1. The Human Cost of Collusion: Health Effects of a Mexican Insulin Cartel. (2023). Barkley, Aaron.
   In: Journal of the European Economic Association.
   RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:21:y:2023:i:5:p:1865-1904..

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. Designing an incentive mechanism for information security policy compliance: An experiment. (2023). Hoffman, Elizabeth ; Li, Yuanxiang John.
   In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
   RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:212:y:2023:i:c:p:138-159.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. Non-standard choice in matching markets. (2022). Khanna, Manshu ; Caspari, Gian.
   In: ZEW Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:zbw:zewdip:22054.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Bipartite choices. (2022). LiCalzi, Marco.
   In: Decisions in Economics and Finance.
   RePEc:spr:decfin:v:45:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10203-022-00380-z.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. Quantifying the High-Frequency Trading “Arms Race†*. (2022). Oneill, Peter ; Budish, Eric ; Aquilina, Matteo.
   In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
   RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:137:y:2022:i:1:p:493-564..

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Improving refugee resettlement: insights from market design. (2022). Teytelboym, Alexander ; Hadad, Justin.
   In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
   RePEc:oup:oxford:v:38:y:2022:i:3:p:434-448..

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. Can Market Participants Report Their Preferences Accurately (Enough)?. (2022). Kessler, Judd B ; Budish, Eric.
   In: Management Science.
   RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:68:y:2022:i:2:p:1107-1130.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. Markets, market algorithms, and algorithmic bias. (2022). van Basshuysen, Philippe.
   In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
   RePEc:ehl:lserod:115694.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Nobel laureates’ contributions to and impacts on operations management. (2022). Sethi, Suresh ; Agrawal, Vijay K ; Gupta, Sushil.
   In: Production and Operations Management.
   RePEc:bla:popmgt:v:31:y:2022:i:12:p:4283-4303.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. How to Improve Worker–Firm Matching: Evidence from a Temporary Foreign Worker Market. (2021). Lee, Soohyung ; Cho, Yoonyoung.
    In: Korean Economic Review.
    RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20210701-37-2-08.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. Re-Designing GB’s Electricity Market Design: A Conceptual Framework Which Recognises the Value of Distributed Energy Resources. (2021). Mitchell, Catherine ; Soutar, Iain ; Pownall, Thomas .
    In: Energies.
    RePEc:gam:jeners:v:14:y:2021:i:4:p:1124-:d:502748.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Non-Standard Choice in Matching Markets. (2021). Khanna, Manshu ; Caspari, Gian.
    In: Papers.
    RePEc:arx:papers:2111.06815.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Natural capital market design. (2019). Teytelboym, Alexander.
    In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
    RePEc:oup:oxford:v:35:y:2019:i:1:p:138-161..

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. Epic Fail: How Below-Bid Pricing Backfires in Multiunit Auctions. (2018). Teytelboym, Alexander ; Marszalec, Daniel ; Laks, Sanna.
    In: CIRJE F-Series.
    RePEc:tky:fseres:2018cf1096.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

1. Åslund, O. and D.-O. Rooth (2007). Do when and where matter? Initial labour market conditions and immigrant earnings. Economic Journal 117(518), 422–448.

2. Åslund, O., P.-A. Edin, P. Fredriksson, and H. Grönqvist (2011). Peers, neighborhoods, and immigrant student achievement: Evidence from a placement policy. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(2), 67–95.

3. Abdulkadiroğlu, A. (2005). College admissions with affirmative action. International Journal of Game Theory 33, 535–549.
   Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
   

4. Abdulkadiroğlu, A. and T. Sönmez (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American Economic Review 93, 729–747.

5. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sönmez (2005). The Boston public school match. American Economic Review 95, 368–371.

6. Abdulkadiroğlu, A., P. A. Pathak, and A. E. Roth (2005). The New York City high school match. American Economic Review 95, 364–367.

7. Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91(5), 1369–1401.

8. Agarwal, N., S. Athey, and D. Yang (2009). Skewed bidding in pay-per-action auctions for online advertising. American Economic Review 99, 441–447.

9. Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for “lemons:” Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(3), 488–500.

10. Alberola, E., J. Chevallier, and B. Chèze (2008). Price drivers and structural breaks in European carbon prices 2005–2007. Energy Policy 36(2), 787–797.

11. Allen, M. R., D. J. Frame, C. Huntingford, C. D. Jones, J. A. Lowe, M. Meinshausen, and N. Meinshausen (2009). Warming caused by cumulative carbon emissions towards the trillionth tonne. Nature 458(7242), 1163–1166. Allison, J. R., M. A. Lemley, and D. L. Schwartz (forthcoming). How often do patent assertion entities win patent suits? Berkeley Technology Law Journal.

12. Anderson, R., I. Ashlagi, D. Gamarnik, and A. E. Roth (2015). Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112(3), 663–668.

13. Andersson, T. and L. Ehlers (2016). Assigning refugees to landlords in Sweden: Stable maximum matchings. Lund University Working Paper.

14. Appel, I., J. Farre-Mensa, and E. Simintzi (2016). Patent trolls and small business employment. Harvard University Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

15. Armstrong, M. (2006). Competition in two-sided markets. RAND Journal of Economics 37(3), 668–691.

16. Arrow, K. J. (1964). The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk-bearing. Review of Economic Studies 31(2), 91–96.

17. Arrow, K. J. and G. Debreu (1954). Existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy. Econometrica 22(3), 265–290.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

18. Ashlagi, I., D. Gamarnik, M. Rees, and A. E. Roth (2012). The need for (long) chains in kidney exchange. NBER Working Paper No. 18202.

19. Ashlagi, I., M. Braverman, and A. Hassidim (2014). Stability in large matching markets with complementarities. Operations Research 62(4), 713–732.

20. Athey, S. (2017). Beyond prediction: Using big data for policy problems. Science 355(6324), 483–485.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
21. Athey, S. and D. Nekipelov (2010). A structural model of sponsored search advertising auctions. Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

22. Athey, S. and G. Ellison (2011). Position auctions with consumer search. Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 1213–1270.

23. Athey, S., C. Catalini, and C. Tucker (2017). The digital privacy paradox: Small money, small costs, small talk. NBER Working Paper No. 23488.

24. Atkinson, A. B. (2015). Inequality: What Can Be Done? Harvard University Press.

25. Ausubel, L. M. and O. V. Baranov (2014). Market design and the evolution of the combinatorial clock auction. American Economic Review 104(5), 446–451.

