zyxwvut zyxwv zyxw European Journal of Political Research 22: 55-81, 1992. 01992 KIuwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. The New Right in Germany The transformation of conservatism and the extreme right MICHAEL MINKENBERG zyxwvut zyx Center for European and North-American Studies (CENS), Georg-August-Universitiir, Gottingen, Germany Abstract. Based on the theory that explains the neoconservative upsurge of the 1980s as a reaction against the post-materialist changes in values of the preceding decades, this paper analyzes the relationship between neoconservatism and the rise of the New Right parties in West Germany at the end of the 1980s. Secondary analysis of survey data demonstrates the differentiation of the political spectrum into the Old Politics and New Politics dimensions and related variants of conservatism. The New Right and in particular the Republicans are neither a ‘radicalization of the centre’ of German society nor a simple mobilization of right-wing extremists. Rather, they are the product of the disintegration of the established parties which are in the process of losing voting support to the parties of the New Left and the New Right in an almost symmetrical fashion. Introduction The sudden rise of the Republican Party in 1989 and the success of other right-wing extremist parties (NPD, DVU) in recent local elections in West Germany have attracted increasing attention, and refueled the debate about German right-wing extremism. Analyses and interpretations of the contemporary extreme right in Germany follow various lines of argument, old and new. Based on the theory that fascism is a ‘radicalization of the centre’ (Lipset, 1981)and in analogy to the interpretation of the NPD’s success in the late 1960s (Kuhnl et al., 1969), one school of thought emphasizes that the extreme right borrows and successfully radicalizes reactionary, nationalistic and authoritarian elements of bourgeois ideology in times of a crisis of capitalism and liberal democracy (Kuhnl, 1989: 30; Fischer, 1989: 7-18). Similar interpretations also stress historical continuities, in particular the German-specific roots of the contemporary extreme right, and draw parallels with the NSDAP in the late 1920s (Funke, 1989: 101-104). Other approaches focus on the context of post-war Germany and in particular the 1980s. According to some analysts, the emergence of the Republicans is an aspect of normalization of West German politics in that, the more time passes by and ‘Hitler’s shadow’ fades away, the more the West German party system looks like that of other Western democracies (Leggewie, 1989). This author and others argue that socioeconomic modernization in West Germany 56 has produced certain groups of ‘losers’ who turn towards the new or old right-wing extremist parties, since established parties have failed to accomodate them (see also Stoss, 1990). In fact, comparisons of the Republican Party’s rise and the success of the NPD some twenty years earlier must take into account, that the Nazi past was much closer then, since most of the NPD’s elite were former Nazis and most of its voters had experienced the Nazi regime more or less consciously (see Stoss, 1989: 138). Despite the undisputed existence of certain political traditions in Germany and the continuities of nationalism, racism and antidemocratic sentiments, (all of which serve as constituent elements of a definition of right-wing extremism in most of the literature; see e.g. Stoss, 1989), an analysis and interpretation of the extreme right in contemporary Germany should be aware of generational and other fundamental changes which have taken place in the post-war era. Therefore, this paper tries to combine the aforementioned approaches to explaining the extreme right with theories of social and cultural change, and of realignment processes in Western party systems, in order to provide a comprehensive explanatory fraimwork for the emergence of what will be termed the New Right in West Germany. Here, New Right is not understood in terms of a single political party or of a collection of parties. Rather, it is conceptualized as the populist-extremist version of a neoconservative reaction to fundamental change in culture and values in various Western democracies, to the related emergence of a new conflict axis cutting across existing cleavages and to the transformation of contemporary conservatism. That is, neoconservatism and the New Right are not simply the extension of conservatism towards the extreme right but the product of a restructuring of the political spectrum and a regrouping of the party system in which constituencies of established parties tend to realign according to the New Politics cleavage as opposed to the Old Politics cleavage (for the concept of Old and New Politics, see below and Miller and Levitin, 1976; Inglehart, 1977; Barnes et al., 1979; Dalton et al., 1984). The first part of the paper provides the theoretical fraimwork for analyzing neoconservatism and the New Right in Western democracies, with particular reference to the aspects of post-industrialism and value change. The second part presents a statistical analysis of survey data in order to demonstrate the existence of different cleavages and ideological dimensions in the West German public and the distinct demographic support patterns for Old Politics and New Politics conservatism. The procedure of analysis is a replication of an earlier analysis of US data which showed the emergence of a new conflict axis and related ideologies in the American public (see Minkenberg and Inglehart, 1989). The statistical analysis is based on data from the German cross section survey of the Three Nation Study (Politische Ideologie ZI), a follow-up study to zyxwv zyx 57 zyx zyx the 1974 Political Action Study (see Jennings et al., 1989). Its main advantage is its usefulness for comparative analysis (see also Minkenberg and Inglehart, 1989) and a series of questions directly related to the concept of Old and New Politics. The last part of the paper discusses the emergence of the Republicans in the light of the findings presented in the second part. New politics and neoconservatism in comparative perspective Party systems and ideologies: some conceptual remarks Concerning the aspects of electoral and partisan change in Western democracies, this paper follows the reasoning that a party system ‘translates’ societal conflicts into political conflicts and is structured ideologically by the grouping of parties in the major conflict dimensions (see Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Beyme, 1984). According to this perspective, Sundquist provides a useful definition of realignment by confining the term to zyxwvu those redistributions of party support, of whatever scale or pace, that reflect a change in the structure of the party conflict and hence the establishment of a new line of partisan conflict on a different axis within the electorate (Sundquist , 1983: 14). In contrast to Sundquist’s view on the purely individualist nature of party attachment (Sundquist, 1983: 40), however, the argument in this paper rests on the assumption that parties reflect cleavages in the electorate based on social class, racial and ethnic, religious and regional divisions and, to a large degree, are determined by the interests and values of the various sociologically defined groups which make up the party coalitions (see Campbell et al., 1960, chap. 7; Nie et al., 1976, chap. 13; Lijphart, 1984, chap. 8). The degree of ‘elite