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2. Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
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   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study. (2009). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume ; Calsamiglia, Caterina.
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5. Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag.
   In: American Economic Review.
   RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:1954-78.

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6. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures. (2008). Kojima, Fuhito.
   In: Social Choice and Welfare.
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7. Enjeux stratégiques du concours des Maîtres de Conférences. (2008). Iehlé, Vincent ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
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1. A market design approach to job rotation. (2020). Zhang, Jun ; Yu, Jingsheng.
   In: Games and Economic Behavior.
   RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:120:y:2020:i:c:p:180-192.

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2. Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis. (2017). Chen, Yan ; Kesten, Onur.
   In: Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/689773.

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3. A theory of school choice lotteries. (2015). Unver, Utku ; Kesten, Onur.
   In: Theoretical Economics.
   RePEc:the:publsh:1558.

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4. Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement. (2015). Romero Medina, Antonio ; Alcalde, Jose.
   In: QM&ET Working Papers.
   RePEc:ris:qmetal:2014_001.

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5. Monkey see, monkey do: truth-telling in matching algorithms and the manipulation of others. (2014). Hakimov, Rustamdjan.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9951.

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6. Course Allocation via Stable Matching. (2014). Aziz, Haris ; Diebold, Franz ; Matthes, Florian ; Schneider, Alexander ; Bichler, Martin.
   In: Business & Information Systems Engineering: The International Journal of WIRTSCHAFTSINFORMATIK.
   RePEc:spr:binfse:v:6:y:2014:i:2:p:97-110.

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7. Improving Fairness and Efficiency in Matching with Distributional Constraints: An Alternative Solution for the Japanese Medical Residency Match. (2014). Yasuda, Yosuke ; Kawasaki, Yujiro ; Iwasaki, Atsushi ; Goto, Masahiro ; Yokoo, Makoto.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:53409.

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8. Efficiency versus Equity in the Allocation of Medical Specialty Training Positions in Spain: A Health Policy Simulation Based on a Discrete Choice Model. (2014). Ortun, Vicente ; Lopez-Valcarcel, Beatriz G. ; Barber, Patricia ; Harris, Jeffrey E..
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   RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19896.

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9. Affirmative Action through Minority Reserves: An Experimental Study on School Choice. (2014). Vorsatz, Marc ; Klijn, Flip ; Pais, Joana.
   In: Working Papers.
   RePEc:bge:wpaper:752.

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10. An analysis of the German university admissions system. (2013). Westkamp, Alexander.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:561-589.

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11. Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem. (2013). Klaus, Bettina ; Payot, Frederic.
    In: Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP).
    RePEc:lau:crdeep:13.14.

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12. Non-Manipulable House Allocation with Rent Control. (2013). Andersson, Tommy ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2012_018.

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13. Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: An almost impossibility result. (2013). Kumano, Taro .
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:105:y:2013:i:c:p:23-29.

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14. Affirmative Action and School Choice. (2012). Subiza, Begoña ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: QM&ET Working Papers.
    RePEc:ris:qmetal:2012_003.

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15. On integration policies and schooling. (2012). Subiza, Begoña ; Martinez, Begoa Subiza ; Perez, Jose Alcalde .
    In: Working Papers. Serie AD.
    RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2012-06.

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16. Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare. (2012). Troyan, Peter.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:936-947.

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17. School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action. (2012). Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:685-693.

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18. Dominant strategy implementation of stable rules. (2012). watabe, masahiro ; Kumano, Taro .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:428-434.

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19. On Integration Policies and Schooling. (2011). Subiza, Begoña ; Alcalde, Jose.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:29145.

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20. Strategy-Proof Tie-Breaking. (2011). Ehlers, Lars ; Westkamp, Alexander .
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:09-2011.

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21. Matching Markets with Mixed Ownership: The Case for A Real-life Assignment Mechanism. (2010). Guillen, Pablo ; Kesten, Onur.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/7220.

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22. Axiomatization of the Shapley value using the balanced cycle contributions property. (2010). Kamijo, Yoshio ; Kongo, Takumi.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:4:p:563-571.