26. Avery, C., C. Jolls, R. A. Posner, and A. E. Roth (2001). The market for federal judicial law clerks. University of Chicago Law Review 68, 793–902.

27. Avery, C., C. Jolls, R. A. Posner, and A. E. Roth (2007). The new market for federal judicial law clerks. University of Chicago Law Review 74, 447–486. Avery, C. and P. A. Pathak (forthcoming). Missing “one-offs” in high school choice in New York City. In S. D. Kominers and A. Teytelboym (Eds.), Fair by Design: Economic Design Approaches to Inequality. Oxford University Press.

28. Aygün, O. and B. Turhan (2017). Large-scale affirmative action in school choice: Admissions to IITs in India. American Economic Review 107, 210–213.

29. Aygün, O. and I. Bó (2016). College admission with multidimensional privileges: The Brazilian affirmative action case. WZB Berlin Social Science Center Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
30. Azevedo, E. M. and E. G. Weyl (2016). Matching markets in the digital age. Science 352(6289), 1056–1057.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
31. Azevedo, E. M. and J. W. Hatfield (2015). Existence of stable matchings in large markets with complementarities. University of Texas at Austin Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

32. Azevedo, E. M., E. G. Weyl, and A. White (2013). Walrasian equilibrium in large, quasilinear markets. Theoretical Economics 8, 281–290.

33. Baldwin, R. (2016). The Great Convergence. Harvard University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

34. Bandyopadhyay, S., F. Ishakov, T. Johnson, S. Lee, D. McArthur, J. Rust, J. Watson, and J. Watson (2013). Can the job market for economists be improved? In N. Vulkan, A. E. Roth, and Z. Neeman (Eds.), The Handbook of Market Design, pp. 189–221. Oxford University Press.

35. Banerjee, A. V. and E. Duflo (2011). Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty. PublicAffairs.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
36. Bergstrom, T. C. (1978). Cournot equilibrium in factor markets. UCSB Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
37. Bessen, J. E. and M. J. Meurer (2014). The direct costs from NPE disputes. Cornell Law Review 99(2), 387–424.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

38. Bessen, J. E., M. J. Meurer, and J. Ford (2011). The private and social costs of patent trolls. Regulation 34, 26–35.

39. Biais, B., L. Glosten, and C. Spatt (2005). Market microstructure: A survey of microfoundations, empirical results, and policy implications. Journal of Financial Markets 8(2), 217–264.

40. Biais, B., T. Foucault, and S. Moinas (2015). Equilibrium fast trading. Journal of Financial Economics 116(2), 292–313.

41. Bichler, M., P. Shabalin, and J. Wolf (2013). Do core-selecting combinatorial clock auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs. Experimental Economics 16(4), 511–545.

42. Binmore, K. and P. Klemperer (2002). The biggest auction ever: The sale of the British 3G telecom licences. Economic Journal 112(478).

43. Biró, P. and F. Klijn (2013). Matching with couples: A multidisciplinary survey. International Game Theory Review 15(02), 1340008.

44. Bishop, J. and S. Pagiola (2012). Selling Forest Environmental Services: Market-Based Mechanisms for Conservation and Development. Taylor & Francis.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

45. Bjørndal, T. and G. Munro (2012). The Economics and Management of World Fisheries. Oxford University Press.

46. Bogomolnaia, A. and H. Moulin (2001). A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic theory 100, 295–328.

47. Brunner, C., J. K. Goeree, C. A. Holt, and J. O. Ledyard (2010). An experimental test of flexible combinatorial spectrum auction formats. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2(1), 39–57.

48. Bryan, G., J. de Quidt, T. Wilkening, and N. Yadav (2017). Land trade and development: A market design approach. CESifo Working Paper No. 6557.

49. Budish, E. (2011). The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes. Journal of Political Economy 119(6), 1061–1103.

50. Budish, E. and E. Cantillon (2012). The multi-unit assignment problem: Theory and evidence from course allocation at Harvard. American Economic Review 102(5), 2237– 2271.

51. Budish, E. and J. B. Kessler (2016). Bringing real market participants’ real preferences into the lab: An experiment that changed the course allocation mechanism at Wharton. NBER Working Paper No. 22448.

52. Budish, E. and R. S. Lee (2017). Will the market fix the market? A theory of stock market competition and innovation. Booth School of Business Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
53. Budish, E., G. P. Cachon, J. B. Kessler, and A. Othman (2016). Course match: A largescale implementation of approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes for combinatorial allocation. Operations Research 65(2), 314–336.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

54. Budish, E., P. Cramton, and J. Shim (2015). The high-frequency trading arms race: Frequent batch auctions as a market design response. Quarterly Journal of Economics 130(4), 1547–1621.

55. Budish, E., Y.-K. Che, F. Kojima, and P. Milgrom (2013). Designing random allocation mechanisms: Theory and applications. American Economic Review 103(2), 585–623.

56. Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (1996). Auctions versus negotiations. American Economic Review 86, 180–194.

57. Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer (2009). Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions? American Economic Review 99, 1544–1575.

58. Calsamiglia, C. and A. Miralles (2016). Catchment areas and access to better schools. Working Paper.

59. Cantillon, E. (2017). Broadening the market design approach to school choice. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33(4).

60. Cantillon, E. and M. Pesendorfer (2006). Auctioning bus routes: The London experience.

61. Cardinale, B. J., J. E. Duffy, A. Gonzalez, D. U. Hooper, C. Perrings, P. Venail, A. Narwani, G. M. Mace, D. Tilman, D. A. Wardle, et al. (2012). Biodiversity loss and its impact on humanity. Nature 486(7401), 59–67.

62. Castillo, J. C., D. Knoepfle, and G. Weyl (2017). Surge pricing solves the wild goose chase. Stanford University Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
63. Che, Y.-K., J. Kim, and F. Kojima (2015). Stable matching in large economies. Columbia University Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

64. Chen, P., M. Egesdal, M. Pycia, and M. B. Yenmez (2016). Manipulability of stable mechanisms. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8(2), 202–214.

65. Chen, Y. and K. Takeuchi (2010). Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA. Games and Economic Behavior 68(2), 557–579.

66. Chernomaz, K. and D. Levin (2012). Efficiency and synergy in a multi-unit auction with and without package bidding: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior 76(2), 611–635.

