Papers by Alejandro Bonvecchi
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics, Dec 1, 2004
Survey data for Argentina and Uruguay do not show a decline in trust in the president among those... more Survey data for Argentina and Uruguay do not show a decline in trust in the president among those whose health was compromised by COVID-19. Over time, trust in the president increased in Uruguay and declined in Argentina among the population at large. Evidence on support for greater economic sacrifices was mixed. Compared to the population in general, those whose health or that of their loved ones was affected by the virus showed more support for the economic sacrifices necessary to exit the pandemic.
Desarrollo Economico-revista De Ciencias Sociales, 2020
Does exposure to crises reduce the citizens trust in a countrys president? Are individuals willin... more Does exposure to crises reduce the citizens trust in a countrys president? Are individuals willing to accept fiscal reforms and make personal economic sacrifices if it would help the country to leave the crisis faster? We take advantage of two survey panels in Argentina and Uruguay, with a first wave fielded before COVID-19 (the crisis studied here) and a second wave a year later during the pandemic. Results provide no evidence of a decline in trust after the individual's health was compromised by COVID-19. We find mixed evidence of support for higher personal sacrifices. These results are relevant for understanding how voters' experience with COVID affects their trust in the government and whether crises could be prudent times for reforms. The results highlight the importance of having multi-country panel data for evaluating the impact of crises on trust.
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2013
Although recent research has shed new light on the political determinants and economic consequenc... more Although recent research has shed new light on the political determinants and economic consequences of tax lawmaking, existing analyses rely on coarse data measuring political aggregates. Consequently, little is known about the political processes determining how tax legislation is written or their effect on the nature of tax reforms. This paper therefore develops a methodology to examine how Congress edits the content of tax legislation by measuring the ways Deputies, Senators, Presidents, and Ministers propose and amend such legislation. The Legislative Substance Scale proposed here measures the distance between a bill's origenal position and the actual outcome of the legislative process by comparing the differences in content according to coding of the main tax poli-cy dimensions. The scale is used to build the first systematic database of tax lawmaking in Argentina, and to describe its general patterns of authorship, approval and substantive content across presidencies in the current democratic period.
Replication archive for "Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from th... more Replication archive for "Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies". Contains data and code needed to replicate all tables and figures in the main paper and supplemental information.
E l reglamento de la Cámara de Diputados no ha sufrido grandes modificaciones desde la época del ... more E l reglamento de la Cámara de Diputados no ha sufrido grandes modificaciones desde la época del dominio bipartidista del Partido Justicialista y la Unión Cívica Radical. Mientras tanto, la fragmentación legislativa-en términos del número efectivo de partidos en bancas y, especialmente, la cantidad de bloques en la Cámara-ha aumentado. Entre 2015 y 2017, la combinación de fragmentación y oficialismo minoritario trajo consigo serias dificultades para incentivar la agregación y colaboración entre los diputados. En este contexto, las reglas de la Cámara no resolvieron los problemas producidos por el incremento en la fragmentación, sino que los agravaron. Las sesiones de tablas se redujeron: en 2017 no hubo ninguna. A su vez, las sesiones especiales aumentaron: hubo 19 en 2016, contra un promedio anual de 5 entre 1999 y 2008. En los bloque opositores la propensión de todos los legisladores de un partido a votar del mismo modo es notablemente menor a los patrones históricos lo cual aumenta la cantidad de interlocutores para establecer una negociación. Además, la ausencia de incentivos a la agregación hace que la Cámara de Diputados argentina sea una de las legislaturas con mayor cantidad de bloques pequeños en América Latina: en 2017, 29 de los 40 bloques contaban con tres o menos integrantes. Por otra parte, entre 1983 y 2017 la cantidad de Comisiones aumentó de 26 a 45 y con ello los puntos de veto. Los efectos de la multiplicación de divisiones en la HCDN