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Sustaining Social Security. (2005). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin.
In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1494.

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Cited: 24

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Cites: 25

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  1. Markov equilibrium of social security: An analytic solution under CRRA utility and the future of social security. (2024). Lopez-Velasco, Armando R.
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:132:y:2024:i:c:s0264999324000117.

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  2. Dynamic tax externalities and the U.S. fiscal transformation. (2020). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:114:y:2020:i:c:p:144-158.

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  3. Dynamic Tax Externalities and the U.S. Fiscal Transformation in the 1930s. (2018). Niepelt, Dirk.
    In: Diskussionsschriften.
    RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp1803.

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  4. The farm, the city, and the emergence of social security. (2013). Guner, Nezih ; Cooley, Thomas ; Caucutt, Elizabeth.
    In: Journal of Economic Growth.
    RePEc:kap:jecgro:v:18:y:2013:i:1:p:1-32.

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  5. Ageing, government budgets, retirement, and growth. (2012). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:44218.

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  6. Ageing, government budgets, retirement, and growth. (2012). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:56:y:2012:i:1:p:97-115.

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  7. Ageing, Government Budgets, Retirement, and Growth. (2011). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:szg:worpap:1106.

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  8. Ageing, Government Budgets, Retirement, and Growth. (2011). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3352.

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  9. Internal Migrations and Decentralization of Public Investment. (2010). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin.
    In: 2010 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed010:737.

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  10. Ageing, Government Budgets, Retirement, and Growth. (2010). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin.
    In: 2010 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed010:69.

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  11. Sharing Demographic Risk – Who is Afraid of the Baby Bust?. (2009). Reiter, Michael ; Ludwig, Alexander.
    In: 2009 Meeting Papers.
    RePEc:red:sed009:389.

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  12. The Dynamics of Inequality and Social Security in General Equilibrium. (2008). Song, Zheng.
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:10365.

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  13. Sharing Demographic Risk – Who is Afraid of the Baby Bust?. (2008). Reiter, Michael ; Ludwig, Alexander.
    In: MEA discussion paper series.
    RePEc:mea:meawpa:08166.

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  14. The Farm, the City, and the Emergence of Social Security. (2008). Guner, Nezih ; Cooley, Thomas ; Caucutt, Elizabeth.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3731.

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  15. A quantitative theory of social security without commitment. (2008). Mateos-Planas, Xavier.
    In: Journal of Public Economics.
    RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:3-4:p:652-671.

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  16. The future of social security. (2008). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:55:y:2008:i:2:p:197-218.

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  17. Sharing Demographic Risk – Who is Afraid of the Baby Bust?. (2008). Reiter, Michael ; Ludwig, Alexander.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2422.

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  18. Rotten parents and disciplined children: a politico-economic theory of public expenditure and debt. (2007). Zilibotti, Fabrizio ; Storesletten, Kjetil ; Song, Zheng.
    In: IEW - Working Papers.
    RePEc:zur:iewwpx:325.

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  19. Population Ageing, Government Budgets, and Productivity Growth in Politico-Economic Equilibrium. (2007). Niepelt, Dirk ; Gonzalez-Eiras, Martin ; Gonzales-Eiras, Martin.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:szg:worpap:0705.

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  20. The Farm, the City, and the Emergence of Social Security. (2007). Guner, Nezih ; Cooley, Thomas ; Caucutt, Elizabeth.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12854.

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  21. Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt. (2007). Zilibotti, Fabrizio ; Storesletten, Kjetil ; Song, Zheng.
    In: Memorandum.
    RePEc:hhs:osloec:2008_005.

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  22. The Farm, the City and the Emergence of Social Security. (2007). Guner, Nezih ; Cooley, Thomas ; Caucutt, Elizabeth.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6131.

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  23. Pension Systems, Ageing and the Stability and Growth Pact. (2007). Beetsma, Roel ; Oksanen, Heikki .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2141.

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  24. The Welfare Gains of Improving Risk Sharing in Social Security. (2004). Olovsson, Conny.
    In: Seminar Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0728.

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References

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