67. Chien, C. V. (2014). Startups and patent trolls. Stanford Technology Law Review 17, 461–506.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
68. Chu, C. (2009). Thirty years later: the global growth of ITQs and their influence on stock status in marine fisheries. Fish and Fisheries 10(2), 217–230.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
69. Clements, M. (2018). The Walls of Nations. Columbia University Press.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

70. Coase, R. H. (1960). The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1–44. Cohen, L., J. M. Golden, U. G. Gurun, and S. D. Kominers (forthcoming). ‘Troll’ check? A proposal for administrative review of patent litigation. Boston University Law Review.

71. Cohen, L., U. G. Gurun, and S. D. Kominers (2015). Shielded innovation. Harvard University Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
72. Cohen, L., U. G. Gurun, and S. D. Kominers (2016). The growing problem of patent trolling. Science 352(6285), 521–522.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

73. Cohen, L., U. G. Gurun, and S. D. Kominers (2017b). Patent trolls: Evidence from targeted firms. NBER Working Paper No. 20322.

74. Cohen, P., R. Hahn, J. V. Hall, S. Levitt, and R. Metcalfe (2016). Using big data to estimate consumer surplus: The case of Uber. Technical report. NBER Working Paper No. 22627.

75. Coles, P., J. Cawley, P. B. Levine, M. Niederle, A. E. Roth, and J. J. Siegfried (2010). The job market for new economists: A market design perspective. Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, 187–206.

76. Cournot, A.-A. (1838). Recherches sur les Principes Mathématiques de la Théorie des Richesses. Chez L. Hachette.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

77. Cramer, J. and A. B. Krueger (2016). Disruptive change in the taxi business: The case of Uber. American Economic Review 106(5), 177–182.

78. Cramton, P. (2017). Electricity market design. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33(4).

79. Cramton, P., E. Kwerel, G. Rosston, and A. Skrzypacz (2011). Using spectrum auctions to enhance competition in wireless services. Journal of Law and Economics 54(S4), S167–S188. Cramton, P. and A. Ockenfels (forthcoming). The German 4G spectrum auction: Design and behavior. Economic Journal 128.

80. Cramton, P., R. R. Geddes, and A. Ockenfels (2017). Markets in road use: Eliminating congestion through scheduling, routing, and real-time road pricing.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

81. Cramton, P., Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (Eds.) (2006). Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press.

82. Crawford, V. P. (2008). The flexible-salary match: A proposal to increase the salary flexibility of the National Resident Matching Program. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 66(2), 149–160.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
83. Crawford, V. P. (2016). Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading. Oxford University Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

84. Crawford, V. P. and E. M. Knoer (1981). Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers. Econometrica 49(2), 437–450.

85. Crawford, V. P. and N. Iriberri (2007). Level-k auctions: Can a nonequilibrium model of strategic thinking explain the winner’s curse and overbidding in private-value auctions? Econometrica 75(6), 1721–1770.

86. Crawford, V. P., T. Kugler, Z. Neeman, and A. Pauzner (2009). Behaviourally optimal auction design: Examples and observations. Journal of the European Economic Association 7(2-3), 377–387.

87. Day, R. W. and P. Cramton (2012). Quadratic core-selecting payment rules for combinatorial auctions. Operations Research 60(3), 588–603.

88. Day, R. W. and P. Milgrom (2008). Core-selecting package auctions. International Journal of Game Theory 36(3), 393–407.

89. Delacrétaz, D., S. D. Kominers, and A. Teytelboym (2016). Refugee resettlement. Oxford University Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
90. Dickerson, J. P. and T. Sandholm (2014). Multi-organ exchange: The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 1412–1418.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
91. Dimakopoulos, P. D. and C. Heller (2017). Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labour market for lawyers. Working Paper.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
92. Dirzo, R., H. S. Young, M. Galetti, G. Ceballos, N. J. Isaac, and B. Collen (2014). Defaunation in the Anthropocene. Science 345(6195), 401–406.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
93. Doğan, B. (2016). Responsive affirmative action in school choice. Journal of Economic Theory 165, 69–105.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
94. Dubins, L. E. and D. A. Freedman (1981). Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. American Mathematical Monthly 88, 485–494.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

95. Duffie, D., N. Gârleanu, and L. H. Pedersen (2005). Over-the-counter markets. Econometrica 73(6), 1815–1847. Dur, U., S. D. Kominers, P. A. Pathak, and T. Sönmez (forthcoming). The demise of walk zones in Boston: Priorities vs. precedence in school choice. Journal of Political Economy.

96. Dwork, C. (2011). Differential privacy. In H. C. A. van Tilborg and S. Jajodia (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, pp. 338–340. Springer.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    
97. Dwork, C. and A. Roth (2014). The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy, Volume 9 of Foundations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
    

98. Echenique, F. and M. B. Yenmez (2015). How to control controlled school choice. American Economic Review 105, 2679–2694.

99. Edelman, B. (2017). The market design and policy of online review platforms. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33(4).

100. Edelman, B., M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz (2007). Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review 97, 242–259.

101. Edgeworth, F. Y. (1881). Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. Kegan Paul.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

102. Ehlers, L., I. E. Hafalir, M. B. Yenmez, and M. A. Yildirim (2014). School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds. Journal of Economic Theory 153, 648–683.

103. Einav, L. and J. Levin (2014). Economics in the age of big data. Science 346(6210), 1243089.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
104. Eisenmann, T., G. Parker, and M. W. Van Alstyne (2006). Strategies for two-sided markets. Harvard Business Review 84(10), 92–101.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

105. Ekins, P., S. Simon, L. Deutsch, C. Folke, and R. De Groot (2003). A framework for the practical application of the concepts of critical natural capital and strong sustainability. Ecological Economics 44, 165–185.

106. Erdil, A. and P. Klemperer (2010). A new payment rule for core-selecting package auctions. Journal of the European Economic Association 8(2-3), 537–547.

107. Ergin, H., T. Sönmez, and M. U. Ünver (2014). Lung exchange. Boston College Working Paper. Ergin, H., T. Sönmez, and M. U. Ünver (forthcoming). Dual-donor organ exchange. Econometrica.

108. Fama, E. F., L. Fisher, M. C. Jensen, and R. Roll (1969). The adjustment of stock prices to new information. International Economic Review 10(1), 1–21.

109. Feng, J. and X. Jaravel (2015). Patent trolls and the patent examination process. Harvard University Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

110. Ferraro, P. J. (2008). Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services. Ecological Economics 65(4), 810–821.

111. Fisman, R. and T. Sullivan (2016). The Inner Lives of Markets: How People Shape Them–And They Shape Us. PublicAffairs.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

112. Fleiner, T. (2003). A fixed-point approach to stable matchings and some applications. Mathematics of Operations Research 28, 103–126.

