Books by Jack Reynolds
Phenomenology and naturalism are standardly thought of as philosophical opponents, and the histor... more Phenomenology and naturalism are standardly thought of as philosophical opponents, and the historical interaction between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century has sometimes been adversarial in nature. While the major phenomenologists have drawn deeply on science, they have often also sought to discipline the reach and ambition of science, with such attempts sometimes provocatively posed - e.g. science does not think. For the phenomenologist, the success of empirical science should be bracketed when doing philosophy, even if it is not so clear that considerations to do with the consequences of science for the life-world are quite so assiduously bracketed. Moreover, modes of reasoning that are characteristic of the empirical sciences (e.g. inference to the best explanation, reduction, causal explanation, etc.), and generally endorsed by the philosophical naturalist, are held to be non-phenomenological. In the opposite direction, phenomenology is frequently reproached by naturalists and scientists for being, as Daniel Dennett suggests, a theoretical trajectory with no agreed method and hence no agreed results; nothing that might play a role in engagement with science, as John Searle complains. On both of these commonly held views, then, phenomenology cannot be a potential research program in interaction with empirical sciences: the phenomenologist standardly embraces this; the naturalist typically bemoans it and suspects an untenable “first philosophy”.
In this book, however, I argue that these understandings of phenomenology (and indeed of naturalism) should not be taken to be the final word, and that they are premised upon an understanding of transcendental phenomenology that is ultimately untenable and in need of updating. Phenomenology, as I seek to reorient it, is compatible with what is called liberal naturalism, as well as with weak forms of methodological naturalism, in virtue of being committed to a relationship of “results continuity” with relevant sciences (albeit indexed to future scientific and epistemic results), and exhibiting due attentiveness to Quinean sensitivity requirements, as I contend in the opening methodological chapter. The burden of this book will be to positively develop this claim, this naturalising of phenomenology, in a manner that does not amount to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul.
To do this, the book is structurally organised around what I take to be core features of phenomenology. Although the book will not be predominantly expositional, or historical in focus, a remark from Maurice Merleau-Ponty best captures what I take to be these core features. In the Phenomenology of Perception he enigmatically remarks at one point: “if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, we shall understand that beyond these there is nothing to understand”. This seems like an outlandish statement in one sense, tantamount to a transcendental mysticism in which ambiguity is resolved and we access the real, once and for all. Of course, that is not what he means. He means that everything central to phenomenology is somehow ensnared in understanding the paradoxes of what Mark Sacks calls “situated thought”, and also that the paradoxes of situated thought cannot be overcome for philosophical reflection, and indeed, existential experience in general. The book is organised around the key elements of any situation as Merleau-Ponty describes them: time; the body; world; thing; and others. They all admit of a third-person perspective. They all also apparently irremediably have a first-person perspective and transcendentally condition our access to objects. And yet on most construals of naturalism – e.g. for the ontological and scientific naturalist – we are told that there is no ‘here’ and ‘now’ in nature. My book argues for a hybrid account of phenomenology and naturalism that is able to simultaneously respect both of these views, something akin to the manifest image and the scientific image for Wilfrid Sellars, without resorting to strategies of methodological separatism/incompatibilism, which seek to preserve a proper and autonomous space for phenomenological and empirical science, such that the twain does not meet.
A battle over the politics (and philosophy) of time is a major part of what is at stake in the di... more A battle over the politics (and philosophy) of time is a major part of what is at stake in the differences between three competing currents of contemporary philosophy: analytic philosophy, post-structuralist philosophy, and phenomenological philosophy. Avowed or tacit philosophies of time define representatives of each of these groups and also guard against their potential interlocutors. However, by bringing the temporal differences between these philosophical trajectories to the fore, and showing both their methodological presuppositions and their ethico-political implications, this book begins a long overdue dialogue on their respective strengths and weaknesses. It argues that there are systemic temporal problems (chronopathologies) that afflict each, but especially the post-structuralist tradition (focusing on Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida and their prophetic future politics) and the analytic tradition (focusing on John Rawls and analytic methodology in general, particularly the tendency to oscillate between forms of atemporality and intuition-oriented “presentism”). What is required is a “middle-way” that does not treat the living-present and the pragmatic temporality associated with bodily coping as an epiphenomenon to be explained away as either a transcendental illusion (and as a reactive force that is ethically problematic), or as a subjective/psychological experience that is not ultimately real.
