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2. Under threat: Rules-based fiscal policy and how to preserve it. (2019). Jonung, Lars ; Debrun, Xavier.
   In: European Journal of Political Economy.
   RePEc:eee:poleco:v:57:y:2019:i:c:p:142-157.

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3. Under Threat: Rules-Based Fiscal Policy and How to Preserve It. (2018). Jonung, Lars ; Debrun, Xavier.
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4. Fiscal transfers in a monetary union with sovereign risk. (2018). Bandeira, Guilherme.
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5. Macroeconomic Stabilization, Monetary-Fiscal Interactions, and Europes Monetary Union. (2017). Schmidt, Sebastian ; Maćkowiak, Bartosz ; Jarociński, Marek ; Corsetti, Giancarlo ; MacKowiak, Bartosz Adam ; Jarocinski, Marek ; Dedola, Luca.
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2. Taxation, Corruption and the Exchange Rate Regime. (2009). Hefeker, Carsten.
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3. Public Debt Accumulation and Institutional Quality: Can Corruption Improve Welfare?. (2009). Faure, Pierre-Henri.
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4. Controllability under rational expectations.. (2008). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola ; Nicola, Acocella .
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5. The effects of macroeconomic institutions on economic performance in a general equilibrium model. (2008). Cuciniello, Vincenzo.
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6. Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations. (2008). Hughes Hallett, Andrew ; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola ; Nicola, Acocella .
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9. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction: What is the Role of the Transaction Cost of the Tax System in Stabilisation Policies?. (2008). Strantzalou, Aspassia ; Chronis, Panagiotis .
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11. Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy. (2007). Billi, Roberto ; Adam, Klaus.
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15. The Role of Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union: Are National Automatic Stabilizers Effective?. (2006). Tirelli, Patrizio ; Ropele, Tiziano ; Muscatelli, Vito ; Colciago, Andrea.
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16. Monetary and Fiscal Interactions without Commitment and the Value of Monetary Conservatism. (2005). Billi, Roberto ; Adam, Klaus.
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