113. Fleiner, T., R. Jagadeesan, Z. Jankó, and A. Teytelboym (2017). Trading networks with frictions. Oxford University Working Paper. Fradkin, A. (forthcoming). Digital market design and inequality. In S. D. Kominers and A. Teytelboym (Eds.), Fair by Design: Economic Design Responses to Inequality. Oxford University Press.

114. Fradkin, A., E. Grewal, and D. Holtz (2017). The determinants of online review informativeness: Evidence from field experiments on Airbnb. MIT Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

115. Friedman, M. and A. J. Schwartz (1963). A monetary history of the United States. Princeton University Press.

116. Gale, D. and L. S. Shapley (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

117. Ghosh, A. and A. Roth (2015). Selling privacy at auction. Games and Economic Behavior 91, 334–346. Glaeser, E. L. and S. D. Kominers (forthcoming). Market design in developing-world cities. In S. D. Kominers and A. Teytelboym (Eds.), Fair by Design: Economic Design Approaches to Inequality. Oxford University Press. Glaeser, E. L., S. D. Kominers, M. Luca, and N. Naik (forthcoming). Big data and big cities: The promises and limitations of improved measures of urban life. Economic Inquiry.

118. Ghosh, A., K. Ligett, A. Roth, and G. Schoenebeck (2014). Buying private data without verification. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

119. Goeree, J. K. and C. A. Holt (2010). Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction. Games and Economic Behavior 70(1), 146–169.

120. Goldfarb, A. and C. E. Tucker (2011). Privacy regulation and online advertising. Management Science 57, 57–71.

121. Hafalir, I. E., M. B. Yenmez, and M. A. Yildirim (2013). Effective affirmative action in school choice. Theoretical Economics 8, 325–363.

122. Hall, J. D. (2017). Pareto improvements from Lexus lanes: The case for pricing a portion of the lanes on congested highways. Working Paper.

123. Hall, J. V. and A. B. Krueger (2016). An analysis of the labor market for Uber’s driverpartners in the United States. NBER Working Paper No. 22843.

124. Hansen, M. C., P. V. Potapov, R. Moore, M. Hancher, S. Turubanova, A. Tyukavina, D. Thau, S. Stehman, S. Goetz, T. Loveland, et al. (2013). High-resolution global maps of 21st-century forest cover change. Science 342(6160), 850–853.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

125. Hassidim, A., A. Romm, and R. I. Shorrer (2016). “Strategic” behavior in a strategy-proof environment. Harvard University Working Paper.

126. Hassidim, A., A. Romm, and R. I. Shorrer (2017). Redesigning the israeli psychology master’s match. American Economic Review 107(5), 205–209.

127. Hatfield, J. W. and P. Milgrom (2005). Matching with contracts. American Economic Review 95, 913–935.

128. Hatfield, J. W. and S. D. Kominers (2012). Matching in networks with bilateral contracts. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 4, 176–208.

129. Hatfield, J. W. and S. D. Kominers (2015). Hidden substitutes. Harvard University Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

130. Hatfield, J. W. and S. D. Kominers (2017). Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching. Games and Economic Behavior 101, 78–97.

131. Hatfield, J. W., F. Kojima, and Y. Narita (2016). Improving schools through school choice: A market design approach. Journal of Economic Theory 166, 186–211.

132. Hatfield, J. W., S. D. Kominers, A. Nichifor, M. Ostrovsky, and A. Westkamp (2013). Stability and competitive equilibrium in trading networks. Journal of Political Economy 121, 966–1005.

133. Hayek, F. A. (1945). The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review 35(4), 519–530.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
134. Helm, D. (1990). The Economic Borders of the State. Oxford University Press.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

135. Helm, D. and C. Hepburn (2012). The economic analysis of biodiversity: An assessment. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 28(1), 1–21.

136. Helmers, C., B. Love, and L. McDonagh (2013). Is there a patent troll problem in the UK? Fordham Intellectual Property Media & Entertainment Law Journal 24, 509–553.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
137. Hepburn, C., A. Pfeiffer, F. Pretis, and A. Teytelboym (2017). Are we running out of minerals? Institute for New Economic Thinking Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
138. Hicks, J. R. (1939). The foundations of welfare economics. Economic Journal 49(196), 696–712.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

139. Hylland, A. and R. Zeckhauser (1979). The efficient allocation of individuals to positions. Journal of Political economy 87, 293–314.

140. Iftekhar, M. S., A. Hailu, and R. Lindner (2012). The effect of bidder heterogeneity on combinatorial conservation auction designs. Environmental and Resource Economics 53(1), 137.

141. Jagadeesan, R. (2017). Complementary inputs and the existence of stable outcomes in large trading networks. Harvard University Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

142. Jayachandran, S., J. de Laat, E. F. Lambin, C. Y. Stanton, R. Audy, and N. E. Thomas (2017). Cash for carbon: A randomized trial of payments for ecosystem services to reduce deforestation. Science 357(6348), 267–273. Jones, W. and A. Teytelboym (forthcoming). The Local Refugee Match: Aligning refugees’ preferences with the capacities and priorities of localities. Journal of Refugee Studies.

143. Kőszegi, B. (2014). Behavioral contract theory. Journal of Economic Literature 52(4), 1075–1118.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

144. Kagel, J. H. and A. E. Roth (2000). The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 201–235.

145. Kagel, J. H., Y. Lien, and P. Milgrom (2010). Ascending prices and package bidding: A theoretical and experimental analysis. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2(3), 160–185.

146. Kagel, J. H., Y. Lien, and P. Milgrom (2014). Ascending prices and package bidding: Further experimental analysis. Games and economic behavior 85, 210–231.

147. Kamada, Y. and F. Kojima (2012). Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A problem in the Japanese medical match and its solution. American Economic Review 102(3), 366–370.

148. Kamada, Y. and F. Kojima (2015). Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications. American Economic Review 105, 67–99.

149. Kearns, M. (2017). Fair algorithms for machine learning. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, pp. 1.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

150. Kelso, A. S. and V. P. Crawford (1982). Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes. Econometrica 50, 1483–1504.

151. Kessler, J. B. and A. E. Roth (2012). Organ allocation policy and the decision to donate.

152. Kessler, J. B. and A. E. Roth (2014). Getting more organs for transplantation. American Economic Review 104(5), 425–430.

153. Kesten, O. (2010). School choice with consent. Quarterly Journal of Economics 125, 1297–1348.

154. Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Palgrave Macmillan.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

155. Kiebzak, S., G. Rafert, and C. E. Tucker (2016). The effect of patent litigation and patent assertion entities on entrepreneurial activity. Research Policy 45(1), 218–231.

