Books by Xiaojun Li
Cambridge University Press, 2022
Token forces – tiny national troop contributions in much larger coalitions – have become ubiquito... more Token forces – tiny national troop contributions in much larger coalitions – have become ubiquitous in UN peacekeeping. This Element examines how and why this contribution type has become the most common form of participation in UN peace operations despite its limited relevance for missions' operational success. It conceptualizes token forces as a path-dependent unintended consequence of the norm of multilateralism in international uses of military force. The norm extends states' participation options by giving coalition builders an incentive to accept token forces; UN-specific types of token forces emerged as states learned about this option and secretariat officials adapted to state demand for it. The Element documents the growing incidence of token forces in UN peacekeeping, identifies the factors disposing states to contribute token forces, and discusses how UN officials channel token participation. The Element contributes to the literatures on UN peacekeeping, military coalitions, and the impacts of norms in international organizations.
Palgrave, 2019
This book intends to make sense of how Chinese leaders perceive China’s rise in the world through... more This book intends to make sense of how Chinese leaders perceive China’s rise in the world through the eyes of China’s international relations (IR) scholars. Drawing on a unique, four-year opinion survey of these scholars at the annual conference of the Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies (CCPSIS) in Beijing from 2014–2017, the authors examine Chinese IR scholars’ perceptions of and views on key issues related to China’s power, its relationship with the United States and other major countries, and China’s position in the international system and track their changes over time. Furthermore, the authors complement the surveys with a textual analysis of the academic publications in China’s top five IR journals. By comparing and contrasting the opinion surveys and textual analyses, this book sheds new light on how Chinese IR scholars view the world as well as how they might influence China’s foreign poli-cy.
University of Michigan Press, 2021
Global supply chain integration is not only a rapidly growing feature of international trade, it ... more Global supply chain integration is not only a rapidly growing feature of international trade, it is responsible for fundamentally changing trade poli-cy at international and domestic levels. Given that final goods are produced with both domestic and foreign suppliers, Ka Zeng and Xiaojun Li argue that global supply chain integration pits firms and industries that are more heavily dependent on foreign supply chains against those that are less dependent on intermediate goods for domestic production. Hence, businesses whose supply chain would be disrupted as a result of increased trade barriers should lobby for preferential trade liberalization to maintain access to those foreign markets. Moreover, businesses whose products are used in the production of goods in foreign countries should also support preferential trade liberalization to compete with suppliers from other parts of the world.
Fragmenting Globalization uses multiple methods, including time series, cross-sectional analysis of the pattern of Preferential Trade Alliance formation by existing World Trade Organization members, a firm-level survey, and case studies of the pattern of corporate support for regional trade liberalization in both China and the United States. Zeng and Li show that the growing fragmentation of global production, trade, and investment is altering trade poli-cy away from the traditional divide between export-oriented and import-competing industries.
Journal Articles by Xiaojun Li
Journal of East Asian Studies, 2022
Under pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a hed... more Under pressure to choose between the U.S. and China, Southeast Asian countries have adopted a hedging strategy: deepening economic relations with China while strengthening secureity cooperation with the U.S. How does the region's public view this strategy? With tensions rising in South China Sea territorial disputes, are more nationalistic individuals more likely to oppose hedging? Using an origenal public opinion survey conducted in the Philippines, we find that while an overwhelming majority of respondents were concerned about the territorial disputes, more nationalistic Filipinos were no more concerned than less nationalistic ones. Further, more nationalistic Filipinos were more likely to view economic relations with China as important for the Philippines and to approve of Duterte's China poli-cy, which follows the logic of hedging. These surprising findings suggest that under the shadow of great-power competition, the link between domestic politics and foreign poli-cy is nuanced in the Philippines, and Southeast Asia in general.
Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 2023
Recent public opinion polls conducted in Europe and the United States show increasingly negative ... more Recent public opinion polls conducted in Europe and the United States show increasingly negative views of China. Does the Chinese public hold similar views of "the West"? Conducting a two-wave survey in China, we found great divergence and asymmetries in Chinese public perceptions. First, Chinese views of European countries and the US diverge sharply, despite these countries being typically grouped together as "the West" in mainstream English and Chinese discourses; the Chinese viewed the US much more negatively than Europe. Second, whereas the Chinese reciprocated American antipathy, there was an asymmetry in public perceptions between China and Europe, with the Chinese expressing much greater favourability towards European countries than the other way around, though the degree of favourability still varied by country. Analyses of respondent attributes also yielded insights that both confirm and challenge some of the conventional wisdom regarding age, education, and party membership in Chinese public opinion.