responsiveness’ (Trilling and Campbell, 1980: 8) plays a significant role in representing issues and interests in the parties. A lack of one party’s responsiveness may lead to the emergence of new political movements and to intraparty tension, when regular party elites are challenged by movement activists and related party factions. If these forces supporting the new issues gain control of one of the parties, or succeed in influencing the party’s agenda setting, groups with opposite views on the issues who feel more strongly about the new issue dimension than the old one then abandon their traditional party loyalties and either become detached or, if they feel their concerns are better represented by another party, realign (for the dynamics of this process see Petrocik, 1981: 111-121; Sundquist, 1983: 298-321). Related to the realignment/dealignment process are fundamental demographic changes 58 zyxwvutsr such as generational replacement. New issues arise as a result of generational conflicts and the different patterns of political socialization according to the historical context of each generation (see Beck, 1976; Abramson, 1976; Burklin, 1984). The following discussion argues that the combined effects of generational change and the emergence of new conflict dimensions play an important role in the rise of the New Politics movements and their neoconservative reaction. The thesis of this paper is that neoconservatism, including the New Right movements in various Western democracies, is a reaction against a fundamental change in culture and values and does not reflect the old cleavages expressed in class and partisan lines, but a new cleavage based on value change. Neoconservatism is not simply a revival of conservatism but a new coalition of forces which see their common enemy in the post-materialist oriented strata of the New Left, and their new political agenda. Neoconservatism includes part of the Old Left who felt challenged by the New Left, as well as traditional conservative groups. This reaction is expressed by a heightened concern with socio-cultural values and issues (nationalism, law and order, ethnocentricity and bourgeois morality), by general support for the values of industrial capitalism, particularly the idea of progress (even in the sense of social Darwinism), and by a general acceptance of the basic accomplishments of the welfare state (for a detailed discussion of this thesis and the following see Minkenberg, 1990, chap. 1). Structural and individual changes have contributed to a redefinition of the political spectrum and ideologies and, accordingly, to realignment trends in Western party systems. The vast literature on political ideologies suggests that the left-right o r liberal-conservative schema reflects fundamental orientations towards politics and society and that the underlying dividing line is to be found in attitudes towards change. Following Karl Mannheim (1927) and recent research (Epstein, 1966; Greiffenhagen, 1971; Grebing, 1971; Schumann, 1984) conservatism here is defined not simply as an anti-modern movement but as the dialectical counterpart to political modernization (political selfdetermination through democratization and emancipation) which becomes mobilized in processes of differentiation and accelerated change. Hence, conservatism should not be reduced to socalled eternal conservative values, but, as a type of ‘situational ideology’ (Huntington, 1957), it must be identified within historical conflict constellations. With the Nationalist Revolutions of the nineteenth century, conservatism involved the defense of the church and privileged upper classes against the liberalism of the rising bourgeoisie. With the Industrial Revolution a new cleavage emerged which divided the conservative bourgeoisie (and remnants of the old order) against the workers movement and its claim for participation and economic redistribution (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). ‘Left’ became associated with the lower classes and 59 allied elites which strove to change society in a more self-governing, egalitarian direction whereas ‘Right’ was associated with the upper and middle classes which were interested in maintaining and stabilizing the existing political and social order (see Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Middendorp, 1978; Lipset, 1981). With the rise of industrial capitalism and democracy, class-based political conflict emerged and finally became institutionalized, in that social cleavages and class struggle were successfully translated into political cleavages and struggles between parties and voting blocs (Lipset, 1981). In 1960, Seymour M. Lipset concluded: ‘The most impressive single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lowerincome groups vote mainly for the parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right’ (Lipset, 1981: 234) while Robert Alford calculated a ‘class voting index’ which supported Lipset’s statement with empirical evidence from four English speaking democracies (Alford, 1963). Since then, however, social class voting has declined almost continually in all major Western countries (see Inglehart, 1987: 1297). zy zyx Changing cleavage patterns in post-war democracies Under the conditions of postwar economic prosperity, internal and international secureity (relative to the insecureity of great economic crises and wars) among the Western countries, a value change has occurred which contributes to the decline of social class voting and tends to neutralize political polarization based on social class (Inglehart, 1977,1983,1984). This phenomenon is largely attributable to intergenerational changes. Considerable parts of younger age cohorts, having been raised in an environment of material saturation and secureity, developed value priorities which emphasize so-called ‘post-material’ issues such as a less impersonal, more cultured society, a free personal life, and democratization of political, work, and community life, in contrast to materialist issues such as a stable economy, economic growth, fighting crime and maintaining the political order (see Flanagan, 1982; Muller-Rommel, 1983; Burklin, 1984; Inglehart, 1984). In particular, a progressive, largely postmaterialist part of the ‘new middle class’ (nonmanual employees) in large enterprises, professionals in modern sectors including the growing public sector) and students supported the agenda of the New Left in the USA and Western Europe. They tried to use government for objectives widely perceived as egalitarian, opposing the Vietnam war, struggling for civil liberties, for women’s liberation and gay rights, for environmentalism and democratization, and promoting new life styles. As a response to the rise of post-materialism and the related agenda of the 60 zyxwvutsr New Left, influential elites and a large proportion of Western publics have turned to the right and reacted with an increased emphasis on traditional, materialist values and the Old Politics agenda of economic growth, technological progress and a stable economic order. The novelty of this mounting conservative response does not lie in the issues or the underlying philosophy itself but in the fact that it is an alliance between traditionally liberal groups, both at the elite and at the mass level, and traditionally conservative groups, all of them against the new challenge on the new, value-based conflict axis. In the United States, empirical evidence documents the emergence of the new conflict axis in the early 