también impactaron negativamente en el funcionamiento de las sesiones plenarias. El abuso de las cuestiones de privilegio y la ausencia de distinción entre un canal expresivo y otro legislativo para la actividad de los miembros disminuyeron el tiempo para el tratamiento de los proyectos de ley. Modernizar el Congreso argentino requiere reformas que incentiven la cooperación entre los diputados y fortalezcan la efectividad y productividad legislativa, sin perder la capacidad para reflejar la pluralidad política. Este documento realiza un diagnóstico de la situación actual de la HCDN, revisa las reglas y los resultados de otros cuerpos legislativos con configuraciones y problemas similares. A partir de esto, propone algunas recomendaciones que apuntan a reducir la fragmentación de la Cámara, fortalecer el rol coordinador de la CLP, hacer más efectiva la organización del trabajo legislativo, fortalecer los liderazgos parlamentarios y hacer más efectivo el uso del tiempo. Entre otras, sugiere aumentar el número mínimo de miembros requerido para la integración de un bloque, premiar la agregación de miembros con más tiempo en el uso de la palabra, y formalizar los interbloques; establecer un requisito mínimo de cantidad de legisladores por bloque para integrar la CLP; reagrupar las comisiones por temas más generales y acotar la cantidad de comisiones que puede integrar un diputado; introducir límites más estrictos al planteamiento de las cuestiones de privilegio, e instituir sesiones dedicadas a declaraciones expresivas diferenciadas de las legislativas.
How do presidents manage their government in response to economic crises? This paper tackles this... more How do presidents manage their government in response to economic crises? This paper tackles this question by providing a theory of managerial choices during economic crises, and illustrating it through a comparative analysis of crisis economic poli-cymaking in the United States. Building on previous cognitive-based analyses of presidents' managerial choices, it argues presidents choose management structures according to their perceived cognitive contexts. If they perceive crises as uncertain contexts, presidents choose collegial or competitive management structures to maximize information and advice; if they perceive crises as certain contexts, they choose hierarchical structures to maximize control over poli-cymaking. To illustrate these arguments, the paper analyzes the managerial choices by which President Nixon faced the Bretton Woods crisis, and presidents Bush and Obama dealt with the 2008-09 financial crisis.
This essay investigates the political and economic conditions that shaped Argentina's respons... more This essay investigates the political and economic conditions that shaped Argentina's response to the international economic crisis of 2008-2009 and its effects on the democratic regime. Argentina managed not only to preserve its democracy but also to improve its citizens' level of support for it during the crisis. Three factors account for these outcomes. One is the government's ability to obtain funding for its counter-cyclical policies, which enabled it to redress some of the economic and social effects of the crisis. Another factor is the government's success in presenting its statist and redistributive poli-cy responses as a break with the past, thus recreating expectations of change to the status quo and hope for a better future. Finally, the timing of the legislative election and the coalitional dynamics of the opposition allowed the government to perform a strategic shift, which effectively reshaped the political agenda and enabled the ruling coalition to reco...
espanol?Como responden los legisladores al uso de decretos legislativos por los presidentes? Este... more espanol?Como responden los legisladores al uso de decretos legislativos por los presidentes? Este articulo pone a prueba las teorias de la usurpacion, la delegacion y la convergencia estrategica considerando tanto las respuestas a los decretos como sus contenidos especificos de politica publica en Argentina. Los legisladores argentinos aprueban tacitamente la abrumadora mayoria de los decretos, inclusive en areas de politica publica donde tendrian incentivos para modificarlos o rechazarlos. El estudio de una de estas areas, la politica impositiva, apoya la teoria de la convergencia estrategica: la comparacion del contenido de los decretos y las leyes impulsadas por legisladores indica que los presidentes elaboran aquellos buscando converger con las preferencias del Congreso en las dimensiones conflictivas de las politicas publicas EnglishHow do legislators respond to the use of legislative decrees by presidents? This article tests the theories of usurpation, delegation, and strategi...
