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Consumption commitments and preferences for risk. (2004). Silverman, Dan ; Postlewaite, Andrew ; Samuelson, L..
In: Working papers.
RePEc:att:wimass:200415.

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  1. .

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  2. How strong is the macroeconomic case for downward real wage rigidity?. (2009). Wulfsberg, Fredrik ; Holden, Steinar.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:56:y:2009:i:4:p:605-615.

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  3. Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs. (2009). Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
    RePEc:cla:levarc:843644000000000332.

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  4. Are real wages rigid downwards?. (2007). Wulfsberg, Fredrik ; Holden, Steinar.
    In: Memorandum.
    RePEc:hhs:osloec:2007_007.

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  5. How strong is the case for downward real wage rigidity?. (2007). Wulfsberg, Fredrik ; Holden, Steinar.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedbwp:07-6.

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  6. Consumption Commitments and Risk Preferences. (2006). Szeidl, Adam ; Chetty, Raj.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12467.

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  7. Consumption Commitments: Neoclassical Foundations for Habit Formation. (2005). Szeidl, Adam ; Chetty, Raj.
    In: 2005 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed005:122.

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  8. Commitment, Risk, and Consumption: Do Birds of a Feather Have Bigger Nests?. (2005). Sinai, Todd ; Shore, Stephen H..
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11588.

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References

References cited by this document

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  21. Consumption commitments and preferences for risk. (2004). Silverman, Dan ; Postlewaite, Andrew ; Samuelson, L..
    In: Working papers.
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  31. Short-Time Compensation: Job Security, and Employment Contracts: Evidence from Selected OECD Countries.. (1994). Van Audenrode, Marc A.
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