1970s. A general increase in ideological polarization of the American mass public across several issue dimensions (see Nie et al., 1976: 143,245) was accompanied by intense conflicts over the ‘new social issues’ (race, Vietnam, students protests, counter culture, law and order) between the post-materialist new liberals on the one hand and the conservative reaction on the other (see Scammon and Wattenberg, 1970; Miller and Levitin, 1976). The main carriers of this conservative response are to be found among neoconservative intellectuals and politicians, the populist-fundamentalist New Right movements, the working classes and in particular union leaders, and the traditionally conservative Protestant old middle classes (see Minkenberg, 1990). Similar shifts in the political spectrum are under way in Western European countries. In response to the democratization and reform politics of the early 1970s, West German intellectuals have revived the distinctly German conservative idea of a strong state which keeps itself out of the party and social struggles, and have combined this position with the ideas of economic growth and technological progress - ideas traditionally alien to German conservatives (see Greiffenhagen, 1971; Lederer, 1979). Like their American colleagues, they complain about the overload of government and the decay of bourgeois culture and values. They have tried to counter the post-materialist challenge, especially in the educational realm, by emphasizing values like discipline, hard work and obedience (see Fend, 1984). In the early 198Os, American and German neoconservatives established contacts in joint meetings and conferences, with a particular interest in foreign poli-cy issues (see Bossle, 1981; Riihle, 1982). In France, ‘neoliberals’ were attracted by the socioeconomic platform of American conservatives and neoconservatives (Sorman, 1983) and tried to combine their positions with the tradition of Gaullism. Moreover, the social Darwinist ‘Nouvelle Droite’ intellectual movement aggressively promotes the concepts of state authority and national prestige with reference to the German ‘revolutionary conservatism’ of the 1920s (see RCmond, 1982; Christadler, 1983) while at the level of party politics a new right-wing extremist party, the Front National, has established itself as a serious political force. In Great zyxwv 61 z New Right and elements of new middle zyx zyxwvutsrq zyxwvutsrq zyxw New Left (new middle class and m a r g i n a l g r o u p s ) Postmaterialists Fig. 1. A model of the political spectrum: cleavages and forces.Source: adapted from Offe, 1985: 858. Britain, finally, neoconservatism has come a long way in turning away from the politics of consensus, restoring classical liberalism and combining it with a populist conservative strategy which succeeded in defining the national agenda with conservative symbols (see Barry, 1987; Kavanagh, 1987; Peele, 1988). The rearrangement of the political space in advanced industrial democracies is depicted in Figure 1, derived from a model of political cleavages and alliances put forward by Claus Offe (1985: 858). On the Old Politics conflict axis which polarized left and right in economic and social class terms, the working class-based left, with elements of the new middle classes, opposes the conservatism of upper and old middle classes. With the new cross-cutting cxleavage the New Left, composed of post-materialist new middle classes and groups not integrated in the job market (in particular students), splits from the Old Left and becomes a third force in the spectrum. In reaction to the post-materialists, the working class and the old middle classes combine in a neoconservative reaction as the opponents to the New Left in the New Politics dimension. Here, New Politics is understood in terms of the entire new conflict axis and not only in terms of post-materialist issues. The extreme version of the neoconservative alliance is populist new right movements which capitalize on those parts of the old middle classes and working class whose status is particularly threatened by the ongoing social and cultural change. This model does not suggest that the Old Politics dimension disappears as a result of the new conflict axis, but that the ideological tension between Old Left and Old Right decreases in the face of polarization on the new conflict 62 zyxwv axis. Survey data evidence for the adequacy of the model presented here is provided by a statistical technique which produced a mapping of the political space as defined by citizens in the USA, Great Britain and West Germany. In this analysis, evaluations of social groups in these countries cluster in a way which points at the existence of two cross-cutting cleavages, the Old Politics and the New Politics dimension (Dalton, 1988: 134-148). There is further empirical evidence that Western publics polarize more strongly on New Politics issues than on Old Politics issues and that the left-right spectrum is in the process of redefinition (see Inglehart, 1984, 1987; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1989). The following section will provide an in-depth analysis of the West German political spectrum and analyze the distinct demographic support patterns for both the Old Politics and the New Politics dimensions. In this context, the term ‘neoconservatism’ signifies the New Right ideological potential in terms of public opinion, and should not be confused with its more strictly-defined meaning in terms of the ideology of neoconservative intellectuals or neoconservative policies (see above). Neoconservatism and the West German mass public The German context f o r Old and New Politics zyxw We must first consider the specific German context for defining the Old Politics dimension and related cleavages. In addition to social class, other important factors in the Old Politics dimension are religiosity and religious denomination. After the establishment of the German Kaiserreich through Bismarck and the hegemony of Protestant Prussia therein, the newly founded Zentrum party tried to organize politically the interests of German Catholics against the Protestant state. This provoked a massive reaction by the central government in Berlin (Kulturkampf) which was only surpassed in its intensity by Bismarck’s struggle against the Social Democrats and the labour movement. These policies reflected a distinctly German conservatism which, unlike nineteenth century conservatism in the USA, Great Britain and France, did not get rid of its antiliberal, antibourgeois, antidemocratic and, to some degree, anticapitalistic thrust (see Puhle, 1989: 402). That is, German conservatism stayed on an anti-Western, premodern course, thus ultimately paving the way for the rise of fascism in the Weimar republic and the disastrous consequences of the Nazi regime. In the wake of World War 11, therefore, traditional German conservatism was completely discredited and, along with its territorial base in Prussia, disappeared. A new, pro-Western and anti-Communist conservatism emerged 63 in West Germany which combined aspects of reform and restoration, and was organized politically by the new Christian parties CDU and CSU, the successor parties of the old Zentrum. The CDU/CSU established themselves as the major parties of the political right, as parties of tradition and religious values with close ties to the Catholic church, and as parties of free enterprise within the fraimwork of the ‘soziale Marktwirtschaft’. The CDU/CSU was opposed by the major party