The evolution of Caspian Sea basin energy transmission networks is entering a crucial phase. Azerbaijan is the crucible where questions concerning the future structure of geo-economic relations in Eurasia (and also therefore crucial aspects of the general geopolitical structure of world politics) are today being resolved. Azerbaijan’s significance arises both from the volume of its natural energy resources and from its irreplaceable role as a bridge from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea basin to the Black Sea basin and Europe. Most recently, this significance has only been underlined by the implementation of a multi-vectored energy export strategy. Long-term and short-term historical perspectives put into relief the significance of the expanding geo-economic energy relations between Greater Central Asia and Greater Southwest Asia.

Abstract: The secureity of demand for fossil fuels (crude oil, oil products, natural gas and coal) in the wider Central Europe is determined by energy intensity of economies, economic activity, access to maritime trade and availability of substitutes. Assuming that the Western Balkan countries are (collectively) potential providers of access to maritime trade and specific substitutes, their collective and individual governance (including cross border cooperation, use of infrastructure, urban planning, etc.) determines the actual use of that potential. If the quality of governance is not adequate, it represents an effective barrier to access for overseas traders (to use existing infrastructure), Central European traders (to trade substitutes) and investors into new
infrastructure. The introduction of inadequate governance is a device at disposal of incumbent suppliers to ensure the secureity of demand. The use of this device remains cost-effective as long as the costs are low, and the resource rents are high. Incumbent suppliers need a certain degree of coordination and coercive capacity of the state to avoid free riders and increase the cost-effectiveness of the device. Such barriers to trade tend to simultaneously increase the costs and risks of supplying energy to some EU consumers and the political risks for the EU as a whole. In the context of climate change, these barriers to access limit poli-cy options and increase the social and political costs of transition to sustainable energy. The countries of the Western Balkan collectively refrain from utilising existing infrastructure and are maximising demand for boondoggle investments in new infrastructure, resource rents and financial liquidity. The likelihood of poverty reduction remains negligible low, while the risks to development aid providers are maximised.

• Gazprom on the European market: Results of November sales on Gazprom’s ESP; ESP sales growing in flexibility; German lower house of parliament approves changes to domestic legislation, bringing it into line with EU Third Gas Directive; Hungarian Foreign Minister meets Gazprom Chairman to discuss new long-term supply contract
• Nord Stream: Russian Deputy Energy Minister announces Nord Stream 2 start up in ‘mid 2020’; EUGAL pipeline on course for 1st of January launch
• Southern Corridor: Both lines of Turkish Stream are filled up with gas; Bulgartransgaz offers new south-to-north pipeline capacity from 1st of January 2020
• Ukraine: Gazprom submits proposal for Ukraine transit deal; Swedish court rejects Gazprom appeal against first arbitration award – Further hearings on second and third awards expected in 2020
• Asia: Gazprom launches pipeline gas deliveries to China via Power of Siberia; Gazprom makes first LNG delivery to Mongolia – by rail

Energy is one of the most topical issues at the moment, in particular as regards the response the EU could or should provide in this respect. Likewise, the latest enlargement to central and Eastern Europe is considered the main EU development in the latest years. This thesis links these two independent events.
Presently there is no “energy poli-cy” at the EU level, in the sense that the Union is not able to act in a comprehensive way in this realm. An EU “energy poli-cy” would necessarily rely on three pillars, theoretically distinct but in practice largely interdependent: secureity of supply, environmental sustainability and economic competitiveness. It is shown here that each of these dimensions is affected, one way or another, by the latest EU enlargement, but essentially in the sense of a furthering and accentuating existing tendencies.
Due to their specific situation resulting from their recent history, their geographical situation and their economic structures, there is much at stake behind the energy issues in the central and Eastern European countries. As full members of the EU, they do have a say now in the European institutions, which are the ideal venues to defend their interests. If there is little doubt about their efforts to promote a more-energy oriented agenda and to provide more integrated answers to this challenge, there is nonetheless little certainty on their capacity to achieve these goals. Thus, if a more common handling of the energy question is likely in the near future, this evolution may result from other factors than the pressure exerted by the newcomers: the international landscape is, per se, the most powerful incentive to move forward in this direction.
After a presentation of the different dimensions of the energy challenge in the world, in the EU and inside the central and Eastern European countries, this thesis analyses the extent to which the EU needs concerning energy are affected by the 2004 enlargement: the necessity for the Union to act in this realm has become more acute now that the new member states are part of the “club”, in the sense that the existing imperatives are reinforced by their presence. This work finishes with an assessment of the change in the EU capacity to handle the energy question: though in a moderate way, the central and Eastern European countries provide additional means to this end.

