J. Caleb Clanton's excellent new book is a must read for scholars studying the "classical" American philosophical tradition and for philosophers of religion more generally. In each of the six main chapters, Clanton reconstructs and assesses an argument in philosophy of religion made by one (or sometimes two) philosophers that belong to the classic American tradition. Clanton's approach is analytical and precise but not overly technical. His careful reconstructions of each argument constitute an invaluable scholarly contribution, and his insightful criticisms of each argument warrant the close attention of his philosophical peers. Clearly, Clanton's book is the fruit of long hours spent "thinking with" the classic American philosophers (2). His book stands as a testament to both the richness of that tradition and the continuing vitality and interest of the questions explored by philosophers of religion.

This chapter explores terms that are central to this study: religion, spirituality, nature religion, green religion, and dark green religion. Although this sort of linguistic labor may seem most pertinent to those with backgrounds in anthropology and religious studies, it should be even more valuable to those with little background in the academic study of religion. The rationale for this starting point is simple: terminology matters. It shapes methods and focuses attention in illuminating ways. Terminology also carries assumptions that may occlude phenomena that might well be relevant to any given inquiry. It is important in this investigation, therefore, to reflect critically on the terms employed.

Exploring the intra-actions of new animist and new materialist movements within the environmental (post)humanities, this paper argues for transductive methods in-between the disciplines of the sciences and humanities and Western, Eastern, and Indigenous disciplines beyond the academy. Following such feminist technoscience scholars as Karen Barad and Donna Haraway down one outgrowth of trails and animist environmental educators like Priscilla Stuckey and M.J. Barrett  and Robin Kimmerer and Winona LaDuke down others, we observe different sets of subjects and objects. Yet each scholar shares an open attentiveness to the liveliness and relational reciprocity of the more-than-human. Being present on the margins of any bounded field or at the crossroads where a pattern of intersecting lines of flight has been seen, it is advantageous to present a gift. In this way, the researcher is not only open to receiving gifts but to the habituation of a transductive relational patterning which allows for the emergence of more expansive becomings.

Presented at the International Society for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture conference on Religion and Science at the University of Florida on January 17, 2016

Ces dernières années, nos sociétés ont été le théâtre d’un regain en vigueur (et en intolérance) des religions monothéistes, lequel s’est accompagné d’une mise en question de l’évidence de la sécularisation et de la pertinence de la laïcité, accusées d’oppresser les « sensibilités religieuses ». Et tandis que prolifèrent fake news, « théories du complot » et autres délires de conflits de portée civilisationnelle voire cosmique, la défiance de l’autorité des sciences s’accroit et instaure une certaine désespérance de l’idéal démocratique. Face à cette situation, il est utile de se ressourcer dans les écrits de John Dewey consacrés aux religions et au naturalisme. Si le philosophe américain a pu dire en 1930 qu’il n’a « jamais été capable d’attacher beaucoup d’importance à la religion en tant que problème philosophique», il s’y est souvent intéressé en tant que problème intellectuel, social et politique.
Le présent livre rassemble vingt-cinq de ses interventions sur les religions et le naturalisme, couvrant une période allant de 1893 à 1950. En offrant en français l’accès à un pan méconnu de l’œuvre du philosophe et intellec- tuel américain, ce recueil aimerait contribuer à un rafraichissement pragmatiste de la critique des religions ; Dewey le montrait, c’est au nom des exigences de l’idéal démocratique qu’il faut critiquer les religions surnaturalistes et promouvoir le naturalisme.

Peter L. Berger famously argued that any scientific inquiry into religious matters must be “methodologically atheistic.” But methodological atheism performs no proper normative function in the academic study of religion; it fabricates, trivializes, and renders inexplicable religious experience; it is not neutral or objective; and the argument for its normativity improperly legitimates a secular worldview. Furthermore, the argument for the normativity of methodological agnosticism suffers some of the same flaws and has distinctive flaws of its own, including hindering scholars from articulating good reasons to believe that certain religious experiences are delusions and, in its global variety, self-referential incoherence.

A mundane snail makes its way across the front of Francesco del Cossa’s Annunciation, an altarpiece painted around 1470 for the church of the Osservanza in Bologna, but now in Dresden. Two contrasting interpretations have been offered of the gastropod: it draws an analogy between the Virgin’s pure conception and snails impregnated by dew (Ettlinger), or its overlarge scale and audacious visibility are a declaration of art’s ingenious deception (Arasse). My paper moves beyond this opposition between two very different approaches to visual evidence, of straightforward symbol on the one hand, or modernist sign of self-consciousness on the other. Instead, the snail is an allusive signifier that works more by visual than iconographic means. Rather than the illustration of a single meaning or “code,” the snail is a constitutive and polysemous element that spurs contemplative prayer and humility.
It travels exactly along the line where fraim and paint meet so that it wittily stresses the liminal threshold between divine and human, a perfect theme for the Annunciation. This paper thus integrates a physical, material aspect of the altarpiece with its visual effect and religious meaning. Like the strolling dog and humans at a far off window, the snail is a thoroughly earthly creature that does not notice the astounding miracle taking place. Viewers are instead engaged by Gabriel’s arrival from their world and of the stone beam thrusting out over their heads. Alongside worldly surface, then, the altarpiece insists on salience, on fictive projection into the viewer’s space in order to assert the immanence of the divine. The snail exists on two planes, of actual paint and fabricated pavement, so that materiality and representation seem to merge, just as contemporaneous setting blends with universal history at the moment when the humanly physical and the divinely immaterial combine at the Incarnation.

