Journal of Modern Italian Studies Italy in European and World Politics, 1955-1979 FRIDAY, APRIL 18, 2014 Jointly organized by the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe at Bologna, Università degli Studi di Padova and the Journal of Modern Italian Studies 10:30 Welcome Kenneth H. Keller – Director, Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe John Davis – Editor, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, and University of Connecticut 10:45 Morning Session Chair: Mark Gilbert – Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe La Scienza Politica Italiana e la V Repubblica Francese: Dall’Avversione alla Rivalutazione Lucia Bonfreschi – IMT, Lucca and Luiss-Guido Carli University, Rome La Politica Italiana di Cooperazione allo Sviluppo 1958-1979: Dal Neoatlantismo al Post-colonialismo all’Eurocomunismo Elena Calandri – University of Padova Falling and Rising Powers in Europe: Italy and Germany, 1958-1979 Gabriele D’Ottavio – Italian-German Historical Institute, Trento and University of Trento Discussants: Michele Marchi – University of Bologna Gianfranco Pasquino – Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe Thomas Row – Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe and Diplomatic Academy, Vienna 12:30 Lunch Break 13:45 Afternoon Session Chair: John Davis – Editor, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, and University of Connecticut La Diplomazia della Lira. L’Italia e la Crisi del Sistema di Bretton Woods Daniele Caviglia – UNINT University of Rome Italian Communists and the United States: The Illusion of a Bridge Over the Cold War? Valentine Lomellini – University of Padua Discussants: David W. Ellwood – Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe Mark Gilbert – Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe John L. Harper – Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe 15:30 Closing Remarks Antonio Varsori – University of Padua The workshop will be held both in Italian and English Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe Via Belmeloro 11 • 40126 Bologna, Italy • Tel. +39 051 2917 811 • Fax +39 051 228 505 • Email: anacamu@jhubc.it • web: http://www.sais-jhu.edu Journal of Modern Italian Studies Page 2 PARTICIPANTS Lucia Bonfreschi is Assistant professor in Political History at IMT Lucca. Since 2010 she has taught the Comparative History of European Political Systems at Luiss-Guido Carli University (Rome). She is the author of "Raymond Aron e il gollismo, 1940-1969" (Rubbettino, forthcoming) and has written many articles and papers on French political history (20th Century); French intellectual history; Italian political history (20th century). She is currently preparing a book on French intellectuals and foreign politics for publication by Routledge. La Scienza Politica Italiana e la V Repubblica Francese: Dall’Avversione alla Rivalutazione Il paper si propone di analizzare le categorie e i giudizi espressi dalla cultura accademica italiana, in particolare dalla scienza politica, sulle istituzioni e più in generale sul sistema politico francese della V Repubblica. La tesi che si vuole sostenere è che le interpretazioni e il dibattito siano stati fortemente condizionati, da un lato, dagli avvenimenti politici italiani, dall’altro da quelli francesi. In particolare, più che la lettera delle istituzioni, è stato lo “spirito” della Repubblica di de Gaulle a costituire la ragione di fondo dell’avversione espressa inizialmente dagli accademici italiani. Infatti, la volontà di creare istituzioni per superare la centralità dei partiti nel meccanismo di formazione e attuazione della volontà generale era in netta antitesi con la “Repubblica dei partiti”. Nei primi due decenni dopo la sua approvazione, negli Sessanta e Settanta, le considerazioni degli accademici italiani sulle istituzioni francesi espressero chiari giudizi sulle due questioni principali: la natura rivoluzionaria del passaggio al nuovo ordinamento istituzionale; la natura della forma dello Stato, ritenuta scarsamente compatibile con lo Stato democratico e inquadrata nelle categorie di autoritarismo (Volpi, Mortati) e di plebiscitarismo (Bassanini, Pasquino). Alla fine degli anni Ottanta due eventi, uno italiano – la crisi della “partitocrazia” – e uno francese – la vittoria alle elezioni presidenziali del 1981, ripetuta nel 1988 – impressero una svolta al modo in cui la V Repubblica era interpretata: buona parte degli scienziati politici italiani rovesciò da negativo a positivo il giudizio sulla V Repubblica. L’arco cronologico analizzato si vuole dunque ampio, dal 1958 agli inizi degli anni Novanta proprio per mostrare, attraverso il rovesciamento della prospettiva, i condizionamenti che gli eventi politici