- (2012)) 1950 − 2010. (2) The main measure for education is the percentage of the population above 15 years of age that has primary education, and for robustness checks average years of schooling in the population aged 25 and above is used. Both measures from Barro and Lee (2013) 1950 − 2010. (3) To control for resource abundance I use a dummy for oil producing countries from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) 1950 − 2010.
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- A Data Description All data are observed in five-year intervals in the period 1950 − 2010. The panel is unbalanced and some data series start at a later date than 1950. Note that the main data set starts at 1975 due to the availability of the measure for economic institutions. However, since my estimation strategy relies on lag instruments, data from periods earlier than 1975 is utilized as instruments if available.
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- Political Instability. 1950 − 2010. The proxy for Political Instability is based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. (2002), Harbom and Wallensteen (2012)). Specifically, I make use of the Onset Dataset’s dummy variable, which is equal to one for each country year of internal conflict over government (i.e. where conflict is over government, or over government and territory) with at least 1000 (alternatively 25) battle deaths. The political instability measure is constructed as a country’s conflict experience over a window of J years. Conflict experience Γ at time t for country i is the sum of the conflict dummy, denote it CD, over that window Γi,t = PJ−1 j=0 CDi,t−j. The main measure sets J = 15 and focuses on a strict measure of civil war with at least 1000 battle deaths per country year. In the robustness test section I explore alternative J and the effect of smaller scale conflict with at least 25 battle death.
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- Political Institutions. The measure is Constraints on the Executive from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. (2013)), 1950 − 2010. This is a classification of “institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives†into seven categories. These reach from the lowest category “Unlimited Authority†with no such rules to the highest constraint category “Executive Parity of Subordinates â€. The seven Categories are: (1) “Unlimited Authorityâ€, (2) “Intermediate Categoryâ€, (3) “Slight to Moderate Limitation [...]â€, (4) “Intermediate Categoryâ€, (5) “Substantial Limitations [...]â€, (6) “Intermediate Categoryâ€, and (7) “Executive Parity of Subordinatesâ€. Country years classified as “interruptionâ€, “interregnumâ€, and “transition†are treated as missing values.
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- The original index quantifies the categories in an ordered variable that ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 denotes the lowest and 7 the highest constraints. For all empirical work in this paper, the index is normalized to the (0,1) interval and treated as a continuous measure. To extend the time series for certain countries the following changes are made. Germany after reunification in 1990 is treated as a continuation of West Germany (FRG). The Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic are treated as continuation of Czechoslovakia. The Russian Federation is treated as continuation of the UDSSR.
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- Turnover. This is a proxy for alternative measures that determine political survival available for the period 1950 − 2010. The variable combines two Polity IV indices, one of “Competitiveness of Recruitmentâ€, and the other of “Openness of Recruitment†of the executive branch of government. As such it classifies de facto rules (rules in practice) that determine regulated turnover of government. The measure is the unweighted sum of both indexes normalized to the (0,1) interval. Control Variables. (1) Income is measured by purchasing power parity adjusted GDP per capita (lrgdpch) from the Penn World Tables 7.1 (Heston et al.
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World Bank (2012). World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank.