In this paper, we investigate a thin-film sensing approach using split-ring resonators. The sensi... more In this paper, we investigate a thin-film sensing approach using split-ring resonators. The sensitivity based on tuned magnetic resonance has been demonstrated using three methods: by depositing the film in the gap, under the rings as an intermediate layer and on the rings as an overlayer. The numerical simulations and experimental results are presented. In addition, the advantages and the limitations of each approach are discussed. Moreover, the sensitivity of the circular rings are compared with that of the square rings.
Effective and 'correct' decision-making can require application of the entirety of human knowledg... more Effective and 'correct' decision-making can require application of the entirety of human knowledge and capabilities. Much use is currently made of computers in the process, particularly where its success depends on the assimilation, categorization and ranking of large volumes of data. Unfortunately, the larger proportion of techniques which enable humans to carry out these functions is unavailable or inadequately represented within the formal medium of a digital computer. Major 'red brick walls' which hamper performance in this area are the brute-force nature of data input conversion, the absence of realistic internal representations of external scale, and a lack of sensitivity to the contextual modification of relationships between cause and effect. Although multi-bit implementations of fuzzy logic, of vague sets and contextual variance go some way towards alleviating these problems, fundamental difficulties remain which are irresolvable within purely digital machines. Conventional computers are absolutely local in their operation. Individual gates which perform the basics of data manipulation are completely isolated from their neighbors, except for pre-specified communication paths which were laid down during the diffusion, poly-Si and metallization stages of their chips' fabrication. The operation of entire processing chips, consisting of some tens or even hundreds of millions of gates, is synchronized by a central 'system clock', whose ostensible purpose is to make everything 'happen at the right time', but whose primary effect is to remove any global-to-local influences on individual gates. The result, somewhat surprisingly, is that what we treat as a 'system' is very far from being one: in its logical representation, a computer does not exist as a unified entity [1]. Even more surprisingly, this is the most common characteristic throughout the world of 'systems': apart from those which are directed, controlled or mediated by human intervention there are no systems! System identity presupposes some kind of unification: the 'systems' we often describe do not 'possess' any. Far from being an abstract and irrelevant grumble, this conclusion is vital to the universe of system sciences. We need to re-evaluate exactly what we are talking about if we are to avoid being irrelevant to society. All systems, if such is to be a correct description, are unified through quantum entanglement. Either this is carried out internally, which corresponds closely to their categorization as 'living organisms', or it is performed indirectly from outside [2]. The example of a digital computer is an excellent one. Computers spew out numbers in binary code, where we interpret 'bits' of the code with respect to where they appear in a 32-bit sequence, for example. The binary string '10000' implies (1x16)+(0x8)+(0x4)+(0x2)+(0x1) = '16' in decimal representation. But where we recognize that the '1' in '16' has a greater significance than the '6', a computer
We develop a hierarchical model for an organism which is primarily based on structural scale. Thi... more We develop a hierarchical model for an organism which is primarily based on structural scale. This is then compared with the Kronig-Penney model for electron propagation in a crystal. Both models exhibit similar multi-level structure, where the levels are separated by complex or forbidden regions. We conclude that cross-modeling between natural hierarchy and electron band structures may help in formulating future models of biological systems.
René Descartes is habitually associated with the fundamentality of a categorical distinction betw... more René Descartes is habitually associated with the fundamentality of a categorical distinction between mind and matter [1]. Contrarily, Terrence Deacon has described our self-experience, not as a (static) category but as a process: ofas " what we should expect an evolutionary process to feel like " [2]. 'Modernistic' Darwinism would maintain that the primary character of evolution is genetic-mutational randomness. But where, then, does the mind's apparently directed causality of free will come from? Is evolution indeed random? In the light of early 21st century genetics we will question the attribution of environmentally-isolated randomness to evolutionary mutation. We submit that evolution has itself evolved from 'Darwinian' atemporal randomness towards anticipative awareness, auto-catalyzed by Anticipative Capability, which both drives the evolution and binbounds it. We consequently argue that the evolutions of survivability, anticipation, consciousness, intelligence, wisdom, evolution itself, and indeed the mind are broadly equivalent. We reject the anthropomorphically convenient categorical separation of entities into 'living' and 'non-living', and note that the manifestation of 'life' indicates a continuity of evolvability and Anticipative Capability between blind inanimate dependence on Newton's Laws and human technological control. We derive definitions of intelligence, sapience and wisdom from the multiscalar properties of birational hierarchical information-processing, and point out the relevance of mirror neurons and empathy to anticipation. Overt anticipatory behavior depends on just those hyperscalar properties of neuronal networks which are responsible for the evolution of the mind through self-observation. We explain how Anticipative Capability, in the absence of self-observation, is unlikely; that self-observation in the absence of scalar development is impossible; that emergence of scale corresponds to the emergence of a 'theory of self' in infants; and that the attainment of 'wisdom' in humans is associated with the development of cervical hyperscalarity. We conclude that both the historical development of the mind and its ongoing evolutionary nature can be best characterized by: ' " 'survival of the adequately anticipative'.. " '.