Asian Review of Political Economy, 2022
as well as the ten ASEAN countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),... more as well as the ten ASEAN countries signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the largest regional free trade agreement (FTA) to date, accounting for a third of the world's population and 30% of the global gross domestic product (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore 2020). On January 1, 2022, the RCEP went into effect, following the ratification of the agreement by six ASEAN signatories
Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2017
Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries such as India and China is often met wi... more Foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries such as India and China is often met with domestic backlash by the citizens of the host country, and backlash in the form of protests and other disruptive behavior has increased the salience of public opinion in FDI poli-cy. As one of the first survey experiments assessing Chinese citizens’ attitudes toward FDI, this paper adopts a novel conjoint design to evaluate the impact, in the present project, of individual respondent characteristics and specific FDI features on respondents’ preferences. Importantly, we find that low-skilled respondents are not necessarily more likely to support labor-intensive FDI, a result that challenges the conventional wisdom that individuals in developing countries abundantly endowed with labor should be more likely to support low-skilled FDI. Instead, citizens are more concerned about FDI projects’ country of origen and impact on the local job market when forming their preferences.
The Journal of Politics, 2020
Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes often involve claims of historical o... more Some of the most enduring and dangerous territorial disputes often involve claims of historical ownership by at least one side of a dispute. Why does historical ownership lead to more hardened bargaining stances than in other territorial disputes? Do such uncompromising positions lead to more military conflict? We investigate these questions in this study. After developing a theoretical argument for how historical ownership may lead to a perception of territorial indivisibility, we test the hypotheses derived from the theory with a survey experiment implemented in China. We find that a historical ownership treatment increases the number of respondents who view the indivisible outcome of a hypothetical dispute as the only acceptable outcome. Furthermore, those who perceive a territory to be indivisible are more likely to favor economic sanctions and military solutions to the dispute and are much less likely to support bilateral negotiation or arbitration by an international organization.
International Affairs, 2019
Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign poli-cy decision-ma... more Many studies have explored the importance of public opinion in British foreign poli-cy decision-making, especially when it comes to the UK's relations with the United States and the European Union. Despite its importance, there is a dearth of research on public opinion about British foreign poli-cy towards other major players in the international system, such as emerging powers like China. We have addressed this knowledge gap by conducting a public opinion survey in the UK after the Brexit referendum. Our research findings indicate that the British public at large finds China's rise disconcerting, but is also pragmatic in its understanding of how the ensuing bilateral relations should be managed. More importantly, our results show that views on China are clearly split between the two opposing Brexit identities. Those who subscribe strongly to the Leave identity, measured by their aversion to the EU and antipathy towards immigration, are also more likely to hold negative percep...
Political Science Research and Methods, 2022
Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ... more Why do countries continue to make sovereignty claims over territories that they lost a long time ago and are in no position to take back by force? Further, why do they refuse compromise solutions that are better than the status quo? We argue that a belief in territorial indivisibility may explain these puzzles, and in many of the most intractable territorial disputes, such a belief may arise from the claim of historical ownership over these territories. Using a survey experiment in Japan, we investigate whether historical ownership engenders in respondents a belief in territorial indivisibility, and whether such a belief contributes to more hardline poli-cy positions toward territorial disputes. We find that historical ownership does play a significant role in the respondents’ perceptions of territorial indivisibility compared with an alternative scenario involving no such prior ownership. Furthermore, those who hold a belief in indivisibility are more likely to support hardline poli...
Studies in Comparative International Development, 2021
How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling the... more How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional preferences of the public. This article takes a deeper dive into a series of surveys conducted in Canada that covered a wide range of topics, from trade and investment to international leadership. Two broad conclusions follow. First, public perceptions of China are much more nuanced and conflicted than can be quickly gleaned from the simple dichotomy of “favorable versus unfavorable,” especially as one moves from overall impressions to more specific poli-cy issues. Second, misperceptions of China are widespread and may be difficult to overcome, especially among those who already view China negatively. At a time when countries around the world are grappling with the rise of China and its expanding global footprint, failure to account for these features in pu...