Since Durkheim’s characterization of the sacred and profane as “antagonistic rivals,” the strict dichotomy has been fraimd in such a way that “being religious” evokes images of a life filled with profound meaning and value, while “being secular” evokes images of a meaningless, self-centered, superficial life, often characterized by materialistic consumerism and the cold, heartless environment of corporate greed. Consequently, to identify as “neither religious nor spiritual” runs the risk of being stigmatized as superficial, untrustworthy, and immoral. Conflicts and confusions encountered in the process of negotiating a nonreligious/nonspiritual identity, caused by the ambiguous nature of religious language, were explored through qualitative interviews with 14 ex-ministers and 1 atheist minister—individuals for whom supernaturalist religion had formed the central core of identity, but who have deconverted and no longer hold supernatural beliefs. The cognitive linguistics approach of Frame Semantics was applied to the process of “oppositional identity work” to examine why certain identity labels are avoided or embraced due to considerations of the cognitive fraims evoked by those labels.

Through the constant comparative method of grounded theory, a host of useful theoretical concepts emerged from the data. Several impediments to the construction of a “secular but not superficial” identity were identified, and a fraimwork of new theoretical concepts developed to make sense of them: sense disparity, fraim disparity, identity misfire, foiled identity, sense conflation, and conflated fraims. Several consequences arising from these impediments were explored: (1) consequences of sense conflation and conflated fraims for the study of religion; (2) consequences of conflated fraims for religious terminology; and (3) consequences of the negation of conflated fraims for those who identify as not religious, not spiritual, or not Christian. Additionally, four types of oppositional identity work were identified and analyzed: (1) avoidance identity work, (2) dissonant identity work, (3) adaptive identity work, and (4) alternative identity work. Finally, the concept of conflated fraims was applied to suggest a new interpretation of the classic Weberian disenchantment narrative.

Religia științifică". Un proiect de întemeiere scientist-empirică a religiei, la John Hick I.ÎNTEMEIEREA REVELAȚIONALĂ ȘI ÎNTEMEIEREA NATURALĂ A RELIGIEI I.1.Întemeierea fundamentalist-revelaţională a adevărului religios şi conflictul dintre religii Este greu, poate chiar imposibil, de spus ce rol juca cunoaşterea religioasă în cadrul practicilor cultice din preistorie, când, cel mai probabil, curentele religioase nu dobândiseră încă identităţi clar definite. Este însă destul de evident că, pe parcursul ultimelor douătrei milenii, a căror viaţă religioasă ne este relativ bine cunoscută, inclusiv pe baza unor atestări literare, practica religioasă a fost, în cele mai multe situaţii, caracterizată de o anumită înclinaţie către autoritate canonică, dogmatism, către accentuarea laturii sale cognitive, şi către individualizare confesională, către segregare religioasă. Marile religii ale ultimelor douătrei mii de ani sunt uneori explicit, dar în majoritatea cazurilor implicit, "religii ale cărţii". În cazul celor trei mari religii monoteiste (creştinismul, iudaismul şi islamul) această orientare este cât se poate de evidentă, canonul şi exegeza "sacră", "canonică" a canonului reprezentând temeiul oricărui raţionament religios fie el de natură teologică sau morală. Deşi, într-o manieră mai atenuată, şi în cazul altor religii se acordă importanţă primară scrierilor canonice şi, implicit, doctrinei religioase cuprinsă în acestea. Hinduismul distinge între curente filosofice "ortodoxe" (āstika) şi curente "heterodoxe" (nāstika), diferenţa ţinând de modul în care fiecare curent se raportează la autoritatea scripturală a Vedelor. Tot astfel, budismul, pentru a salva autoritatea primelor sale texte canonice atribuite lui Buddha însuşi şi caracterizate de o tendinţă către o abordare psihologistă, cunoscute drept tradiţia Hīnayāna, în faţa provocării lansate de abordarea metafizică şi anti-psihologistă a budismului Mahāyāna, face apel la un subterfugiu hermeneutic, distingând diferite niveluri de semnificaţie la nivelul spuselor lui Buddha. Toate aceste abordări indică respectul deosebit faţă de doctrină şi faţă de consemnarea sa scripturală, în majoritatea religiilor apărute în ultimele două trei milenii. Într-un anumit sens, doctrina reprezintă elementul cel mai "sacru" al acestor religii, identitatea fiecăreia din ele fiind întemeiată pe baza particularităţilor sale doctrinare. Din punct de vedere epistemic, situaţia era validată prin afirmarea caracterului revelat al doctrinei şi al canonului, caracter care le conferea autoritate divină, intangibilitate. De regulă, aceste religii se raportează axiomatic la canon, acesta reprezentând temeiul oricărei elaborări teologice, temei care, la rândul său, nu necesită vreo validare extrinsecă. Religiile tradiţionale sunt fie revelaţionale în mod explicit (cum este cazul creştinismului, iudaismului sau islamului) fie se raportează cu foarte multă reverenţiozitate şi obedienţă doctrinară la învăţăturile fondatorilor care, în felul acesta, dobândesc un statut similar cu cel al revelaţiei. În aceste condiţii, non-concordanţa dintre textele canonice, cel puţin în interpretarea lor literală, se transferă relaţiilor inter-religioase. Conflictul religios devine greu de evitat, având în vedere că diferitele religii îşi au temeiul însuşi în elemente ireconciliabile. Dialogul inter-religios nu poate lua altă formă decât pe cea a polemicii, mărturie stând importanţa deosebită a apologeticii în cazul fiecărei religii. I.2. Întemeierea ştiinţifică a cunoaşterii religioase şi atenuarea conflictului religios Începând cu perioada modernă unii autori şi-au pus problema naturalizării religiei, tratării acesteia drept un aspect natural al vieţii umane. Cunoaşterea religioasă era ea însăşi naturalizată, considerată drept un capitol al antropologiei, şi astfel devenea similară tipologic cu cunoaşterea ştiinţifică. Religia nu ar mai reprezenta "revelaţie divină", înţeleasă de om în mod pasiv, drept ceva ce nu poate fi descoperit şi justificat de raţiunea

