Endogenous Political Institutions

Alberto Alesina, Philippe Aghion and Francesco Trebbi

No 3473, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyse both 'optimal' constitutional design and 'positive' aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications, which we then discuss.

Keywords: Political systems; Endogenous constitutions; Super-majority rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 O50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lam
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Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous Political Institutions (2004)
Working Paper: Endogenous Political Institutions (2004)
Working Paper: Endogenous Political Institutions (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Political Institutions (2002)
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