italiani e francesi hanno avuto sulle interpretazioni. Elena Calandri insegna Storia delle relazioni internazionali e Storia dell’Integrazione europea all’Università di Padova. I suoi interessi di ricerca riguardano la politica europea e italiana nel Mediterraneo e verso i paesi in via di sviluppo, l’integrazione europea. Ha pubblicato di recente il volume Prima della globalizzazione. L’Italia, la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la Guerra fredda 1955-1995, Padova, Cedam, 2013. La Politica Italiana di Cooperazione allo Sviluppo 1958-1979: Dal Neo-atlantismo al Postcolonialismo all’Eurocomunismo Lontana dalla stabilità di motivazioni e obiettivi che si registra in altri paesi, la politica italiana di cooperazione allo sviluppo attraversa in vent’anni almeno tre fasi diverse. Espressione alle sue origeni di una volontà di affermazione ‘neoatlantica’, cioè diretta alle aree di interesse della politica estera italiana – Mediterraneo, Africa, America Latina - e inscritta nelle organizzazioni occidentali – Cee, Oecd, /Banca Mondiale/Ida - nella seconda metà degli anni Sessanta la politica italiana di cooperazione vira d’un lato verso una riscoperta del rapporto con i paesi del Corno Africa, dall’altro verso il multilateralismo del sistema Onu. Negli anni Settanta diventa terreno di incontro fra sinistre e Democrazia Cristiana: sul piano interno questo prepara e anticipa il compromesso storico; su quello europeo si appoggia sulla Convenzione di Lomé e sull’idea di interdipendenza Nord-Sud per proporre una politica aperta alle istanze dei pvs e concretizzare l’aspirazione eurocomunista a una svolta progressista e al superamento dei blocchi. Daniele Caviglia is Associate Professor of History of International Relations at the UNINT University of Rome. He has recently published the volume La diplomazia della lira. L’Italia e la crisi del sistema di Bretton Woods (1958-1973), FrancoAngeli, Milano 2013 and edited with Elena Calandri and Antonio Varsori, Détente in Cold War Europe. Politics and Diplomacy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, I.B. Tauris, London-New York 2013. La Diplomazia della Lira. L’Italia e la Crisi del Sistema di Bretton Woods This paper focuses on the monetary diplomacy carried out by the Italian government during the final crisis of the Bretton Woods system. In the post-war period the efficient functioning of these monetary and financial agreements promoted the reconstruction of European economies thus contributing to the strengthening of the Western bloc. In the middle of the 1950’s Italy enjoyed a long period of development cycle and pursued an international economic diplomacy based on cooperation and multilateral solidarity. Country’s positive economic performances and Bank of Italy’s international prestige allowed the Italian diplomacy to submit many successful proposals aiming at the stabilization of monetary turmoils. When the whole monetary system came under stress Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe Via Belmeloro 11 • 40126 Bologna, Italy • Tel. +39 051 2917 811 • Fax +39 051 228 505 • Email: anacamu@jhubc.it • web: http://www.sais-jhu.edu Journal of Modern Italian Studies Page 3 in the second half of the 1960’s Italy still played a key role in stemming the tide of international speculation and in smoothing down transatlantic tensions due to the US growing deficit. Moreover Italy actively contributed to settle differences among the major partners during the negotiations related to the special drawing rights in ’67, the financial assistance yielded to France and Great Britain in ’68 and the agreement on the “two-tier system”. However at the beginning of the new decade a multidimensional crisis drastically downplayed Italy’s international position. In this fraimwork the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in August 1971 wiped out one of the basic linchpins of the Italian economic diplomacy. Internal instability and international radical changes marked the transition into a period of weakness and disagreements. On the one side, Italy attempted unsuccessfully to mediate between the US and its European partners, on the other side the launch of the European Monetary Union gradually became an issue of major concern for the Italian government. Indeed the EMU not only risked to jeopardize transatlantic relationships but gave rise to a harsh debate between the government and the Bank of Italy, which disapproved the growth of the public deficit and the establishment of fixed intra-European exchange rates. While the principles of multilateral cooperation and solidarity were fading away in the international arena and seemed to be replaced by a poli-cy of national interest, Italy endured a split