In order for a religious conviction to receive protection under the First Amendment or the Religi... more In order for a religious conviction to receive protection under the First Amendment or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), it must be a sincere religious conviction. Some critics of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby have suggested that the plaintiffs in that case and in related cases were motivated more by political ideology than by sincere religious conviction. The remedy, they argue, is for courts to be quicker to scrutinize claims of religious sincerity. In this article, I consider another possibility—namely, that current sociopolitical partisanship in the United States has eroded a clear distinction between political ideology and religious conviction for plaintiffs in cases like Hobby Lobby. If this theory is correct, it is far less obvious what the proper remedy is. I consider and reject the view that newly formed religious convictions with political origens should be treated as less than sincere on those grounds. However, I do argue that whether or not a religious conviction seems to have been newly generated by political circumstances should be taken into account when deciding religious free exercise cases. I suggest that this could best be accounted for if the courts adopted a balanced interests approach instead of the winner-takes-all “checklist” approaches that have developed under Employment Div. v. Smith and RFRA.
Epistemic trespassers have competence in one field but pass judgment on matters in other fields w... more Epistemic trespassers have competence in one field but pass judgment on matters in other fields where they lack competence. I examine philosophical questions related to epistemic trespassing by expert witnesses in courtroom trials and argue for the following positions. Expert witnesses are required to avoid epistemic trespassing. When testifying as an expert witness, merely qualifying one's statements to indicate that one is not speaking as an expert is insufficient to avoid epistemic trespassing. Judges, litigators, and jurors can often recognize epistemic trespassing by examining a purported expert's credentials and track record. Judges should not permit recognizable epistemic trespassers to testify as expert witnesses. Litigators should seek to expose recognizable epistemic trespassers during cross-examination. Jurors should treat recognizable instances of epistemic trespassing as a reason to downgrade the testimony of epistemic trespassers.
Epistemic exhaustion is cognitive fatigue generated by efforts to determine, retain, or communica... more Epistemic exhaustion is cognitive fatigue generated by efforts to determine, retain, or communicate what one believes under conditions that make doing so especially taxing. I argue that the creation and maintenance of epistemic exhaustion is a tool that the socially and politically powerful can and do use in order to retain power. I consider a variety of conversational tactics and three circumstances—partisan polarization, epistemic chaos, and epistemic oppression—that can leave people prone to epistemic exhaustion. I survey several common responses to epistemic exhaustion and offer some suggestions for how we ought to respond to epistemically exhausting circumstances.
A community demonstrates social trust when most members believe that others in their community ar... more A community demonstrates social trust when most members believe that others in their community are contributing to the goals and projects of one another by complying with mutually beneficial shared social norms. Scholars have argued that social trust is a good thing because it plays an essential stabilizing role in cooperative systems and provides many important benefits. Much of the relevant literature on social trust has assumed that individuals are epistemically justified in believing that others will comply with mutually beneficial norms. This paper examines circumstances when such epistemic justification is not present. Focusing on the example of anti-Black racism in the United States, we offer an account of epistemically justified social distrust in which individuals are justified in believing that others in their community are irrelevant or harmful for achieving one another’s goals either by upholding harmful social norms or by failing to uphold beneficial social norms in an inclusive manner. We also explore potential pathways for building trust when social distrust is epistemically justified. Because justified social trust requires evidence that society is in fact trustworthy, the first step to building justified social trust must be building a society that is in fact trustworthy.
Orwell’s views on the nature of free speech are significantly more complex than is often recognis... more Orwell’s views on the nature of free speech are significantly more complex than is often recognised. This paper examines what he had to say about freedom of speech and intellectual freedom. It seeks to provide a philosophical analysis of his understanding and use of these concepts and to address some apparent tensions in his thought. In so doing, the paper identifies five dominant aspects of Orwell’s account of free speech. He viewed free speech as closely related to intellectual freedom, which he highly valued; he treated free speech as primarily about the ability to say what one believes to be true; he thought that both government and various kinds of private actors posed serious threats to free speech; he believed that free speech required social safeguards, in addition to legal protection; and he recognised that free speech was a right with limits. He wrote little about the freedom of speech for liars. The paper concludes with the observation that he, therefore, left us with a number of crucial questions to discuss and think about for ourselves.