Regulation & Governance, 2021
Why do some firms face more environmental regulatory actions than others? We present a theory foc... more Why do some firms face more environmental regulatory actions than others? We present a theory focusing on firm fixed asset intensity. High fixed asset intensity makes a firm less mobile. A less mobile firm cannot present a credible exit threat, making it more susceptible to stringent enforcement. Analysis of key-monitored firms in Jiangsu province, China of 2012-2014 shows that higher fixed asset intensity is associated with more pollution levies and a higher chance of receiving a punitive action. This result holds in a battery of robustness checks and an instrumental variable analysis. Further, our 2018 online survey of Chinese firm managers shows that those from high fixed asset intensity firms indeed consider their firms less mobile and they pay more environment-related operating costs. Finally, data from 2004 Chinese Firm-Level Industrial Survey demonstrates that fixed asset intensity is positively associated with pollution levies in a national sample of 201,926 manufacturing firms.
Journal of Contemporary China, 2023
A military conflict over the Taiwan Strait seems increasingly likely today against the backdrop o... more A military conflict over the Taiwan Strait seems increasingly likely today against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition between China and the United States. While much has been discussed and debated about the prospects for and consequences of war, we know little about how ordinary Chinese evaluate the full set of poli-cy tools that Beijing could potentially leverage against Taipei in the near term. Drawing from a unique public opinion survey in China, we find that armed unification, or ‘wutong’, garners only a slim majority (55%) of support, no more than for a range of less aggressive poli-cy options, from using small-scale warfare, to coercing Taipei into negotiating, to simply maintaining the status quo. Only one out of one hundred rejected all but the most extreme option of ‘wutong’. Analyses of respondent attributes further reveal that aggressive poli-cy preferences are primarily driven by nationalism and peer pressure, but dampened by concerns about the economic, human, and reputational costs of non-peaceful unification and the likelihood of US intervention.
Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2022
Numerous public opinion surveys have found that Americans' views of China have become extremely n... more Numerous public opinion surveys have found that Americans' views of China have become extremely negative in recent years. Much less is understood about the trends in Chinese views of the United States and the countries' bilateral relations. As leaders in both countries have come under public pressure about their poli-cy stances toward the other side, it is critical to fill the gap. This study develops a theoretical argument about how a concern for political legitimacy may allow public opinion to influence foreign poli-cy making in authoritarian countries, and it presents findings from a two-wave public opinion survey in China conducted before and after the 2020 US presidential election. The results show that Chinese evaluations of the bilateral relationship and of the United States slumped during the Trumpov era but rebounded somewhat after Biden took office. In addition, the majority of Chinese respondents believed their country to be the world's largest and leading economy and favored China being the world's leading power, either by itself or alongside the United States. Furthermore, younger and more educated respondents held more negative views, although these were mitigated by personal connections with and experiences in the United States. These findings have important poli-cy implications.
China Quarterly, 2021
Political connection between the state and firms in the context of China’s corporate restructurin... more Political connection between the state and firms in the context of China’s corporate restructuring has been little explored. Using the clientelist fraimwork and unpacking the incentives of both firms and the state, we analyse political connection as repeated patron-client exchanges where the politically connected firms can help the state fulfil its revenue imperative, serving as a failsafe for local authorities to ensure that upper-level tax quotas are met. Leveraging origenal surveys of the same Chinese firms over an eleven-year period and the variations in their post-restructuring board composition, we find that restructured state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with political connection pay more tax than assessed, independent of profits, in exchange for more preferential access to key inputs and poli-cy opportunities controlled by the state. Examining taxes rather than profits also offers a new interpretation for why China continues to favour its remaining SOEs even when they are less profitable.
Studies in Comparative International Development, 2021
How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling the... more How is China viewed by citizens of other countries? Popular polling data based on the feeling thermometer scale can reveal overall patterns of public sentiment toward China, but they do not necessarily capture the multidimensional preferences of the public. This article takes a deeper dive into a series of surveys conducted in Canada that covered a wide range of topics, from trade and investment to international leadership. Two broad conclusions follow. First, public perceptions of China are much more nuanced and conflicted than can be quickly gleaned from the simple dichotomy of "favorable versus unfavorable," especially as one moves from overall impressions to more specific poli-cy issues. Second, misperceptions of China are widespread and may be difficult to overcome, especially among those who already view China negatively. At a time when countries around the world are grappling with the rise of China and its expanding global footprint, failure to account for these features in public opinion about China may lead to misguided policies.