156. Kinzig, A. P., C. Perrings, F. S. Chapin, S. Polasky, V. K. Smith, D. Tilman, and B. Turner (2011). Paying for ecosystem services—promise and peril. Science 334(6056), 603–604.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

157. Klaus, B. and F. Klijn (2005). Stable matchings and preferences of couples. Journal of Economic Theory 121, 75–106.

158. Klemperer, P. (2002). What really matters in auction design. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16(1), 169–189.

159. Klemperer, P. (2003). Why every economist should learn some auction theory. In M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Invited Lectures to 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society. Cambridge University Press.

160. Klemperer, P. (2004). Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press.

161. Kojima, F. (2012). School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action. Games and Economic Behavior 75, 685–693.

162. Kojima, F. and P. A. Pathak (2009). Incentives and stability in large two-sided matching markets. American Economic Review 99, 608–627.

163. Kojima, F., P. A. Pathak, and A. E. Roth (2013). Matching with couples: Stability and incentives in large markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(4), 1585–1632.

164. Kominers, S. D. and E. G. Weyl (2012). Holdout in the assembly of complements: A problem for market design. American Economic Review 102, 360–365.

165. Kominers, S. D. and T. Sönmez (2016). Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory. Theoretical Economics 11, 683–710.

166. Leape, J. (2006). The London congestion charge. Journal of Economic Perspectives 20(4), 157–176.

167. Levin, J. and A. Skrzypacz (2016). Properties of the combinatorial clock auction. American Economic Review 106(9), 2528–2551.

168. Lewis-Faupel, S., Y. Neggers, B. A. Olken, and R. Pande (2016). Can electronic procurement improve infrastructure provision? Evidence from public works in India and Indonesia. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8(3), 258–83.

169. Leychkis, Y. (2007). Of fire ants and claim construction: An empirical study of the meteoric rise of the eastern district of Texas as a preeminent forum for patent litigation. Yale Journal of Law & Technology 9, 193–232.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
170. Leyton-Brown, K., P. Milgrom, and I. Segal (2017). Economics and computer science of a radio spectrum reallocation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(28), 7202–7209.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

171. Li, S. (2017). Ethics and Market Design. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33(4). Li, S. (forthcoming). Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms. American Economic Review.

172. Liu, Q. and M. Pycia (2016). Ordinal efficiency, fairness, and incentives in large markets. Mimeo.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
173. Love, B. J. (2013). An empirical study of patent litigation timing: Could a patent term reduction decimate trolls without harming innovators? University of Pennsylvania Law Review 161, 1309–1359.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
174. Luca, M. (2016). Reviews, reputation, and revenue: The case of Yelp.com. Harvard Business School Working Paper No. 12-016. Luca, M. (forthcoming). User-generated content and social media. In S. Anderson, D. Strömberg, and J. Waldfogel (Eds.), Handbook of Media Economics. Elsevier.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

175. Madhavan, A. (2000). Market microstructure: A survey. Journal of Financial Markets 3(3), 205–258.

176. Mailath, G. J. and A. Postlewaite (1990). Asymmetric information bargaining problems with many agents. Review of Economic Studies 57(3), 351–367.

177. Marszalec, D. (2016). Auctions for complements: An experimental analysis. Technical report, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. Marszalec, D. (forthcoming). Auctions for quota: A primer and perspectives for the future. Fisheries Research.

178. McAfee, R. P. and J. McMillan (1996). Analyzing the airwaves auction. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(1), 159–175.

179. McAfee, R. P., J. McMillan, and S. Wilkie (2010). The greatest auction in history. In J. J. Siegfried (Ed.), Better Living Through Economics, pp. 168–184. Harvard University Press.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
180. McKenzie, L. (1954). On equilibrium in Graham’s model of world trade and other competitive systems. Econometrica 22(2), 147–161.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

181. Milgrom, P. (1989). Auctions and bidding: A primer. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(3), 3–22.

182. Milgrom, P. (2000). Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy 108(2), 245–272.

183. Milgrom, P. (2004). Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge University Press.

184. Milgrom, P. (2007). Package auctions and exchanges. Econometrica 75(4), 935–965.

185. Milgrom, P. (2010). Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 70, 62–70.

186. Milgrom, P. (2017). Discovering Prices: Auction Design in Markets with Complex Constraints. Columbia University Press.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
187. Milgrom, P. R. and I. Segal (2017). Deferred-acceptance auctions and radio spectrum reallocation. Stanford University Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

188. Miller, A. R. and C. E. Tucker (2011). Can health care information technology save babies? Journal of Political Economy 119, 289–324.

189. Miller, S. P. (2013). Where’s the innovation: An analysis of the quantity and qualities of anticipated and obvious patents. Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 18(1), 1–58.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

190. Mishra, D. and D. C. Parkes (2007). Ascending price vickrey auctions for general valuations. Journal of Economic Theory 132(1), 335–366.

191. Montgomery (2009). A nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic-donor chain. New England Journal of Medicine 360(11), 1096–1101. Rees-Jones, A. (forthcoming). Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match. Games and Economic Behavior.

192. Montgomery, W. D. (1972). Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory 5(3), 395–418.

193. Moore, G. E. (1965, April 19). Cramming more components onto integrated circuits. Electronics, 114–117.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

194. Moraga, J. F.-H. and H. Rapoport (2014). Tradable immigration quotas. Journal of Public Economics 115, 94–108.

195. Morstyn, T., A. Teytelboym, and M. D. McCulloch (2017). Bilateral contract networks for peer-to-peer energy trading. Oxford University Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

196. Mullainathan, S. and Z. Obermeyer (2017). Does machine learning automate moral hazard and error? American Economic Review 107(5), 476–480.

197. Muradian, R., M. Arsel, L. Pellegrini, F. Adaman, B. Aguilar, B. Agarwal, E. Corbera, D. Ezzine de Blas, J. Farley, G. Froger, et al. (2013). Payments for ecosystem services and the fatal attraction of win-win solutions. Conservation Letters 6(4), 274–279.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

198. Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6, 58–73.

199. Naik, N., S. D. Kominers, R. Raskar, E. L. Glaeser, and C. A. Hidalgo (2017). Computer vision uncovers predictors of physical urban change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(29), 7571–7576.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
200. Nemes, V., C. R. Plott, and G. Stoneham (2008). Electronic BushBroker exchange: Designing a combinatorial double auction for native vegetation offsets. Working Paper. Newman, N., A. Fréchette, and K. Leyton-Brown (forthcoming). Deep optimization for spectrum repacking. Communications of the ACM.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

201. Niederle, M. and A. E. Roth (2003). Unraveling reduces mobility in a labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match. Journal of Political Economy 111, 1342–1352.