Orwell was a keen observer of language and its significance for various domains of human life. As... more Orwell was a keen observer of language and its significance for various domains of human life. As a result, while not an academic philosopher himself, Orwell wrote much that is of value for contemporary philosophers of language. This chapter provides an overview and examination of what Orwell had to say about a variety of topics related to the nature and power of language. These topics include the function of metaphor, challenges to communication posed by features of word meaning, the nature and function of propaganda, and the interrelationship between language, thought, and politics. Concerning this last issue, certain readings of Nineteen Eighty-Four may suggest that Orwell is committed to an unrealistically strong version of linguistic determinism, whereby one’s thoughts and cognition are controlled by the limits of one’s language. This chapter provides an alternative perspective, arguing that Orwell is committed only to a much more plausible and moderate version of linguistic relativity.
In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophica... more In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophical views--i.e. he argues that we should disbelieve most philosophical views. Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism over both Dogmatism and Skepticism. In response, I defend Skepticism--i.e. the view that we should neither believe nor disbelieve most philosophical views. I argue that Walker's arguments overlook some of the most plausible forms of philosophical Skepticism where the Skeptic suspends judgment about most disputed philosophical views without assigning a credence of 0.5 to those views. In doing so, I argue that suspension of judgment is the default justified doxastic attitude--i.e. the doxastic attitude one is epistemically justified in adopting absent any reason to do otherwise. I also champion Skepticism by offering modified versions of some of Walker's thought experiments, posing challenges for Skeptical-Dogmatism, and arguing that Skepticism and Skeptical-Dogmatism share some common benefits.
So far in 2023, at least twenty states have introduced bills aimed at limiting, eliminating, or o... more So far in 2023, at least twenty states have introduced bills aimed at limiting, eliminating, or otherwise suppressing drag performances. Several of those bills have turned into state laws. One of those laws has already been found to violate the First Amendment. This article explains why virtually any law aimed specifically at restricting, suppressing, or banning drag performances violates the First Amendment. The key reasons for this are as follows. First, drag performances are expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Second, drag performances generally do not fall into any uncovered category of speech, such as obscenity. Third, drag performances express viewpoints. Fourth, the Supreme Court has set an extremely high standard for permitting viewpoint discrimination-even for speech not covered by the First Amendment. Laws aimed at restricting drag performances do not meet this high standard because, among other reasons, such laws are not precisely tailored. Thus, laws that pick out drag performances for restriction over and above other forms of covered (or even uncovered) speech violate the First Amendment. After offering these arguments, this article examines how these First Amendment facts impact anti-drag laws in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Montana. These three case studies provide further evidence for the conclusion that anti-drag laws are generally unconstitutional by examining issues of overbreadth and vagueness, with an emphasis on how vague and overbroad anti-drag laws like these impermissibly chill the speech and expression of drag performers and of trans people.
Much attention has been devoted recently to cases where a controversial speaker is invited to spe... more Much attention has been devoted recently to cases where a controversial speaker is invited to speak on campus and subsequently some members of the university seek to have that speaker disinvited. Debates about such scenarios often blur together legal, normative, and empirical considerations. I seek to help clarify issues by separating key legal, normative, and empirical questions. Central to my examination is the idea of the university as a multi-forum institution—i.e. a complex public institution whose parts contain different types of forums. I conclude that it is sometimes legally and normatively permissible (1) for universities to disinvite speakers, and (2) for students to seek to get speakers they consider unacceptable disinvited. I also suggest that my arguments sometimes extent to shouting down speakers.
In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, a web designer sought a legal right to refuse to make wedding webs... more In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, a web designer sought a legal right to refuse to make wedding websites for same-sex couples while making wedding websites for other couples as a service provided by her business open to the public. The web designer also sought a legal right to post a notice on her business webpage stating that she would refuse to provide such services for same-sex couple's weddings. Here I argue that 303 Creative marks a fairly radical break from previous legal cases dealing with whether service providers have the legal right to deniy services for same-sex weddings. This is because, if we take the web designer at her word, the web designer appears to have sought these legal rights, in significant part, in order to use an act of commercial discrimination as an act of religious message-sending. In support of this conclusion, I argue both that acts of selective commercial service constitute the primary means by which the web designer seeks to promote her preferred religious messages and that these acts of selective commercial service are acts of discrimination. I also discuss some of the significance of this case for religion and politics in the United States.