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23. Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts. (2010). Kojima, Fuhito ; Hatfield, John William .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:5:p:1704-1723.

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24. Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14864.

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25. Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities. (2009). Klaus, Bettina ; Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:17-2009.

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26. Manipulation via Capacities Revisited. (2009). Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montec:04-2009.

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27. Constrained school choice. (2009). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:1921-1947.

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28. Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts. (2009). Kojima, Fuhito ; Hatfield, John William .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:745-749.

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29. Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match. (2009). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:1954-78.

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30. On-Campus Housing: Theory vs. Experiment. (2008). Guillen, Pablo ; Kesten, Onur.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/7219.

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31. Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures. (2008). Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Social Choice and Welfare.
    RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:31:y:2008:i:3:p:357-365.

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32. The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules. (2008). Sotomayor, Marilda.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:621-640.

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33. A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the technion. (2008). Rothblum, Uriel ; Perach, Nitsan ; Polak, Julia.
    In: International Journal of Game Theory.
    RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:519-535.

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34. The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market. (2008). Kojima, Fuhito.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:3:p:581-584.

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35. College admissions and the role of information : an experimental study. (2008). Veszteg, Róbert ; Pintér, Ágnes ; Pais, Joana.
    In: UC3M Working papers. Economics.
    RePEc:cte:werepe:we080302.

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36. Constrained School Choice. (2008). Klijn, Flip ; Haeringer, Guillaume.
    In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
    RePEc:aub:autbar:671.06.

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37. School Choice and Information. An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms. (2007). Pintér, Ágnes ; Pais, Joana ; Pinter, Agnes .
    In: Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena.
    RePEc:usi:labsit:018.

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38. Consistent House Allocation. (2007). Klaus, Bettina ; Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Economic Theory.
    RePEc:spr:joecth:v:30:y:2007:i:3:p:561-574.

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39. What Have We Learned From Market Design?. (2007). Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13530.

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40. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11965.

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41. Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools. (2006). Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Cahiers de recherche.
    RePEc:mtl:montde:2006-04.

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42. School Choice and Information An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms. (2006). Pintér, Ágnes ; Pais, Joana ; Pinter, gnes .
    In: Working Papers Department of Economics.
    RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp142006.

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43. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001022.

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44. Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism. (2006). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:639.

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45. Consistent House Allocation. (2005). Klaus, Bettina ; Ehlers, Lars.
    In: Research Memorandum.
    RePEc:unm:umamet:2005007.

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46. Auctions, Matching and the Law of Aggregate Demand. (2005). Milgrom, Paul ; Hatfield, John W..
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000780.

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47. Matching with Contracts. (2005). Milgrom, Paul ; Hatfield, John William .
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:4:p:913-935.

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48. The Collapse of a Medical Labor Clearinghouse (and Why Such Failures Are Rare). (2005). Roth, Alvin ; Niederle, Muriel ; McKinney, Nicholas C..
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:3:p:878-889.

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49. The Boston Public School Match. (2005). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:368-371.

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50. The New York City High School Match. (2005). Roth, Alvin ; Pathak, Parag ; Abdulkadiroglu, Atila.
    In: American Economic Review.
    RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:2:p:364-367.

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51. Course Bidding at Business Schools. (2004). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0306001.

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52. Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance. (2004). Roth, Alvin ; Niederle, Muriel.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000207.

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53. Market Culture: How Norms Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance. (2004). Roth, Alvin ; Niederle, Muriel.
    In: Levine's Bibliography.
    RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000000018.

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54. School Choice: An Experimental Study. (2004). Sönmez, Tayfun ; Chen, Yan.
    In: Boston College Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:boc:bocoec:622.

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55. Kidney Exchange. (2003). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: Game Theory and Information.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0308002.

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56. Matching with Contracts. (2003). Milgrom, Paul.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:stanec:03003.

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57. Kidney Exchange. (2003). Unver, Utku ; Sönmez, Tayfun ; Roth, Alvin.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10002.

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