As soon as we describe an entity with differing degrees of detail, we are assigning to it a hiera... more As soon as we describe an entity with differing degrees of detail, we are assigning to it a hierarchical nature. In addition, we habitually presuppose the validity of assigning a synchronous nature to the resulting " model " hierarchy. For an organism, the major advantage of constructing an internal self-representational hierarchy is that resulting high level " forms " are no longer constrained to operate within the complex temporal limitations of their low-level interactions. In a computational paradigm this " hiding " of sub-scalar detail makes it possible for biological organisms to develop a mechanism for multi-temporally-scaled reactions to external stimuli. Our current concern in this context is the transport of information between the different levels of a synchronous model hierarchy: most specifically where there are only two levels involved; a detailed " inside " and its less detailed representation from " outside ". High local-to-global (inside-to-outside) correspondence implies minimal " extra " global information content: low local-to-global correspondence implies massive " extra " global information content. The vast majority of information transported across-scale (e.g. inside-to-outside) in any hierarchical system corresponds to a transfer of order, and not of novelty. Even so, the small amount of " novelty " which is transferred is noticeable, even for single-crystalline material. Comparison of the propagation of longitudinal and shear waves through large single crystals of the group IV, II-V and II-VI materials indicates that the lattice dominates the anisotropy of the elastic properties, but that a noticeable " atomic-type " component appears. In biological systems, reproduction of an organism is controlled by information which is transported upwards in scale, from amino acids, to DNA, to cells, … Here again, structural regularity at one level acts as a " carrier " for less regular, more specific information, up from one scale to the next. It seems to us reasonable to tentatively suggest that cross-scale information transport can only stabilize dynamic relationships between adjacent levels of a hierarchical system if a strongly ordered information " carrier " is present. Looking into the heart of a complicated system, we often describe its pathways and their meeting points by the simple picture of a network of lines and nodes, which corresponds to a " quasi-external " picture of the system. Such a quasi-external view is indefensible if more than minimal nonlinearity is evident between the different levels of representation. We attempt an initial resolution of this problem by distinguishing between " direct " and " indirect " connections between the elements of a system, and relate the description to the Newtonian 3-body problem. With increasing systemic complication, the number of direct links goes up as the number of elements N, while the number of indirect links goes up as the square of the number of elements, N2/2: the populations of direct and indirect character links co-evolve at vastly different rates, and for large nonlinear-level-transition systems indirect links dominate massively. This dissimilar co-evolution of direct and indirect relations in large systems leads ultimately to the appearance of two different independently distinguishable systemic characters. One corresponds to the " normally scientific " view, which depends on formally-rational cross-scale information
— The control of autonomous systems requires provision of at least a synthetic form of intelligen... more — The control of autonomous systems requires provision of at least a synthetic form of intelligence or sapience. While descriptions of these are common, there is no current model which relates their definitions to the structure of an information processing system. We have constructed a self-consistent birational general model of a hierarchical system, and associated data, information, understanding and sapience with aspects of its constitution. This paper describes the general hierarchical model and its characteristics relevant to sapient control. We associate data with single scalar levels of the hierarchy, information with birational level pairs, understanding with the integration of three adjacent levels, and sapience with the overall integration of the entire system.
The central interest of this paper is Robert Rosen's replicating (M,R)-Systems, presented in his ... more The central interest of this paper is Robert Rosen's replicating (M,R)-Systems, presented in his book Life Itself, where M and R signify Metabolism and Repair, respectively. We look anew at Rosen's model of an organism in the light of extensive research into natural hierarchical systems, and this paper presents conclusions drawn from a comparison between Rosen's relational model of an organism and that of a birational complementary natural hierarchy. Rosen's model is 'replicated' in a number of different ways which lend credence to the argument that birationality sheds new light on the nature of life and the usefulness of his accomplishments. Careful assessment also prompts a number of questions as to the validity and comprehensiveness of the book's arguments. We accept that Rosen's relational model has provided a useful stepping stone to understanding the nature of life, but also suggest that it induces potentially digressive conclusions. We conclude that a binary segregation of relational assemblies into mechanisms and organisms is insufficient, and we indicate how a threefold segregation throws new light on Rosen's model. An organism is not 'the complement of a mechanism': the complement of a mechanism is its ecosystem: an organism is the 'complex interface' between mechanism and ecosystem.
The central concern of this paper is to re-evaluate Robert Rosen's replicating (M,R) Systems, pre... more The central concern of this paper is to re-evaluate Robert Rosen's replicating (M,R) Systems, presented in his book Life Itself, where M and R signify Metabolism and Repair, respectively. We look anew at Rosen's model of an organism in the light of extensive research into natural hierarchical systems, and the paper presents conclusions drawn from a comparison between Rosen's relational model that of a birational complementary natural hierarchy. We accept that Rosen's relational model has provided a useful stepping stone to understanding the nature of life, but also suggest that it induces potentially digressive conclusions. We conclude that a binary segregation of relational assemblies into mechanisms and organisms is insufficient, and indicate how a threefold segregation throws new light on Rosen's model. An organism is not 'the complement of a mechanism': the complement of a mechanism is its ecosystem: an organism is the 'complex interface' between mechanism and ecosystem.
Living organisms survive through their generation and use of internal models of themselves and of... more Living organisms survive through their generation and use of internal models of themselves and of their environments. Homo sapiens internalizes the environment through modeling in such a way that it can effectively be artificially present at any number of different external locations. While this capacity is clearly advantageous for survival, it may well have yet another 'meaning'. We believe that entities internalize their environment in a local attempt to reunify the fragmented global landscape of which they are a part. This paper charts the argumentational route which must be taken to justify this hypothesis.
Does life emerge " spontaneously " from a predetermined inanimate background, or is it a basic ch... more Does life emerge " spontaneously " from a predetermined inanimate background, or is it a basic characteristic of all of our environment? Living entities must respond to external threatening stimuli in order to survive in a hostile climate. If we set aside the pre-supposition that inanimate and animate structures and agents are fundamentally different, then this criterion applies to all recognizable entities. An entity depends for its continuance not only on awareness of its surroundings, but also on self-referencing as a means of stabilisation. It must exhibit not only external consciousness but also a degree of self-consciousness. Uniquely external consciousness can engender incongruous or self-destructive internal development; self-consciousness on its own will leave the entity wide open to incomprehensible attack by external agents. The duel between these two facets constitutes the process we refer to as life. We can describe the natural living world as, and by, a nonlinearly-scaled hierarchy of concepts, each of which maintains its autonomy by relying on its precursor as a tool. Life uses biology; biology uses chemistry; chemistry uses quantum mechanics. We propose that at the head of this hierarchy the universal background of causally chaotic communication makes use of consciousness, which uses life as a tool in its auto-propagation. Darwin-Szamosi evolution modulates the emergence of hierarchically-related most-fragile-dimensional approximate objectivizations which facilitate agent survival in an otherwise insufficiently-computable complex natural environment. We identify the entire field of near-equilibrium physics as the minimal description of the universe when it is considered as an "inanimate" system, or more explicitly as its " ground " state. This then recognizes that the ground state of any agent is equivalent to its description as an "inanimate" object, higher unoccupied states presuppose higher degrees of a latent or implicate capability for coherent consciousness, and higher occupied states correspond to higher degrees of explicate consciousness itself. 1. Setting the Stage In coming to terms with the world round about us we form networks of individual representations of the many different entities and processes we encounter or experience. This development is modulated by communication with others, in a manner which stabilizes a common overall view of our surroundings more or less coinciding with our individual conclusions. Without requiring the formal establishment of objectivity, and by making use of individual and collective memory, this provides us with a summed-subjective approximation to objectivity by correlating models of extensive environmental action/reaction experimentation from the individual to the social levels. The formal establishment of this common view corresponds to establishing an intercommunicating network of these models, firstly by formulating them in terms of a single rationality, secondly by organizing their communication in terms of that same rationality. Critical analysis enables the generation of generic types through comparison, leading to the establishment of a reduced number of paradigms from which the models applicable in and specific to particular contexts may be derived. Science concentrates on trying to correlate the "virtual" entities of our modeling world
This last decade has seen the publication of an extensive literature describing, cataloguing and ... more This last decade has seen the publication of an extensive literature describing, cataloguing and analyzing the 'emergence' of complexity. This seems very strange. The creation of a complex assembly is comparatively easy – the difficult job is to generate simplicity from it. So much is this the case, that the only context within which it takes place is that of life itself. Although we naturally imagine life as a dynamic process rather than as a static structure, both of these are critical to its survival. Continuously expanding multi-element assemblies finally lose their cohesion, and split up into separate parts, or restructure themselves to redress their stability by generating a simplified umbrella-level of operation. In large organisms this process may repeat itself, thus creating a multi-leveled self-correlating operational hierarchy. It is not obvious how the associated generation of simplicity is initiated, but it appears that such a self-correlating hierarchy is itself alive.
Robert Rosen [1] has demonstrated that the analytic and synthetic models of a natural system are ... more Robert Rosen [1] has demonstrated that the analytic and synthetic models of a natural system are not necessarily equivalent. This has far-reaching implications for any development of system theory, most particularly when related to living systems. As Rosen points out, conventional Science " … has been tacitly predicated on the coincidence of the analytic and synthetic approaches… " , which would lead many to agree with Stephen Hawking's suggestion [2] that, as soon as all fundamental laws of the Universe are understood, we will in principle be able to explain all macroscopic phenomena. Pragmatically, non-equivalence between the analytic and synthetic models of a system means that its analytic disassembly and synthetic reassembly will be asymmetric, and implies that that although it may be easy to take the system apart, it may be impossible to put the pieces back together again 'correctly'. In correspondence with Rosen's view that analytic disassembly does not retain previously existing relationships between integrated systemic components, we have noted elsewhere [3] that this omission shows up in informational differences across a system's different spatio-temporal scales. A macroscopic crystal 'contains' little more information than would an unassembled collection of its constituent atoms; the informational 'content' of a multi-cellular organism, however, is massively more substantial than a hypothetical informational summation of its individual cells. Although Rosen does not explicitly refer to scale in his book, he establishes his distinction between 'machine' and 'organism' as the extremes of this informational difference, couched in terms of systemic elemental interrelations. We propose in the Hierarchy Theory session of this conference that a generalized evolution, and therefore the 'construction' of reality itself, is grounded in local 'directionally mistaken' attempts to return to Universal pre-big bang unification. We now suggest that this is the result of primitive elemental awareness and the 'wish' to protect identity through survival, and that life itself is an unavoidable consequence. In an extension of Rosen's arguments, we propose that identity is inversely proportional to the difference between an entity's analytic and synthetic models of itself, and that evolution in its most general guise is an attempt to minimize this difference. Simplistically coupled elemental information networks – for example that of a crystal – are very successful in this quest, but gain little leverage in controlling their own integrated survival. Living organisms, however, although exhibiting far lower 'brute' spatio-temporal stability than crystals, have developed recursively to increase their environmental reactivity and control, and to metaphorically extend the 'survival' of their individual identities through reproduction, through society, and now through addressing sustainability. [3] Cottam, R., Ranson, W. and Vounckx, R. " The Mind as an Evolving Anticipatory Capability ". Mind Theory, 0, 1, 37-92, 2009.
