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Regulating Matching Markets with Constraints: Data-driven Taxation. (2022). IWASAKI, ATSUSHI ; Tomita, Yoji ; Okumura, Kyohei ; Ikegami, Kei ; Matsushita, Akira.
In: Papers.
RePEc:arx:papers:2205.14387.

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  11. COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MATCHING MODELS WITH FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS. (2022). Herings, P. Jean-Jacques ; Zhou, YU.
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  14. Marriage Market Counterfactuals Using Matching Models. (2022). Weber, Simon ; Dupuy, Arnaud.
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  15. Revealed Preferences of One-Sided Matching. (2022). Tai, Andrew.
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  16. Regulating Matching Markets with Constraints: Data-driven Taxation. (2022). IWASAKI, ATSUSHI ; Tomita, Yoji ; Okumura, Kyohei ; Ikegami, Kei ; Matsushita, Akira.
    In: Papers.
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  18. Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies. (2021). Greinecker, Michael ; Kah, Christopher.
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