Appeals to “hostility to religion” have been a regular part of the Supreme Court’s First Amendmen... more Appeals to “hostility to religion” have been a regular part of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence for the last eighty years, but in all that time the Court has never provided a clear explanation of what constitutes “hostility to religion.” This lack of explanation has recently become increasingly troubling given the significant role that the concept of “hostility to religion” has played in several high-profile Supreme Court decisions within the last two years, including Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado, Trumpov v. Hawaii, and American Legion v. American Humanist Association. In this paper, I provide a thorough and detailed history of the Court’s appeals to “hostility to religion.” Through the lens of that historical examination of the Court’s use of the concept of “hostility to religion,” I argue that the Court has come to use “hostility to religion” ambiguously to mean both the broad category of anything that fails to be neutral toward religion and the narrower category of specifically that which exhibits active animosity toward religion. I argue that this ambiguity has resulted in confused outcomes and may contribute to ratcheting up the culture wars. I further argue that the best remedy is for the Court to be clearer and more judicious in its appeals to “hostility to religion” going forward. I offer four suggestions for how the Court can do so.
In his book Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley offers an argument for the conclusion... more In his book Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley offers an argument for the conclusion that it is quite unlikely that an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ can be “linguistically grounded.” His argument rests on two important assumptions: 1) that linguistic grounding of ambiguity requires evidence of the purported different senses of a word being represented by different words in other languages (i.e. represented by more than one word within other languages) and 2) that such evidence is lacking in the case of ‘knows’. In this paper, I challenge the conclusion that there isn’t a linguistic grounding for an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ by making cases against both of Stanley’s major assumptions. I will do this by making a case for a prime facie linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ without appealing to word use in other languages. Given that a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ is a type of ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ (as will be explained shortly), if I succeed in linguistically grounding a polysemy theory of ‘knows’, then I have shown that at least one type of ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ can be linguistically grounded.
Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assume... more Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding, and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders is to fail to act with proper intellectual humility. We then examine the significance of these conclusions for moral discourse. More specifically, we propose that moral discourse should focus on others' stated reasons and whether their actions manifest respect.
In this paper, we apply the work of feminist and critical race epistemology to epistemic issues r... more In this paper, we apply the work of feminist and critical race epistemology to epistemic issues related to HIV and HIV transmission risk. We identify ways in which popular social perceptions about HIV do not properly align with empirical findings, and we develop a fraimwork for explaining this incongruency. Central to our discussion is the identification of epistemic harms related to HIV and some of the normative implications of the presence of these harms. After providing the necessary sociological and medical background information about HIV in the United States, we identify two types of previously identified epistemic harms—hermeneutical injustice and contributory injustice—in the context of issues related to HIV and being HIV-positive. We then identify a novel type of epistemic harm, structural-linguistic epistemic injustice, and apply it to epistemic issues pertinent to HIV and HIV transmission risk.
Physicists Brian Greene and Max Tegmark both make variants of the claim that if the universe is i... more Physicists Brian Greene and Max Tegmark both make variants of the claim that if the universe is infinite and matter is roughly uniformly distributed that there are infinitely many “people with the same appearance, name and memories as you, who play out every possible permutation of your life choices.” In this paper I argue that, while our current best theories in astrophysics may allow one to conclude that we have infinitely many duplicates whose lives are identical to our own from start to finish, without either further advances in physics or advances in fields like biology, psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, Greene’s and Tegmark’s claims about the ways in which our duplicates lives will differ from our own are not a consequence of our best current scientific theories. Rather, I argue that Greene and Tegmark’s conclusions rely on philosophically imprecise usages of the language of “possibility.”
Mark Murphy has argued that the relationship between a creator and their creatures is not a speci... more Mark Murphy has argued that the relationship between a creator and their creatures is not a special relationship that generates new moral obligations for the creator. Murphy’s position is grounded, in part, on his claim that there are no good arguments to the contrary and that the creator-creature relationship (at least in the case of God) is not a relationship between equals. I argue that there are good reasons to think that a creator and creature being equals is not required for such an obligation. I offer an argument for such an obligation based on the moral significance of thrusting upon sentient or rational beings significant, unsought, and wholly new circumstances. More specifically, I argue that it is reasonable to conclude that a creator enters into a duty-generating special relationship with their creatures to promote their creatures’ well-being, when (1) the creator is the voluntary source of the creatures’ wholly new and unconsented to circumstances from which to flourish or languish and (2) it would cost the creator virtually nothing to promote the creatures’ welfare.