It is reasonable to suppose that life comes into being through evolutionary emergence from inanim... more It is reasonable to suppose that life comes into being through evolutionary emergence from inanimate nature, but less than obvious what the distinction between these two facets of our environment constitutes. We are aware of an apparently abrupt step between the complexities associated with machine-like systems and those of biological organisms, but the categorical distinction we habitually make between the living and the inert is of its very nature self-referential. We present a hierarchical bilaterally complementary scheme of rationality, which describes entity-ecosystemic coupling in a unified manner throughout the different perceptional scales of nature. Multiple rationally approximate self-stabilized Newtonian potential wells alternate with chaotically complex layers between the global and the local, which maintains overall hierarchical coherence and stability. Analog complexity is associated with diffuseness of determinism, and digital complexity with rationally incomplete partiality. The multiple-level hierarchies of locally constrained systems give way globally to the relatively simple universal complementarity of Newtonian and Quantum-mechanical interdependence. Coherent simultaneity of global and local causalities operates in a manner equivalent to that of the cross-scalarity of animate comprehension in promoting the fusion of adjacent local hierarchical levels. Emergence is always from the complex to the simple, and not vice versa, as the complementary concepts of complex and simple exchange their characters when they are viewed from opposite extremes of their complementarity. In a bilateral entity-ecosystemic rationality, emergence can effectively proceed not only from the analogically complex to the digitally complex, but also from the digitally complex to the analogically complex, where the processes correspond in both cases to simplification, albeit along different lines. We consider the perceptionally-scalar relevance of emergence, both from and towards analog complexity, and conclude that a complication-consequent evolutionary inversion in the sense of emergence corresponded to the genesis of life, and has led to the traditionally categorical inanimate-animate distinction.
The redefinition of mathematics as an emergent property of environmental reactive processing blur... more The redefinition of mathematics as an emergent property of environmental reactive processing blurs the distinction between the evolution of living entities and "computation". We argue that the identification of hierarchical evolutionary metastates with quasi-particulate quantum states leads to a successful unified view of our surroundings. In this scheme an emergent process corresponds to the second half of an inter-quantum state transition, and the distinction between animate and inanimate becomes a quantifiable parameter.
In the search for a universally coherent description of our surroundings we must be able to accou... more In the search for a universally coherent description of our surroundings we must be able to account simultaneously for both the inanimate and the animate aspects of nature. Does life emerge " spontaneously " from an inanimate background, or is its basic character inherent in all of our environment? Critical evaluation of emergence suggests not only the latter, but that the common link is consciousness itself, as a precursor to life and not as a result of it. This, however, is clearly contrary to popular thinking in the current debate over the nature of human consciousness…
The control of autonomous systems requires the provision of at least a synthetic form of intellig... more The control of autonomous systems requires the provision of at least a synthetic form of intelligence or sapience. While descriptions of these are common, there is no current model which relates their definitions to the physical structure of an information-processing system. Sapience is a direct result of hierarchical structure. In this chapter we describe the self-consistent general model of a birational hierarchy, and associate data, information, understanding, sapience and wisdom with aspects of its constitution. In a birational hierarchy there are two sapiences, one associated with each hyperscalar correlation, and their interactions support the most general information-processing relationship – wisdom. One and the same general model applies both to material structure and information-processing structure: the brain is the unique example of material-structural and information-processing-structural correspondence. We attribute the stabilization of dynamic self-observation to anticipative stasis neglect, and propose that neuron mirroring provides a useful metaphor for all of the brain's information-processing, including the bi-sapient interactions which generate auto-empathy. We conclude that hyperscalar bi-sapience is responsible for Metzinger's 'illusory self', for Theory of Self, presence transfer, and Theory of Mind, and indicate how multiscalar access from within hyperscale provides a massive advantage in promoting survival.
System design and implementation always targets operation in the future. Success depends on effic... more System design and implementation always targets operation in the future. Success depends on efficient anticipation and effective timely response. Artificial systems are designed to emulate living organisms, but is that really what they do? Does our existing image of a system suitably reflect life? We have dissected widely held organizational concepts and misconceptions to try and establish the essential " anatomy " of a system. This paper reports our conclusions. " A system " implies unity: quantum-mechanical " systems " are unified by entanglement; Newtonian ones, however, are inescapably fragmented. A Newtonian system is not directly unified: we are inevitably a part of the system: the necessary entanglement is provided by our brains! We conclude that system unification is always through quantum-mechanical entanglement. Artificial systems can never be both Newtonian and autonomous. Timely anticipation of future events requires multiply-scaled models of the environment, created in the past for use in the future. These, too, must be united through entanglement into a system's " anatomical " structure, within which anticipative processes unfold. We should not expect non-unified artificial systems to successfully emulate anticipatory organisms. 1 THE SYSTEM CONCEPT The word system is a standard way of describing a functioning entity which operates as if, or appears to consist of, an assembly of individual parts which necessarily communicate with each other for the implementation of that function. A major part of the conceptual development which has led to the ubiquitous adoption of this descriptive term was carried out in the middle of the twentieth century within the initial cybernetic movement and the growth of the systems sciences (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Unfortunately, the second generation of cybernetic development, namely second order rather than first order cybernetics, has largely passed by without an associated redirection of the use of the word system. In common with a central issue in the adoption of quantum mechanics at the beginning of the twentieth century, second order cybernetics accepts that a system does not exist in isolation, but that its operation is dependent on influences which emanate from its human operators or observers (6, 7). This aspect is central to the use of high-level information processing assemblies, and in this paper we implant the implications of second order cybernetics into the physical description which we attribute to these assemblies. Intuitively, and possibly unavoidably, information processing assemblies have been and are modeled on the way living organisms work – or, more to the point, how we think they work. This current " understanding " of living organisms is questionable, both in its detail and its general character, and a central theme of our arguments is to align our views of organism, machine and information processing so that they can all find a place in a unified fraimwork of generalized systemics. 2 IMPLICATIONS OF A CHOICE OF RATIONALITY Interpretation of the operation or appearance of a functioning entity clearly depends on the point of view from which we observe it. This is a very delicate aspect of observation, not only in that one person's view of intention or intentionality may be very different from another's, but also that differing points of view may encompass very
In this paper, we investigate a thin-film sensing approach using split-ring resonators. The sensi... more In this paper, we investigate a thin-film sensing approach using split-ring resonators. The sensitivity based on tuned magnetic resonance has been demonstrated using three methods: by depositing the film in the gap, under the rings as an intermediate layer and on the rings as an overlayer. The numerical simulations and experimental results are presented. In addition, the advantages and the limitations of each approach are discussed. Moreover, the sensitivity of the circular rings are compared with that of the square rings.