202. Niederle, M. and A. E. Roth (2005). The gastroenterology fellowship market: Should there be a match? American Economic Review 95, 372–375.

203. Nikzad, A., M. Akbarpour, M. A. Rees, , and A. E. Roth (2017). Financing transplants’ costs of the poor: A dynamic model of global kidney exchange. Stanford University Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
204. Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Basic Books.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
205. O’Hara, M. (1995). Market microstructure theory. Blackwell Cambridge, MA.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

206. Olivares, M., G. Y. Weintraub, R. Epstein, and D. Yung (2012). Combinatorial auctions for procurement: An empirical study of the Chilean school meals auction. Management Science 58(8), 1458–1481.

207. Ostrovsky, M. (2008). Stability in supply chain networks. American Economic Review 98, 897–923.

208. Parkes, D. C. and L. H. Ungar (2000). In Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, pp. 74–81. ACM.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
209. Parkes, D. C. and M. P. Wellman (2015). Economic reasoning and artificial intelligence. Science 349(6245), 267–272.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
210. Parkes, D. C., J. Kalagnanam, and M. Eso (2001). Achieving Budget-Balance with VickreyBased Payment Schemes in Exchanges. In Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

211. Pathak, P. A. (2011). The mechanism design approach to student assignment. Annual Review of Economics 3, 513–536.

212. Pentland, A. (2014). Social physics: How good ideas spread-the lessons from a new science. Penguin.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
213. Prendergast, C. (2017). The allocation of food to food banks. Booth School of Business Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

214. Rassenti, S. J., V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin (1982). A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics 13(2), 402–417.

215. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Belknap, Harvard University Press.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
216. Rees, M. A., T. B. Dunn, C. S. Kuhr, C. L. Marsh, J. Rogers, S. E. Rees, A. Cicero, L. J. Reece, A. E. Roth, O. Ekwenna, et al. (2017). Kidney exchange to overcome financial barriers to kidney transplantation. American Journal of Transplantation 17, 782–790.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
217. Robertson, M. and N. Hayden (2008). Evaluation of a market in wetland credits: entrepreneurial wetland banking in Chicago. Conservation Biology 22(3), 636–646.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

218. Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (2003). Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association 1(4), 990–1029.

219. Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (2006). Two-sided markets: a progress report. RAND Journal of Economics 37(3), 645–667.

220. Rosston, G. (2012). Incentive auctions. Communications of the ACM 55, 24–26.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
221. Roth, A. and G. Schoenebeck (2012). Conducting truthful surveys, cheaply. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 826–843. ACM.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

222. Roth, A. E. (1982). The economics of matching: Stability and incentives. Mathematics of Operations Research 7, 617–628.

223. Roth, A. E. (1984). The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory. Journal of Political Economy 92, 991–1016.

224. Roth, A. E. (1990). New physicians: A natural experiment in market organization.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

225. Roth, A. E. (1991). A natural experiment in the organization of entry-level labor markets: Regional markets for new physicians and surgeons in the United Kingdom. American Economic Review 81, 415–440.

226. Roth, A. E. (2002). The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics. Econometrica 70, 1341–1378.

227. Roth, A. E. (2008a). Deferred acceptance algorithms: History, theory, practice, and open questions. International Journal of Game Theory 36, 537–569.

228. Roth, A. E. (2008b). What have we learned from market design? Economic Journal 118(527), 285–310.

229. Roth, A. E. (2015). Who Gets What—and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

230. Roth, A. E. and E. Peranson (1999). The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design. American Economic Review 89, 748–780.

231. Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayor (1990). Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Volume 18 of Econometric Society Monographs. Cambridge University Press.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

232. Roth, A. E. and X. Xing (1994). Jumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions. American Economic Review 84, 992–1044.

233. Roth, A. E. and X. Xing (1997). Turnaround time and bottlenecks in market clearing: Decentralized matching in the market for clinical psychologists. Journal of Political Economy 105(2), 284–329. Roth, B. N. (forthcoming). Market design under weak institutions. In S. D. Kominers and A. Teytelboym (Eds.), Fair by Design: Economic Design Approaches to Inequality. Oxford University Press.

234. Roth, A. E., T. Sönmez, and M. U. Ünver (2004). Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 457–488.

235. Roth, A. E., T. Sönmez, and M. U. Ünver (2005a). A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New England. American Economic Review 95, 376–380.

236. Roth, A. E., T. Sönmez, and M. U. Ünver (2005b). Pairwise kidney exchange. Journal of Economic theory 125(2), 151–188.

237. Roth, A. E., T. Sönmez, and M. U. Ünver (2007). Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences. American Economic Review 97, 828–851.

238. Roth, B. N. and R. I. Shorrer (2017). Making it safe to use centralized markets: Dominant individual rationality and applications to market design. MIT Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

239. Sönmez, T. (1997). Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets. Journal of Economic Theory 77(1), 197–204.

240. Sönmez, T. (2013). Bidding for army career specialties: Improving the ROTC branching mechanism. Journal of Political Economy 121, 186–219.

241. Sönmez, T. and M. U. Ünver (2010). Course bidding at business schools. International Economic Review 51, 99–123.

242. Sönmez, T. and T. B. Switzer (2013). Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at United States Military Academy. Econometrica 81, 451–488.

243. Sönmez, T. and U. Ünver (2017). Market design for living-donor organ exchanges: An economic policy perspective. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33(4).

244. Sandel, M. J. (2012). What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. Macmillan.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
245. Santos, G. (2005). Urban congestion charging: a comparison between London and Singapore. Transport Reviews 25(5), 511–534.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

246. Scheffel, T., A. Pikovsky, M. Bichler, and K. Guler (2011). An experimental comparison of linear and nonlinear price combinatorial auctions. Information Systems Research 22(2), 346–368.

247. Schmalensee, R. and R. N. Stavins (2017). The design of environmental markets: What have we learned from experience with cap and trade? Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33(4).

248. Schummer, J. and A. Abizada (2017). Incentives in landing slot problems. Journal of Economic Theory 170, 29–55.

249. Schummer, J. and R. V. Vohra (2013). Assignment of arrival slots. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5(2), 164–185.