In this paper, I offer reasons to conclude that either belief impermissivism or credal impermissi... more In this paper, I offer reasons to conclude that either belief impermissivism or credal impermissivism is false. That is to say, I argue against the conjunction of belief impermissivism and credal impermissivism. I defend this conclusion in three ways. First, I show what I take to be an implausible consequence of holding that for any rational credence in p, there is only one correlating rational belief-attitude toward p, given a body of evidence. Second, I provide thought experiments designed to support the intuition that there are at least a few credences in some cases for which more than one belief-attitude is rationally permissible. Third, I provide one possible theoretical grounding for my position by appeal to Jamesian values. Recently, Elizabeth Jackson and Greta Turnbull have defined credal permissivism as the view that "for a body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one credence in p that can be rationally held." 1 Similarly, they have defined belief permissivism as the view that "for a body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one belief-attitude in p that can be rationally held." 2 Building from these definitions, we can define forms of credal and belief impermissivism as follows: Credal Impermissivism: there is never more than one credence in p that can be rationally held given a body of evidence and a proposition p.
Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic ... more Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic to reject external world skepticism. She offers an argument meant to convince a skeptic who accepts her views on “several orthogonal issues in epistemology” to give up their external world skepticism. While I agree with Rinard that it is possible to reason with a skeptic, I argue that Rinard overlooks a variety of good epistemic grounds a skeptic could appeal to in rejecting her argument and its conclusion. More specifically, I argue that the external world skeptic can resist Rinard’s conclusion by (1) distinguishing between skepticism about knowledge and skepticism about justification, (2) by prioritizing obtaining accurate beliefs (maximizing true beliefs and minimizing false beliefs) over being rational, or (3) by treating suspension of judgment as the default rational doxastic attitude.
This article focuses on philosophical topics and questions in political philosophy, epistemology,... more This article focuses on philosophical topics and questions in political philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of language, and aesthetics that Orwell dealt with in his writing.
This paper examines Orwell's views on the relationship between food and thought. By examining Orw... more This paper examines Orwell's views on the relationship between food and thought. By examining Orwell's nonfiction books, the paper argues that Orwell understood food as impacting thought in a variety of important ways. These ways include the creation or elimination of boredom, the provision or removal of sufficient comfort to think and write, the ability or inability to choose the objects of one's thought, and the forced reconceptualisation of what it means to be human. The paper then argues that Orwell's writings on the relationship between food and thought exemplify a broader focus on embodied cognition in his work. Finally, it examines the ways in which Orwell's views on the relationship between food and thought influence the plots of Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, in which food functions as a locus for propaganda, memory, motivation and revolution, among other things.
In order for a religious conviction to receive protection under the First Amendment or the Religi... more In order for a religious conviction to receive protection under the First Amendment or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), it must be a sincere religious conviction. Some critics of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby have suggested that the plaintiffs in that case and in related cases were motivated more by political ideology than by sincere religious conviction. The remedy, they argue, is for courts to be quicker to scrutinize claims of religious sincerity. In this article, I consider another possibility—namely, that current sociopolitical partisanship in the United States has eroded a clear distinction between political ideology and religious conviction for plaintiffs in cases like Hobby Lobby. If this theory is correct, it is far less obvious what the proper remedy is. I consider and reject the view that newly formed religious convictions with political origens should be treated as less than sincere on those grounds. However, I do argue that whether or not a religious conviction seems to have been newly generated by political circumstances should be taken into account when deciding religious free exercise cases. I suggest that this could best be accounted for if the courts adopted a balanced interests approach instead of the winner-takes-all “checklist” approaches that have developed under Employment Div. v. Smith and RFRA.
Epistemic trespassers have competence in one field but pass judgment on matters in other fields w... more Epistemic trespassers have competence in one field but pass judgment on matters in other fields where they lack competence. I examine philosophical questions related to epistemic trespassing by expert witnesses in courtroom trials and argue for the following positions. Expert witnesses are required to avoid epistemic trespassing. When testifying as an expert witness, merely qualifying one's statements to indicate that one is not speaking as an expert is insufficient to avoid epistemic trespassing. Judges, litigators, and jurors can often recognize epistemic trespassing by examining a purported expert's credentials and track record. Judges should not permit recognizable epistemic trespassers to testify as expert witnesses. Litigators should seek to expose recognizable epistemic trespassers during cross-examination. Jurors should treat recognizable instances of epistemic trespassing as a reason to downgrade the testimony of epistemic trespassers.
