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Promises and Conventions - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements. (2006). Miettinen, Topi.
In: Papers on Strategic Interaction.
RePEc:esi:discus:2006-29.

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  1. Honest Abe or Doc Holliday? Bluffing in Bargaining. (2016). McCannon, Bryan ; DeAngelo, Gregory.
    In: Working Papers.
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  2. Honesty and Informal Agreements. (2016). Servátka, Maroš ; Dufwenberg, Martin ; Vadovi, Radovan .
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    RePEc:pra:mprapa:73442.

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  3. Lying, Spying, Sabotaging -- Balancing Means and Aims --. (2015). Riener, Gerhard ; Chlaß, Nadine ; Chlass, Nadine .
    In: Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy.
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  4. Lying, spying, sabotaging: Procedures and consequences. (2015). Riener, Gerhard ; Chlaß, Nadine ; Chlass, Nadine .
    In: DICE Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:dicedp:196.

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  5. Lying, Spying, Sabotaging: Procedures and Consequences. (2015). Riener, Gerhard ; Chlaß, Nadine ; Chlass, Nadine .
    In: Jena Economic Research Papers.
    RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2015-016.

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  6. Honesty and Informal Agreements. (2015). Vadovic, Radovan ; Servátka, Maroš ; Dufwenberg, Martin.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:igi:igierp:538.

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  7. Temptation in Vote-Selling: Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Philippines. (2014). Yang, Dean ; Hicken, Allen ; Leider, Stephen G. ; Ravanilla, Nico .
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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  8. Sexual orientation and self-reported lying. (2009). Berg, Nathan ; Lien, Donald.
    In: Review of Economics of the Household.
    RePEc:kap:reveho:v:7:y:2009:i:1:p:83-104.

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  9. Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution. (2009). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: Working Papers.
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  10. Communication and Guilt in a Prisoners Dilemma. (2008). Suetens, Sigrid ; Miettinen, Topi.
    In: Discussion Paper.
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  11. Communication and Guilt in a Prisoners Dilemma. (2008). Suetens, Sigrid ; Miettinen, Topi.
    In: Journal of Conflict Resolution.
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  12. Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution. (2008). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: American Economic Review.
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  13. Moral Hazard and Clear Conscience. (2007). Miettinen, Topi.
    In: Jena Economic Research Papers.
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  14. Smoking and Social Interaction. (2007). Siemers, Lars ; Poutvaara, Panu.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
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  15. Setting the Anchor: Price Competition, Level-n Theory and Communication. (2007). Wengström, Erik ; Wengstrom, Erik.
    In: Working Papers.
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  16. Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution. (2007). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: Carlo Alberto Notebooks.
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  17. Efficiency, communication and honesty. (2006). Weibull, Jörgen ; DEMICHELIS, Stefano .
    In: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance.
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