Timing of predictions in dynamic cheap talk: experts vs. quacks

Aleksei Smirnov () and Egor Starkov

No 334, ECON - Working Papers from Department of Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a sufficiently general class earlier reports are more credible. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time.

Keywords: Career concerns; reputation; dynamic games; games of timing; strategic information transmission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 D83 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:econwp:334

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