Throughout much of the 20th Century, the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy... more Throughout much of the 20th Century, the relationship between analytic and continental philosophy has been one of disinterest, caution or hostility. Recent debates in philosophy have highlighted some of the similarities between the two approaches and even envisaged a post-continental and post-analytic philosophy. Opening with a history of key encounters between philosophers of opposing camps since the late 19th Century - from Frege and Husserl to Derrida and Searle - the book goes on to explore in detail the main methodological differences between the two approaches. This covers a very wide range of topics, from issues of style and clarity of exposition to formal methods arising from logic and probability theory. The final section presents a balanced critique of the two schools’ approaches to key issues such as Time, Truth, Subjectivity, Mind and Body, Language and Meaning, and Ethics. Analytic Versus Continental is the first sustained analysis of both approaches to philosophy, examining the limits and possibilities of each. It provides a clear overview of a much-disputed history and, in highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both traditions, also offers future directions for both continental and analytic philosophy.
This book examines the core thinkers of existential phenomenology: Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Pon... more This book examines the core thinkers of existential phenomenology: Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and de Beauvoir.
While there have been many essays devoted to comparing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with tha... more While there have been many essays devoted to comparing the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with that of Jacques Derrida, there has been no sustained book-length treatment of these two French philosophers. Additionally, many of the essays presuppose an oppositional relationship between them, and between phenomenology and deconstruction more generally. Jack Reynolds systematically explores their relationship by analyzing each philosopher in terms of two important and related issues—embodiment and alterity. Focusing on areas with which they are not commonly associated (e.g., Derrida on the body and Merleau-Ponty on alterity) makes clear that their work cannot be adequately characterized in a strictly oppositional way. Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: Intertwining Embodiment and Alterity proposes the possibility of a Merleau-Ponty-inspired philosophy that does not so avowedly seek to extricate itself from phenomenology, but that also cannot easily be dismissed as simply another instantiation of the metaphysics of presence. Reynolds argues that there are salient ethico-political reasons for choosing an alternative that accords greater attention to our embodied situation.
Edited Books by Jack Reynolds
Examines the influence of the Great War upon core aspects of European thought in the subsequent c... more Examines the influence of the Great War upon core aspects of European thought in the subsequent century
This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the ... more This book investigates the complex, sometimes fraught relationship between phenomenology and the natural sciences. The contributors attempt to subvert and complicate the divide that has historically tended to characterize the relationship between the two fields. Phenomenology has traditionally been understood as methodologically distinct from scientific practice, and thus removed from any claim that philosophy is strictly continuous with science. There is some substance to this thinking, which has dominated consideration of the relationship between phenomenology and science throughout the twentieth century. However, there are also emerging trends within both phenomenology and empirical science that complicate this too stark opposition, and call for more systematic consideration of the inter-relation between the two fields. These essays explore such issues, either by directly examining meta-philosophical and methodological matters, or by looking at particular topics that seem to require the resources of each, including imagination, cognition, temporality, affect, imagery, language, and perception.
Contributors include:
Amanda Taylor Aiken
Shaun Gallagher
Aaron Harrison
Andrew Inkpin
Joel Krueger
Chris McCarroll
David Morris
Jack Reynolds
Richard Sebold
Marilyn Stendera
Michela Summa
John Sutton
Michael Wheeler
Bloomsbury Companion to Existentialism, Jan 1, 2011
This is an important and original collection of essays examining the relationship between Analyti... more This is an important and original collection of essays examining the relationship between Analytic and Continental philosophy. Analytic and Continental philosophy have become increasingly specialised and differentiated fields of endeavour. This important collection of essays details some of the more significant methodological and philosophical differences that have separated the two traditions, as well as examining the manner in which received understandings of the divide are being challenged by certain thinkers whose work might best be described as post-analytic and meta-continental. Together these essays offer a well-defined sense of the field, of its once dominant distinctions and of some of the most productive new areas generating influential ideas and controversy. In an attempt to get to the bottom of precisely what it is that separates the analytic and continental traditions, the essays in this volume compare and contrast them on certain issues, including truth, time and subjectivity. The book engages with a range of key thinkers from phenomenology, post-structuralism, analytic philosophy and post-analytic philosophy, examines the strengths and weaknesses of each tradition, and ultimately encourages enhanced understanding, dialogue and even rapprochement between these sometimes antagonistic adversaries. "Continuum Studies in Philosophy" presents cutting-edge scholarship in all the major areas of research and study. The wholly original arguments, perspectives and research findings in titles in this series make it an important and stimulating resource for students and academics from a range of disciplines across the humanities and social sciences.
