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Reputation with Analogical Reasoning. (2011). Jehiel, Philippe ; Samuelson, Larry.
In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000304.

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Cites: 12

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Cocites: 37

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Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Reputations in Repeated Games. (2015). Mailath, George J. ; Samuelson, Larry.
    In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
    RePEc:eee:gamchp:v:4:y:2015:i:c:p:165-238.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. David Ettinger and Philippe Jehiel. A theory of deception. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(1):1â20, 2010.

  2. David M. Kreps and Robert J. Wilson. Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2):253â279, 1982.

  3. David M. Kreps, Paul R. Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert J. Wilson. Rational cooperation in the ïnitely repeated prisonersâ dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2):245â252, 1982.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  4. Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine. Reputation and equilibrium selection in games with a patient player. Econometrica, 57(4):759â778, 1989.

  5. George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

  6. George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson. Who wants a good reputation? Review of Economic Studies, 68(1):425â442, 2001.

  7. Joel Watson. A âreputationâ reïnement without equilibrium. Econometrica, 61:199â206, 1993.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  8. Martin W. Cripps, George J. Mailath, and Larry Samuelson. Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships. Journal of Economic Theory, 134(1):287â316, 2007.

  9. Martin W. Cripps, George J. Mailath, and Larry Samuelson. Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations. Econometrica, 72(2):407â432, 2004.

  10. Paul R. Milgrom and John Roberts. Predation, reputation and entry deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2):280â312, 1982.

  11. Philippe Jehiel. Analogy-based expectation equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory, 123:81â104, 2005.

  12. Qingmin Liu and Andrzej Skrzypacz. Limited records and reputation. Technical report, NYU annd Stanford Univerity, 2011.

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  4. Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts:Theory, Applications, and Beyond. (2022). Jehiel, Philippe.
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  14. Lying and Deception in Games. (2020). Sobel, Joel.
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  24. Information-theoretic models of deception: Modelling cooperation and diffusion in populations exposed to fake news. (2018). Mills, Bruce I ; Korb, Kevin B ; Kopp, Carlo.
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  25. Rational attitude change by reference cues when information elaboration requires effort. (2018). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio.
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  26. Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information. (2018). Boncinelli, Leonardo ; Bilancini, Ennio.
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  28. News and Archival Information in Games. (2018). spiegler, ran.
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  29. Reputations in Repeated Games. (2015). Mailath, George J. ; Samuelson, Larry.
    In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications.
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  36. Reputation with Analogical Reasoning. (2011). Jehiel, Philippe ; Samuelson, Larry.
    In: Levine's Working Paper Archive.
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    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

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