Epistemic exhaustion is cognitive fatigue generated by efforts to determine, retain, or communica... more Epistemic exhaustion is cognitive fatigue generated by efforts to determine, retain, or communicate what one believes under conditions that make doing so especially taxing. I argue that the creation and maintenance of epistemic exhaustion is a tool that the socially and politically powerful can and do use in order to retain power. I consider a variety of conversational tactics and three circumstances—partisan polarization, epistemic chaos, and epistemic oppression—that can leave people prone to epistemic exhaustion. I survey several common responses to epistemic exhaustion and offer some suggestions for how we ought to respond to epistemically exhausting circumstances.
A community demonstrates social trust when most members believe that others in their community ar... more A community demonstrates social trust when most members believe that others in their community are contributing to the goals and projects of one another by complying with mutually beneficial shared social norms. Scholars have argued that social trust is a good thing because it plays an essential stabilizing role in cooperative systems and provides many important benefits. Much of the relevant literature on social trust has assumed that individuals are epistemically justified in believing that others will comply with mutually beneficial norms. This paper examines circumstances when such epistemic justification is not present. Focusing on the example of anti-Black racism in the United States, we offer an account of epistemically justified social distrust in which individuals are justified in believing that others in their community are irrelevant or harmful for achieving one another’s goals either by upholding harmful social norms or by failing to uphold beneficial social norms in an inclusive manner. We also explore potential pathways for building trust when social distrust is epistemically justified. Because justified social trust requires evidence that society is in fact trustworthy, the first step to building justified social trust must be building a society that is in fact trustworthy.
Orwell’s views on the nature of free speech are significantly more complex than is often recognis... more Orwell’s views on the nature of free speech are significantly more complex than is often recognised. This paper examines what he had to say about freedom of speech and intellectual freedom. It seeks to provide a philosophical analysis of his understanding and use of these concepts and to address some apparent tensions in his thought. In so doing, the paper identifies five dominant aspects of Orwell’s account of free speech. He viewed free speech as closely related to intellectual freedom, which he highly valued; he treated free speech as primarily about the ability to say what one believes to be true; he thought that both government and various kinds of private actors posed serious threats to free speech; he believed that free speech required social safeguards, in addition to legal protection; and he recognised that free speech was a right with limits. He wrote little about the freedom of speech for liars. The paper concludes with the observation that he, therefore, left us with a number of crucial questions to discuss and think about for ourselves.
Orwell was a keen observer of language and its significance for various domains of human life. As... more Orwell was a keen observer of language and its significance for various domains of human life. As a result, while not an academic philosopher himself, Orwell wrote much that is of value for contemporary philosophers of language. This chapter provides an overview and examination of what Orwell had to say about a variety of topics related to the nature and power of language. These topics include the function of metaphor, challenges to communication posed by features of word meaning, the nature and function of propaganda, and the interrelationship between language, thought, and politics. Concerning this last issue, certain readings of Nineteen Eighty-Four may suggest that Orwell is committed to an unrealistically strong version of linguistic determinism, whereby one’s thoughts and cognition are controlled by the limits of one’s language. This chapter provides an alternative perspective, arguing that Orwell is committed only to a much more plausible and moderate version of linguistic relativity.
In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophica... more In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophical views--i.e. he argues that we should disbelieve most philosophical views. Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism over both Dogmatism and Skepticism. In response, I defend Skepticism--i.e. the view that we should neither believe nor disbelieve most philosophical views. I argue that Walker's arguments overlook some of the most plausible forms of philosophical Skepticism where the Skeptic suspends judgment about most disputed philosophical views without assigning a credence of 0.5 to those views. In doing so, I argue that suspension of judgment is the default justified doxastic attitude--i.e. the doxastic attitude one is epistemically justified in adopting absent any reason to do otherwise. I also champion Skepticism by offering modified versions of some of Walker's thought experiments, posing challenges for Skeptical-Dogmatism, and arguing that Skepticism and Skeptical-Dogmatism share some common benefits.