Papers by Jack Reynolds
Philosophical Psychology, 2024
Current evidence suggests that the efficacy of psychedelic therapy depends, in part, on the chara... more Current evidence suggests that the efficacy of psychedelic therapy depends, in part, on the character of psychedelic experiences themselves. One pronounced aspect of psychedelic experiences is alterations to the experience of time, including reports of timelessness or transcending time. However, how we should interpret such reports remains unclear, and this lack of clarity has philosophical and clinical implications. For instance, “true” timelessness may be considered antithetical to having any experience at all, and descriptions of experiences involving “timelessness” are known to be diverse and of varying clinical significance. In this article, we utilize a phenomenological approach to the study of temporality to highlight ambiguities in current constructs used to assess psychedelic experiences. In doing so, we advance some preliminary phenomenological accounts of psychedelic therapy’s mechanisms of action, such as psychedelic temporality acting as a kind of counterpoint for depressive temporality. We conclude by outlining how a dedicated phenomenological research program can provide a nuanced map of psychedelic temporality, guiding future research in a manner that addresses both philosophical and clinical ambiguities.
Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, 2024
In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus' old but influential critique of artificial intelligence... more In this paper I return to Hubert Dreyfus' old but influential critique of artificial intelligence, redirecting it towards contemporary predictive processing models of the mind (PP). I focus on Dreyfus' arguments about the "frame problem" for artificial cognitive systems, and his contrasting account of embodied human skills and expertise. The frame problem presents as a prima facie problem for practical work in AI and robotics, but also for computational views of the mind in general, including for PP. Indeed, some of the issues it presents seem more acute for PP, insofar as it seeks to unify all cognition and intelligence, and aims to do so without admitting any cognitive processes or mechanisms outside of the scope of the theory. I contend, however, that there is an unresolved problem for PP concerning whether it can both explain all cognition and intelligent behavior as minimizing prediction error with just the core formal elements of the PP toolbox, and also adequately comprehend (or explain away) some of the apparent cognitive differences between biological and prediction-based artificial intelligence, notably in regard to establishing relevance and flexible context-switching, precisely the features of interest to Dreyfus' work on embodied indexicality, habits/skills, and abductive inference. I address several influential philosophical versions of PP, including the work of Jakob Hohwy and Andy Clark, as well as more enactive-oriented interpretations of active inference coming from a broadly Fristonian perspective.
Asian Journal of Philosophy, 2023
In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the cha... more In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the charge of conservatism against the analytic tradition. We differentiate that conservatism into three kinds: starting place; path dependency; and modesty. We also think again about gender in philosophy, consider the positive account of speculative philosophy presented by de Laguna and Katzav in comparison to some other naturalist trajectories, and conclude with a brief Australian addendum that reflects on a similar period in our own country which was also associated with the professional institutionalisation of analytic philosophy.
Critical Horizons, 2023
Despite rarely explicitly thematizing the problem of dirty hands, this essay argues that Merleau-... more Despite rarely explicitly thematizing the problem of dirty hands, this essay argues that Merleau-Ponty’s political work can nonetheless make some important contributions to the issue, both descriptively and normatively. Although his political writings have been neglected in recent times, his interpretations of Marxism and Machiavelli enabled him to develop an account of political phronesis and virtù that sought to retain the strengths of their respective positions without succumbing to their problems. In the process, he provides grounds for generalizing the problem of “dirty hands” beyond Michael Walzer’s influential understanding that pertains primarily to “emergencies” and singular time-slice actions, and addresses concerns about the coherence of the very idea that there is justified action that one ought to do which remains wrong. Merleau-Ponty does this by emphasizing the diachronic relationship between theoretical principles and concrete political action over a period of time, thus imbuing the problem of dirty hands with a historicity that is not sufficiently recognized in the more static and action-focused discussions.