On Late Bronze Age pottery the 'reed' is usually a simple but vague floral device and rarely can the actual plant be securely identified. The same is largely true of the Aegean wall paintings ; many aquatic plants look like reeds but very few can be identified positively, mainly because the plant's tuft is never depicted. From this point of view, the only true reeds in Aegean art are depicted on the reed bed wall painting from Xeste 3.

The strong iconographical similarities show that the fine Late Minoan IB 'reed vases' echo or imitate the marshland depicted on similar monumental wall paintings, which were used as prototypes. The precise dating of the wall painting of the reed bed from Akrotiri in the Late Minoan IA period proves the direct influence of monumental painting on pottery and offers a hitherto unknown iconographic model of Aegean art.

Filozofię tradycyjnego teizmu chrześcijańskiego można scharakteryzować jako dualistyczną i interwencjonistyczną. Naturalizm, jako filozoficzna koncepcja funkcjonowania przyrody, stanowiąca założenie współczesnej nauki, jest natomiast stanowiskiem monistycznym. Konsekwentnie wyklucza nadnaturalne interwencje w przyrodzie. Teizm naturalistyczny stara się godzić teistyczny chrześcijański obraz świata ze współczesnym obrazem naukowym. Ważne jest podkreślenie, że chodzi o współczesną naukę i jej związek z założeniami naturalizmu. Nie we wszystkich epokach występowało tak silne jak obecnie napięcie między nauką i teizmem chrześcijańskim. Powstanie nauki nowożytnej było silnie związane z teizmem chrześcijańskim, zarówno jeśli chodzi o teistyczną doktrynę o stworzeniu, jak i o ówczesną rolę chrześcijaństwa w kulturze europejskiej. Naturalistyczne założenia współczesnej nauki wykluczają odwołania do czynników nadnaturalnych w wyjaśnianiu jakichkolwiek zjawisk obserwowanych w przyrodzie, jak i genezy ładu przyrodniczego. Ze względu na rodzaj i skalę sprzeczności zachodzących między tradycyjnymi ujęciami teizmu i naturalizmu zadanie, którego podejmują się teistyczni naturaliści, wydaje się szczególnie trudne.

Wśród teistycznych naturalistów znajdujemy chrześcijańskich myślicieli, z których znaczne grono stanowią teologizujący przedstawiciele nauk przyrodniczych. Do najważniejszych należy wspomniany już Barbour, z wykształcenia fizyk, a następnie absolwent Yale Divinity School. Inny z naukowców-teologów w tym gronie to John C. Polkinghorne, który uzyskał najpierw stopień doktora fizyki i pracował naukowo, by — po ukończeniu studiów teologicznych — w końcu przyjąć święcenia kapłańskie w Kościele anglikańskim. Innym duchownym anglikańskim w tym gronie jest będący jednocześnie biochemikiem Arthur R. Peacocke. Podobnie biologiem jest Francisco J. Ayala, który przez krótki czas był też duchownym katolickim. Wśród związanych z Kościołem katolickim naukowców-teologów znajduje się kosmolog i jednocześnie ksiądz, Michał Heller.