250. Sen, A. (1985). Commodities and Capabilities. Oxford University Press.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

251. Sentance, A. (2003). Airport slot auctions: Desirable or feasible? Utilities Policy 11(1), 53–57.

252. Sheffi, Y. (2004). Combinatorial auctions in the procurement of transportation services. Interfaces 34(4), 245–252.

253. Shortle, J. and R. D. Horan (2013). Policy instruments for water quality protection. Annual Review of Resoure Economics 5(1), 111–138.

254. Stavins, R. N. (2011). The problem of the commons: Still unsettled after 100 years. The American Economic Review 101(1), 81–108.

255. Stoneham, G., V. Chaudhri, A. Ha, and L. Strappazzon (2003). Auctions for conservation contracts: An empirical examination of Victoria’s BushTender trial. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 47(4), 477–500.

256. Sunstein, C. R. and R. H. Thaler (2003). Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron.

257. Sweeney, J. and R. J. Sweeney (1977). Monetary theory and the great Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-op crisis: Comment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 9, 86–89.

258. Tisdell, J. and M. S. Iftekhar (2013). Fisheries quota allocation: Laboratory experiments on simultaneous and combinatorial auctions. Marine Policy 38, 228–234.

259. Tran, A. (2009). Can procurement auctions reduce corruption? Evidence from the internal records of a bribe-paying firm. Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
260. Tucker, C. E. (2014). Patent trolls and technology diffusion: The case of medical imaging. MIT Working Paper.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
261. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2017). Global trends. Report.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

262. Varian, H. R. (2007). Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization 25(6), 1163–1178.

263. Vickrey, W. S. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16, 8–37.

264. Vickrey, W. S. (1969). Congestion theory and transport investment. American Economic Review 59(2), 251–260.

265. Westkamp, A. (2010). Market structure and matching with contracts. Journal of Economic Theory 145(5), 1724–1738.

266. Weyl, E. G. (2010). A price theory of multi-sided platforms. American Economic Review 100, 1642–1672.

267. Wilson, R. (1979). Auctions of shares. Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(4), 675–689.

268. Worm, B., R. Hilborn, J. K. Baum, T. A. Branch, J. S. Collie, C. Costello, M. J. Fogarty, E. A. Fulton, J. A. Hutchings, S. Jennings, et al. (2009). Rebuilding global fisheries. Science 325(5940), 578–585.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     
269. Zervas, G., D. Proserpio, and J. W. Byers (2014). The rise of the sharing economy: Estimating the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry. Journal of Marketing Research.
     Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
     

1. Why does birthplace matter so much?. (2019). Overman, Henry ; Bosquet, Clement.
   In: Post-Print.
   RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03193933.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

2. On the Anatomy of a Refugee Dispersal Policy: Neighborhood Integration and Dynamic Sorting. (2019). Valeyatheepillay, Madhinee ; Dahlberg, Matz.
   In: ifo Working Paper Series.
   RePEc:ces:ifowps:_285.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

3. The Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany: Evidence from a Field Experiment. (2018). Laurentsyeva, Nadzeya ; Giesing, Yvonne ; Battisti, Michele.
   In: Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy.
   RePEc:zbw:vfsc18:181522.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

4. Consequences of Immigrating During a Recession: Evidence from the US Refugee Resettlement Program. (2018). Mask, Joshua.
   In: MPRA Paper.
   RePEc:pra:mprapa:88492.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

5. (The Struggle for) Refugee Integration into the Labour Market: Evidence from Europe. (2018). Minale, Luigi ; Frattini, Tommaso ; Fasani, Francesco.
   In: IZA Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11333.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

6. Inspiration for integration. Labour market policies for refugees in five Northern European countries. (2018). Joyce, Patrick.
   In: Ratio Working Papers.
   RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0308.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

7. (The Struggle for) Refugee Integration into the Labour Market: Evidence from Europe. (2018). Frattini, Tommaso ; Fasani, Francesco.
   In: Development Working Papers.
   RePEc:csl:devewp:435.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

8. (The Struggle for) Refugee Integration into the Labour Market: Evidence from Europe. (2018). Minale, Luigi ; Fasani, Francesco ; Frattini, Tommaso.
   In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
   RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12718.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

9. Local labor markets and earnings of refugee immigrants. (2017). Godoy, Anna.
   In: Empirical Economics.
   RePEc:spr:empeco:v:52:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s00181-016-1067-7.

   Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

10. An invitation to market design. (2017). Kominers, Scott ; Crawford, Vincent ; Teytelboym, Alexander.
    In: Oxford Review of Economic Policy.
    RePEc:oup:oxford:v:33:y:2017:i:4:p:541-571..

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

11. An Invitation to Market Design. (2017). Teytelboym, Alexander ; Kominers, Scott ; Crawford, Vincent.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:hka:wpaper:2017-069.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

12. Labour market entry of non-Labour migrants – Swedish evidence. (2017). Åslund, Olof ; Forslund, Anders ; Liljeberg, Linus .
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2017_015.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

13. Intergenerational correlation and social interactions in education. (2017). Zenou, Yves ; Bervoets, Sebastian.
    In: European Economic Review.
    RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:92:y:2017:i:c:p:13-30.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

14. The (Struggle for) Labour Market Integration of Refugees: Evidence from European Countries. (2017). Minale, Luigi ; Frattini, Tommaso ; Fasani, Francesco.
    In: CReAM Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:crm:wpaper:1716.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

15. Austria; Selected Issues. (2016). International Monetary Fund, .
    In: IMF Staff Country Reports.
    RePEc:imf:imfscr:2016/051.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

16. Why does birthplace matter so much? sorting, learning and geography. (2016). Overman, Henry ; Bosquet, Clement.
    In: LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
    RePEc:ehl:lserod:66492.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

17. Why does birthplace matter so much? Sorting, learning and geography. (2016). Overman, Henry ; Bosquet, Clement.
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11085.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

18. Why Does Birthplace Matter So Much? Sorting, Learning and Geography. (2016). Overman, Henry ; Bosquet, Clement.
    In: SERC Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cep:sercdp:0190.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

19. Who suffers from unemployment? The role of health and skills. (2015). Nilsson, Anton.
    In: IZA Journal of Labor Policy.
    RePEc:spr:izalpo:v:4:y:2015:i:1:p:1-24:10.1186/s40173-015-0046-5.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

20. Childhood Exposure to Segregation and Long-Run Criminal Involvement - Evidence from the “Whole of Sweden” Strategy#. (2015). Robling, Per Olof ; Gronqvist, Hans ; Niknami, Susan ; Robling, P-O, .
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:sofiwp:2015_001.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

