create a website

Central bank independence : a critical view. (1994). Mas, Ignacio .
In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1356.

Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Cited: 4

Citations received by this document

Cites: 24

References cited by this document

Cocites: 50

Documents which have cited the same bibliography

Coauthors: 0

Authors who have wrote about the same topic

Citations

Citations received by this document

  1. Political Pressure on the National Bank of Slovakia. (2011). Gersl, Adam ; Kukuk, Peter .
    In: Working Papers IES.
    RePEc:fau:wpaper:wp2011_29.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Central Bank Independence and Budget Deficits in Developing Countries: New Evidence from Panel Analysis. (2009). .
    In: LEO Working Papers / DR LEO.
    RePEc:leo:wpaper:303.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Central Bankers and Central Bank Independence. (2003). Beblavý, Miroslav ; BADRAN, rema ; Beblavy, Miroslav.
    In: Scottish Journal of Political Economy.
    RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:50:y:2003:i:1:p:61-68.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Central-bank decapitalization in developing economies. (1997). Beckerman, Paul.
    In: World Development.
    RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:25:y:1997:i:2:p:167-178.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

References

References cited by this document

  1. Alesina, Alberto (1989), Politics and BusinessCycles in Industrial Democracies, Economic Policy 8, pp. 57-98, April.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  2. Alesina, Alberto 11988), Macroeconomics and Politics. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual, edited by Stanley Fischer, pp. 17-52 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

  3. Alesina, Alberto and Lawrence H. Summers (1993), Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, Journal of Money. Credit and Banking, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 151-162, May.

  4. Banaian, King, Leroy 0. Laney and Thomas D. Willett (1983), Central Bank Independence: An International Comparison, FederalReserveBank of Dallas: Economic Review pp. 1-13, March.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  5. Bernanke, Benand Frederic Mishkin (1992), Central Bank Behavior and the Strategy of Monetary Policy from Six Industrialized Countries. In Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer (eds.), NBERMacroeconomics Annual 1992 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

  6. Burdekin, Richard C. K. and Leroy 0. Laney (1988), Fiscal Policy-making and the Central Bank Institutional Constraint, Kyklos 41(4), p. 647-662.

  7. Cukierman, Alex (1992), Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).

  8. Cukierman, Alex and Steven B. Webb (1994), Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence, mimeo, January.

  9. Cukierman, Alex, Pantelis Kalaidzidakis, Lawrence Summers and Steven B. Webb (1993), Central Bank Independence, Growth, Investment and Real Rates, Carnegie-RochesterConference Series on Public Policy 39, pp. 95-140, December.

  10. Cukierman, Alex, Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini (1992), Seignorage and Political Instability, American Economic Review 82(3), pp. 537-555, June.

  11. Cukierman, Alex, Steven B. Webb and Bilin Neyapti (1992), Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes, The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 353-398.

  12. Friedman, Milton (1959), A Program for Monetary Stability (New York: Fordham University Press).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  13. Friedman, Milton (19621, Should there be an Independent Monetary Authority? In Leland B. Yeager (ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), Ch. 8, pp. 219-243.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  14. Goodhart, Charles A. E. (1994), Game Theory for Central Bankers: A Report to the Governor of the Bank of England, Journal of Economic Literature, pp.

  15. Goodman, John B. (1991), The Politics of Central Bank Independence, Comparative Politics, pp. 329-349, April.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  16. Grilli, Vittorio, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini (1991), Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries, Economic Policy, pp. 342-392, October.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  17. Hetzel, Robert L. (1990), Central Banks Independence in Historical Persp ctive: A Review Essay, Journal of Monetary Economics 25(1), pp. 165-176, January.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  18. Persson,Torsten (1988), Credibility of Macroeconomic Policy: An Introduction and Broad Survey, European Economic Review 32 (2/3), pp. 519-532, March.

  19. Persson,Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1993), Designing Institutions for Monetary Stability, Carnegie-RochesterConference Series on Public Policy 39, pp. 5384, December.

  20. Posen, Adam S. (1994), Why Central Bank Independence Does Not Cause Low Inflation, Finance and the International Economy 7 (Oxford University Press), pp. 51-63.
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  21. Rogoff, Kenneth (1985), The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, pp. 1169-90, November.

  22. Sargentr Thomas J. and Neil Wallace (1981), Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis: Quarterly Review 5(3), pp.

  23. Swinburne, Mark and Marta Castello-Branco (1991), Central Bank Independence and CentralBankFunctions. In PatrickDownesand RezaVaez-Zadeh(eds.), The EvolvingRoleof CentralBanks,pp. 414-445 (Washington,DC: InternationalMonetaryFund).
    Paper not yet in RePEc: Add citation now
  24. Walsh,Carl E.(1993), CentralBankStrategies,Credibilityand Independence:A Review Essay, Journal of Mgnetary Economics 32, pp. 287-302, November.

