Abbink, K., G. Bolton, K. Sadrieh and F-F. Tang, Adaptive Learning versus Pun- ishment in Ultimatum Bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior 37 (2001), 1-25.
Abbink, K., J. Buchta, K. Sadrieh and R. Selten, How to Play 3x3-Games - A Strategy Method Experiment, Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2003), 19-37.
Andreoni, J., N.J. Smelser and P.B. Baltes, The Economics of Philanthropy, in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (London: Elsevier, 2001).
Armantier, 0., Does Observation Influence Learning?, Games and Economic Be- havior 46-2 (2004), 221-239.
- Armantier, 0., Estimation and Comparison of Learning Models, mimeo, SUNY Stony Brook, 2000.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Bewley, T., Why Not Cut Pay?, European Economic Review 42 (1998), 459-490.
Binmore, K., A. Shaked and J. Sutton, Testing Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: A Preliminary Study, American Economic Review 75 (1985), 1178-1180.
Binmore, K., S. Avner and J. Sutton, An Outside Option Experiment, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (1989), 753-770.
Blundell, R. and S. Bond, Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models, Journal of Econometrics 87 (1998), 115-143.
Bolle, F., High Reward Experiments without High Expenditure for the Experi- menter?, Journal of Economic Psychology 11(1990), 157-167.
Bolton, G. and A. Ockenfels, ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competi- tion, American Economic Review 90 (2000), 166-193.
Bolton, G. and R. Zwick, Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior 10 (1995), 95-121.
- Bush, R. and F. Mosteller, Stochastic Models of Learning, (New York: Wiley, 1955).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Cabrales, A. and W. Garcia-Fontes, Estimating Learning Models from Experimental Data: Quadratic Deviation and Maximum Likelihood, mimeo, Universitat Pompeu WEALTH DIFFERENCES AND FAIRNESS 44 Fabra, 1999.
Camerer, C. and R. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, Jourmal of Risk amd Umcertaimty 19 (1999), 7-42.
Camerer, C. and R. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, Jourmal of Ecomomic Perspectives 9 1995, 209-219.
Camerer, C. and T-H. Ho, Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games, Ecomometrica 67 (1999), 827-874.
Chamberlain G., Panel Data, in Hamdbook of Ecomometrics, Vol. II, Z. Griliches and M. Intriligator eds. (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1984).
Charness, G. and M. Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, Quarterly Jourmal of Ecomomics 117 (2002), 817-869.
Cooper, D. and C. Kraker-Stockman, Fairness and Learning: an Experimental Ex- amination, Games amd Ecomomic Behavior 41(2002), 26-45.
Cooper, D., D. Feltovich, A. Roth and R. Zwick, Relative versus Absolute Speed of Adjustment in Strategic Environments: Responder Behavior in Ultimatum Games, E~perimemtal Ecomomics 6 (2003), 181-207.
Cubitt, R., C. Starmer and R. Sugden, On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive System, E~perimemtal Ecomomics, 1 (1998), 115-31.
Duffy, J. and N. Feltovich, Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study, Imtermatiomal Jourmal of Game Theory 28 (1999), 131-52.
Eckel, C. and P. Grossman, Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games, Games amd Ecomomic Behavior 16 (1996), 181-191.
Eckel, C. and P. Grossman, Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games, Eco- momic Imquiry 39 (2001), 171-188.
Erev, I. and A. Roth, Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria, Amen cam Ecomomic Review 8 (1998), 848-881.
Fershtman, C., U. Gneezy and F. Verboven, Discrimination and Nepotism: The Efficiency of the Anonymity Rule, mimeo, University of Chicago Graduate School of Busisness, 2002.
Frank, B. and G. Schulze, Does Economics Make Citizens Corrupt?, Jourmal of Ecomornic Behavior amd Orgamizatiom 43 (2000), 101-113.
Frechette, G., Learning in a Multilateral Bargaining Experiment, mimeo, Harvard University, 2003.
- Friedman, D. and S. Sunder, Experirnemtal Methods: A Primer for Ecomomnists, (Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Gãchter, S. and A. Falk, Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation, Scamdimaviam Jourmal of Ecomomnics, 104 (2002), 1-26.
- Güth, W. and R. Tietz, Ultimatum bargaining for a shrinking cake-An experimental analysis, in Boumded Ratiomal Behavior im Experimnemtal Gaines amd Markets, R. Tietz, W. Albers, R. Selten eds., (Berlin: Springer, 1988).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Güth, W., On Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments-A Personal Review, Jourmal of Ecomomnic Behavior amd Orgamizatiom 27 (1995), 329-344.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Güth, W., P. Ockenfels and R. Tietz, Distributive justice versus bargaining power, in New directiom im Ecomomnic Psychology: Theory, Experimnemt amd Applicatiom, S.E.G. Lea and P. Webley eds., (Edward Edgar Ltd, 1992).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Goeree, J. and C. Holt, Asymmetric Inequality Aversion and Noisy Behavior in Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games, Europeam Ecomomnic Review 44 (2000), 1079-1089.