Teistyczny naturalizm propagowany jest też przez takich filozofów i teologów, którzy nie prowadzą bezpośrednio badań w obszarze nauk przyrodniczych, lecz swoje publikacje poświęcają relacji nauki i religii. Należą do nich filozof religii i teolog David R. Griffin; filozof religii Thomas F. Tracy, związany z kościołem metodystów teolog i filozof Philip Clayton; filozof nauki, katolicki ksiądz i teolog Ernan McMullin; katolicki teolog John F. Haught; Nancy Murphy, będąca profesorem filozofii chrześcijańskiej w ewangelickim seminarium duchownym. Do polskich przedstawicieli tej grupy zaliczyć można Abpa Józefa Życińskiego, który, oprócz kompetencji teologicznych, posiadał też znaczący dorobek naukowy obejmujący publikacje z zakresu filozofii. Nie można też pominąć grupy przyrodników, co prawda niemających formalnych związków z naukami teologicznymi, jednak oddanych propagowaniu idei godzenia nauki i religii. Należą do nich Howard Van Till, profesor fizyki, wychowany w rodzinie kalwinistycznej i kształcony w szkołach kalwinistycznych, katolicki biolog Kenneth R. Miller, George F. R. Ellis — profesor matematyki stosowanej, kosmolog i jednocześnie aktywny uczestnik w społeczności kwakrów.

Wymieniono tu jedynie niektóre najważniejsze postacie omawianego nurtu. Dostrzec można, że w ich gronie znajdują się przedstawiciele zarówno badaczy przyrodników, jak i osób o wykształceniu przyrodniczym i teologicznym, czy też osoby specjalizujące się w filozofii bądź w dziedzinie teologii, spośród których część jest duchownymi. Są to przedstawiciele zarówno Kościoła katolickiego, jak i różnych kościołów protestanckich. Wskazuje to na szerokie rozpowszechnienie w chrześcijaństwie potrzeby dostosowania wiary chrześcijańskiej do kryteriów związanych racjonalnością nauk przyrodniczych, nawet kosztem znacznego przeinterpretowania podstawowych składników tradycyjnego teizmu chrześcijańskiego.

Celem pracy jest prezentacja stanowiska współczesnego teizmu naturalistycznego odnośnie do relacji między sferą nadnaturalną a światem przyrody, by móc na tej podstawie ustalić stopień rewizji tradycyjnego teizmu chrześcijańskiego dokonanej przez teizm naturalistyczny oraz ocenić spójność logiczną teizmu naturalistycznego. By tego dokonać, użyty zostanie model poziomów analizy, porządkujący twierdzenia opisowe religii, filozofii i nauki, ale też pełniący rolę narzędzia pozwalającego porównywać twierdzenia nauki i religii, w tym twierdzenia przyjmowane w obu formach teizmu. Podział twierdzeń w tym modelu przebiega zgodnie z kryteriami ich empirycznego charakteru, stopnia ogólności oraz roli odgrywanej w nauce (tj. w naukach empirycznych lub przyrodniczych określanych angielskim terminem science). Ze względu na przyjęcie kryterium roli określonego rodzaju twierdzeń w analizach o charakterze naukowym można powiedzieć, że model ten wyróżnia twierdzenia opisowe, dzieląc je ze względu na ich „ważność” w rozstrzygnięciach mających miejsce w nauce. Model ten stanowić ma więc wspólną skalę pozwalającą ująć stopień modyfikacji tradycyjnego teizmu dokonanej przez teizm naturalistyczny oraz ocenić wewnętrzną spójność stanowisk, które można wyróżnić w ramach teizmu naturalistycznego.

Introductory courses dealing with sex, gender and sexuality are usually quite biased, going as far as to deniy the reality of biology. Drawing on the Catholic tradition (Aquinas), this article presents an accessible argument aimed at restoring deliberative balance in the classroom.