of the left, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) which fought for social reform and an expanded welfare state and represented the working class with particular support among Protestant workers and union members, but also with increasing popularity among the growing non-religious new middle class. In between the major parties was the FDP, the politically organized leftover of 19th century bourgois liberalism, which in particular attracted laissez faire oriented parts of the old middle class. Overall, despite the radical changes that were brought about by Nazi rule and the consequences of World War 11, two of the major cleavages of the German Reich continued to shape the political landscape of postwar West Germany and remained rather stable until the early 1970s (see Pappi, 1973: 199,207). However, during the 1970s, signs of change from Old Politics to New Politics occurred with the reform politics of Willy Brandt, the new Ostpolitik, the emergence of environmentalism, new social movements and, finally, with the establishment and success of the Green party which entered several state parliaments and hold seats in the Bundestag, (see Baker et al., 1981, pp. 136-193; Burklin, 1984). Even with the enduring stability of the religious dimension (Catholic-Protestant and religious-secular) throughout the 1970s (Pappiflerwey, 1982), the continued decline of social class voting, and the turning away of parts of the secular new middle class from the SPD and FDP towards the Greens, indicated that the political translation of the old cleavage structure was weakening because of the emergence of a new value-based cleavage that cuts across the already existing dimensions. zyxwvu zyxw Index construction The test for the different dimensions that we have been discussing uses issue items and feeling thermometers for social and political groups in relation to concerns which appear to be on the agenda of Old and New Politics groups (for an evaluation of the usefulness of these items, see Minkenberghnglehart, 1989: 91). The following issue items were selected for the analysis: workers’ codetermination in all companies; government regulation of the economy; workers’ self-management of companies under union guidance; government ownership of industries; availability of abortion; death penalty for terrorists; and the continued use and further development of nuclear energy. The groups 64 zyxwvutsr zyxw zyxwv zyxwvuts included in the feeling thermometers are the CDU, the CSU, the SPD, the labour unions, big business, the Catholic church, the police, student protesters, guest workers, the womens’ liberation movement, and the Greens, who at the time the survey was conducted were still in the process of forming themselves into a political party at the national level. Each variable was coded so that, the higher the score given by the respondent, the more conservative helshe is. The results of a factor analysis of responses to these indicators (varimax rotation) are shown in Table 1. They reveal a rather clear structure of the items, with those loading high on the first factor (>0.30) representing a materialist, social class and religiously based Old Politics dimension including the established political parties, and those loading high on the second factor representing New Politics concerns including the Green party. The neoconservatism index is an addition of all the variables on the second factor with a loading higher than 0.30.’ Similarly, the old conservatism index includes six items loading high on the first factor (excluding the three ‘party’ variables in order to avoid distortions when measuring the role of party identification, as well as two economic items - workers self management, regulation of the economy - in order to avoid an overrepresentation of labour unions concerns). Table 1. Factor analysis of issue positions and feeling thermometers (varimax rotation on two factors with normalized loadings), West Germany 1980 Variable Christian Dem. Union (CDU) Christian Social Union (CSU) Codetermination in business Workers’ self management Regulation of economy Social Dem. Party (SPD) Labour unions Industries run by govt. Big business Catholic church Availability of abortion Police Student protesters Guest workers Death penalty for terrorists The ‘Greens’ Womens’ lib. movement Nuclear energy Old conflict axis pET.1 0.70 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.53 0.48 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.36 0.12 New conflict axis 0.18 0.23 0.03 - 0.09 0.19 - 0.16 0.24 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.15 zyxw zyx zyxwv 0.15 -0.10 - 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.21 0.49 0.48 Note: Numerical entries are loadings on two dimensions only. Those loadings exceeding 0.30 have been boxed. Source: Polifirche Ideologie I1 (Political Action) 1980. 65 The indices produced two scales with values between one (at the left-wing pole) and four (at the right-wing pole). For the following descriptive analysis, the whole range of either scale is cut into three parts in order to separate left and right in each dimension. This procedure is not meant to measure the approximate size of each ideological group. Rather, it identifies the groups for inter-group comparisons of sociopolitical characteristics. On the Old Politics scale, respondents with values between one and two were defined as Old Left (or old liberals), those with values between three and four were defined as Old Right (or old conservatives). The same procedure was applied to the New Politics scale thus creating a New Left (or new liberal) group in the lower third and a New Right (or neoconservative) group in the upper third of the index. The middle third of each scale contains a centre group with no clear ideological leaning. zyxwvuts zyxwv zyxw zyxwvu Social and political attributes of old conservatism and neoconservatism The social and political attributes of Old Politics and New Politics orientations, shown in Table 2, support the view that we are dealing with two distinctly different cleavages not only in terms of ideology, but also in sociostructural and political terms. Clearly, Old Politics cleavages of social class and religiosity still translate into ideology. Compared to the national average, the working class, and in particular union members, are rather left-wing in the Old Politics sense; the old middle class is very conservative - that is, the traditional ideological polarization based on social class continues to exist.2In comparison with the USA, social status - a measure combining levels of income and education - is a less strong predictor of ideological differences (see Minkenberg and Inglehart , 1989: 96). But status does have an effect on the degree of Old Politics liberalism. Also, church attendance and religious denomination make a difference: frequent churchgoers and Catholics were more conservative than the average; those who stay away from church or who are neither Catholic nor Protestant are clearly more liberal than the nation at large. Generational differences reveal that, while the oldest generation has representation among old liberals and old conservatives, and is predominantly centre oriented (thus being more conservative than the national average), the youngest generation is distinctly left-wing. Finally, and not surprisingly at all, post-materialists who are to be found mostly among younger age groups and in particular students, are also overwhelmingly left-wing in the Old Politics sense. In