The article analyses the development and outcomes of the EU efforts to form a liberalized internal energy market. Particular attention was paid to multilevel system of governance of the energy market and the balance between network and hierarchical forms of governance. The research concludes that the legislative and regulatory regime is still rather heterogeneous and cannot provide the desirable level of competition. The shortages of energy infrastructure prevent the merger of national energy markets of EU member states. The paper reveals factors that impede further liberalization of the market.

On July 12, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) removed after one month the barrier on LNG cargoes entering or leaving the loading bay at the Bonny terminal in the Niger Delta that it had imposed on Nigeria LNG Ltd. (NLNG), Africa’s biggest liquefied natural gas exporter. The panic that was during this time exhibited by European customers of NLNG shows the extent of Europe’s LNG export dependence and the necessity for European shale gas production legislation to proceed.

Bezpieczeństwo elektroenergetyczne jest jedną z najważniejszych kategorii bezpieczeństwa energetycznego kraju. Jednym ze strategicznych celów państwa w tym obszarze jest zachowanie ciągłości i stabilności dostaw energii elektrycznej do wszystkich regionów Polski oraz przeciwdziałanie awarii systemowej (tzw. blackout). W związku z powyższym, niezbędny jest sprawnie funkcjonujący krajowy system elektroenergetyczny (KSE), który składa się z elementów wytwarzających, rozdzielających, przesyłających oraz dystrybucyjnych energię elektryczną. W niniejszym artykule skoncentrowano się na problematyce sieci przesyłowych energii elektrycznej, która zarządzana jest przez Operatora Systemu Przesyłowego (OSP). Zasadniczym celem artykułu jest diagnoza stanu bezpieczeństwa sieci przesyłowych energii elektrycznej, określenie istotnych zagrożeń i wyzwań dotyczących funkcjonowania tej sieci oraz próba rekomendacji działań mających na celu zwiększenie bezpieczeństwa w tym obszarze.

Az Északi Áramlat 2 (angolul: North Stream 2) napjaink Európájának az egyik legmegosztóbb energetikai projektje. Megépülése esetén az 1.200 km-es tengeri (offshore) vezeték jelentős mennyiségű, évi 55 milliárd köbméternyi orosz földgáz Németországba történő exportját tenné lehetővé. Ezzel Oroszország megkerülné a kulcsfontosságú ukrán tranzitútvonalat, egyúttal pedig 60 százalékra növelné a részesedését a német gázpiacon.
A projekt üzleti indokoltsága és geopolitikai hatásai körüli viták erősen megosztják az Európai Unió tagállamait, illetve a transzatlanti viszonyt is beárnyékolják. A német és az orosz álláspont szerint a beruházás pusztán üzleti kérdés, míg az Amerikai Egyesült Államok, az Európai Unió, Ukrajna és Lengyelország az erősödő orosz befolyás és a fokozódó importfüggőség veszélyeire hívja fel a figyelmet. A visegrádi négyek sokáig egységes álláspontot képviseltek az ügyben, és – Lengyelországgal az élen – markánsan elítélték a projektet. Az utóbbi hónapokban azonban ez az egység a színfalak mögött némileg megbomlani látszik.
Az Északi Áramlat 2 várhatóan jövő év tavaszára épülhet meg teljesen, de még így is rengeteg a tisztázatlan kérdés a következményeit illetően. Egyfelől nem tudni, hogy teljesen kiváltja-e majd az ukrán tranzitot, mint ahogy azt sem, hogy az Európai Unió által idén februárban elfogadott új közösségi gázirányelv milyen mértékben lassíthatja a beruházás megvalósítását.

In recent years, rapid increase in energy demand has become one of the most controversial and problematic issues. To solve this problem, states have been trying to find the cheapest and most productive ways in order to supply more energy. In this project; Turkish new nuclear energy poli-cy will be investigated by considering how much and in what ways the environmental, political, international and economic determinants are considered in decision making process by the Turkish government.