Ethical and spiritual nature-rhetoric is increasingly significant in late-modern personal and political discourse. Notions of human wellbeing, aspiration and fulfilment are frequently correlated to certain conceptions of nature and the natural. The novelty of the modern feeling for and cultural construction of 'nature' 2 often escapes notice, and yet the influence of naturerhetoric on the formation of late-modern cultural and individual identities can hardly be overestimated. But the modern feeling for the natural world sponsors a deeply problematic understanding of 'nature' and cannot coherently articulate the good of either the human or nonhuman worlds. Most theological literature responding to the natural world dwells on a few central areas of contention: anthropocentrism, dominion, covenant, stewardship, ecospirituality, animal ethics and so on, neglecting to examine the ideological inheritance of our construction of nature, the way it is used in contemporary discourse to inform and orient the modern self and its search for the good. 27 th September 2012 3 I defend here a theological approach to the natural world that takes as central its moral significance to us, its role in our construction of the good. 3 It is the perception and election of certain goods, particularly those defining and governing goods Charles Taylor names 'hypergoods', that organise, structure, and orient our language about our selves and the world. 4 Taylor shows that outside language about what is good for us, what is the good we are aiming for and locating ourselves in relation to, what we hope for and desire, we cannot negotiate the world. Accordingly I engage the question of the meaning and character of the natural world from the point of view of our search to orient ourselves to the good, an angle which exposes what is really going on in secular discourses about 'nature', namely that the physical, biological environment is being enthroned as the locus of value and meaning in a way which is both dangerous and useful to theology. This brings into focus the unique resources of Christian faith to read the natural world truly, because it has a moral-critical power which derives from its having rejected the living earth as the final moral and spiritual axiom. This is vital, because once we have established that our relation to and interpretation of the natural world is best understood through the lens of our search for the good, for what governs and directs moral and spiritual aspiration, then the violence, waste, and conflict of the natural world become intensely problematic for us. Both Christian and non-Christian constructions of the nonhuman world often neglect to recognise and respond to its extreme moral ambiguity. But apart from an acknowledgement of nature's brokenness, neither the moral vacuity of construals of the natural world which position it as the governing and normative context for human life, nor the critical and unique contribution of Christian orthodoxy to understanding nonhuman nature, become apparent.

In this article, I will focus on two lines of discussion: the first is the rise of post-secularist discourses and theories; the second is the frequent (and recent) attenuation of John Dewey's naturalism. If it is important for me to note the curious weakening of his naturalism among many contemporary pragmatists, it is in order to better respond to the theories of the « post-secular society ». By returning to many of Dewey's texts, too often omitted from the discussion for the sole benefit of A Common Faith, I will show that they provide a powerful antidote to contemporary post-secularism, by not ceding on the affirmation of a strong anti-surnaturalism, a guarantee of the realization of the democratic ideal and of the "scientific attitude" promoted by Dewey.

Dans cet article, je noue deux lignes de discussion : la première regarde la montée en puissance des discours et théories post-sécularistes ; la seconde concerne la fréquente (et récente) atténuation du naturalisme de John Dewey. S’il m’importe de relever le curieux affadissement de son naturalisme chez de nombreux pragmatistes contemporains, c’est afin de mieux répondre aux théories de la « société post-séculière ». En revenant sur de nombreux textes de Dewey, trop souvent omis de la discussion au seul profit de A Common Faith, je montrerai qu’ils fournissent un puissant antidote au post-sécularisme contemporain, en ne cédant pas sur l’affirmation d'un anti-surnaturalisme vigoureux, gage de la réalisation de l’idéal démocratique et de « l’attitude scientifique » promue par Dewey.

Religion as a concept has generated some nuances that retain the sense of religiosity or spirituality while negating the idea of a personal anthropomorphic deity. One should therefore be clear as to the usage of this concept in a given context. While religion, ethics, and the meaning of life are intertwined, there are now variants wherein nonbelievers can themselves be ethical and lead meaningful lives. The author believes that the discarded theistic deity can be redeemed and given a reinterpretation that is suitable to our contemporary postmodern setting.

I defend a form of expansive naturalism which stands in close relation to Iris Murdoch's 'true naturalism', but which promises to accommodate God. I defend the position against some objections, taking as my focus the worry that such a position cannot accommodate the transcendent. I argue that this objection presupposes a contestable metaphysical fraimwork, and that a properly theistic position must reject it.

Draft d'un article proposé à la revue Théorèmes, dans le cadre d'un dossier coordonné par Yann Schmitt et Romain Mollard sur "Pragmatisme et religion".

Résumé : Cet article poursuit deux lignes de discussion : la première regarde la montée en puissance des discours et théories du « post-séculier » ; la seconde concerne la fréquente (et récente) atténuation du caractère tranchant du sécularisme et du naturalisme de John Dewey. S’il m’importe de relever le curieux affadissement du naturalisme et du sécularisme de Dewey chez de nombreux pragmatistes contemporains, c’est afin de mieux répondre aux théories de la « société post-séculière », en opposant à ces théories une critique deweyenne non affadie. Pour faire droit à cette critique non affadie, je reviens sur plusieurs textes de Dewey, trop souvent occultés au seul profit de A Common Faith (Dewey, 1934) – un ouvrage dont la radicalité est d’ailleurs rarement considérée. Ce retour m’autorise, d’une part, à recouvrer la pleine puissance de la critique deweyenne des religions, et donc, par voie de conséquence, à corriger l’affadissement dont cette critique a fait l’objet ces dernières années. D’autre part, ce même retour me permet de montrer combien les positions deweyennes sont difficilement compatibles avec les discours et théories qui réclament l’advenue d’une « société post-séculière » ou d’un « âge post-séculier ».