Synthese, 2020
The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the pr... more The role of the body in cognition is acknowledged across a variety of disciplines, even if the precise nature and scope of that contribution remain contentious. As a result, most philosophers working on embodiment—e.g. those in embodied cognition, enactivism, and ‘4e’ cognition—interact with the life sciences as part of their interdisciplinary agenda. Despite this, a detailed engagement with emerging findings in epigenetics and post-genomic biology has been missing from proponents of this embodied turn. Surveying this research provides an opportunity to rethink the relationship between embodiment and genetics, and we argue that the balance of current epigenetic research favours the extension of an enactivist approach to mind and life, rather than the extended functionalist view of embodied cognition associated with Andy Clark and Mike Wheeler, which is more substrate neutral.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2020
Despite a recent surge in publications on Tourette Syndrome (TS), we still lack substantial insig... more Despite a recent surge in publications on Tourette Syndrome (TS), we still lack substantial insight into first-personal aspects of "what it is like" to live with this condition. This is despite the fact that developments in phenomenological psychiatry have demonstrated the scientific and clinical importance of understanding subjective experience in a range of other neuropsychiatric conditions. We argue that it is time for Tourette Syndrome research to tap into the sophisticated frameworks developed in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology (qualitative research into the formal structures or the "how" of lived experience) for describing experience in a way that integrates discrete symptoms into an overarching experiential framework concerning the self, the body, and its modes of experience. Following a historical introduction that contextualises the pertinence of phenomenology to psychopathology, we distinguish this approach from the existing, psychologically oriented studies on TS that are also qualitative. We then outline gaps and opportunities for future research, including the sorts of questions that might be utilised in phenomenological interviews and why they are of potential benefit to research programs in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. In conclusion we address some of the broader implications for phenomenology of the body and philosophy of action.
Philosophy in Review, Dec 31, 2013
Philosophers disposed to thinking of phenomenology as a quaint historical antiquity would be well... more Philosophers disposed to thinking of phenomenology as a quaint historical antiquity would be well-advised to read the Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology, edited by Dan Zahavi. With a small caveat to follow, the book certainly realises Zahavi's expressed aim of providing a "representative sample of what is currently happening in phenomenology, and make it clear to philosophers from other traditions that phenomenology, far from being a tradition of the past, is quite alive and in a position to make valuable contributions to contemporary thought" (4). Of course, it is always possible to quibble regarding the "representative sample" claim for any such volume, and I think it is fair to say that this book actually has particular strengths that simultaneously preclude it being a wholly representative sample of the best of the field. One reason for this is that it is deliberately not a historically focused book, eschewing scholarly chapters on famous phenomenological names, as well as prolonged or detailed exposition for its own sake (3). Moreover, many of the essays also have what might be described as a problem-centred approach. This has its own benefits for those of us working within the field, and it also makes possible some quite detailed and compelling engagements with analytic philosophy.
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Books by Jack Reynolds
In this book, however, I argue that these understandings of phenomenology (and indeed of naturalism) should not be taken to be the final word, and that they are premised upon an understanding of transcendental phenomenology that is ultimately untenable and in need of updating. Phenomenology, as I seek to reorient it, is compatible with what is called liberal naturalism, as well as with weak forms of methodological naturalism, in virtue of being committed to a relationship of “results continuity” with relevant sciences (albeit indexed to future scientific and epistemic results), and exhibiting due attentiveness to Quinean sensitivity requirements, as I contend in the opening methodological chapter. The burden of this book will be to positively develop this claim, this naturalising of phenomenology, in a manner that does not amount to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul.
To do this, the book is structurally organised around what I take to be core features of phenomenology. Although the book will not be predominantly expositional, or historical in focus, a remark from Maurice Merleau-Ponty best captures what I take to be these core features. In the Phenomenology of Perception he enigmatically remarks at one point: “if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, we shall understand that beyond these there is nothing to understand”. This seems like an outlandish statement in one sense, tantamount to a transcendental mysticism in which ambiguity is resolved and we access the real, once and for all. Of course, that is not what he means. He means that everything central to phenomenology is somehow ensnared in understanding the paradoxes of what Mark Sacks calls “situated thought”, and also that the paradoxes of situated thought cannot be overcome for philosophical reflection, and indeed, existential experience in general. The book is organised around the key elements of any situation as Merleau-Ponty describes them: time; the body; world; thing; and others. They all admit of a third-person perspective. They all also apparently irremediably have a first-person perspective and transcendentally condition our access to objects. And yet on most construals of naturalism – e.g. for the ontological and scientific naturalist – we are told that there is no ‘here’ and ‘now’ in nature. My book argues for a hybrid account of phenomenology and naturalism that is able to simultaneously respect both of these views, something akin to the manifest image and the scientific image for Wilfrid Sellars, without resorting to strategies of methodological separatism/incompatibilism, which seek to preserve a proper and autonomous space for phenomenological and empirical science, such that the twain does not meet.