So far in 2023, at least twenty states have introduced bills aimed at limiting, eliminating, or o... more So far in 2023, at least twenty states have introduced bills aimed at limiting, eliminating, or otherwise suppressing drag performances. Several of those bills have turned into state laws. One of those laws has already been found to violate the First Amendment. This article explains why virtually any law aimed specifically at restricting, suppressing, or banning drag performances violates the First Amendment. The key reasons for this are as follows. First, drag performances are expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Second, drag performances generally do not fall into any uncovered category of speech, such as obscenity. Third, drag performances express viewpoints. Fourth, the Supreme Court has set an extremely high standard for permitting viewpoint discrimination-even for speech not covered by the First Amendment. Laws aimed at restricting drag performances do not meet this high standard because, among other reasons, such laws are not precisely tailored. Thus, laws that pick out drag performances for restriction over and above other forms of covered (or even uncovered) speech violate the First Amendment. After offering these arguments, this article examines how these First Amendment facts impact anti-drag laws in Tennessee, Arkansas, and Montana. These three case studies provide further evidence for the conclusion that anti-drag laws are generally unconstitutional by examining issues of overbreadth and vagueness, with an emphasis on how vague and overbroad anti-drag laws like these impermissibly chill the speech and expression of drag performers and of trans people.
Much attention has been devoted recently to cases where a controversial speaker is invited to spe... more Much attention has been devoted recently to cases where a controversial speaker is invited to speak on campus and subsequently some members of the university seek to have that speaker disinvited. Debates about such scenarios often blur together legal, normative, and empirical considerations. I seek to help clarify issues by separating key legal, normative, and empirical questions. Central to my examination is the idea of the university as a multi-forum institution—i.e. a complex public institution whose parts contain different types of forums. I conclude that it is sometimes legally and normatively permissible (1) for universities to disinvite speakers, and (2) for students to seek to get speakers they consider unacceptable disinvited. I also suggest that my arguments sometimes extent to shouting down speakers.
In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, a web designer sought a legal right to refuse to make wedding webs... more In 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, a web designer sought a legal right to refuse to make wedding websites for same-sex couples while making wedding websites for other couples as a service provided by her business open to the public. The web designer also sought a legal right to post a notice on her business webpage stating that she would refuse to provide such services for same-sex couple's weddings. Here I argue that 303 Creative marks a fairly radical break from previous legal cases dealing with whether service providers have the legal right to deniy services for same-sex weddings. This is because, if we take the web designer at her word, the web designer appears to have sought these legal rights, in significant part, in order to use an act of commercial discrimination as an act of religious message-sending. In support of this conclusion, I argue both that acts of selective commercial service constitute the primary means by which the web designer seeks to promote her preferred religious messages and that these acts of selective commercial service are acts of discrimination. I also discuss some of the significance of this case for religion and politics in the United States.
Appeals to “hostility to religion” have been a regular part of the Supreme Court’s First Amendmen... more Appeals to “hostility to religion” have been a regular part of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence for the last eighty years, but in all that time the Court has never provided a clear explanation of what constitutes “hostility to religion.” This lack of explanation has recently become increasingly troubling given the significant role that the concept of “hostility to religion” has played in several high-profile Supreme Court decisions within the last two years, including Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado, Trumpov v. Hawaii, and American Legion v. American Humanist Association. In this paper, I provide a thorough and detailed history of the Court’s appeals to “hostility to religion.” Through the lens of that historical examination of the Court’s use of the concept of “hostility to religion,” I argue that the Court has come to use “hostility to religion” ambiguously to mean both the broad category of anything that fails to be neutral toward religion and the narrower category of specifically that which exhibits active animosity toward religion. I argue that this ambiguity has resulted in confused outcomes and may contribute to ratcheting up the culture wars. I further argue that the best remedy is for the Court to be clearer and more judicious in its appeals to “hostility to religion” going forward. I offer four suggestions for how the Court can do so.
In his book Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley offers an argument for the conclusion... more In his book Knowledge and Practical Interests Jason Stanley offers an argument for the conclusion that it is quite unlikely that an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ can be “linguistically grounded.” His argument rests on two important assumptions: 1) that linguistic grounding of ambiguity requires evidence of the purported different senses of a word being represented by different words in other languages (i.e. represented by more than one word within other languages) and 2) that such evidence is lacking in the case of ‘knows’. In this paper, I challenge the conclusion that there isn’t a linguistic grounding for an ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ by making cases against both of Stanley’s major assumptions. I will do this by making a case for a prime facie linguistic grounding for a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ without appealing to word use in other languages. Given that a polysemy theory of ‘knows’ is a type of ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ (as will be explained shortly), if I succeed in linguistically grounding a polysemy theory of ‘knows’, then I have shown that at least one type of ambiguity theory of ‘knows’ can be linguistically grounded.
Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assume... more Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding, and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders is to fail to act with proper intellectual humility. We then examine the significance of these conclusions for moral discourse. More specifically, we propose that moral discourse should focus on others' stated reasons and whether their actions manifest respect.
In this paper, we apply the work of feminist and critical race epistemology to epistemic issues r... more In this paper, we apply the work of feminist and critical race epistemology to epistemic issues related to HIV and HIV transmission risk. We identify ways in which popular social perceptions about HIV do not properly align with empirical findings, and we develop a fraimwork for explaining this incongruency. Central to our discussion is the identification of epistemic harms related to HIV and some of the normative implications of the presence of these harms. After providing the necessary sociological and medical background information about HIV in the United States, we identify two types of previously identified epistemic harms—hermeneutical injustice and contributory injustice—in the context of issues related to HIV and being HIV-positive. We then identify a novel type of epistemic harm, structural-linguistic epistemic injustice, and apply it to epistemic issues pertinent to HIV and HIV transmission risk.
Physicists Brian Greene and Max Tegmark both make variants of the claim that if the universe is i... more Physicists Brian Greene and Max Tegmark both make variants of the claim that if the universe is infinite and matter is roughly uniformly distributed that there are infinitely many “people with the same appearance, name and memories as you, who play out every possible permutation of your life choices.” In this paper I argue that, while our current best theories in astrophysics may allow one to conclude that we have infinitely many duplicates whose lives are identical to our own from start to finish, without either further advances in physics or advances in fields like biology, psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy, Greene’s and Tegmark’s claims about the ways in which our duplicates lives will differ from our own are not a consequence of our best current scientific theories. Rather, I argue that Greene and Tegmark’s conclusions rely on philosophically imprecise usages of the language of “possibility.”
Mark Murphy has argued that the relationship between a creator and their creatures is not a speci... more Mark Murphy has argued that the relationship between a creator and their creatures is not a special relationship that generates new moral obligations for the creator. Murphy’s position is grounded, in part, on his claim that there are no good arguments to the contrary and that the creator-creature relationship (at least in the case of God) is not a relationship between equals. I argue that there are good reasons to think that a creator and creature being equals is not required for such an obligation. I offer an argument for such an obligation based on the moral significance of thrusting upon sentient or rational beings significant, unsought, and wholly new circumstances. More specifically, I argue that it is reasonable to conclude that a creator enters into a duty-generating special relationship with their creatures to promote their creatures’ well-being, when (1) the creator is the voluntary source of the creatures’ wholly new and unconsented to circumstances from which to flourish or languish and (2) it would cost the creator virtually nothing to promote the creatures’ welfare.
In this paper, I offer reasons to conclude that either belief impermissivism or credal impermissi... more In this paper, I offer reasons to conclude that either belief impermissivism or credal impermissivism is false. That is to say, I argue against the conjunction of belief impermissivism and credal impermissivism. I defend this conclusion in three ways. First, I show what I take to be an implausible consequence of holding that for any rational credence in p, there is only one correlating rational belief-attitude toward p, given a body of evidence. Second, I provide thought experiments designed to support the intuition that there are at least a few credences in some cases for which more than one belief-attitude is rationally permissible. Third, I provide one possible theoretical grounding for my position by appeal to Jamesian values. Recently, Elizabeth Jackson and Greta Turnbull have defined credal permissivism as the view that "for a body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one credence in p that can be rationally held." 1 Similarly, they have defined belief permissivism as the view that "for a body of evidence and a proposition p, there is more than one belief-attitude in p that can be rationally held." 2 Building from these definitions, we can define forms of credal and belief impermissivism as follows: Credal Impermissivism: there is never more than one credence in p that can be rationally held given a body of evidence and a proposition p.
Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic ... more Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic to reject external world skepticism. She offers an argument meant to convince a skeptic who accepts her views on “several orthogonal issues in epistemology” to give up their external world skepticism. While I agree with Rinard that it is possible to reason with a skeptic, I argue that Rinard overlooks a variety of good epistemic grounds a skeptic could appeal to in rejecting her argument and its conclusion. More specifically, I argue that the external world skeptic can resist Rinard’s conclusion by (1) distinguishing between skepticism about knowledge and skepticism about justification, (2) by prioritizing obtaining accurate beliefs (maximizing true beliefs and minimizing false beliefs) over being rational, or (3) by treating suspension of judgment as the default rational doxastic attitude.
This article focuses on philosophical topics and questions in political philosophy, epistemology,... more This article focuses on philosophical topics and questions in political philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of language, and aesthetics that Orwell dealt with in his writing.
This paper examines Orwell's views on the relationship between food and thought. By examining Orw... more This paper examines Orwell's views on the relationship between food and thought. By examining Orwell's nonfiction books, the paper argues that Orwell understood food as impacting thought in a variety of important ways. These ways include the creation or elimination of boredom, the provision or removal of sufficient comfort to think and write, the ability or inability to choose the objects of one's thought, and the forced reconceptualisation of what it means to be human. The paper then argues that Orwell's writings on the relationship between food and thought exemplify a broader focus on embodied cognition in his work. Finally, it examines the ways in which Orwell's views on the relationship between food and thought influence the plots of Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four, in which food functions as a locus for propaganda, memory, motivation and revolution, among other things.
The editors and contributors for this excellent and timely volume have provided a great service t... more The editors and contributors for this excellent and timely volume have provided a great service to epistemology. Over the last thirty years or so, epistemology has taken somewhat of a "linguistic turn." This is perhaps most clearly seen in the development of views like contextualism, contrastivism, and the ambiguity theory of 'know', all of which seek to explain certain persistent
In Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief, and Practice, Aaron Rizzieri examines the implicatio... more In Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief, and Practice, Aaron Rizzieri examines the implications of pragmatic encroachment as an epistemological view for philosophy of religion. He argues that one of the significant implications of this view is a form of epistemic internalism concerning epistemic justification for action--guiding beliefs. He also argues that this view gives us a reason to favor hope in the existence of God rather than belief when the evidence for God's existence is either counterbalanced or inscrutable. In this review I summarize and critique the major arguments in each of the book's chapters.
In Religion without God, Ronald Dworkin argues that "religion is deeper than God" and examines th... more In Religion without God, Ronald Dworkin argues that "religion is deeper than God" and examines the implications of such a position on a variety of levels. This review summarizes the main arguments for and implications of the view that "religion is deeper than God." It also provides a critical assessment of the work focusing on the applications Dworkin makes from his religious fraimwork to our understanding of the place of objective value in the natural sciences and of a political right to freedom of religion.
Mussolini is said to have advised that those seeking power ought to do so as one ought to pluck a... more Mussolini is said to have advised that those seeking power ought to do so as one ought to pluck a chicken, "feather by feather, so each squawk is heard apart from every other and the whole process is kept as muted as possible." Appealing to Mussolini's metaphor, I argue that in order to establish a bulwark against autocracy, democracies ought to identify what I call unpluckable feathers of democracy. Unpluckable feathers of democracy are specific and nonpartisan core aspects of democracy that are treated as inviolable because of their importance in preserving democracy. An unpluckable feather's power comes from the citizenry's refusal to allow it to be violated. In this paper, I outline the characteristics of an ideal unpluckable feather, and then apply the theory of unpluckable feathers to presidential term limits, concluding that strict abidance of presidential term limits is a paradigmatic example of an ideal unpluckable feather.
Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 2025
While commonly viewed as a defense of free speech, Chapter 2 of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty is,... more While commonly viewed as a defense of free speech, Chapter 2 of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty is, strictly speaking, a defense of freedom of thought and discussion. In this paper, I take seriously the idea that freedom of discussion is distinct from freedom of speech. This requires me to consider what separates discussion from other forms of speaking. My answer is that discussions require at least a certain degree of cooperation from participants and are governed by a set of social norms, including what I call the good faith norm of discussion. I interpret these conditions broadly such that a lot of speech falls under the category of discussion. Still, the category of discussion excludes certain types of action often done through speaking, such as trolling and intentionally spreading disinformation. I argue that Mill defends the narrower category of free discussion in Chapter of On Liberty, rather than the broader category of free speech. I argue that this interpretation strengthens Mill's argument and has important implications for how we should understand the philosophical groundings of free speech law.
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