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Robert Aumanns and Thomas Schellings Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation. (2005). Committee, Nobel Prize.
In: Nobel Prize in Economics documents.
RePEc:ris:nobelp:2005_001.

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  50. The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis. (1996). Krishna, Vijay ; Benoit, Jean-Pierre.
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