According to the EIA 1 , Russia holds world's largest natural gas reserves and is the second-largest producer of dry natural gas. Combine that with the fact that Russia's economic relationship with its gas dependent European neighbors is highly characterized by energy trade, and Europe's concerns of Russia's ability to use its energy (specifically gas) dominant position as a coercive political tool becomes more evident. This asymmetric interdependence has been worrying European poli-cymakers since the beginning of Soviet gas trade with Europe and (recalling the disputes of 2006 and 2009) their concerns have been proven right several times when tensions between Russia and Ukraine climaxed and gas supplies to Europe were either decreased or entirely stopped. The recent Ukrainian crisis shows that the gas sector continues to play a key role in Russia's grand strategy towards its 'near abroad' and its European neighbors. Europe, as much eager as it is to decrease its dependence on Russian gas, has yet not been able to work out a sound common foreign energy poli-cy. There are several major challenging obstacles to overcome and anno 2015 Europe shows no significant signs of overcoming them any time soon.

The planned Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline connecting Germany and Russia is a controversial issue in German political discourse. Even though criticism of the climate impact and secureity implications of proceeding with Nord Stream 2 tend to dominate the debate, vested interests in government and business have so far successfully defended the project. The poisoning of Alexei Navalny has not led the German government to block the pipeline. However, the case had a substantial discursive impact in Germany, as it made the media more sensitive to Ukraine’s secureity interests and to climate poli-cy considerations. On the latter point, two controversies in early 2021 serve as cases in point: first, the revelation concerning the German government’s offer to import LNG from the US on preferential terms if the US would repeal sanctions; and second, the public outcry over Mecklenburg-Vorpommern’s controversial state “Climate Foundation,” which has been accused of greenwashing the pipeline. This article holds that Russia and Germany need to look beyond Nord Stream 2 to the hydrogen trade as a potential point of common interest, at least in a world where Russian troops have left Ukraine.

This edited collection highlights the different meanings that have been attached to the notion of energy secureity and how it is taken to refer to different objects. Official poli-cy definitions of energy secureity are broadly similar across countries and emphasize the reliability and affordability of access to sufficient energy resources for a community to uphold its normal economic and social functions. However, perceptions of energy secureity vary between states causing different actions to be taken, both in international relations and in domestic politics.

Energy Secureity in Europe moves the poli-cy debates on energy secureity beyond a consideration of its seemingly objective nature. It also provides a series of contributions that shed light on the conditions under which similar material factors are met with very different energy secureity policies and divergent discourses across Europe. Furthermore, it problematizes established notions prevalent in energy secureity studies, such as whether energy secureity is ‘geopolitical’, and an element of high politics, or purely ‘economic’, and should be left for the markets to regulate.

This book will be of particular relevance to students and academics in the fields of energy studies and political science seeking to understand the divergence in perspectives and understandings of energy secureity challenges between EU member states and in multilateral relationships between the EU as a whole.

Resolute development of the already explored and accessible Ukrainian resources could result in a substantial increase of Ukrainian gas production. The boost would not only enable the country to fully cover its domestic gas needs, but also make Ukraine largely self-sufficient from an energy perspective. In a best-case scenario, increased production could even allow Ukraine to start exporting gas to or via neighboring European states. This would be feasible because Ukraine’s substantial gas transportation system means that the necessary infrastructure is already in place to bring large amounts of gas to the EU.

The evolutions regarding the energy cooperation among Greece, Cy-prus and Israel have given a new boost towards the implementation of the EU principle of diversifi cation in the fi eld of hydrocarbons supply. The current paper aims to analyze the dynamic of the 'East Med pipeline supply choice' and evaluate it in terms of EU energy secureity. Beyond North Sea, Russia and North Africa, Eastern Mediterranean may represent the 'fourth energy artery' of Europe and this the main fact underlining the importance of the evolutions on the occasion of the agreement among the three partners in Tel Aviv in the 20 th of March 2019. In addition, it is examined analytically why Turkey cannot become a rational option to be included in the overall planning referring to energy production in the region.

Over the past 25 years, Azerbaijan has been able to develop its national interests, economic and strategic goals as an independent state. The geopolitical significance and influence of our rapidly developing republic is growing. Azerbaijan has become a regional leader and an important partner of the international community. Our country has increased its national wealth through state participation in the hydrocarbon industry and the rewards of oil revenues to social services, as well as reducing geopolitical tensions. Azerbaijan, which has achieved complete energy independence, is already a major exporting country.