Edited Books by Jack Reynolds
Contributors include:
Amanda Taylor Aiken
Shaun Gallagher
Aaron Harrison
Andrew Inkpin
Joel Krueger
Chris McCarroll
David Morris
Jack Reynolds
Richard Sebold
Marilyn Stendera
Michela Summa
John Sutton
Michael Wheeler
Papers by Jack Reynolds
In this book, however, I argue that these understandings of phenomenology (and indeed of naturalism) should not be taken to be the final word, and that they are premised upon an understanding of transcendental phenomenology that is ultimately untenable and in need of updating. Phenomenology, as I seek to reorient it, is compatible with what is called liberal naturalism, as well as with weak forms of methodological naturalism, in virtue of being committed to a relationship of “results continuity” with relevant sciences (albeit indexed to future scientific and epistemic results), and exhibiting due attentiveness to Quinean sensitivity requirements, as I contend in the opening methodological chapter. The burden of this book will be to positively develop this claim, this naturalising of phenomenology, in a manner that does not amount to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul.
To do this, the book is structurally organised around what I take to be core features of phenomenology. Although the book will not be predominantly expositional, or historical in focus, a remark from Maurice Merleau-Ponty best captures what I take to be these core features. In the Phenomenology of Perception he enigmatically remarks at one point: “if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, we shall understand that beyond these there is nothing to understand”. This seems like an outlandish statement in one sense, tantamount to a transcendental mysticism in which ambiguity is resolved and we access the real, once and for all. Of course, that is not what he means. He means that everything central to phenomenology is somehow ensnared in understanding the paradoxes of what Mark Sacks calls “situated thought”, and also that the paradoxes of situated thought cannot be overcome for philosophical reflection, and indeed, existential experience in general. The book is organised around the key elements of any situation as Merleau-Ponty describes them: time; the body; world; thing; and others. They all admit of a third-person perspective. They all also apparently irremediably have a first-person perspective and transcendentally condition our access to objects. And yet on most construals of naturalism – e.g. for the ontological and scientific naturalist – we are told that there is no ‘here’ and ‘now’ in nature. My book argues for a hybrid account of phenomenology and naturalism that is able to simultaneously respect both of these views, something akin to the manifest image and the scientific image for Wilfrid Sellars, without resorting to strategies of methodological separatism/incompatibilism, which seek to preserve a proper and autonomous space for phenomenological and empirical science, such that the twain does not meet.
Contributors include:
Amanda Taylor Aiken
Shaun Gallagher
Aaron Harrison
Andrew Inkpin
Joel Krueger
Chris McCarroll
David Morris
Jack Reynolds
Richard Sebold
Marilyn Stendera
Michela Summa
John Sutton
Michael Wheeler
Notwithstanding that analytic philosophy and phenomenology both precede the Great War (and its prospect), and that the critique of idealism was already very strong in Anglophone countries, I argue that the war was a significant factor in the ‘divide’ between analytic and continental philosophy. My claim is not simply that this is because of the widespread rhetoric, caricature, and stereotype stemming from the war concerning Germany (and German Idealism), but that it also involves some significant methodological and meta-philosophical transformations in the incipient analytic and continental trajectories that bear a close relationship to experiences of the war by some of the key philosophers (albeit also to internal philosophical pressures). I will thus contend that the first world war is closely connected with a “parting of the ways” in such self-understandings, between “philosophy and history/politics” on the one hand, and “philosophy or history/politics” on the other, even if both of these normative self-understandings are often betrayed in practice. I will mainly focus upon phenomenology and some trajectories in early analytic philosophy to argue this case.
Conference organiser: Andrea Staiti