21. Forty years of immigrant segregation in France, 1968-2007 How different is the new immigration?. (2015). Verdugo, Gregory ; Ke, Jean-Louis Pan.
    In: Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers).
    RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-01296756.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

22. Immigrant Occupational Mobility: Longitudinal Evidence from Spain. (2014). SIMON, HIPOLITO ; Sanroma, Esteban ; Ramos, Raul.
    In: European Journal of Population.
    RePEc:spr:eurpop:v:30:y:2014:i:2:p:223-255.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

23. Forty Years of Immigrant Segregation in France, 1968-2007: How Different Is the New Immigration?. (2014). Verdugo, Gregory ; Pan Ke Shon, Jean-Louis, .
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8062.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

24. Reverse assimilation? Immigrants in the Canadian labour market during the Great Depression. (2014). Summerfield, Fraser ; Minns, Chris ; Inwood, Kris.
    In: Economic History Working Papers.
    RePEc:ehl:wpaper:57209.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

25. Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: Evidence from quasi-random neighborhood assignment of immigrants. (2014). Damm, Anna.
    In: Journal of Urban Economics.
    RePEc:eee:juecon:v:79:y:2014:i:c:p:139-166.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

26. The Impacts of Social Networks on Immigrants’ Employment Prospects: The Spanish Case 1997-2007. (2013). Méndez Errico, Luciana.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:uab:wprdea:wpdea1301.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

27. Immigration in Europe: Trends, Policies and Empirical Evidence. (2013). Ortega, Francesc ; Glitz, Albrecht ; De La Rica, Sara.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7778.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

28. Immigration in Europe: Trends, Policies and Empirical Evidence. (2013). Ortega, Francesc ; Glitz, Albrecht ; De La Rica, Sara.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2013-16.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

29. Refugee and asylum migration. (2013). TimothyJ. Hatton, .
    In: Chapters.
    RePEc:elg:eechap:4026_24.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

30. Neighborhood Quality and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Quasi-Random Neighborhood Assignment of Immigrants. (2012). Damm, Anna.
    In: Norface Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:nor:wpaper:2012025.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

31. Refugee and Asylum Migration to the OECD: A Short Overview. (2012). Hatton, Timothy.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7004.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

32. Overeducation among Immigrants in Sweden: Incidence, Wage Effects and State-Dependence. (2012). Wadensjö, Eskil ; Datta Gupta, Nabanita ; Wadensjo, Eskil ; Joona, Pernilla Andersson.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6695.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

33. Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: evidence from quasi-random neighborhood assignment of immigrants. (2012). Damm, Anna Piil.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2012-22.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

34. Neighborhood quality and labor market outcomes: evidence from quasi-random neighborhood assignment of immigrants. (2012). Damm, Anna.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2012/6/doc2012-22.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

35. Overeducation among Immigrants in Sweden: Incidence, Wage Effects and State-dependence. (2012). Wadensjö, Eskil ; Datta Gupta, Nabanita ; Wadensjo, Eskil ; Joona, Pernilla Andersson.
    In: SULCIS Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:sulcis:2012_002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

36. Immigrant wage profiles within and between establishments. (2012). Raaum, Oddbjørn ; Bratsberg, Bernt ; Barth, Erling.
    In: Labour Economics.
    RePEc:eee:labeco:v:19:y:2012:i:4:p:541-556.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

37. Income inequality and health: Lessons from a refugee residential assignment program. (2012). Niknami, Susan ; Johansson, Per ; Grnqvist, Hans .
    In: Journal of Health Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:31:y:2012:i:4:p:617-629.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

38. Neighborhood Quality and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Quasi-Random Neighborhood Assignment of Immigrants. (2012). Damm, Anna.
    In: CReAM Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:crm:wpaper:1235.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

39. Neighborhood Quality and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from Quasi-Random Neighborhood Assignment of Immigrants. (2012). Damm, Anna.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-18.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

40. THE REGIONAL SETTLEMENT PATTERNS OF IMMIGRANTS TO SWEDEN 1967-2005 BY SEX AND AGE.. (2011). Rauhut, Daniel ; Johansson, Mats .
    In: ERSA conference papers.
    RePEc:wiw:wiwrsa:ersa10p1467.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

41. Do Employers Use Unemployment as a Sorting Criterion When Hiring? Evidence from a Field Experiment. (2011). Rooth, Dan-Olof ; Eriksson, Stefan.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6235.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

42. Peers, Neighborhoods, and Immigrant Student Achievement: Evidence from a Placement Policy. (2011). Åslund, Olof ; Grönqvist, Hans ; Fredriksson, Peter ; Edin, Per-Anders ; Aslund, Olof ; Gronqvist, Hans .
    In: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.
    RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:67-95.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

43. Dynamics of the Employment Assimilation of First-Generation Immigrant Men in Sweden: Comparing Dynamic and Static Assimilation Models with Longitudinal Data. (2009). Akay, Alpaslan.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4655.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

44. Immigrant Wages in the Spanish Labour Market: Does the Origin of Human Capital Matter?. (2009). SIMON, HIPOLITO ; Sanroma, Esteban ; Ramos, Raul.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4157.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

45. On Mandatory Activation of Welfare Recipients. (2009). Mörk, Eva ; Dahlberg, Matz ; Mork, Eva ; Johansson, Kajsa.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3947.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

46. Peers, neighborhoods and immigrant student achievement – evidence from a placement policy. (2009). Åslund, Olof ; Grönqvist, Hans ; Fredriksson, Peter ; Edin, Per-Anders.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2009_020.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

47. How Important is Access to Jobs? Old Question - Improved Answer.. (2009). Zenou, Yves ; Östh, John ; Åslund, Olof ; John Östh, ; Aslund, Olof ; Osth, John.
    In: CReAM Discussion Paper Series.
    RePEc:crm:wpaper:0925.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

48. Differences in Wage Distributions between Natives, Non-Refugees, and Refugees. (2008). Wahlberg, Roger .
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0316.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

49. Dynamics of Employment- and Earnings-Assimilation of First-Generation Immigrant Men in Sweden, 1990-2000. (2007). Akay, Alpaslan.
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0279.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

50. Local Unemployment and the Earnings-Assimilation of Immigrant Men in Sweden: Evidence from Longitudinal Data, 1990-2000. (2007). Tezic, Kerem ; Akay, Alpaslan.
    In: Working Papers in Economics.
    RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0277.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Report date: 2025-02-28 06:36:47 || Missing content? Let us know