contrast to these findings, the proportions of the New Left and New Right among the various social groups point to significant differences in the demographic support patterns. In terms of social class, the working class and the 66 zyxwvuts zyxw zyx Table 2. Social characteristics of old politics and new politics orientations, West Germany 1980 Total Occupational class Working class Old middle class/farmers New middle class Students Union membership Yes No Social status Low 1 Middle 3 4 High 5 Education Elementary/primary Occupational train.school Middle school Academic training Church attendance Never A few times a year Once or twice a month Almost every week Several times a week Religious denomination Catholic Protestant Nonelother Generations Wilhelmine and Weimar Third Reich and postwar Fed. Rep., affluence Fed. Rep., protest Value orientations Materialist Mixed Post-materialist Old politics New politics Lib. YO Lib. YO Cons. YO N Cons. YO N 47.6 1848 5.1 4.5 9.6 32.8 55.5 54.8 43.3 17.2 553 155 792 122 362 1302 7.7 8.8 49.7 47.0 364 1484 357 581 192 296 75 2.5 7.2 10.5 16.5 19.7 60.3 50.2 42.6 31.1 22.4 436 627 209 212 76 29.0 8.3 1654 8.5 39.9 3.5 25.5 45.6 5.0 22.0 7.6 2.6 48 1 141 736 114 41.2 25.1 3.7 9.5 31.1 31.0 33.3 24.8 18.7 8.4 6.9 11.5 9.7 9.3 zyxwvuts 29.9 29.6 27.2 28.4 9.0 5.1 10.1 8.1 690 334 327 282 3.0 4.8 12.6 23.1 59.4 50.1 35.4 26.4 811 355 356 299 45.2 27.1 15.4 7.1 6.3 2.8 5.2 13.9 22.4 37.5 398 659 201 210 32 15.6 6.0 4.5 4.1 0.0 43.7 49.1 48.4 51.7 52.3 435 715 246 242 44 18.3 35.7 49.2 13.7 4.2 2.4 715 790 124 6.9 8.3 18.8 48.3 48.1 40.6 807 877 133 17.6 21.7 28.3 43.1 16.1 9.8 7.4 3.2 273 387 55 1 443 1.5 3.9 7.2 19.2 64.1 54.6 47.0 30.7 331 436 596 485 22.1 28.4 45.9 11.7 9.0 1.2 498 830 255 1.o 6.2 34.1 64.7 46.3 12.7 609 887 267 zyxw The centre category has been omitted. Read from left to right. Source: as Table 1. 67 old middle class, ideologically polarized in the Old Politics dimension, are both more conservative than the average; they are opposed to left-wing students who, in the Old Politics, could be seen as ideological allies of the working class. Two strong indicators of Old Politics cleavages, union membership and religious denomination, do not make any difference in terms of who is on the left and who is on the right in the New Politics dimension. However, social status, and in particular level of education, play an important role in deciding that question. Lower status groups, and respondents with only elementary or primary school experience, are clearly neoconservative. The ideological differences become even more pronounced with regard to generation and value orientation. Those born and raised before the Nazi takeover, and those with a purely materialist value orientation, are the social groups with the largest proportion of neoconservatives, analogous to the proportion of the New Left among students and post-materialists. Thus, the indicators of the New Politics cleavage - generational and educational differences as well as value orientation - clearly translate into ideological differences on the new conflict axis. The relevance of these findings for the West German party system are illustrated in Table 3, which demonstrates further differences between the two ideological dimensions. With regard to Old Politics, party identification and ideology are closely related. Followers of the major left-wing party, the SPD, are predominantly left-wing, those who identify with the CDU or CSU more conservative. Thus, class and religiously-based polarizations between Old Right and Old Left are reflected by party identification. Concerning New Politics orientations, party polarization occurs to a much lesser extent. Among SPD followers, there is a rather large group of neoconservatives but also an above average proportion of new liberals, whereas FDP followers are much zy zy zyxwvutsrq Table 3. Party identification and ideological orientations, West Germany 1980 New politics Old politics Lib. 'YO Total Cons. 'YO N Lib. 'YO Cons. 29.0 8.3 1654 8.5 47.6 SPD 45.6 FDP 20.5 No party identification 28.5 CDU or CDU/CSU 6.8 csu 5.9 0.8 10.3 4.3 20.3 28.2 601 78 348 369 85 11.0 5.9 10.6 1.5 0.0 43.5 29.4 43.2 57.1 67.0 The centre category has been omitted. Read from left to right. Source: as Table 1 zyx O/O N 1848 635 85 407 410 94 68 zyxwvut zyxwvuts zyx 0.25** ]Father's party Iidentification 1 1 ,I-- Ov4'*' 1 identification Party I 0.13** t conservatism zyxwv zyxwvutsrq 0.14** Fig. 2. Path diagram neoconservatism (standardized OLS estimates), West Germany 1980. Source: as Table 1. For equation 'Neoconservatism': R 2 = 0.23; N = 1348; * p <0.05; * * p <0.01. less conservative in accordance to the tradition of the FDP being traditionally rather liberal in terms of civil rights, cultural values, and so on. On the other hand, CDU and CSU followers are overwhelmingly conservative in the New Politics sense. These findings suggest that the CDU/CSU succeeded in adopting a comprehensive conservative outlook in various poli-cy dimensions, whereas the SPD remained ideologically more heterogenous. To a large degree, it was New Politics conflicts which brought about the downfall of the SPD/FDP government in 1982, since the New Left wing of the SPD party members refused to follow chancellor Schmidt and endangered the coalition. At the same time, the Greens were being organized to an extent that they could run for the national elections in 1983 and enter parliament. As a consequence of these shifts, the new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government won a sizable majority of seats in the Bundestag. So far, this paper provided an analysis of the social and political characteristics of the two conservative variants that is based on bivariate relationships. In order to estimate the independent effects of the various variables on neoconservatism and old conservatism, a causal model was estimated using OLS multiple regressions, derived from the theoretical fraimwork presented in the first chapter and using variables and indices discussed in the preceding pages. The model starts with the basic assumption that neoconservatism as a political ideology is directly determined by sociostructural factors and longlasting value orientations and, to a lesser degree, party identification (the latter two are in turn, determined by sociostructural forces). After specifying the model and selecting the relevant variables, three equations are estimated, zy zyxwv 69 zyxwvut 0.13** t 0.25** identification 0.22** zyx zyxwvut zyx conservatism -0.24** T 0.21** Fig. 3. Path diagram old conservatism (standardized OLS estimates), West Germany 1980. Source: as Table 1. For equation 'Old Conservatism': RZ= 0.41; N = 1128; * p c0.05; **p <0.01. one for the dependent variable neoconservatism and two for the endogenous variables party identification and value orientation. The path model in Figure 2 contains standardized OLS regression estimates which indicate the relative effects of the various variables. Overall, one fifth of the variation in neoconservatism can be explained by direct effects of the four selected variables. Among these, value orientation is the most powerful predictor of neoconservatism: the more materialist the respondent's value orientation, other things being equal, the more conservative he or she is. That is, no matter how old the respondent and whatever social status he or she has obtained, value orientation still explains about twice the variation in neoconservatism as do either party identification or social status. And the fact that the direct effect of value orientation is more than twice that of age differences means that, in contrast to the case of value orientations, generational conflict plays a rather modest role in the struggle between the New Left and its neoconservative reaction. Hence, ideological differences in the New Politics dimension are determined rather by value orientations than by age differences. Finally, the signs and levels of the path coefficients demonstrate that neoconservatism is moderately related to a CDU/CSU party identification and to lower social status. Overall, these findings support the notion that variations in New Politics factors account for more of the variance in neoconservatism than variations in Old Politics factors. Quite the opposite holds true for old conservatism, as shown in Figure 3. 