- Gourieroux, C. and A. Monfort, Simnulatiom Based Ecomomnetric Methods, Louvain, CORE Lectures Series, (Oxford University Press, 1995).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Ham, J., J. Kagel and S. Lehrer, Randomization, Endogeneity and Laboratory Experiments: The Role of Cash Balances in Private Value Auctions, forthcoming in the Jourmal of Ecomomnetrics. Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, K. Shachat and V. Smith, Preferences, Property Rights, WEALTH DIFFERENCES AND FAIRNESS 46 and Anonymity in Bargaining Games, Games amd Ecomomic Behavior 7 (1994), 346- 380.
Kahn, L. and J. Murnighan, A General Experiment on Bargaining in Demand Games with Outside Options, Amen cam Ecomomic Review 83 (1993), 1260-1280.
Levine, D., Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments, Review of Eco- momic Dymamics 1 (1998), 593-622.
McKelvey, R. and T. Palfrey, Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games, Games amd Ecomomic Behavior 10 (1995), 6-38.
Murnighan, J. and M. Saxon, Ultimatum Bargaining by Children and Adults, Jourmal of Ecomomic Psychology 19 (1998), 415-445.
Neelin, J., H. Sonnenschein and M. Speigel, A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Comment, Amen cam Ecomomic Review 78 (1988), 824-836.
- Newey, W.K. and K. West, Hypotheses Testing with Efficient Method of Moments Testing, Imtermatiomal Ecomomic Review 28 (1987), 777-787.
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Ochs, J. and A. Roth, An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining, Amen cam Ecomomic Review 79 (1989), 355-384.
Oosterbeck, H., R. Sloof and G. Van de Kuilen, Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Games Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis, mimeo, University of Amster- dam, 2003.
Rabin, M., Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, Amenicam Ecomomic Review 83 (1993), 1281-1302.
- Roth, A., Bargaining Experiments, in The Hamdbook of Expenimemtal Ecomomics, J. Kagel and A. Roth eds., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Roth, A., V. Prasnikar, M. Okuno-Fujiwara and S. Zamir, Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, Americam Ecomomic Review 81(1991), 1068-1095.
Ruffle, B., More is Better, but Fair is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games, Games amd Ecomomic Behavior 23 (1998), 247-265.
Schlag, K., Which One Should I Imitate?, Jourmal of Mathematical Ecomomics 31 WEALTH DIFFERENCES AND FAIRNESS 47 (1999), 493-522.
Sefton, M., Incentives in Simple Bargaining Games, Jourmal of Ecomomic Psycholgy 13 (1992), 263-276.
- Selten, R. and J. Buchta, Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Di- rectly Observed Bid Functions, In Games amd Humam Behavior (Mahwah NJ, L.Erlbaum Associates Inc., 1999).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
- Shao, J. and D. Tu, The Jackkmife amd Bootstrap (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995).
Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
Slembeck, T., A Behavioral Approach to Learning in Economics. Toward an Eco- nomic Theory of Contingent Learning, mimeo, University of St. Gallen, 1998.
Slembeck, T., Low Information Games: Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining, mimeo, University of St.Gallen, 1999.
Slonim, R. and A. Roth, Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experi- ment in the Slovak Republic, Ecomometrica 66 (1998), 569-596.
Stahl, D., Boundedly Rational Rules Learning in Guessing Games, Games amd Ecomomic Behavior 16 (1996), 303-330.
Stahl, D., Rule Learning in Symmetric Normal Form Games: Theory and Evi- dence, Games amd Ecomomic Behavior 32 (2000), 105-138.
Starmer, C. and R. Sugden, Does the Random-Lottery Incentive System Elicit True Preferences? An Experimental Investigation, Americam Ecomomic Review, 81 (1991), 971-78.
Straub, P., and J. Murnighan, An Experimental Investigation of Ultimatum Games: Information, Fairness, Expectations, and Lowest Acceptable Offers, Jourmal of Eco- momic Behavior amd Orgamizatiom 27 (1995), 345-364.
Vega-Redondo, F., The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior, Ecomometrica 65 (1997), 375-384.
WEALTH DIFFERENCES AND FAIRNESS 45 Fehr, E. and K. Schimdt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, Quarterly Jourmal of Ecomornics 114 (1999), 817-868.
Weg, E. and V. Smith, On the Failure to Induce Meager Offers in Ultimatum Games, Jourmal of Ecomomic Psychology 14 (1) (1993), 17-32.
Winter, W. and S. Zamir, An Experiment with Ultimatum Bargaining in a Changing Environment, mimeo, The Hebrew University, 1997.