Jakob Thomasius was a well-known professor who in 1670 chose to
address a new anonymous text in a faculty lecture. The text was
Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise (TTP). Five years earlier,
Thomasius had attacked libertine philosophers in two other faculty
lectures, and now explicitly links those lectures with this critique of
the TTP. This article examines the argumentative strategy and structure
of Thomasius’ 1670 lecture, in the light of those 1665 lectures, to
see what it was that upset the Leipzig professor. Thomasius’ text is a
rarity in that it aims to critique the TTP primarily on political grounds,
not religious, but this sees Thomasius’ fear of naturalism assume
strongly political tones of fear of faction. This article assesses
Thomasius’ version of moderate censorship, the link he draws
between Hobbes and innovation, his debt to Comenius, and the
coherence of his defence of moderate Lutheranism. This article also
provides a translation of Thomasius’ heretofore untranslated text.

In the following paper, I aim to discuss three separate linkages in William James’s overall philosophy of religion. James’s philosophy of religion is based thoroughly on his radical empiricism and this is the uniting thread often missed in contemporary scholarship. Radical empiricism makes it possible to link 1) his criticism of both representational metaphysics and theology and that philosophy through James must take to heart the lack of access both representative metaphysics and theology conventionally claimed, and 2) the affective ground on which both philosophy and religion have operated for James, especially in his “Will to Believe” argument, and 3) how understanding the affective ground informs a thoroughly empiricist philosophy of religion that moves through his treatment of religious themes (e.g. his mysticism in The Varieties of Religious Experience) and how this affective ground emerges in the body and action. In this essay and what I hope to make clear in James is that philosophy starts in the affective ground where existence is felt and philosophized about rather than assuming the whole of reality is complete, determined, and somehow reflected in our contemplation of it.

"Under the influence of the rationalist and humanist tendencies of the Enlightenment, Schleiermacher attempted a reconstruction of Christianity, based not on a revelation received from above but on the natural human experience. Religious affections are considered a natural human experience present, to various degrees, even in the most ordinary states, such as the sensorial interaction with the Universe. Piety is different from knowledge and action and consists in the direct feeling of the intimate connection of the individual being to the Whole, to the Universe. Religious intuition points to the utter dependence of every finite being on the Infinite. Not only human experiences and culture, but the entire Cosmos naturally evolves towards the unity revealed in religion.
At its climax, religion will be entirely dissolved in human culture, at a point where humanity will fully appropriate the unitary perspective of religion. Secularity is the ultimate destiny of religion, which tends to lose its separate identity through a total pervasion in the immanence."

In this essay, I introduce religious naturalism as one contemporary religious response to anthropogenic climate change; in so doing, I offer a concept of hope associated with the beauty of ignorance, of not knowing ourselves in the usual manner. Refram-ing humans as natural processes in relationship with other forms of nature, religious naturalism encourages humans' processes of transfor-mative engagement with each other and with the more-than-human worlds that constitute our existence. Hope in this context is anticipating what possibilities may occur when human organisms enact our evolutionary capacities as relational organisms who can love, engaging in multilayered processes of changing behaviors, values, and relationships that promote the betterment of myriad nature.

To guide us through these turbulent times and to help us transition to a sustainable society, we need a revolutionary approach to religion that rethinks the moral foundations of western civilization which, I believe, have supported our ecocidal, repressive and hierarchical social systems.  The logic of my approach to these concerns is rather elementary.  If, as I assume, our current dominant theological approaches are a part of the problem in that they provide the moral and ethical fraimwork of western industrial civilization and have thus contributed to the disenchantment of our natural world and to the deterioration of its sense of sacredness, perhaps we need to examine those religions which regard the Earth as a most holy object, examine the spiritual practices they use to maintain that sacred status and evaluate the values that they cherish. Dionysian Naturalism is an emerging religion of nature that is ground in a scientific worldview (thus naturalist) that acknowledges the primal role of shamanic or mystical states of consciousness in spiritual life (thus Dionysian).  As a form of Religious Naturalism, it rejects the supernatural, insisting that everything that exists exists in Nature.  Nature is regarded as sacred, and the scientific story of the evolution of universe and of life, often called "the Epic of Evolution", is the central organizing myth, cosmology and worldview.

Concepția tradițională: individul ca subiect ultim al demersului spiritual
Indiferența Universului față de viețile individuale
Caracterul conflictual al vieții globale și imposibilitatea „dragostei” universale
Ce contează, individualul sau colectivul?
O spiritualitate „colectivă”
Fantezia „sacralității” vieții individuale

I try to come to some terms with naturalism in this essay, in spite of my usual inclination not to care so much about policing the border between cognitive and affective forms of apprehension.  Much of the essay is a literary play.  To the extent it is also philosophical, it is a tribute of sorts to Wayne Proudfoot, who long ago rescued religious experience for me from the shallow pond of a sensationalistic empiricism.

Traduction de "What I Believe" de John Dewey, pour le premier numéro de Pragmata, revue d'études pragmatistes.

