Basia Ellis
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Papers by Basia Ellis
Authors' analyses suggest that DACA had a nearly immediate and positive impact on adult trajectories, delaying certain aspects of the “transition to illegality.” In addition, authors found differences in the experiences of respondents who received DACA at earlier and later stages in their transition to adulthood. Nevertheless, important limitations of the program continued to keep DACA beneficiaries in a developmental limbo.
In this chapter, we investigate how time is taken up in dialogical self theory and attempt to elaborate the current view with an onto-existential understanding. In our view, such an elaboration is necessary because time in dialogical self theory is for the most part regarded abstractly, as a background—clock time—according to which the dynamics of a primarily spatial dialogical self are traced. We in turn conceptualize the dialogical self as a temporal structure in its own right, unfolding in lived time with others in the world.1 For this we take Heidegger as a contentious starting point, for with him we maintain that the question of time is not one of developmental accounts or narrowly conceived clock time but of our finitude in relation to Being.
recognized in mainstream psychological research, especially within applied fields such as clinical and counseling psychology. Within this context it is reasonable to question whether Eastern ideas can also inform dialogical self theory. The question is apposite given that dialogical self theory takes as its prerogative the ‘bridging’ of distinct, even opposing, theoretical approaches and research traditions into a single framework. Our paper examines what is at stake in such attempts through a study of Buddhist understandings of mind and consciousness. We argue that Buddhist principles are grounded in a unique, ethical epistemology contradistinctive from Western traditions and this makes a bridging of dialogical and Buddhist approaches unlikely in the first instance. Attempts to do so, we argue, risk compromising the meanings of Buddhist concepts. Does this preclude the possibilities for dialogue between Buddhism and dialogical self theory? We do not think so. Rather, we suggest that Buddhism can be drawn upon to study the assumptions of dialogical theory, and we exemplify this through an analysis of the dialogical self’s moral program. Our study reveals how dialogical self theory retains a uniquely Western ethics that, despite being explicitly open to alterity, remains at risk of imposing itself onto alternative cultural positions. To genuinely engage Buddhism in dialogue, we conclude, is not a matter of translating Buddhist ideas onto the dialogical platform but to allow the Buddhist position to disturb the certitudes of the dialogical model.
Authors' analyses suggest that DACA had a nearly immediate and positive impact on adult trajectories, delaying certain aspects of the “transition to illegality.” In addition, authors found differences in the experiences of respondents who received DACA at earlier and later stages in their transition to adulthood. Nevertheless, important limitations of the program continued to keep DACA beneficiaries in a developmental limbo.
In this chapter, we investigate how time is taken up in dialogical self theory and attempt to elaborate the current view with an onto-existential understanding. In our view, such an elaboration is necessary because time in dialogical self theory is for the most part regarded abstractly, as a background—clock time—according to which the dynamics of a primarily spatial dialogical self are traced. We in turn conceptualize the dialogical self as a temporal structure in its own right, unfolding in lived time with others in the world.1 For this we take Heidegger as a contentious starting point, for with him we maintain that the question of time is not one of developmental accounts or narrowly conceived clock time but of our finitude in relation to Being.
recognized in mainstream psychological research, especially within applied fields such as clinical and counseling psychology. Within this context it is reasonable to question whether Eastern ideas can also inform dialogical self theory. The question is apposite given that dialogical self theory takes as its prerogative the ‘bridging’ of distinct, even opposing, theoretical approaches and research traditions into a single framework. Our paper examines what is at stake in such attempts through a study of Buddhist understandings of mind and consciousness. We argue that Buddhist principles are grounded in a unique, ethical epistemology contradistinctive from Western traditions and this makes a bridging of dialogical and Buddhist approaches unlikely in the first instance. Attempts to do so, we argue, risk compromising the meanings of Buddhist concepts. Does this preclude the possibilities for dialogue between Buddhism and dialogical self theory? We do not think so. Rather, we suggest that Buddhism can be drawn upon to study the assumptions of dialogical theory, and we exemplify this through an analysis of the dialogical self’s moral program. Our study reveals how dialogical self theory retains a uniquely Western ethics that, despite being explicitly open to alterity, remains at risk of imposing itself onto alternative cultural positions. To genuinely engage Buddhism in dialogue, we conclude, is not a matter of translating Buddhist ideas onto the dialogical platform but to allow the Buddhist position to disturb the certitudes of the dialogical model.