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2. The Effect of FOMC Votes on Financial Markets. (2019). Madeira, Carlos.
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3. Disagreement Between FOMC Members and the Fed’s Staff: New Insights Based on a Counterfactual Interest Rate. (2018). Neuenkirch, Matthias ; Bennani, Hamza ; Kranz, Tobias.
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4. Disagreement between FOMC members and the Fed’s staff: New insights based on a counterfactual interest rate. (2018). Neuenkirch, Matthias ; Kranz, Tobias ; Bennani, Hamza.
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8. Disagreement Between the FOMC and the Feds Staff: New Insights Based on a Counterfactual Interest Rate. (2017). Neuenkirch, Matthias ; Bennani, Hamza ; Kranz, Tobias.
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9. Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting. (2016). Noth, Felix ; Eichler, Stefan ; Lahner, Tom.
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10. Regional Banking Instability and FOMC Voting. (2016). Noth, Felix ; Eichler, Stefan ; Lahner, Tom.
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11. Behavioral Regulatory Agencies. (2016). Jane, Francesc Trillas .
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12. Measuring Monetary Policy Stress for Fed District Representatives. (2016). Bennani, Hamza.
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13. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Mahieu, Ronald ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Eijffinger, S. C. W., ; Raes, L. B. D., .
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15. Hawks and Doves at the FOMC. (2015). Raes, Louis ; Eijffinger, Sylvester ; Eijffinger, Sylvester C W, ; Mahieu, Ronald J.
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17. Forecast dispersion, dissenting votes, and monetary policy preferences of FOMC members: the role of individual career characteristics and political aspects. (2014). Eichler, Stefan ; Lahner, Tom.
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18. Dissent in monetary policy decisions. (2014). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco ; Riboni, Alessandro.
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20. REGIONAL HOUSE PRICE DYNAMICS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN THE FOMC. (2014). Eichler, Stefan ; Lahner, Tom.
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21. Using forecasts to uncover the loss function of FOMC members. (2013). Tillmann, Peter ; Pierdzioch, Christian ; Rulke, Jan-Christoph ; PeterTillmann, .
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26. Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions. (2011). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco ; Riboni, Alessandro.
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27. Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions. (2011). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco ; Riboni, Alessandro.
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28. Dissent in Monetary Policy Decisions. (2011). Riboni, Alessandro ; Ruge-Murcia, Francesco .
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29. Committees as Substitutes for Commitment. (2010). Riboni, Alessandro.
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31. Is There a Limit on FOMC Dissents? Evidence from the Greenspan Era. (2010). Meade, Ellen ; Gerlach-Kristen, Petra.
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32. Decade of dissent: explaining the dissent voting behavior of Bank of England MPC members. (2008). Spencer, Christopher ; Harris, Mark.
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33. The Role of the Chairman in Setting Monetary Policy: Individualistic vs. Autocratically Collegial MPCs. (2008). Gerlach-Kristen, Petra.
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34. Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees. (2008). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco ; Riboni, Alessandro.
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35. Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees. (2008). Riboni, Alessandro ; Ruge-Murcia, Francesco .
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36. The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee. (2008). Riboni, Alessandro ; Ruge-Murcia, Francesco .
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37. An Inflated Ordered Probit Model of Monetary Policy: Evidence from MPC Voting Data. (2007). Spencer, Christopher ; Harris, Mark ; Brooks, Robert.
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38. Preference Heterogeneity in Monetary Policy Committees. (2007). Ruge-Murcia, Francisco ; Riboni, Alessandro.
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39. Taking Personalities out of Monetary Policy Decision Making? Interactions, Heterogeneity and Committee Decisions in the Bank of England’s MPC. (2006). Holly, Sean ; Bhattacharjee, Arnab.
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40. Dissent and Disagreement on the Feds FOMC: Understanding Regional Affiliations and limits to Transparency. (2006). Meade, Ellen.
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41. Inflation Targeting, Committee Decision Making and Uncertainty: The Case of the Bank of England’s MPC. (2005). Holly, Sean ; Bhattacharjee, Arnab.
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42. On the Optimality of Decisions made by Hub-and-Spokes Monetary Policy Committees. (2005). Berk, Jan Marc ; Bierut, Beata K..
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43. Inflation Targeting, Committee Decision Making and Uncertainty: The case of the Bank of England’s MPC. (2005). Holly, Sean ; Bhattacharjee, Arnab.
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44. On the Optimality of Decisions. (2004). Bierut, Beata ; Berk, Jan Marc .
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45. Committee structure and its implications for monetary policy decision-making. (2003). Berk, J M ; Bierut, B K.
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46. Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe. (2002). Sheets, Nathan ; Meade, Ellen.
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47. Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe. (2002). EllenE. Meade, ; Sheets, Nathan D..
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48. SHORT-RUN MONETARY POLICY AND THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT. (2001). Rebeck, Ken ; Pierce, Thomas J..
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49. Dynamic Inconsistency and Exchange-Rate Target Zones: A Welfare Analysis. (1997). Zhu, Zhen.
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50. Institutions for Monetary Stability. (1996). Romer, Christina.
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51. Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders views. (1996). Faust, Jon.
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52. Leaning into the Wind or Ducking out of the Storm: U.S. Monetary Policy in the 1980s. (1991). Alt, James E..
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53. Are district presidents more conservative than board governors?. (1991). Tootell, Geoffrey.
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54. RATIONALE FOR DISSENT: THE CASE OF FOMC MEMBERS. (1991). Belden, Susan .
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