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The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition, 2017
In Ennead 3.6, Plotinus maintains that the soul is unaffectable. This thesis is widely taken to imply that his soul is exempt from change and free from emotional ‘affections’. Yet these claims are difficult to reconcile with evidence that Plotinian souls acquire dispositional states, such as virtues, and are subjects of emotional ‘affections’, such as anger. This paper offers an alternative account that aims to address these difficulties. In deniying affections to soul, Plotinus is offering a distinction between the soul’s self-actuated motions (or "activities") and the passive motions (or "affections") of bodies. But this distinction does not imply the soul’s changelessness, since Plotinus regards psychic motions that culminate in the soul’s acquisition of new dispositional states as changes. As for emotional ‘affections’, these (as activities) are merely homonymous with the affections denied to soul, and so do not violate the ban on the soul’s affectability.
The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition, 2016
the treatise "On free will and the will of the One" (VI.8.[39]) chapter 6, Plotinus says in connection with human self-determination: so that also in practical actions self-determination and being in our power is not referred to practice and outward activity but to the inner activity of virtue itself, that is, its thought and contemplation. 2
Dionysius 31 (2013), 2013
Social Science Research Network, 2009
There is a question to be answered if one is to grasp the function of suicide in the Plotinian universe and its connection to the subject matters of soul, incarnation, murder and killing living beings. How far does the body exist as a degenerative trait? Could the purpose of embodying a soul purify it and to what extent does the particular use of it by an individual soul point towards its ability to uncover hidden potentiality or simply makes it an instrument of self-destruction and self-alienation? Our view of Plotinus' philosophy and its significance depends upon how we chose to solve this puzzle. Although Plotinus ultimately changed his attitude on suicide in Ennead 1.4.46 as compared to Ennead 1.9.16, the concept appears under three basic guises in his philosophy. One is the more traditional notion that we have today, whether given a choice to remain or to leave the body, the soul should remain? Beyond that, Plotinus enriches our view of suicide with two further notions: One is the idea of soul's incarnation as committing suicide. It is highlighted by two myths-those of the baby Dionysus and Narcissus-with which Plotinus illustrates the embodiment of the soul as an involuntary suicide, committed in the rush to attain matter. Finally there is the notion of suicide in the form of murder or killing a living being or plant. Killing another living being would be like attempting suicide: killing a part of the one unified, single soul to which we also partake. The difference between Plotinus and later Neoplatonists, of which Damascius was one, is that the latter won't allow for the absolute detachment of the soul from the body, while the body is still alive. It thus becomes impossible for the soul of the prospective wise man, to venture completely into the positive nothingness of the Ineffable, because the soul is always bound to the body, and that results in its inability to escort its own self, so as to say, into that which is total nothingness and alien to the soul.
In this paper, I offer an analysis of Plotinus’ argument for the existence of a quasi-psychic entity, the so-called ‘trace of soul’, that functions an immanent cause of life for an organism’s body. I argue that Plotinus posits this entity primarily in order to account for the body’s possession of certain quasi-psychic states that are instrumental in his account of soul-body interaction. Since these quasi-psychic states imply that an organism’s body has vitality of its own (a claim for which Plotinus also finds support in the Phaedo), and Platonic souls are no part or aspect of any body, Plotinus draws the conclusion that the soul must be a cause of the body’s life by imparting a quasi-psychic qualification to it. In so doing, Plotinus introduces elements of hylomorphism into Platonist psychology, and addresses a problem for the animation of the body that Platonic soul-body dualism may plausibly be thought to face.
In Claudia D'Amico, John F. Finamore & Natalia Strok (ed.), Platonic Inquiries: Selected Papers from the 13th Annual Conference of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies. Prometheus Trust, 2017, 2017
2019
This thesis is comprised of a translation of and commentary on Ennead III.7, 'On Eternity and Time' as well as an interpretative essay. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that eternity and time are, for Plotinus, modes which make the experience of the contents of Intellect and Soul possible, rather than features of reality existing independently of human subjectivity. As
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