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32. Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information. (2017). Ray, Indrajit ; Drouvelis, Michalis ; Cabrales, Antonio ; Gurguc, Zeynep.
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33. Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games. (2017). Schipper, Burkhard.
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34. Rationalizability in general situations. (2016). Luo, Xiao ; Qu, Chen ; Chen, Yi-Chun.
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35. Belief distorted Nash equilibria: introduction of a new kind of equilibrium in dynamic games with distorted information. (2016). Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Agnieszka.
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37. Maximin equilibrium. (2014). Ismail, Mehmet.
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39. Correlated Equilibrium, Conformity, and Stereotyping in Social Groups. (2014). Wooders, Myrna ; Cartwright, Edward.
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40. Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games. (2013). Tomala, Tristan.
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41. Computation of Correlated Equilibrium with Global-Optimal Expected Social Welfare. (2012). Rustem, Ber ; Kleniati, Polyxeni-Margarita ; Kong, Fook Wai.
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42. Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games. (2012). Heller, Yuval.
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43. Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems. (2011). Tomala, Tristan.
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44. Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity. (2008). von Stengel, Bernhard ; Forges, Franoise.
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45. Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. (2007). Tomala, Tristan ; Gossner, Olivier.
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46. A Model of Search Intermediaries and Paid Referrals. (2007). Weber, Thomas ; Zheng, Zhiqiang.
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47. Correlated equilibrium and behavioral conformity. (2004). Wooders, Myrna ; Cartwright, Edward.
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48. EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOLUTION CONCEPTS IN GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION. (2003). Bonanno, Giacomo ; Nehring, Klaus.
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49. Correlated Equilibrium in Quitting Games. (2001). Solan, Eilon ; Vohra, R V.
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