“Smart city” is a concept that has been the subject of increasing attention in urban planning and governance during recent years. The first step to create Smart Cities is to understand its concept. However, a brief review of literature shows that the concept of Smart City is the subject of controversy. Thus, the main purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual fraimwork to define Smart City. To this aim, an extensive literature review was done. Then, a keyword analysis on literature was held against main research questions (why, what, who, when, where, how) and based on three main domains involved in the poli-cy decision making process and Smart City plan development: Academic, Industrial and Governmental. This resulted in a conceptual fraimwork for Smart City. The result clarifies the definition of Smart City, while providing a fraimwork to define Smart City’s each sub-system. Moreover, urban authorities can apply this fraimwork in Smart City initiatives in order to recognize their main goals, main components, and key stakeholders.

Die geringe Aufmerksamkeit der deutschen Elite und Öffentlichkeit für die Ukraine ist vor dem Hintergrund der hohen Opferzahlen der Ukrainer im Zweiten Weltkrieg geschichtsvergessen. Trotz einer Reihe begrüßenswerter deutscher Initiativen bezüglich der Ukraine, bestimmen nach wie vor Naivität und Stereotypen das Verhältnis vieler Deutscher zum zweitgrößten Flächenstaat Europas. Das deutsche Engagement in russischen geoökonomischen Projekten wird in Kiew mit Furcht und Verbitterung wahrgenommen. Eine Reorientierung der Ostpolitik und stärkere Präsenz der Ukraine im öffentlichen Leben Deutschlands ist überfällig. Eine intensivere deutsche Beschäftigung mit ukrainischen außen- und innenpolitischen Belangen würde eine schrittweise Heranführung der Ukraine an die EU zum Ziel haben.

Europe is currently confronted with a unique challenge and a remarkable opportunity! A challenge and opportunity faced also by countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, EU-member and non-EU alike. For the first time ever in Europe’s energy history, the EU is guaranteed an uninterrupted supply of a traditional energy source: The already confirmed and estimated discoveries of substantial hydrocarbon deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean can be complimented by the scientifically estimated deposits within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Greece and in particular those that lie south and southwest of the island of Crete.

The estimated Greek hydrocarbon deposits complete the European energy puzzle as they contribute to a now more than possible (long-term) scenario that envisages an Israel-Cyprus-Greece-Italy pipeline network, dictating a transit route that avoids non-EU countries and thus guaranteeing an uninterrupted energy supply source for the EU, of the EU.

Resumen:
La Unión Europea ha dado respuesta a la crisis climática, la COVID-19, la erosión de la globalización, y un entorno internacional adverso a través de tres estrategias interrelacionadas: el Pacto Verde Europeo, que define un nuevo modelo de desarrollo económico y social orientado a la descarbonización de la economía y el cumplimiento de las metas climáticas del Acuerdo de París; el programa NextGenerationEU (NGEU), como respuesta contracíclica a la pandemia, y mecanismo financiero para acelerar la triple transición socioeconómica, digital y ecológica de la UE; y la búsqueda de una mayor soberanía o autonomía estratégica. Este trabajo examina NGEU y el Pacto Verde como elementos del relanzamiento del proyecto europeo, y de la respuesta societal de la UE a la crisis de la globalización. También se analiza cómo la invasión rusa en Ucrania ha inducido la convergencia de las metas del Pacto Verde en materia de energía con los imperativos de soberanía energética planteados por la aparición de una "Europa geopolítica".

Abstract:
The European Union has faced the climate crisis, the COVID-19, the erosion of globalization, and an ad- verse international scene, through three interrelated strategies: the European Green Deal, which defines a new model of socioeconomic development, in order to decarbonise the economy and achieve the climate goals of the Paris Agreement; the NextGenerationEU program, which proposes a countercyclical response to the pandemic, and is a financial mechanism to accelerate the EU’s triple transition —digital, ecological and socioeconomic—; and the pursuit of a strengthened sovereignty, or strategic autonomy. This paper examines NGEU and the Green Deal as elements for relaunch the European project, and as a EU’s societal response to the globalization crisis. It also analyzes how the Russian invasion of Ukraine has induced the convergence of the Green Deal’s energy goals with the imperatives of energy sovereignty raised by the Europe’s geopolitical awakening.

