American and European constitutional systems have two similar doctrines: balancing and proportionality. Both resemble each other in important aspects and are often discussed in tandem. However, balancing has never attained the status of an established doctrine in American constitutional law in the same way that proportionality has in European constitutional law. Moreover, balancing has always been the subject of fierce criticism and is very much a controversial concept in American constitutional law. European proponents of proportionality are perplexed by this American resistance which is sometimes viewed as based on American isolationalism and unilateralism. In this article we suggest an original, and often overlooked, explanation to the difference between balancing and proportionality -the historical origins of the two concepts.

One of the most pressing problems of current constitutional law in the aftermath of September 11 is how to balance constitutional rights and national security interests. No one however seems to pause and ask should we balance individual rights and national security interests and if so when. One of the reasons for this is the widespread acceptance of what I shall term in this Article, the balancing consciousness: the view that every problem can and should be solved through balancing conflicting considerations. This Article demonstrates that the balancing consciousness is misleading. Not every problem can and should be solved through balancing conflicting considerations. Instead of the balancing consciousness, this Article argues for a dual model, which envisions two logical forms of decision-making - balancing and non-balancing. This model has far-reaching implication for constitutional adjudication. The dual model is based on a distinction between two levels, or orders, of considera...

A proposal to ban circumcision for non-medical reasons in Iceland has generated a heated debate over whether banning the practice would amount to an attack on religious freedom. Iddo Porat argues that we should be suspicious of any majority proposed legislation which affects only minority groups.

The literature regarding intraductal papillary mucinous neoplasm (IPMN) continues to clarify this heterogeneous entity. 2,3 Moyer and Gaffney correctly point out that the incidence of these lesions may be higher with more specialized imaging techniques and that risk stratification with regard to cancer can be accomplished according to an evolving set of prognostic characteristics. The 25% risk described in our review refers to the incidence of cancer in resected IPMNs; the risk of cancer in unresected IPMNs is markedly less. A discussion of the diagnosis, prognosis, and management of these lesions was beyond the scope of our review.

This Article has sprung from ideas put forth in my dissertation for the Stanford Law School, and has undergone several changes over the past few years. Many people have helped me form the ideas in this Article, or commented on its various versions. I would like to thank especially

The emergence of multicultural theory and of claims of recognition by cultural, ethnic, and national minorities has brought to the forefront previously neglected aspects of the right to equality. However, when judged on their own, claims for recognition stand the risk of failing to fully capture, and even distorting, the meaning of equality. I suggest that in order to avoid this risk, multicultural claims need to be contextualized. Employing Nancy Fraser's framework of two dimensions of justice-recognition and redistribution-and adding a third dimension-political participation, I suggest a framework for a contextualized assessment of multicultural claims that allows us to properly and fully assess their validity. I then go on to employ this framework on the claims of Israel's two most significant cultural minorities-the Palestinian Arabs and the Ultra Orthodox Jews. I show how the use of the suggested framework helps to expose the considerable differences between these two cultural minorities, and consequently the notable difference in the merits of their claims, a difference that would have otherwise gone undetected.

Controlling natality-the ratio of births to the general population-is one of the best means a state has to control its demographic composition. However, the fact that the state has certain interests with regard to the size and composition of its population does not necessarily give it the right to set and pursue natality policies, because such policies can potentially infringe on various human rights such as the rights of women and the rights of minorities. Using a feminist perspective I first argue that even if it is illegitimate for states to try to influence people's choice as to the number of their children in order to achieve demographic change, the state may, and should, enact natality policies aimed at promoting women's right to equality, regardless of whether their end result is to achieve a demographic change. Next I examine whether states are allowed to pursue natality policies aimed at decreasing natality rates in specific cultural groups, whose cultural precepts are oppressive toward women and dictate very high natality rates. Using the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community in Israel as a test case, I present and reject three objections to the state's right to pursue such natality policies: the objection from free choice, the objection from free association, and the objection from culture. Rejecting these objections I conclude that not only is the state allowed, but it is indeed obligated, to pursue natality policies that aim to alleviate the oppression of women by decreasing inordinately high birth rates in illiberal communities. However, when choosing the measures for the implementation of such policies the state must take care to choose only measures that respect human rights.

Abstract Israel's constitutional structure purports to combine strong establishment of the Orthodox Jewish religion in the state with respect for liberal values such as pluralism equality and liberty. Whereas the establishment of the Orthodox Jewish religion is achieved through laws regulations and administrative power, liberal values that are only partially enshrined in law, are mostly defended and articulated by the Israeli Supreme Court.