishing as consisting in the loving communion of our selves with God. Recently, Natalia Marandiuc has brought the tools of attachment theory to theological anthropology to argue that a self is not inherent to human persons but rather is co-created through our loving relationships with one another and with God. In this paper I argue for the introduction of narrative, particularly as understood through the work of Eleonore Stump, to Marandiuc's account as a practical means by which healing love might be communicated, particularly through Scriptural narratives. In evidence of narrative's usefulness, I offer a brief exegesis of the Gospel of John's account of the Woman at the well. This synthesis fills a gap in our understanding of the self's flourishing by not only adopting a model demonstrating its emergence but also by providing a method by which the model can be applied.

In this article I propose an erotic theosis as a fruitful possibility for conceptualising our final participation in union with God in the beatific vision and for imaging said participation on earth. Particularly, I propose a synthesis of recent work from Oliver Crisp on theosis with that of Sarah Coakley on sexual desire as an especially helpful way in which to conceive of our ever-deepening participation in God's love. Further, this synthesis uses contributions from Erin Dufault-Hunter on the intersections of sexual desire and ethics as a catalyst for its recommendations.

Analytic theology is often described as something like the application of analytic philosophy's tools to theological studies, but what this means can be unclear. In this paper, I offer a primer on analytic theology which clarifies this common description of the field. Particularly, following Sarah Coakley, I sketch an account of analytic theology on which it consists of a relation of familial resemblance. That is, analytic theologians are those who investigate theological loci in ways akin to those seen in contemporary analytic philosophy. In so doing, I also briefly describe how analytic theology is conceptually distinct from both philosophical theology and analytic philosophy of religion. I then provide a threefold typology for understanding analytic theology's literary landscape whereby its practitioners can generally be understood to produce works which are either philosophically-inclined, theologically-inclined, or mixed in their inclination. Finally, I offer a brief survey of new frontiers being explored by analytic theologians.

Christification as Imitative Participation:
Incarnation, Kierkegaard & the Christ Hymn
By: Stefani McDade

CONTENTS
Introduction: Christological Anthropology
Chapter One: Incarnation as Christification
Chapter Two: Kierkegaardian Christification
Chapter Three: Pauline Christification
Conclusion: Prospects of Christification

ABSTRACT
The terms Christification, Cruciformity and Christosis, have only recently become popular in modern scholarship, and yet a flourish of academic research has emerged on this topic in the last few years. And while its language is relatively new, the concept itself is age-old, in that it signifies dynamic identification and vital union with God in the person of Jesus Christ.

In biblical studies, such labels are often used in reference to the cruciform soteriology of the Pauline corpus, wherein Christoformity is seen as transformative participation. In the field of theology, the term may refer to any doctrine of divinization or deification which is defined distinctly along Christological lines—as found in the more Christocentric writers of the Patristic era or in the Augustinian and Lutheran traditions.

In light of the paradigmatic pattern of Christ’s incarnational exchange, I examine the "God-Man" as a Christic prototype and archetype for all divine-human unification. Specifically, I argue for Christification as a holistic model of imitative participation—wherein Christosis is an embodied process of theosis by kenosis, incorporating both existential and relational dimensions.

My primary methodological goals throughout this project will be to assess the key issues at stake, seek ecumenical convergence and bridge pernicious gaps between theology and anthropology, as well as orthodoxy and orthopraxy.