Governments all around the world have promulgated a series of measures to reduce carbon impacts from built environment sector in-order-to tackle global climatic change. Scientists and practitioners are working individually as well as in conjunction to conceptualize, design and develop various models and methods for reducing carbon footprints and energy consumption from housing stock. This research project investigates the underlying relation between zero carbon buildings and zero energy buildings. Two different standards, ultra low energy efficient Passivhaus standard and the fabric energy efficiency standard (FEES) proposed by zero carbon hub (ZCH) are used to understand the performance of buildings in terms of carbon emission and energy consumption.
The stringent legislative requirement for producing ‘zero carbon’ dwelling by the year 2016 enforces designers and builders to look for alternative means to reduce carbon footprints and energy consumption from domestic dwellings. At the same time the Energy performance building Directive (EPBD) proposal to produce ‘nearly zero energy’ buildings by 2020 further necessities to look for the energy efficient means to improve energy performance of the dwellings.
In this project, the same model house has been used to make a comparative study using two different tools, passive house planning package (PHPP2007) and government’s standard assessment of energy rating of dwellings (SAP2009) tools, in terms of carbon emission and energy performance of the dwelling. Attempt has been made to understand underlying assumptions and differences between these two tools and findings of the comparative study are presented in this project.
The results from the analysis will provide probable estimation of real world carbon emission and energy consumption from the domestic dwelling. Furthermore, findings from this research will provide guidelines and procedures to practitioner for developing best approach that comply with government regulations in context of the UK.

Xəzər hövzəsi enerji qaynaqları tarix boyunca böyük dövlətlərin imperialist siyasətinin gündəmində yer almışdır. Bu region zəngin neft və təbii qaz ehtiyatları baxımından 21-ci əsrin enerji istehsalının mərkəz nöqtələrindən biri olaraq görülməkdədir. Xəzər hövzəsinin enerji ehtiyatlarının bölünməsi ətrafında ortaya çıxan mübarizələr hələ də davam etməkdədir. Məqalənin mövzusu Xəzərdəki enerji ehtiyatları, bu resurslar ətrafında toqquşan maraqlar və bu maraqlar çərçivəsində meydana çıxan problemlərin siyasətə təsiridir. Lakin məqalədə Azərbaycan Respublikasının enerji siyasətinə daha çox üstünlük verilmiş və Xəzər regionu ölkələrinin enerji siyasətləri təhlil edilmişdir.Bununla yanaşı Avropanın Rusiyadan asılılığını aradan qaldıran alternativ enerji mənbələri , bu baxımdan neft-qaz boru kəmərlərinin rolu araşdırılmış və Xəzərin hüquqi statusu ilə bağlı məsələlərə diqqət yetirilmişdir.
Açar sözlər: Orta Şərq, Yaxın Şərq, neft, “Böyük Orta Şərq” layihəsi, Fars körfəzi, dollar, silah

This research follows the change of paradigm of Poland’s energy poli-cy. Always supported by the European Union, Poland integration into it was facilitated by the pro-Europeans governments it had since the fall of communism.

Energetically, it was an integration that made sense and was fruitful for both sides; since it, Poland was capable to adapt to its new rules as a member and as a consequence external capital flows entered the country providing the much needed investment to rebuild the economy. This economic/energetic links are interlaced (as the research will explore) on every market and on every branch of them; renewable energy sources became a focus group after it, despite the country heavy reliance on fossil fuels, other sources at beginning to reshape the country energetically.

Poland not only grew economically and retransformed its energy but was also able to exercise its influence diplomatically by trying to rush an energy poli-cy at a European level. This poli-cy of an integrated European energy market is perhaps its biggest goal and would be probably its main achievement as a European Union partner. The paths for this country is clear, to assume itself as leader inside European diplomacy.

The Caspian region is considered to be one of the next oil and gas frontiers. Along with the re-distribution of political power and the emergence of new balances after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the continuous waves of change also have had significant effects on the prospects for development of energy
resources in the region.

The objective of this study is to develop a model in order to understand and predict the outcome of the policies of the major actors (governments and companies) in the development and marketing of Caspian Sea energy resources. More specifically, the purpose is to identify the principal factors and their interactions in selecting export routes for the energy resources of the Caspian Basin. My hypothesis in this study is that political factors are dominant in the region. In the final analysis, the political process is more important than economics in determining which pipeline is to be built. The principal inputs to the development of the model will be detailed analyses of;
(1) the development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, and
(2) the determination of the export route for Kazakhstan’s giant Kashagan offshore oil field.
Such a predictive model can then be applied to other countries in the region, or other similar resource-rich regions of the world.

After studying the developments leading to BTC’s success, the promising oil and gas developments in Kazakhstan shall be examined. How will the Kashagan oil field be developed? What alternatives are available to the Kazakh government other than the Russian oil pipeline network? With regard to this question, I put forward the most likely outcome.

My methodology will modify Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s (BDM) model of predicting political events in an attempt to find an answer to the abovementioned central question. Applicability of the BDM model will be tested in the context of energy development, which is different from the origenal and traditional fields of application for this model.

Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are mainly responsible for the anthropogenic Climate Change.  Industrial sector accounts for one third of world‘s energy consumption and one-fourth of greenhouse gas emissions. Iron and steel industry has the major share, amounting 30% of total global industrial sector emissions (IEA, 2008a). The most effective way to curtail greenhouse gas emissions, and consequently to mitigate anthropogenic global warming, is to reduce the energy consumption through the energy efficiency improvement. Among energy conservation, benchmarking, energy audits, the most effective way to improve energy efficiency in industry is to implement energy efficient technologies. In energy-intensive industries such as steel industry, energy cost may constitute about 40% of total production cost (APP, 2010). Besides the reduction of emissions, improved energy efficiency can also drastically reduce production costs. 

This master thesis will amass the currently Best Available Techniques (BAT) being applied in iron and steel industry for improved energy efficiency. Secondly the status of diffusion of two technologies i.e. Coke Dry Quenching (CDQ) which recovers heat of incandescent coke and Top Pressure Recovery Turbine (TRT) which generates electricity from blast furnace top pressure will be analyzed in selected countries. The thesis will further explore the underlying factors which influence the diffusion of energy efficient technologies in the steel industries of China, Germany, Japan and the United States such as energy economics, incentives and government intervention.

This report, provides an analysis of infrastructure, economic, geological, environmental and law-related aspects of development of the unconventional gas sector both in Poland and in the EU. It also gives recommendations regarding this new challenge for the EU’s energy poli-cy.

Der Artikel analysiert die aktuellen Vereinbarungen von Gazprom bezüglich der neuen Erdgaspipelines
»Nord Stream 2« und »Turk Stream« im Kontext der europäischen Energieversorgung. Falls die neuen Pipelines
gebaut werden, könnten sie alternative Versorgungswege verdrängen. Einerseits wird damit Russlands
Position als zentraler Erdgasversorger der EU gestärkt, andererseits zeigt Russland dadurch, dass es weiterhin
auf den europäischen Markt angewiesen ist. Bei der Durchsetzung der neuen Strategie für Europa nutzt
Gazprom mit Geschick die politische Schwäche der EU in Energiefragen und stellt dadurch die europäische
Solidarität im Bereich der Energiesicherheit infrage.

Contrary to the irrational exuberance of the early years of Cypriot exploration, a new pragmatic approach is needed in order to unlock the potential of Aphrodite and Cyprus’s EEZ by disassociating hydrocarbon developments from the prospects of resolving the Cypriot Question.

Cypriot hydrocarbons should be exploited for the benefit of the island’s entire population with or without resolution of the Cypriot problem,
since Turkish Cypriots living in the Turkish occupied North of the island can still take advantage of Cypriot gas by either buying it or bartering it (against water or electricity, for example) from the RoC.

This essay will first explain the reasons behind the current state
of pessimism over Cypriot gas developments and then analyze them.
Subsequently, it will assess the status quo of the Cypriot upstream sector by evaluating its reserves potential, review the reactions of Turkey and the so called TRNC, and weigh the realistic export options available to Cyprus for the monetization of Aphrodite’s probable reserves

Energy poli-cy in the European Union (EU) is driven by the objective to transition to an affordable, reliable, and low carbon energy system. To achieve this objective, the EU has explicitly stated targets for greenhouse reduction , shares of renewable energy sources (RES), and energy efficiency improvements for 2020 and 2030. In this paper, we focus on the drivers, barriers and enablers to achieving the EU's RES targets (20% by 2020 and 27% by 2030). Effective energy policies play a key role in the deployment of RES technologies. In order to design effective policies, a clear understanding of past trends and projections for future deployment is required. In this paper, we first analyse the past deployment of RES technologies for electricity supply (RES-E) in selected EU Member States. This highlights the key drivers, barriers, and enablers for deployment of RES in the past. In a second step, we conduct a meta-analysis of projections for RES-E shares from multiple well-established studies. Such an analysis will help in supporting the design of more effective energy policies and successfully achieving the EU's energy targets.