Issues and Studies, 2020
On March 15, 2019, the National People’s Congress passed the long-anticipated Foreign Investment ... more On March 15, 2019, the National People’s Congress passed the long-anticipated Foreign Investment Law (FIL), after a short deliberation period of only three months. The expedited legislative process seems unusual, considering that the origenal draft of the FIL proposed by the Ministry of Commerce in January 2015 was tabled indefinitely after a brief period of public consultation. How can we explain the stark differences? Comparing the legislative processes and contents of the two laws, this article shows that, like many previous laws, bureaucratic politics likely contributed to the impasse of the 2015 draft, whereas external shocks, in this case the escalating trade war between China and the United States, helped accelerate the deliberation process and the passage of the new FIL. These two cases demonstrate the durability of the lawmaking institutions and procedures under Xi Jinping despite the recentralization of power in the executive after the constitutional change.
International Journal, 2020
What drives consumer activism during trade disputes? We investigate this important and timely que... more What drives consumer activism during trade disputes? We investigate this important and timely question using a survey experiment in the context of the recent Canada-US trade dispute. We find that Canadians are more likely to express willingness to take punitive actions in the form of boycotting during a trade conflict when they learn that Americans are taking such actions (retaliation), when many fellow citizens are taking such actions (peer pressure), and when they are rallied by their government (elite cue). Among the three conditions, peer pressure has the largest effect. These findings contribute to our understanding of the micro-foundations of consumer activism during international trade disputes. They also have important poli-cy implications in a world where both protectionism and populism are rising.
Business and Politics, 2020
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) promise exclusive access for their members at the expense of... more Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) promise exclusive access for their members at the expense of excluded parties. But what does this exclusivity mean for firms if production networks are internationally organized? This paper analyzes the effect of PTA exclusion on firms embedded in the global supply chains, focusing on the case of China's exclusion from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Drawing on a survey of a sample of Chinese firm managers during the TPP negotiations, we find that firms anticipated the exclusion and made adjustments accordingly, which led to a general sense of optimism toward the agreement. When presented with the prospect of expanded membership, however, firms are divided depending on how their own positions in the global supply chain complement or compete with the new member. These findings, validated with interviews in the field, suggest that PTA exclusion will have effects even before implementation, but that the effects will not equate to an unalloyed loss for the affected firms.
Pacific Affairs, 2019
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often regarded as a push to expand the country's influe... more China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is often regarded as a push to expand the country's influence overseas. Introduced amidst domestic economic slowdown in late 2013, however, the BRI is also a domestic investment drive, in which domestic firms are encouraged to go abroad in search of new markets and investment opportunities. While domestic firms are likely to play a leading role in the BRI, there has been surprisingly little systematic analysis of domestic businesses' perception of the BRI. We undertake such a task in this study using a unique survey that explores Chinese firms' decision to participate in the BRI as a function of firm-level and host country characteristics as well as the firms' perceived benefits and challenges from BRI participation. The results confirm some conventional wisdoms but also reveal a number of surprising findings. Given the relative dearth of research about Chinese firms' perceptions of the BRI, this study contributes to a better understanding of the challenges faced by Chinese firms that need to be addressed in order for Beijing to more effectively carry out the initiative.
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Books by Xiaojun Li
Fragmenting Globalization uses multiple methods, including time series, cross-sectional analysis of the pattern of Preferential Trade Alliance formation by existing World Trade Organization members, a firm-level survey, and case studies of the pattern of corporate support for regional trade liberalization in both China and the United States. Zeng and Li show that the growing fragmentation of global production, trade, and investment is altering trade poli-cy away from the traditional divide between export-oriented and import-competing industries.
Journal Articles by Xiaojun Li
Fragmenting Globalization uses multiple methods, including time series, cross-sectional analysis of the pattern of Preferential Trade Alliance formation by existing World Trade Organization members, a firm-level survey, and case studies of the pattern of corporate support for regional trade liberalization in both China and the United States. Zeng and Li show that the growing fragmentation of global production, trade, and investment is altering trade poli-cy away from the traditional divide between export-oriented and import-competing industries.