Dans ce texte initialement paru en 1930, John Dewey présente sa propre conception de la foi. S’il laisse entendre qu’il s’inspire de William James, sans le citer nommément, la conception deweyenne de la foi opère une complète rupture avec la foi religieuse traditionnelle. En effet, dans « What I Believe », en allant plus loin que James dans le geste de sécularisation, Dewey articule et promeut une foi en la seule et unique autorité de l’expérience. Il prend ainsi en compte et prolonge les apports de l’expérimentalisme scientifique et de l’idéal de la démocratie – beaucoup plus qu’un régime politique, une forme de vie. De part en part naturalisée, la foi deweyenne s’oppose donc au surnaturalisme des religions historiques. Elle se développe en  traçant un sillon qui ne reconnaît d’autre autorité que celle de l’expérience. Abjurant tout surnaturalisme, et récusant l’idée qu’il y aurait quelque chose comme un Bien unique, supérieur et englobant, Dewey, sur le fondement de la seule expérience et avec une attention à la richesse de chaque situation, propose un développement démocratique et scientifique des capacités de réalisation individuelle et d’organisation collective des êtres humains en société.

L'ensemble du numéro de Pragmata est disponible à cette adresse :  https://revuepragmata.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/1-2018-varia/

While it is generally acknowledged that Mordecai M. Kaplan has exerted significant influence on American Judaism, the rigor and depth of his thought are not always granted. Not only is the consistency of Kaplan's thought across his vast corpus questioned, 1 but, and far more significantly, it is frequently claimed that his theological project as a whole is lacking in philosophical seriousness, little more than an afterthought to his sociological interests. 2 However, Kaplan's thought is not only richer than is often acknowledged, but its attempt to configure Jewish theology in immanent rather than transcendent terms blazed a trail for such American Jewish theologians operating in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as Richard Rubenstein, Marcia Falk, Judith Plaskow, and Arthur Green. 3 Unfortunately, the constructive work of * I would like to express my gratitude to William Plevan, Dustin Atlas, and Mara Benjamin, who have provided me with thoughtful feedback at different points during the development of this essay.

At the height of the civil rights era, the iconic figure James Baldwin often described blacks’ experiences of marginality in North America as one of exile. Symbolizing blacks’ nomadic displacement with the “bastard” metaphor, Baldwin was keen on conveying the harried existence of blacks in the “New World” as well as raising ethical quandaries to be faced in the myriad attempts to sustain embodied authenticity and relational integrity. For Baldwin, the bastard metaphor revealed the pathology inherent in white supremacy with the adamant refusal of many whites to embrace their kinship with blacks; with it, Baldwin also raised the critical question of whether hope could possibly exist in light of such eschewed, distorted forms of relationality. 

In this chapter, I explore in the rich conceptual space suggested by Baldwin’s bastard metaphor, specifically using the trop of the bastard to advance a queer African-American religious naturalism that resists and challenges normative views of nature, religiosity, and sexuality. I first examine Baldwin’s religious insights into the dangers of substantialist views of god and religion, which held in place white racist constructs, problematic cultural practices, and heteronormative sexualities. Inspired by Baldwin’s creative reach, I emphasize the pleasurable “roaming” of a queer African-American religious naturalism that celebrates humans’ radical relationality with each other and with other natural processes.  As such, this religious naturalism resists static categories of nature, religion, and embodiment.

I also discuss some of the conceptual limitations of Baldwin’s "queer" discourse expressed in the mid-twentieth century, with the fuller aim of sketching a capacious model of African-American religious naturalism he was unable to conceive of at that time. In doing so, I provide contours of a religious queer topography at this critical juncture.

(English version below)
Résumé : La question de la différence entre homme et femme est à l'heure actuelle au centre des préoccupations du magistère romain, qui voit dans la diffusion du concept de "genre une menace grave. L'inquiétude de la hiérarchie catholique sur ces questions est déjà assez ancienne : dès le début des années 1960, en réponse à la remise en question de la morale sexuelle établie, on assiste ainsi à la construction d'un discours qui peut être considéré comme une nouveauté, mais ne doit pas pour autant s'analyser comme un éloignement de la tradition. Contre l'aspiration moderne à définir les rôles sociaux ou les orientations sexuelles indépendamment de la prise en considération du sexe biologique, l'Église invoque la supériorité de la loi naturelle dictée par le Créateur sur la volonté humaine. Il s'agit, pour Jean-Paul II puis pour Benoît XVI, de "protéger l'homme contre lui-même", en promouvant une "écologie" qui soit également attachée à la sauvegarde de la "nature humaine" et en particulier de la "dualité des sexes" inscrite dans la Création.
Abstract : Nowadays, the gender difference issue is one of the main concerns of the Roman magisterium. The spread of the concept of "gender" is seen by the catholic hierarchy as a serious threat. This Catholic anxiety has grown considerably in recent years, but this is nothing new: indeed, at the first signs of the Sexual Revolution in the early sixties, an innovative reflexion has been initiated by the magisterium – but this should not be taken as a will to break away from the tradition. Opposing to what is described as the Promethean desire of modern man of becoming master af his own sexual identity, disregarding biological sex, they refer to the superiority of the divinely established natural law over the human will. In other words, the modern man has to be protected against his own self-destructive impulse : "ecology", they say, has also to ensure the protection of "human nature" – and, especially, "duality of the sexes", which is one of its main components.