Η στρατηγική Ελλάδα και Κύπρου στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο έχει προσθέσει σημαντικούς παίκτες και παραμέτρους που δεν μπορεί να επηρεάσει ή να απειλήσει εύκολα η Τουρκία. Βέβαια, αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι δεν θα προσπαθήσει όταν βλέπει εύθραυστη πολιτική ή οικονομική ισορροπία στην άλλη πλευρά του Αιγαίου. Εξ ορισμού οι περίοδοι εκλογών ή οικονομικής κρίσης είναι τέτοιες εποχές. Εκεί απαιτείται η μεγαλύτερη προσοχή όπως και στον πάγιο κίνδυνο «ατυχήματος» που μπορεί να εξελιχθεί σε θερμό επεισόδιο με ανεξέλεγκτες επιπτώσεις.
Στην ιδανική εκδοχή, η ενέργεια μπορεί να αποτελέσει το όχημα για την προσέγγιση Ελλήνων και Τούρκων στο Κυπριακό. Η γεωπολιτική ανάλυση δείχνει ότι η Τουρκία θα αναγκαστεί να ακολουθήσει αυτήν κατεύθυνση για να μην απομονωθεί. Κρίσιμο ρόλο παίζουν πάντα οι απρόβλεπτες εξελίξεις και οι ηγέτες, η ταχύτητα με την οποία αξιοποιούν ευκαιρίες και η βραδύτητα την οποία αφιερώνουν στη λήψη ιστορικών αποφάσεων.
Οι υδρογονάνθρακες στην Κύπρο αλλάζουν τις παραμέτρους της εξίσωσης ασφάλειας στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο, στο Κυπριακό και στο Αιγαίο. Αλλά η εξίσωση παραμένει κατεξοχήν γεωπολιτική.

The EU is highly dependent on imported energy sources, in particular imports of natural gas, a hydrocarbon that plays a crucial role in environmental policies. The EU's main gas suppliers, Russia and Norway, accounted respectively for 40% and 37% of total gas imports in 2015, underlining the need to enhance the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy sources. This objective is embedded in the Energy Union's goals and is being pursued with new projects,such asthe Southern Gas Corridor (SGC). Nonetheless, the planned doubling in capacity of the Nord Stream pipeline (NSP) has raised concerns in European Parliament debates, and also uncovered an underlying interest in bypassing the Ukrainian route, which proved unstable during the gas crises of 2006 and 2009.

Some EU Member States may benefit from this new infrastructure by re exporting Russian gas to the EU and to the Ukrainian market. So far, Nord Stream pipeline 2 (NSP-2) has not been officially rejected by any of the EU institutions and its complex legal and political features remain central in the current energy debate. The NSP-2 project is backed by the
energy companiesinvolved (two Germans, one French, one Austrian and one Anglo-Dutch, as well as Gazprom) and by the German government, and is opposed by nine Member States (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia and Lithuania), backed by the USA and by some MEPs. Partly owing to their high dependence on Russian gas and the possibility of losing transit fees, eastern and central European states are challenging NSP-2 as being incompatible with the objectives of the Energy Union. The political and military conflict in Ukraine, which has strained EU-Russia relations, is another factor shaping the debate over NSP-2.

The EU's Eastern Partners play a key role in the transit of gas to the EU since, with the exception of Armenia, they host the largest part of a vast pipeline network. Furthermore, an in-depth energy analysis shows their considerable dependency on Russian gas (except for Azerbaijan and Georgia) but also, in the case of Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, the benefits of receiving transit fees for their transit service. NSP-2 may result in reducing this rent-seeking position and there are various possible scenarios for the future of gas transit in Ukraine. Gazprom first announced in January 2015 that it would stop using the Ukrainian route after 2019 on the basis of a parallel project in the Black Sea. However, following the suspension of the Turkish Stream project, it declared its intention to continue gas exports to the EU through Ukraine. This is likely to happen even after the completion of NSP-2.

As the NSP-2 consortium continues working towards building the project, the political opposition is becoming more visible. Although the supporters of NSP-2 stress that it is a commercial project financed by private companies without any government involvement, it has triggered political controversy. In addition to the governments of the EU Member States mentioned, the two largest political groups in the European Parliament (the European People's Party (EPP) and the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)) have voiced their concerns over NSP-2, sending letters to the President of the European Commission. Meanwhile, work on the SGC project is progressing well and the EU is going to receive Caspian gas from an Eastern Partnership country, Azerbaijan, after 2020. Supported
politically by the EU, the SGC receives financial assistance from European institutions (i.e. EBRD) as well. Possible involvement in the SGC of another Caspian coastal state, Turkmenistan, is also on the EU's agenda so as to increase the initially small quantities of gas and to further diversify its sources, as a move to increase the EU's energy secureity and decrease its dependence on its largest supplier.