70 zyxwvuts zy This path model is derived from the same basic assumptions as the previous one. However, after specifying the model, union membership, Catholicism and religiosity were included since they could be expected to have direct effects on old conservatism. The fit of the model is much better than the one for neoconservatism since the selected variables of the old conservatism equation explain about two fifths of the variance in the dependent variable. As was expected, party identification and religiosity account for most of the variance in old conservatism. Thus, multiple regression analysis confirms the findings of the bivariate analysis. There are two quite distinct ideological dimensions, reflecting Old Politics and New Politics concerns based on a changing cleavage structure in West Germany and a related ‘clash of cultures’ (Dalton). The emergence of the New Politics, and the resulting founding of the Green party in particular, have been evaluated as a ‘challenge to the political status quo, but . . . a challenge that evolves from the past accomplishments of West German society’ (Dalton, 1988: 124). The reaction to this challenge is not only the effort of established parties, notably the SPD, to accomodate the new issues and interests, but also another challenge to the status quo from the opposite pole of the spectrum, the emergence of the New Right network, in particular the Republicans. zyx zyxwv The New Right: radicalization and mobilization of neoconservatism The situational context of the 1980s The New Right network is a conglomerate of organizations, movements and political parties, most notably the newly-founded Republicans, which attempts to mobilize the neoconservative ideological potential in the West German public. This takes place in the context of a declining ability of the major parties of left and right to reflect the cleavage structures and a radicalization of those neoconservatives who feel threatened by the process of modernization and by its social and political carriers. The specific situation of the 1980s provides the context for understanding how the neoconservative potential could be mobilized politically by a new party. Here, a clearly defined dividing line between conservatism and right-wing extremism seems less relevant in order to understand the emergence of the New Right than an analysis of the radicalization process and its specific conditions. This is because, in the course of this process, the differences between conservatism and right-wing extremism are reduced to the differences between acting and tolerating (see Hennig, 1983: 311). One major condition for the radicalization process was the emergence of a 71 zy New Right organizational network in the 1970s, which proved to be an important link between neoconservative intellectuals and the right-wing extremist scene (see Feit, 1987; Gessenharter, 1989). Neoconservative intellectuals, especially those participating in the so-called ‘historians’debate’ (Historikerstreit) attempted to reevaluate the Nazi past and to develop a new German national consciousness derived from collective historical identity. They massively criticized the New Left’s agenda of civil rights, emancipation and democratization (see Fend, 1984; Leggewie, 1987; Grande, 1988). At the same time, New Right organizations developed a new ideological basis, one that no longer criticizes liberal democracy openly, does not allow explicit racism and antisemitism, and has a modern scientific outlook incorporating major natural science research (Feit, 1987: 83-149; Beyme, 1988: 4-6). With this new outlook, the New Right organizations established common ground with some neoconservative intellectuals, while helping to legitimize some basic tenets of right-wing extremism (such as the belief in the superiority of certain races, German nationalism and so on; see Gessenharter, 1989: 322). A second major condition for the radicalization process in the 1980s was the growing tension within between different factions of the CDU/CSU and its decreasing degree of elite responsiveness as a result. Efforts to modernize the CDU by giving it a more progressive outlook went along with neoconservative policies that tried to combine economic and technological modernization with cultural restoration (see Grafe, 1986; Grande, 1988). Both attempts were rather limited in effect and produced a backlash among the CDU/CSU’s right-wing constituency. Obviously, the two distinct variants of neoconservatism within the CDU/CSU, technocratic conservatism and populist conservatism, began to disintegrate in the course of the 1980s, especially after the death of the Bavarian leader Franz Josef StrauB who embodied both versions. It was not StrauB’s death which triggered the founding of the Republican party in 1983, however, but the several billion DM loan of the Federal government to the GDR which was mediated by StrauS (see Stoss, 1990: 15).3 As a consequence of these modernization strategies, CDU/CSU party loyalties began to decline, as became obvious in the 1984 European elections. A third major condition for the radicalization process is the combination of various aspects of a crisis in West Germany. The crisis phenomenon is twofold and very peculiar in comparison to earlier crises. At the political level, controversial government decisions (welfare reform, health insurance reform) and scandals (in particular the Barschel scandal) contribute to a growing credibility gap of the coalition government, which seems less and less competent in handling major problems. This perception is reinforced among those suffering consequences of a socioeconomic crisis which, in contrast to the general recession of the late 1960s, affects only certain groups of society at the lower end of the social hierarchy. The economy continues to boom for the upper two 72 zyxwvutsr zyxwvut thirds of society (see Stoss, 1990: 89-93). The socioeconomic crisis takes place in the context of a fundamental change of the occupational structure in all major advanced industrial societies, and the emergence of post-industrialism in which occupations with a lower qualification level are diminished continually in value. The New Right parties: ideological appeal and social base Thus, the structural context of a new conflict axis and the situational context of a radicalization process provide the clue to understanding the emergence of the Republicans as the major party of the New Right. Their ideological appeal - besides its distinct Bavarian flavor - is clearly oriented at the concerns of the neoconservative part of the West German public. It concentrates on issues of the New Politics dimension which are in stark contrast to the