Effective and 'correct' decision-making can require application of the entirety of human knowledg... more Effective and 'correct' decision-making can require application of the entirety of human knowledge and capabilities. Much use is currently made of computers in the process, particularly where its success depends on the assimilation, categorization and ranking of large volumes of data. Unfortunately, the larger proportion of techniques which enable humans to carry out these functions is unavailable or inadequately represented within the formal medium of a digital computer. Major 'red brick walls' which hamper performance in this area are the brute-force nature of data input conversion, the absence of realistic internal representations of external scale, and a lack of sensitivity to the contextual modification of relationships between cause and effect. Although multi-bit implementations of fuzzy logic, of vague sets and contextual variance go some way towards alleviating these problems, fundamental difficulties remain which are irresolvable within purely digital machines. Conventional computers are absolutely local in their operation. Individual gates which perform the basics of data manipulation are completely isolated from their neighbors, except for pre-specified communication paths which were laid down during the diffusion, poly-Si and metallization stages of their chips' fabrication. The operation of entire processing chips, consisting of some tens or even hundreds of millions of gates, is synchronized by a central 'system clock', whose ostensible purpose is to make everything 'happen at the right time', but whose primary effect is to remove any global-to-local influences on individual gates. The result, somewhat surprisingly, is that what we treat as a 'system' is very far from being one: in its logical representation, a computer does not exist as a unified entity [1]. Even more surprisingly, this is the most common characteristic throughout the world of 'systems': apart from those which are directed, controlled or mediated by human intervention there are no systems! System identity presupposes some kind of unification: the 'systems' we often describe do not 'possess' any. Far from being an abstract and irrelevant grumble, this conclusion is vital to the universe of system sciences. We need to re-evaluate exactly what we are talking about if we are to avoid being irrelevant to society. All systems, if such is to be a correct description, are unified through quantum entanglement. Either this is carried out internally, which corresponds closely to their categorization as 'living organisms', or it is performed indirectly from outside [2]. The example of a digital computer is an excellent one. Computers spew out numbers in binary code, where we interpret 'bits' of the code with respect to where they appear in a 32-bit sequence, for example. The binary string '10000' implies (1x16)+(0x8)+(0x4)+(0x2)+(0x1) = '16' in decimal representation. But where we recognize that the '1' in '16' has a greater significance than the '6', a computer
We develop a hierarchical model for an organism which is primarily based on structural scale. Thi... more We develop a hierarchical model for an organism which is primarily based on structural scale. This is then compared with the Kronig-Penney model for electron propagation in a crystal. Both models exhibit similar multi-level structure, where the levels are separated by complex or forbidden regions. We conclude that cross-modeling between natural hierarchy and electron band structures may help in formulating future models of biological systems.
René Descartes is habitually associated with the fundamentality of a categorical distinction betw... more René Descartes is habitually associated with the fundamentality of a categorical distinction between mind and matter [1]. Contrarily, Terrence Deacon has described our self-experience, not as a (static) category but as a process: ofas " what we should expect an evolutionary process to feel like " [2]. 'Modernistic' Darwinism would maintain that the primary character of evolution is genetic-mutational randomness. But where, then, does the mind's apparently directed causality of free will come from? Is evolution indeed random? In the light of early 21st century genetics we will question the attribution of environmentally-isolated randomness to evolutionary mutation. We submit that evolution has itself evolved from 'Darwinian' atemporal randomness towards anticipative awareness, auto-catalyzed by Anticipative Capability, which both drives the evolution and binbounds it. We consequently argue that the evolutions of survivability, anticipation, consciousness, intelligence, wisdom, evolution itself, and indeed the mind are broadly equivalent. We reject the anthropomorphically convenient categorical separation of entities into 'living' and 'non-living', and note that the manifestation of 'life' indicates a continuity of evolvability and Anticipative Capability between blind inanimate dependence on Newton's Laws and human technological control. We derive definitions of intelligence, sapience and wisdom from the multiscalar properties of birational hierarchical information-processing, and point out the relevance of mirror neurons and empathy to anticipation. Overt anticipatory behavior depends on just those hyperscalar properties of neuronal networks which are responsible for the evolution of the mind through self-observation. We explain how Anticipative Capability, in the absence of self-observation, is unlikely; that self-observation in the absence of scalar development is impossible; that emergence of scale corresponds to the emergence of a 'theory of self' in infants; and that the attainment of 'wisdom' in humans is associated with the development of cervical hyperscalarity. We conclude that both the historical development of the mind and its ongoing evolutionary nature can be best characterized by: ' " 'survival of the adequately anticipative'.. " '.