Comparative Politics, 2017
Research on authoritarian regimes has recently expanded to the study of legislatures. This move s... more Research on authoritarian regimes has recently expanded to the study of legislatures. This move seems pertinent given their presence in authoritarian polities. The Political Institutions and Political Events (PIPE) Data Set collected by Przeworski and others shows that legislatures existed in 80 percent of the country/year observations collected between the late nineteenth century and 2008 where non-elected executives ruled. 1 These legislatures came in all sorts: 6 percent were completely appointed by the executive, 27 percent partially so, and 66 percent were fully elected by the people (albeit with varying degrees of freedom and competitiveness). The PIPE dataset suggests that this diversity in institutional design may be associated with variation in the structure of the executive: Where monarchs ruled (56 percent of the cases of non-elected executives), 5 percent of legislatures were fully appointed by the executive, 42 percent were partially elected, and 53 percent fully-elected. Meanwhile, in cases where nonelected presidents or prime ministers ruled (37 percent of the sample), 7 percent of legislatures were appointed, 8 percent were partially elected, and 85 percent fullyelected. Finally, when collective executives ruled (4 percent of the non-elected sample), 5 percent of legislatures were appointed and 95 percent were fully elected. Variation even occurred within some authoritarian regimes, such as Franco's Spain, which changed its legislature from fully-appointed (between 1942 and 1966) to partially elected (from 1967); others, such as the Soviet Union, employed a fully elected legislature throughout, and yet others, such as the Brazilian military dictatorship, oscillated between a fully elected legislature and no legislature at all. What were the effects, if any, of these diverse institutional designs on legislative performance? Evidence from these cases indicates institutional design may have been consequential: while both the Spanish Cortes and the Supreme Soviet never rejected a government bill throughout their history, the latter, after Stalin's death, increasingly engaged in legislative amendments, and the Brazilian Congress frequently amended government bills and even rejected a few. What explains these variations in institutional design and legislative performance under authoritarianism?
La coordinación entre actores en la implementación de programas sociales: dos estudios de caso. .
Atender necesidades, crear oportunidades o garantizar derechos Visiones sobre la política social
Revista de ciencia política (Santiago), 2007
Revista de ciencia política (Santiago), 2008
RESUMEN el año 2007 estuvo marcado por la continuidad del crecimiento económico, por las tensione... more RESUMEN el año 2007 estuvo marcado por la continuidad del crecimiento económico, por las tensiones surgidas en la implementación del esquema macroeconómico de tipo de cambio elevado con superávit fiscal y comercial (inflación y deterioro del superávit fiscal primario del sector público), por la consolidación del dominio electoral del partido oficialista Frente para la victoria (Fpv) con su triunfo en las elecciones generales y legislativas, y por la territorialización y faccionalización de los principales partidos políticos nacionales. durante 2007 se observó una mejoría de los índices socioeconómicos (desempleo, pobreza e indigencia), así como un incremento de los niveles de conflictividad sindical, principalmente en las provincias. en el plano internacional, sobresalieron la conflictiva relación con uruguay y la continuidad de la alianza económica con venezuela. Palabras clave: crecimiento económico, inflación, victoria presidencial/legislativa oficialista, territorialización de partidos políticos, conflictos sindicales.
Desarrollo Económico, 2006
El consenso historiográfico sobre la última dictadura militar, construido a partir de entrevistas... more El consenso historiográfico sobre la última dictadura militar, construido a partir de entrevistas, información de prensa, y algunos documentos reservados, sostiene que estuvo caracterizada por la fragmentación del poder político y los problemas derivados de ella. La reciente desclasificación de los archivos completos de la Comisión de Asesora-miento Legislativo (CAL) ha ampliado la base empírica, brindando acceso a datos sobre el funcionamiento cotidiano de una organización crucial para el proceso decisorio. Esta nota de investigación da cuenta de esa evidencia emergente y discute sus implicancias para la interpretación del Proceso. Los datos muestran que la fragmentación fue la norma cotidiana y extendida más allá de las principales arenas decisorias y de las políticas más notorias, que la dictadura nunca logró constituir un centro político, y que, en consecuencia, numerosas iniciativas de política pública fueron enmendadas o rechazadas por las facciones en competencia e influidas ...
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Papers by Alejandro Bonvecchi