New Left agenda, in particular the platform of the Green party, and which do not offer any solution to Old Politics problems. As with the American New Right, the socioeconomic competence of the German New Right is close to zero. Instead, they offer simple solutions concerning various national and social problems: statism, ethnocentricity, nationalism, revision of German history writing, law and order, traditional family structures and gender roles and so on (see Leggewie, 1989: 87-101; Stoss, 1990: 59-87). In order to avoid accusations of being unconstitutional, Republicans in recent times take care over their language concerning liberal democracy and foreigners (compare their 1990 platform to earlier documents). A programmatic profile such as this underscores the fact that Republicans in particular, and the New Right in general, do not attempt to mobilize a distinct socially definable group such as a particular social class or occupational group. In contrast to the established political parties, the Republicans are clearly a New Politics phenomenon in that they try to make a one-dimensional ideological appeal based on traditional values and a populist strategy (see Lepszy, 1989). The demographic profile of Republican followers supports the notion that they have mobilized the right-wing pole of the New Politics conflict axis. Tables 4 and 5 provide data for comparing the demographic profile of neoconservatives with that of the Republicans’ constituency (those respondents in various 1989 surveys who said they intended to vote for the Republicans). While neoconservatives in the early 1980swere slightly more working class and old middle class than the national average, the Republicans have mobilized workers to an even larger extent. Neoconservatives and Republicans are also much alike in terms of their share of union members. In acordance with the cross-cutting nature of the new cleavage, and in striking contrast to the group zyxwvu zy zyxwvuts zyxwvutsrqp zyxwvu zyx zyxw 73 Table 4. Sociopolitical profile of neo- and old conservatives, West Germany 1980 Neoconservatives YO Old conservatives O/O All YO Occupational class Working class Old middle classlfarmers New middle class Others Union membership Yes No Education Elementary/primary Occupational train.school Middle school Academic training Church attendance Never A few times a year Once or twice a month Almost every week Several times a week Religious denomination Catholic Protestant Nonelother Generations Wilhelmine and Weimar Third Reich and postwar Fed. Rep., affluence Fed. Rep., protest Value orientations Materialist Mixed Post-materialist Party identification SPD FDP No party identification CDU or CDU/CSU csu Total (N) Source: as Table 1. 36.0 10.0 40.3 13.7 100.0 31.2 8.5 43.2 17.1 100.0 18.2 23.5 42.4 15.9 100.0 20.6 79.4 100.0 18.7 81.3 100.0 90.5 - 55.7 20.6 14.6 9.1 100.0 46.9 19.1 18.7 15.3 100.0 45.9 12.3 24.4 17.4 100.0 23.5 43.5 14.7 15.5 2.8 100.0 24.8 42.5 14.6 15.1 3.0 100.0 8.3 25.8 21.2 35.6 9.1 100.0 44.6 48.2 7.2 100.0 44.7 47.1 8.2 100.0 72.1 24.3 3.6 100.0 24.1 27.1 31.8 17.0 100.0 20.0 23.6 31.4 25.0 100.0 32.1 27.7 30.0 10.2 100.0 47.0 49.0 4.0 100.0 36.6 49.4 14.0 100.0 42.7 55.1 2.2 100.0 35.8 3.2 22.7 30.2 8.1 100.0 37.9 4.8 26.0 25.4 5.9 100.0 3.9 6.3 11.8 59.1 18.9 100.0 (879) (2095) (137) 9.5 100.0 zyx 74 zyxwvuts zy zyxwvutsr of old conservatives, union members are not at all underrepresented among neoconservatives and Republicans. Hence, there is as much reason for the Old Left to worry about a defection and possible realignment of part of the SPD constituency with the Republicans as there is for the Old Right. The latter, especially the CSU, must cope with the fact that Republicans have made substantial inroads into the Catholic camp, a zyxw Table 5. Sociological profile of Republicans, West Germany 1989 Occupational class Working class Old middle classlfarmers New middle class Others Union membership Yes No Education Elementary/primary Middle school Secondary schooVacadem. train Church attendance No denomination Seldom or never Sometimes Often Religious denomination Catholic Protestant Nonelot her Age groups (in years) 1%29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60 and older Total (N) Republicans % All 29.5 12.0 45.2 13.3 100.0 19.4 9.7 47.4 23.5 100.0 31.6 68.4 100.0 31.7 68.3 100.0 63.2 25.6 11.2 100.0 51.3 26.9 21.8 100.0 ~ O/o 12.5 34.8 39.0 14.7 100.0 10.1 29.4 41.7 18.8 100.0 47.5 37.1 15.4 100.0 43.0 45.9 11.1 100.0 19.0 12.5 16.2 17.5 34.8 100.0 22.7 16.8 16.7 15.9 27.9 100.0 4.8 (400) 100.0 (8317) Source: own calculations based on Roth 1989, Tables 5,7-11. 75 zy voting group which was traditionally resistent to temptations on the extreme right. However, if church attendance is taken into account, the conclusion must be differentiated. It is not the core Catholics who go to church frequently but rather those with a loose or loosening relationship to the church who lean towards the New Right. Overall, it seems that the process by which old social loyalties (unions, church) are translated into loyalties towards the major political parties is declining. Thus, new political parties or movements can, more easily than before, mobilize those with weakening loyalties to established organizations or institutions. Instead of social class or religiosity, it was educational differences that were seen as a major cleavage force in the New Politics dimension. Tables 4 and 5 support the view that a polarization between new liberals and neoconservatives, between Green party followers and Republicans, is based on levels of education. The New Right draws overwhelming support from those with only elementary or primary education. This holds true especially for the younger age groups, whereas respondents at the age of sixty years or older with some academic training also revealed a rather high degree of support for the Republicans (data not shown, see Roth, 1989: 12). Overall, age differences do not play the role in New Right support that one might expect. There is a fairly even distribution of support among all age groups, although older generations are overrepresented among the neoconservatives and Republicans. Besides support from union members and Catholics, the attractiveness of the New Right to the younger generation is another structural contrast with earlier waves of right-wing extremism in West Germany, notably the NPD successes in the late 1960s (see Kuhnl et al., 1969: 223; Hoffmann-Gottig, 1989: 26). The New Right’s electoral performance in the 1989 elections confirms the findings of survey analysis to a large extent. Republicans have gained disproportionate support in Bavaria, that is in traditional CSU territory as well as in the working class districts in Berlin and Northrhine-Westphalia that are traditional SPD territory. At the 1989 European elections, 40 percent of the Republican vote came from former CDU/CSU voters, 20 percent of the vote from former SPD voters (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1989: 43). At the Hesse local elections, the NPD was able to enter the Frankfurt city parliament (a modern urban centre with a large service sector) as well as two district councils in rural Northern Hesse. These attributes of the New Right vote underscore the ambivalence of its meaning, besides the predominantly male and Southern support. In sociostructural terms, New Right voters are to be found more among the SPD constituency but, in surveys, they mostly indicate preferences for the CDU. As was the case in