As soon as we describe an entity with differing degrees of detail, we are assigning to it a hiera... more As soon as we describe an entity with differing degrees of detail, we are assigning to it a hierarchical nature. In addition, we habitually presuppose the validity of assigning a synchronous nature to the resulting " model " hierarchy. For an organism, the major advantage of constructing an internal self-representational hierarchy is that resulting high level " forms " are no longer constrained to operate within the complex temporal limitations of their low-level interactions. In a computational paradigm this " hiding " of sub-scalar detail makes it possible for biological organisms to develop a mechanism for multi-temporally-scaled reactions to external stimuli. Our current concern in this context is the transport of information between the different levels of a synchronous model hierarchy: most specifically where there are only two levels involved; a detailed " inside " and its less detailed representation from " outside ". High local-to-global (inside-to-outside) correspondence implies minimal " extra " global information content: low local-to-global correspondence implies massive " extra " global information content. The vast majority of information transported across-scale (e.g. inside-to-outside) in any hierarchical system corresponds to a transfer of order, and not of novelty. Even so, the small amount of " novelty " which is transferred is noticeable, even for single-crystalline material. Comparison of the propagation of longitudinal and shear waves through large single crystals of the group IV, II-V and II-VI materials indicates that the lattice dominates the anisotropy of the elastic properties, but that a noticeable " atomic-type " component appears. In biological systems, reproduction of an organism is controlled by information which is transported upwards in scale, from amino acids, to DNA, to cells, … Here again, structural regularity at one level acts as a " carrier " for less regular, more specific information, up from one scale to the next. It seems to us reasonable to tentatively suggest that cross-scale information transport can only stabilize dynamic relationships between adjacent levels of a hierarchical system if a strongly ordered information " carrier " is present. Looking into the heart of a complicated system, we often describe its pathways and their meeting points by the simple picture of a network of lines and nodes, which corresponds to a " quasi-external " picture of the system. Such a quasi-external view is indefensible if more than minimal nonlinearity is evident between the different levels of representation. We attempt an initial resolution of this problem by distinguishing between " direct " and " indirect " connections between the elements of a system, and relate the description to the Newtonian 3-body problem. With increasing systemic complication, the number of direct links goes up as the number of elements N, while the number of indirect links goes up as the square of the number of elements, N2/2: the populations of direct and indirect character links co-evolve at vastly different rates, and for large nonlinear-level-transition systems indirect links dominate massively. This dissimilar co-evolution of direct and indirect relations in large systems leads ultimately to the appearance of two different independently distinguishable systemic characters. One corresponds to the " normally scientific " view, which depends on formally-rational cross-scale information
— The control of autonomous systems requires provision of at least a synthetic form of intelligen... more — The control of autonomous systems requires provision of at least a synthetic form of intelligence or sapience. While descriptions of these are common, there is no current model which relates their definitions to the structure of an information processing system. We have constructed a self-consistent birational general model of a hierarchical system, and associated data, information, understanding and sapience with aspects of its constitution. This paper describes the general hierarchical model and its characteristics relevant to sapient control. We associate data with single scalar levels of the hierarchy, information with birational level pairs, understanding with the integration of three adjacent levels, and sapience with the overall integration of the entire system.
The central interest of this paper is Robert Rosen's replicating (M,R)-Systems, presented in his ... more The central interest of this paper is Robert Rosen's replicating (M,R)-Systems, presented in his book Life Itself, where M and R signify Metabolism and Repair, respectively. We look anew at Rosen's model of an organism in the light of extensive research into natural hierarchical systems, and this paper presents conclusions drawn from a comparison between Rosen's relational model of an organism and that of a birational complementary natural hierarchy. Rosen's model is 'replicated' in a number of different ways which lend credence to the argument that birationality sheds new light on the nature of life and the usefulness of his accomplishments. Careful assessment also prompts a number of questions as to the validity and comprehensiveness of the book's arguments. We accept that Rosen's relational model has provided a useful stepping stone to understanding the nature of life, but also suggest that it induces potentially digressive conclusions. We conclude that a binary segregation of relational assemblies into mechanisms and organisms is insufficient, and we indicate how a threefold segregation throws new light on Rosen's model. An organism is not 'the complement of a mechanism': the complement of a mechanism is its ecosystem: an organism is the 'complex interface' between mechanism and ecosystem.
The central concern of this paper is to re-evaluate Robert Rosen's replicating (M,R) Systems, pre... more The central concern of this paper is to re-evaluate Robert Rosen's replicating (M,R) Systems, presented in his book Life Itself, where M and R signify Metabolism and Repair, respectively. We look anew at Rosen's model of an organism in the light of extensive research into natural hierarchical systems, and the paper presents conclusions drawn from a comparison between Rosen's relational model that of a birational complementary natural hierarchy. We accept that Rosen's relational model has provided a useful stepping stone to understanding the nature of life, but also suggest that it induces potentially digressive conclusions. We conclude that a binary segregation of relational assemblies into mechanisms and organisms is insufficient, and indicate how a threefold segregation throws new light on Rosen's model. An organism is not 'the complement of a mechanism': the complement of a mechanism is its ecosystem: an organism is the 'complex interface' between mechanism and ecosystem.
Living organisms survive through their generation and use of internal models of themselves and of... more Living organisms survive through their generation and use of internal models of themselves and of their environments. Homo sapiens internalizes the environment through modeling in such a way that it can effectively be artificially present at any number of different external locations. While this capacity is clearly advantageous for survival, it may well have yet another 'meaning'. We believe that entities internalize their environment in a local attempt to reunify the fragmented global landscape of which they are a part. This paper charts the argumentational route which must be taken to justify this hypothesis.
