To Work or Not? Simulating Inspection Game with Labor Unions

Matej Steinbacher, Matjaz Steinbacher and Mitja Steinbacher ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The model of social network is used to analyze the impact of the power of labor unions in the labor relations. We find that labor union capable to affect a pecuniary compensation of shirking employees lessens the motivation of employees to work and improve to the unionization rate. As a result, the performance of the firm is significantly deteriorated and its existence endangered. On the other hand, the inspection proved to be a successful method for “motivating” employees to work. By using non-omniscient agents, we also estimated the cost of that non-omniscience, which proved to be significant in all cases.

Keywords: social networks; inspection game; evolutionary games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D21 J51 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-soc
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13565/1/MPRA_paper_13565.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:13565

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().