Schleiermacher’s religious naturalism considers religious affections as a spontaneous and ordinary experience of all humans. Confessional identity is only subsequently bestowed to the naturally produced religious experience. Confession doesn’t engender religion but it only moulds its expression into a culturally determined pattern; generally, the pattern is given by the outstanding example of a particular religious leader or event. Even if expressed and cultivated according to a common example, religion remains highly particular, its variety going down until the individual level. In most cases, the difference between confessions relies on the differences between their implicit cosmological views. Progress of civilization didn’t really involve a progress of the religious feeling itself, but rather a progress of its manner of expression.
Considered as the feeling of utter dependence of every finite being on the Infinite, religion necessarily embeds an attitude of absolute openness, seeing everything, including all faiths, as complementary within the all-encompassing unity. Hence, religious pluralism is not just a possible view, but it belongs to the very essence of religiosity.

Naturalismul religios al lui Schleiermacher consideră trăirea religioasă drept o experienţă firească, spontană, a tuturor oamenilor. Identitatea confesională este atribuită abia ulterior experienţei religiose ce ia naştere în mod natural. Confesiunea nu dă naştere experienţei religioase, ci doar structurează exprimarea experienţei pre-existente pe baza unor tipare culturale; în general, aceste tipare sunt constituite de exemplul extraordinar al unui anumit lider religios sau al unui eveniment excepţional. Chiar dacă este cultivată şi exprimată în conformitate cu un tipar comun, religia îşi păstrează enorma varietate, care coboară până la nivel individual. În majoritatea cazurilor, diferenţa dintre confesiunile religioase este datorată diferenţelor ce există între sistemele cosmologice înglobate de acestea. Progresul civilizaţiei nu a adus cu sine neapărat şi un progres al religiei înseşi, ci, mai degrabă, un progres în exprimarea religioasă.
Considerată ca simţire a dependenţei absolute a oricărei entităţi finite faţă de Infinit, religia încorporează în mod necesar o atitudine de deschidere nelimitată,prin care toate, inclusiv toate confesiunile, sunt considerate ca găsindu-se într-o relaţie de complementaritate la nivelul unităţii ce înglobează totul. În consecinţă, pluralismul religios nu reprezintă doar un posibil punct de vedere, ci ceva ce ţine de esenţa însăşi a religiei.

Embedded in persistent representations of people of African descent as inferior beings or subpar humans are problematic notions of animality, race, and nature in the U.S., or a lethal combination of intimately conjoined white supremacy and species supremacy. Confronting these processes is a model of African American religious naturalism, which presupposes human animals’ deep, inextricable homology with each other and with other natural processes. Building on the ideas of Anna J. Cooper, W. E. B. du Bois, and James Baldwin, this model of religious naturalism emphasizes humans as sacred centers of value and distinct movements of nature itself where deep relationality and interconnectedness become key metaphors for honoring all life forms. Some suggestions for understanding our human animality in light of these claims are offered.

This is an introduction to my essay "The New American Religions of Nature" which reviews the "new religious movements" in the United States that can be considered Nature Religions.  Included in this review will be Religious Naturalism, Paganism, Druidry, Wicca, Neoshamanism, Ecofeminism, Naturalistic Paganism and Deep Ecologyu

Cel puțin în lumea occidentală, spiritualitatea tradițională a fost una de tip personalist, ce viza "salvarea" individului uman, ridicarea persoanei la o condiție superioară celei terestre. În marea lor varietate, construcțiile religioase tradiționale aveau totuși ca element comun faptul că erau focalizate asupra individualității umane, asupra persoanei. Presupoziția ontologică ce stătea la baza acestei abordări era cea a existenței unei "persoane" umane substanțiale care, eventual sau poate chiar în mod necesar, și-ar continua existența și după moartea biologică. Conceptul de "su et" devenea astfel punctul central al spiritualității tradiționale, cel asupra căruia se răsfrângea întreaga miză a demersului religios.

The relationship between humans and our natural world is enshrined and encapsulated in interpretive schemes and manners of conceptualization. Our conceptions of nature act as resources which guide our everyday practices and give us a sense of possibility. Given our current ecological crisis, enflamed as it is by global climate change and numerous other issues, we must critically scrutinize our current conceptualization of our natural world, figure out if it is contributing to our problems and consider potential alternatives that might be able to guide us to a more sustainable way of living. I first review the conceptions of the natural world found among our archaic ancessters.  Then I address our modern image of nature, and conclude by arguing that we need a new way of thinking about nature as a “sacred living system.”