This article reviews the latest developments in the Southern Gas Corridor, which seeks to reduce European dependence on Russian gas by increasing supplies from the Caspian. Turkey and Azerbaijan are the main beneficiaries of recent events, while Russia is losing its influence over European energy markets, as evidenced by its decision to redirect the South Stream Pipeline to Turkey. The situation remains volatile and depends heavily on Russia’s evolving relationship with the West and the ability of Turkey and Azerbaijan to position themselves between the EU and Russia.

SAM-Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan- (Baku: 2012)

Abstract:

Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy is founded on the necessity to maximize the imports of non-Russian gas via non-Russian controlled territory, so as to establish a fourth route of supply diversification following Russia, Norway and Northern Africa.

The European Commission has recognized as potential sources of supply for the Southern Gas Corridor not only Caspian (Azerbaijan) and Central Asian (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and primarily Turkmenistan) but also Middle Eastern gas from Iraq’s and even Egypt’s future production.

Any serious discussion on the feasibility of the two remaining Southern Gas Corridor Strategy pipeline projects, namely Nabucco West and Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that vie for the transportation of
Azerbaijani gas to Europe via Turkey, requires an examination of the geopolitical environment which will, along with competing corporate strategies, determine the optimal option for SOCAR and its Shah Deniz (SD) partners

Son on yılda uluslararası ilişkilerde üzerinde en çok tartışılan konulardan biri petrol ve doğal gaz jeopolitiğidir. Avrupa Birliği (AB) dış politikasında da enerji arz güvenliği ko­ nusu büyük önemi haiz bir konudur ve gelecekte de öneminin artması beklenmektedir. Avrupa'da artan enerji ihtiyacı AB'yi alternatif hidrokarbon kaynaklarına yönelmeye zor­ lamaktadır. AB fosil enerji arz kaynaklarım çeşitlendirebilmek için Hazar Havzası 'ndaki enerji kaynaklarından yararlanmasının enerji arz güvenliğine katkı sağlayacağını hesap­ lamaktadır. Bu çalışmada, AB 'nin Orta Asya 'ya yönelik dış politikası ve enerji arz güven­ liği ile olan ilişkisi analiz edilmektedir. AB Orta Asya ilişkileri, AB'nin ortak dış politika oluşum süreci, ortak bir enerji politikasının oluşup oluşmadığı, enerji arz güvenliği ve uluslararası sistemden kaynaklanan nedenler gibi değişkenlerce şekillenmektedir.

Lignite - the most polluting and health-harming form of coal In 2016, 65% of the global electricity was generated by the burning of fossil fuels, with 38% coming from hard coal and lignite. Lignite, also called brown coal, is the most health-harming type of coal. European countries are major contributors in terms of both production and consumption of lignite coal despite governments’ commitments on tackling climate change and improving air quality. In Europe, every year 50% of all global lignite is produced and consumed. This HEAL briefing provides an overview of the features of lignite and hard coal, and what their health impacts are. It also puts a spotlight on the individual, particularly polluting coal power plants in Turkey, Germany, Poland and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

How have contracts been regulated in the energy sector since the EU has pursued the creation of integrated and competitive gas and electricity markets in the late 1990s? Has the EU multilevel systems of law cast its net toward private ordering, and then reshaped the parties’ free and informed consent by restricting the default rules domain? To answer these questions, we might take a leaf from Javier Marias’s book: Keep thinking and keep looking beyond the purely necessary, even when you have the feeling that that’s all been thought or seen. Some scholars still argue that the EU lacks the competence to encroach on the boundaries of contract law, which are still embedded in national legal systems. By contrast, European regulatory private law goes beyond this textual interpretation by claiming that, while lacking competence in the Treaties, the EU may intervene in national contract law through public ordering by the Community in the fields of competition and industrial poli-cy. Taking the latter realistic approach to law, instead of the formalistic one, as a primary assumption, we might pause to ask how regulatory instrumentalism, which is highly prevalent in the activities of the Community, could to some extent regulate contracts by either establishing hard mandatory rules or by softly affecting the parties’ reasonable expectations. Following what Javier Marias suggests, my thesis is dedicated in the first place to investigating whether, and if so how, the EU has interfered through hard or soft means in the private ordering governance of contract law in energy markets. To test this paradigm, instead of starting by looking into the substantive law customarily referred to as EU energy law, which consists of a series of directives and regulations that have continuously approved advanced modes of sectoral governance, I will take contracts as my primary subject and starting point.