Cocites

Documents in RePEc which have cited the same bibliography

  1. Does greater central bank independence really lead to lower inflation? Evidence from panel data. (2013). Posso, Alberto ; Tawadros, George B..
    In: Economic Modelling.
    RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:33:y:2013:i:c:p:244-247.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  2. Quest for the Best: How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inflation. (2011). Masłowska-Jokinen, Aleksandra.
    In: Czech Economic Review.
    RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2011_132.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  3. Partisan Liberalizations. A New Puzzle from OECD Network Industries?.. (2010). Belloc, Filippo ; Nicita, Antonio .
    In: RSCAS Working Papers.
    RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2010/28.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  4. Political ideology and economic freedom across Canadian provinces. (2009). Potrafke, Niklas ; Bjørnskov, Christian ; Bjornskov, Christian .
    In: Working Papers CEB.
    RePEc:sol:wpaper:09-054.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  5. Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?. (2009). Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov ; Hellstrom, Jorgen ; Landstrom, Mats .
    In: Ratio Working Papers.
    RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0143.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  6. What Triggers Prolonged Inflation Regimes? A Historical Analysis. (2009). Vansteenkiste, isabel.
    In: Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20091109.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  7. A Historical Analysis of Central Bank Independence in Latin America: The Colombian Experience, 1923-2008. (2009). Meisel Roca, Adolfo ; Barón, Juan ; Baron, Juan David .
    In: BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA.
    RePEc:col:000094:005788.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  8. A Historical Analysis of Central Bank Independence in Latin America: The Colombian Experience, 1923-2008. (2009). Meisel Roca, Adolfo ; Barón, Juan ; Baron, Juan D..
    In: Borradores de Economia.
    RePEc:bdr:borrec:573.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  9. Measuring Central Bank Independence: Ordering, Ranking, or Scoring?. (2008). Banaian, King.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:scs:wpaper:0803.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  10. Does Instrument Independence Matter under the Constrained Discretionof an Inflation Targeting Goal? Lessons from UK Taylor Rule Empirics. (2007). Mihailov, Alexander.
    In: Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2006.
    RePEc:mmf:mmfc06:95.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  11. Employment Performance and Institutions: New Answers to an Old Question. (2007). Gatti, Donatella ; DEMMOU, Lilas ; Amable, Bruno.
    In: IZA Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2731.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  12. The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions in Brazil: The Limits of the Inflation Targeting Strategy, 1999-2005. (2006). Vernengo, Matías.
    In: Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah.
    RePEc:uta:papers:2006_05.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  13. Monetary Policy Transparency in the Inflation Targeting. (2005). Radziwill, Artur ; Orlowski, Lucjan ; Jarmuzek, Mariusz.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0502025.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  14. Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. (2004). Radziwill, Artur ; Orlowski, Lucjan ; Jarmuzek, Mariusz.
    In: CASE Network Studies and Analyses.
    RePEc:sec:cnstan:0281.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  15. Has Monetary Policy Become More Efficient? A Cross Country Analysis. (2004). Krause Montalbert, Stefan ; Flores-Lagunes, Alfonso ; Cecchetti, Stephen.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10973.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  16. DEMOCRACY???S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries. (2003). Vaaler, Paul ; Block, Steven ; Schrage, Burkhard N..
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-575.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  17. Democratization???s Risk Premium: Partisan and Opportunistic Political Business Cycle Effects on Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries. (2003). Vaaler, Paul ; Block, Steven ; Schrage, Burkhard N..
    In: William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series.
    RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-546.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  18. What Triggers Inflation in Emerging Market Economies?. (2003). Yücel, Mustafa ; Domac, Ilker.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:tcb:wpaper:0307.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  19. Political cycles and international interdependence. (2002). Menegatti, Mario.
    In: Economics Department Working Papers.
    RePEc:par:dipeco:2002-ep02.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  20. Central bank structure, policy efficiency, and macroeconomic performance: exploring empirical relationships. (2002). Krause Montalbert, Stefan ; Cecchetti, Stephen.
    In: Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2002:i:jul:p:47-60:n:v.84no.4.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  21. Partisanship and fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union. (2001). Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; acocella, nicola.
    In: Macroeconomics.
    RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0106003.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  22. Central Bank Reform, Liberalization and Inflation in Transition Economies - An International Perspective. (2001). Neyapti, Bilin ; Cukierman, Alex ; Miller, Geoffrey .
    In: CEPR Discussion Papers.
    RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2808.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  23. Wage Indexation, Central Bank Independence and the Cost of Disinflation. (2000). Diana, Giuseppe.
    In: Working Papers of BETA.
    RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2000-03.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  24. Inflation Targeting Macroeconomic Distortions and the Policy Reaction Function. (2000). Karunaratne, Neil D..
    In: Discussion Papers Series.
