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The Economics of Central Banking. (1996). Cukierman, Alex.
In: Discussion Paper.
RePEc:tiu:tiucen:e8f7a23c-1058-4c68-b6b5-dcbe0499d1bd.

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  1. Monetary and macroprudential policies: How to Be green? A political-economy approach. (2024). Masciandaro, Donato ; Russo, Riccardo.
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  2. Framework for Preserving Financial Stability in Montenegro. (2014). Fabris, Nikola ; ugi, Radoje .
    In: Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice.
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  3. Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting.The Case of Romania. (2009). DUMITER, Florin Cornel .
    In: Romanian Economic Journal.
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  4. Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits in Developing Countries: New Evidence from Panel Analysis. (2009). .
    In: LEO Working Papers / DR LEO.
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  5. Measuring the Degree of Central Bank Independence in Egypt. (2007). Kamaly, Ahmed ; Farrag, Noha .
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  6. Central Bank Reform and Inflation Dynamics in the Transition Economies theory and some evidence. (2005). Sidiropoulos, Moise ; Papadopoulos, Athanasios ; Diana, Giuseppe.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005.
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  7. Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. (2004). Radziwill, Artur ; Orlowski, Lucjan ; Jarmuzek, Mariusz.
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  8. New Architectures in the Regulation and Supervision of Financial Markets and Institutions: The Netherlands. (2004). Prast, Henriette ; Lelyveld, Iman ; Sneessens, Henri ; Pierrard, Olivier.
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  9. Comparing Different Central Bank Targets. (2002). .
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  10. Strategic Interactions of Monetary Policymakers and Wage/Price Bargainers: A Review with Implications for the European Common-Currency Area. (2001). .
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  11. Disinflation, Monetary Policy and Fiscal Constraints. Experience of the Countries in Transition. (1999). DABROWSKI, Marek.
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  12. Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro. (1999). Ruggiero, Gian ; Papadia, Francesco.
    In: Open Economies Review.
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  13. Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking. (1999). Woitek, Ulrich ; Berger, Helge.
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  14. Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking. (1999). Woitek, Ulrich ; Berger, Helge.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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  15. A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank. (1997). de Haan, Jakob ; Berger, Helge.
    In: CESifo Working Paper Series.
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