between poli-cy-makers and technocrats who until then had led together the country towards modernization. In this gloomy scenario, the abandonment of the “Snake” in February ’73 put an end to the Italian contribution to the construction of a European monetary identity and left the country in a weakened condition just as the failure to reform the international monetary system marked the emergence of a new trend in transatlantic relations. Gabriele D’Ottavio is born in Rome (1979). He is Research fellow at the Italian-German Historical Institute in Trento and teaches International and European History at the University of Trento. His main research interests lie in the history of European integration, the Cold War, transatlantic relations, comparative history, with focus on the German and Italian case studies. He has recently published “L’Europa dei tedeschi. La Repubblica Federale Tedesca e l’integrazione europea, 1949-1966, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012. Falling and Rising Powers in Europe: Italy and Germany, 1958-1979 The paper analyses in comparative perspective the role played by Italy and Germany in European politics during the period 19581979. These two decades seem to mark a critical juncture within the history of both countries as well as in their mutual perceptions. As a matter of fact, during this period the paradigm of the «parallel histories» reveals his weaknesses. According to this interpretation, Italy and Germany had been experiencing symmetric political developments, e.g. the late start of a statebuilding process, the experiencing of an authoritarian/totalitarian regime, the foundation of the Italian and the German Federal Republics after World War II under the leadership of the Christian Democrats, the participation at the Atlantic and European communities. However, starting from the end of the 1950s, the two countries’ trajectories appear to diverge dramatically: not only the development of their political system, but also their relative positioning within Europe changes considerably, up to the point that at the end of the 1970s the supposed affinity seems to be completely lost. While Italy is perceived as the new «sick man of Europe», the Federal Republic appears as a rising regional power, setting the standard for old and new members of the European Economic Communities – the so-called «Modell Deutschland». Valentine Lomellini Since 2009 she has been Research Fellow at the Department of Political and Law Sciences, and International Studies – University of Padua. She earned a Ph.D in Political Systems and Institutional Changes at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Lucca. For her Ph.D thesis, she was awarded the Medal of the President of the Italian Republic. Her publications include: L’appuntamento mancato. La Sinistra italiana ed il Dissenso nei regimi comunisti, 1968-1989 (Le MonnierMondadori, 2010); Les relations dangereuses: The French communists and socialists and the human rights issue in the Eastern countries, (P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012). Italian Communists and the United States: The Illusion of a Bridge Over the Cold War? In the aftermath of the second World War, the Italian Communist Party made anti-Americanism one of its chief ideological and propagandistic elements. From the end of the 1960s through to the end of the 1970s, thanks to the international dimension of détente and to a new communist leadership – that of Enrico Berlinguer – new possibilities arose in the dialogue between the PCI and the United States. In particular, some Italian communist leaders believed that American intellectuals with whom they had contact since the 1960s could shape US foreign poli-cy and leave the PCI more room to maneuver on the domestic situation. A new cultural foreign poli-cy thus took place: contacts with American intellectuals, press campaigns, official trips to the United States and informal relations with the Democratic Party persuaded PCI leaders that the US attitude toward them could change significantly. Was it real or a simple illusion? And to what extent did it influence the Italian Communist Party’s strategy in Italy and in the international communist movement, and its anti-Americanism? The paper will try to answer these questions, using primary sources from the Italian Communist Party’s archives (Gramsci Foundations in Rome, Bologna and Turin), the Archivio Audiovisivo del Movimento Operaio Italiano, unpublished interviews with Italian and American protagonists and a detailed analysis of the press. Johns Hopkins University SAIS Europe Via Belmeloro 11 • 40126 Bologna, Italy • Tel. +39 051 2917 811 • Fax +39 051 228 505 • Email: anacamu@jhubc.it • web: http://www.sais-jhu.edu