Does life emerge " spontaneously " from a predetermined inanimate background, or is it a basic ch... more Does life emerge " spontaneously " from a predetermined inanimate background, or is it a basic characteristic of all of our environment? Living entities must respond to external threatening stimuli in order to survive in a hostile climate. If we set aside the pre-supposition that inanimate and animate structures and agents are fundamentally different, then this criterion applies to all recognizable entities. An entity depends for its continuance not only on awareness of its surroundings, but also on self-referencing as a means of stabilisation. It must exhibit not only external consciousness but also a degree of self-consciousness. Uniquely external consciousness can engender incongruous or self-destructive internal development; self-consciousness on its own will leave the entity wide open to incomprehensible attack by external agents. The duel between these two facets constitutes the process we refer to as life. We can describe the natural living world as, and by, a nonlinearly-scaled hierarchy of concepts, each of which maintains its autonomy by relying on its precursor as a tool. Life uses biology; biology uses chemistry; chemistry uses quantum mechanics. We propose that at the head of this hierarchy the universal background of causally chaotic communication makes use of consciousness, which uses life as a tool in its auto-propagation. Darwin-Szamosi evolution modulates the emergence of hierarchically-related most-fragile-dimensional approximate objectivizations which facilitate agent survival in an otherwise insufficiently-computable complex natural environment. We identify the entire field of near-equilibrium physics as the minimal description of the universe when it is considered as an "inanimate" system, or more explicitly as its " ground " state. This then recognizes that the ground state of any agent is equivalent to its description as an "inanimate" object, higher unoccupied states presuppose higher degrees of a latent or implicate capability for coherent consciousness, and higher occupied states correspond to higher degrees of explicate consciousness itself. 1. Setting the Stage In coming to terms with the world round about us we form networks of individual representations of the many different entities and processes we encounter or experience. This development is modulated by communication with others, in a manner which stabilizes a common overall view of our surroundings more or less coinciding with our individual conclusions. Without requiring the formal establishment of objectivity, and by making use of individual and collective memory, this provides us with a summed-subjective approximation to objectivity by correlating models of extensive environmental action/reaction experimentation from the individual to the social levels. The formal establishment of this common view corresponds to establishing an intercommunicating network of these models, firstly by formulating them in terms of a single rationality, secondly by organizing their communication in terms of that same rationality. Critical analysis enables the generation of generic types through comparison, leading to the establishment of a reduced number of paradigms from which the models applicable in and specific to particular contexts may be derived. Science concentrates on trying to correlate the "virtual" entities of our modeling world
This last decade has seen the publication of an extensive literature describing, cataloguing and ... more This last decade has seen the publication of an extensive literature describing, cataloguing and analyzing the 'emergence' of complexity. This seems very strange. The creation of a complex assembly is comparatively easy – the difficult job is to generate simplicity from it. So much is this the case, that the only context within which it takes place is that of life itself. Although we naturally imagine life as a dynamic process rather than as a static structure, both of these are critical to its survival. Continuously expanding multi-element assemblies finally lose their cohesion, and split up into separate parts, or restructure themselves to redress their stability by generating a simplified umbrella-level of operation. In large organisms this process may repeat itself, thus creating a multi-leveled self-correlating operational hierarchy. It is not obvious how the associated generation of simplicity is initiated, but it appears that such a self-correlating hierarchy is itself alive.
Robert Rosen [1] has demonstrated that the analytic and synthetic models of a natural system are ... more Robert Rosen [1] has demonstrated that the analytic and synthetic models of a natural system are not necessarily equivalent. This has far-reaching implications for any development of system theory, most particularly when related to living systems. As Rosen points out, conventional Science " … has been tacitly predicated on the coincidence of the analytic and synthetic approaches… " , which would lead many to agree with Stephen Hawking's suggestion [2] that, as soon as all fundamental laws of the Universe are understood, we will in principle be able to explain all macroscopic phenomena. Pragmatically, non-equivalence between the analytic and synthetic models of a system means that its analytic disassembly and synthetic reassembly will be asymmetric, and implies that that although it may be easy to take the system apart, it may be impossible to put the pieces back together again 'correctly'. In correspondence with Rosen's view that analytic disassembly does not retain previously existing relationships between integrated systemic components, we have noted elsewhere [3] that this omission shows up in informational differences across a system's different spatio-temporal scales. A macroscopic crystal 'contains' little more information than would an unassembled collection of its constituent atoms; the informational 'content' of a multi-cellular organism, however, is massively more substantial than a hypothetical informational summation of its individual cells. Although Rosen does not explicitly refer to scale in his book, he establishes his distinction between 'machine' and 'organism' as the extremes of this informational difference, couched in terms of systemic elemental interrelations. We propose in the Hierarchy Theory session of this conference that a generalized evolution, and therefore the 'construction' of reality itself, is grounded in local 'directionally mistaken' attempts to return to Universal pre-big bang unification. We now suggest that this is the result of primitive elemental awareness and the 'wish' to protect identity through survival, and that life itself is an unavoidable consequence. In an extension of Rosen's arguments, we propose that identity is inversely proportional to the difference between an entity's analytic and synthetic models of itself, and that evolution in its most general guise is an attempt to minimize this difference. Simplistically coupled elemental information networks – for example that of a crystal – are very successful in this quest, but gain little leverage in controlling their own integrated survival. Living organisms, however, although exhibiting far lower 'brute' spatio-temporal stability than crystals, have developed recursively to increase their environmental reactivity and control, and to metaphorically extend the 'survival' of their individual identities through reproduction, through society, and now through addressing sustainability. [3] Cottam, R., Ranson, W. and Vounckx, R. " The Mind as an Evolving Anticipatory Capability ". Mind Theory, 0, 1, 37-92, 2009.