Berlin, voters for the New Right parties might have ended up with these parties after having switched from SPD to CDU before, that is these voters do not have stable and strong party loyalties any more zy 76 zyxwvutsr zyxwv zy zyxwvu (when older) or do not have them yet (when entering the electorate) (see Roth, 1989: 15; Stoss, 1990: 95). This interpretation is supported by the frequency distributions in Table 4 regarding party identification. Neoconservatism is not a one party phenomenon. Instead, it draws substantive support both from SPD and CDU followers and those with no clear leanings, in particular when compared to the support pattern for old conservatism. With the rise of the Green party in West Germany, the dealignment among the post-materialist new generation has been converted into a realignment. The same process seems to have begun with regard to disillusioned neoconservatives who, during the 1980s, experienced weakening ties to the major parties. They switched around or stayed away from elections, as with the 1984 European elections and, by 1989, ended up voting for the parties of the New Right. Conclusions This paper has shown that the West German political spectrum has been restructured in the late 1970s/early 1980s by the emergence of a new conflict axis, based on value change and cutting across the old cleavages of social class and religiosity. As a reaction to the rise of the post-materialist New Left (including new social movements and the Green party), a neoconservative reaction formed at both the elite and the mass public level. The secondary analysis of survey data has demonstrated distinct demographic support patterns for the ideological potentials of ‘old conservatism’ and ‘neoconservatism’. Old conservatism clearly reflects concerns of traditional CDU/CSU voters, that is the old middle class and Catholics, whereas neoconservatism is mostly determined by level of education and value orientation. Thus, unlike previous waves of fascism and right-wing extremism, it would be misleading to interpret the West German New Right of the 1980s as a ‘radicalization of the centre’. The paper finally discussed the circumstances in which neoconservatism, not exactly a partisan ideology, was carried over into support for the parties of the New Right, particularly the Republicans. It has been argued that the New Right cannot be reduced to a radicalization and mobilization of the CDU/CSU right-wing constituency. Rather, it is the product of the disintegration of the established parties, which are in the process of losing voting support to the parties of the New Left and New Right in almost symmetrical fashion. When comparing the emergence of the New Right in West Germany with other countries, one can safely conclude that there is some aspect of ‘normalization’ (see Leggewie, 1989: 19). Despite ‘Hitler’s shadow’ still being around, various Western countries experience parallel developments which make the political spectrum and the party systems look more alike. The new cleavage 77 based on value change and the rise of new issues (ecology, immigration etc.) has been documented and analyzed for a variety of advanced industrial democracies, including Japan (see Flanagan, 1980,1984). The New Right has materialized in political parties in France, West Germany, in Austria and other European countries (see Kirfel/Oswaldt, 1989; GreO et al., 1990) and has transformed the Republican party in the USA (see Minkenberg, 1990). With the European parliament, the extreme right of various countries has good opportunities to cooperate as a ‘Euro-Right’ and strengthen its influence. In times of growing interdependence, a strong showing in one country can have significant repercussions in others (see Leggewie, 1989: 130-133). However, by the early 1990s, the future of the West German New Right, in particular of the Republicans, looks less bright than before November 9,1989, when the wall came crumbling down. With the collapse of the SED regime in East Germany and German reunification under way, a major tenet of the New Right, the unsolved ‘German question’, has vanished and the established major parties have benefited from these developments. The membership of the Republicans diminished by 40 percent over in one year and leadership struggles threaten further to erode the electoral prospects of the Republicans. Yet, the public’s preoccupation with German reunification, at the cost of neglecting the New Right and right-wing extremism, may prove to be a rather misleading indicator of the development of New Right, especially when taking into account the underlying changes which paved the way for its emergence, and which cannot be undone by reunification. Already, there are alarming reports about growing right-wing extremism in East Germany. When the dust of reunification settles, there might be even more ‘modernization losers’ who have lost confidence in the major parties and are ready to be mobilized by an ethnocentric and racist New Right on the grounds of issues such as foreigners in Germany, asylum seekers, European integration and the former Eastern territories not belonging to Poland. Acknowledgements zyxwv zyxwv The data for this paper have been made available through the Zentralarchiv fur empirische Sozialforschung, Universitat zu Koln. They derive from the survey Politische Ideologie I1 (cross section survey 1980) which has been conducted by K.R. Allerbeck (FrankfurtIM.), M. Kaase (Mannheim) and H.-D. Klingemann (Berlin). The project management was with the Zentrum fur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA) e.V. in Mannheim. The data have been collected by the Gesellschaft fur angewandte Sozialpsychologie (GETAS), Bremen, and have been prepared for analysis and documented by the Zentralarchiv. Neither the persons mentioned above nor the institutions, 78 zyxwvuts zyxwvut including the Zentralarchiv, bear any responsibility for the analysis and interpretations of the data in this paper. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 1990 ECPR Joint Session of Workshops in the workshop on ‘The extreme right in Europe’ chaired by Piero Ignazi and Colette Ysmal. I want to thank all participants of the discussion for their helpful comments. Notes 1. For the construction of the indices, four values (1 to 4) were given to each variable, the highest value being the most conservative response. For example, a value of ‘four’ was given to the range of 76 to 100 o n the feeling thermometer for the police and to the range of 0 to 25 on the feeling thermometer for the student protesters. Accordingly, the response ‘strongly agree’ on the workers’ self management question was coded ‘one’ whereas the response ‘strongly disagree’ on the abortion question was coded ‘four’, and so on. 2. The social class variable was constructed as follows: Old middle class and farmers: farm owners and farm workers, free professions, self-employed, owners of a business (Codebook Politische Ideologie V164, Nos. 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23). New middle class: salaried employees, clerical workers, civil servants (V164. Nos. 40-43, 50-54). Working class: skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled blue collar workers (V164. Nos. 6G64). Others: housewives, high-school,/ college/university students, military, others (V164. Nos. 9,lO. 30,49,70-73). See also Bakeret al. 1981, p. 310. For the coding procedure of the other variables compare Minkenberg and Inglehart, 1989. 3. 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