    RePEc:qld:uq2004:269.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  25. Fiscal Policy and Inflation Targets: Does Credibility Matters?. (2000). Tirelli, Patrizio ; Natale, Piergiovanna ; Lossani, Marco .
    In: MPRA Paper.
    RePEc:pra:mprapa:18693.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  26. Liquidity Crises and Discount Window Lending: Theory and Implications for the Dollarization Debate. (2000). Keister, Todd ; Antinolfi, Gaetano.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:cie:wpaper:0002.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  27. Partisan social happiness. (1999). MacCulloch, Robert ; DiTella, Rafael ; di Tella, Rafael.
    In: ZEI Working Papers.
    RePEc:zbw:zeiwps:b221999.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  28. Democracy and Markets: The Case of Exchange Rates. (1999). Stix, Helmut ; Freeman, John R. ; Hays, Jude C..
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:onb:oenbwp:39.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  29. Mixed signals: central bank independence, coordinated wage bargaining, and European Monetary Union. (1997). Hall, Peter A. ; Franzese, Robert J..
    In: Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economic Change and Employment.
    RePEc:zbw:wzbece:fsi97307.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  30. Inflation, growth, and central banks : theory and evidence. (1996). De Gregorio, Jose.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1575.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  31. Central bank independence and inflation performance: panacea or placebo?. (1996). Jenkins, M. A..
    In: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.
    RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1996:25.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  32. Central bank independence and inflation performance: panacea or placebo?. (1996). Jenkins, M. A..
    In: BNL Quarterly Review.
    RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1996:25.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  33. Institutions for Monetary Stability. (1996). Romer, Christina.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5557.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  34. Central bank independence in another eleven countries. (1995). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; van Keulen, M..
    In: Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review.
    RePEc:psl:bnlqrr:1995:13.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  35. Central bank independence in another eleven countries. (1995). Eijffinger, Sylvester ; van Keulen, M..
    In: BNL Quarterly Review.
    RePEc:psl:bnlaqr:1995:13.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  36. Central bank independence : a critical view. (1994). Mas, Ignacio .
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1356.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  37. Insulation of Pensions from Political Risk. (1994). Diamond, Peter.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4895.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  38. How independent should a central bank be?. (1994). Debelle, Guy ; Fischer, Stanley.
    In: Conference Series ; [Proceedings].
    RePEc:fip:fedbcp:y:1994:p:195-225:n:38.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  39. Goals, guidelines and constraints facing monetary policymakers: proceedings of a conference held at North Falmouth, Massachusetts in June 1994. (1994). Fuhrer, Jeffrey.
    In: Conference Series ; [Proceedings].
    RePEc:fip:fedbcp:y:1994:n:38.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  40. Rules, Discretion, and Central Bank Independence: The German Experience 1880-1989. (1993). Bordo, Michael ; Eschweiler, Bernhard.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4547.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  41. Timing is All: Elections and the Duration of United States Business Cycles. (1993). Klein, Michael.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4383.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  42. Central bank independence and economic performance. (1993). Pollard, Patricia.
    In: Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:1993:i:jul:p:21-36.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  43. La crise de la macroéconomie, une conséquence de la méconnaissance des institutions?. (1992). Boyer, Robert .
    In: L'Actualité Economique.
    RePEc:ris:actuec:v:68:y:1992:i:1:p:43-68.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  44. Disinflation With Imperfect Credibility. (1992). Ball, Laurence.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3983.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  45. Socialist economic growth and political investment cycles. (1991). zou, heng-fu.
    In: Policy Research Working Paper Series.
    RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:615.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  46. Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence. (1991). Romer, David.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3936.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  47. Los efectos del anuncio de un objetivo de inflación. (1991). Huertas, Juan Ayuso.
    In: Investigaciones Economicas.
    RePEc:iec:inveco:v:15:y:1991:i:3:p:627-644.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  48. Why a rule for stable prices may dominate a rule for zero inflation. (1991). Stockman, Alan ; Gavin, William.
    In: Economic Review.
    RePEc:fip:fedcer:y:1991:i:qi:p:2-8:n:v.27no.1.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  49. The Capital Levy in Theory and Practice. (1989). Eichengreen, Barry.
    In: NBER Working Papers.
    RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3096.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

  50. Macroeconomic Policy and Long-Run Growth. (). Summers, Lawrence ; DeLong, James.
    In: J. Bradford De Long's Working Papers.
    RePEc:wop:calbec:_113.

    Full description at Econpapers || Download paper

Coauthors

Authors registered in RePEc who have wrote about the same topic

Report date: 2025-02-25 09:32:00 || Missing content? Let us know

CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated October, 6 2023. Contact: CitEc Team.

pFad - Phonifier reborn

Pfad - The Proxy pFad of © 2024 Garber Painting. All rights reserved.

Note: This service is not intended for secure transactions such as banking, social media, email, or purchasing. Use at your own risk. We assume no liability whatsoever for broken pages.


Alternative Proxies:

Alternative Proxy

pFad Proxy

pFad v3 Proxy

pFad v4 Proxy