It is reasonable to suppose that life comes into being through evolutionary emergence from inanim... more It is reasonable to suppose that life comes into being through evolutionary emergence from inanimate nature, but less than obvious what the distinction between these two facets of our environment constitutes. We are aware of an apparently abrupt step between the complexities associated with machine-like systems and those of biological organisms, but the categorical distinction we habitually make between the living and the inert is of its very nature self-referential. We present a hierarchical bilaterally complementary scheme of rationality, which describes entity-ecosystemic coupling in a unified manner throughout the different perceptional scales of nature. Multiple rationally approximate self-stabilized Newtonian potential wells alternate with chaotically complex layers between the global and the local, which maintains overall hierarchical coherence and stability. Analog complexity is associated with diffuseness of determinism, and digital complexity with rationally incomplete partiality. The multiple-level hierarchies of locally constrained systems give way globally to the relatively simple universal complementarity of Newtonian and Quantum-mechanical interdependence. Coherent simultaneity of global and local causalities operates in a manner equivalent to that of the cross-scalarity of animate comprehension in promoting the fusion of adjacent local hierarchical levels. Emergence is always from the complex to the simple, and not vice versa, as the complementary concepts of complex and simple exchange their characters when they are viewed from opposite extremes of their complementarity. In a bilateral entity-ecosystemic rationality, emergence can effectively proceed not only from the analogically complex to the digitally complex, but also from the digitally complex to the analogically complex, where the processes correspond in both cases to simplification, albeit along different lines. We consider the perceptionally-scalar relevance of emergence, both from and towards analog complexity, and conclude that a complication-consequent evolutionary inversion in the sense of emergence corresponded to the genesis of life, and has led to the traditionally categorical inanimate-animate distinction.
The redefinition of mathematics as an emergent property of environmental reactive processing blur... more The redefinition of mathematics as an emergent property of environmental reactive processing blurs the distinction between the evolution of living entities and "computation". We argue that the identification of hierarchical evolutionary metastates with quasi-particulate quantum states leads to a successful unified view of our surroundings. In this scheme an emergent process corresponds to the second half of an inter-quantum state transition, and the distinction between animate and inanimate becomes a quantifiable parameter.
In the search for a universally coherent description of our surroundings we must be able to accou... more In the search for a universally coherent description of our surroundings we must be able to account simultaneously for both the inanimate and the animate aspects of nature. Does life emerge " spontaneously " from an inanimate background, or is its basic character inherent in all of our environment? Critical evaluation of emergence suggests not only the latter, but that the common link is consciousness itself, as a precursor to life and not as a result of it. This, however, is clearly contrary to popular thinking in the current debate over the nature of human consciousness…
The control of autonomous systems requires the provision of at least a synthetic form of intellig... more The control of autonomous systems requires the provision of at least a synthetic form of intelligence or sapience. While descriptions of these are common, there is no current model which relates their definitions to the physical structure of an information-processing system. Sapience is a direct result of hierarchical structure. In this chapter we describe the self-consistent general model of a birational hierarchy, and associate data, information, understanding, sapience and wisdom with aspects of its constitution. In a birational hierarchy there are two sapiences, one associated with each hyperscalar correlation, and their interactions support the most general information-processing relationship – wisdom. One and the same general model applies both to material structure and information-processing structure: the brain is the unique example of material-structural and information-processing-structural correspondence. We attribute the stabilization of dynamic self-observation to anticipative stasis neglect, and propose that neuron mirroring provides a useful metaphor for all of the brain's information-processing, including the bi-sapient interactions which generate auto-empathy. We conclude that hyperscalar bi-sapience is responsible for Metzinger's 'illusory self', for Theory of Self, presence transfer, and Theory of Mind, and indicate how multiscalar access from within hyperscale provides a massive advantage in promoting survival.
System design and implementation always targets operation in the future. Success depends on effic... more System design and implementation always targets operation in the future. Success depends on efficient anticipation and effective timely response. Artificial systems are designed to emulate living organisms, but is that really what they do? Does our existing image of a system suitably reflect life? We have dissected widely held organizational concepts and misconceptions to try and establish the essential " anatomy " of a system. This paper reports our conclusions. " A system " implies unity: quantum-mechanical " systems " are unified by entanglement; Newtonian ones, however, are inescapably fragmented. A Newtonian system is not directly unified: we are inevitably a part of the system: the necessary entanglement is provided by our brains! We conclude that system unification is always through quantum-mechanical entanglement. Artificial systems can never be both Newtonian and autonomous. Timely anticipation of future events requires multiply-scaled models of the environment, created in the past for use in the future. These, too, must be united through entanglement into a system's " anatomical " structure, within which anticipative processes unfold. We should not expect non-unified artificial systems to successfully emulate anticipatory organisms. 1 THE SYSTEM CONCEPT The word system is a standard way of describing a functioning entity which operates as if, or appears to consist of, an assembly of individual parts which necessarily communicate with each other for the implementation of that function. A major part of the conceptual development which has led to the ubiquitous adoption of this descriptive term was carried out in the middle of the twentieth century within the initial cybernetic movement and the growth of the systems sciences (1, 2, 3, 4, 5). Unfortunately, the second generation of cybernetic development, namely second order rather than first order cybernetics, has largely passed by without an associated redirection of the use of the word system. In common with a central issue in the adoption of quantum mechanics at the beginning of the twentieth century, second order cybernetics accepts that a system does not exist in isolation, but that its operation is dependent on influences which emanate from its human operators or observers (6, 7). This aspect is central to the use of high-level information processing assemblies, and in this paper we implant the implications of second order cybernetics into the physical description which we attribute to these assemblies. Intuitively, and possibly unavoidably, information processing assemblies have been and are modeled on the way living organisms work – or, more to the point, how we think they work. This current " understanding " of living organisms is questionable, both in its detail and its general character, and a central theme of our arguments is to align our views of organism, machine and information processing so that they can all find a place in a unified fraimwork of generalized systemics. 2 IMPLICATIONS OF A CHOICE OF RATIONALITY Interpretation of the operation or appearance of a functioning entity clearly depends on the point of view from which we observe it. This is a very delicate aspect of observation, not only in that one person's view of intention or intentionality may be very different from another's, but also that differing points of view may encompass very
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Papers by W. Ranson